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Abstract
The War on Terror, initiated by the US Government under George W. Bush,
reintroduced torture as an overt tool of the state. The Australian Government was
heavily implicated in colluding and covering up the US torture program. Drawing on
a model of outrage management, newspaper articles from 2002-2012 reveal
extensive evidence that government officials, their agents, and the media, utilised
methods that served to reduce outrage over the use of torture in the War on Terror.
These tactics not only inhibited outrage, but promoted acceptance of torture as a
legitimate security tool in the post 9/11 era.
There is significant evidence that government officials, and a mostly compliant
media, engaged in cover-up, either by omitting information, destroying evidence of
torture, or failing to call into question statements made by US or Australian officials.
There is extensive evidence of dehumanising or devaluing the survivors/victims and
their experience including denigrating them as liars, casting them as unreliable
sources, or, alternatively, attacking their personal character. Evidence extends to the
reinterpretation of events and the way in which language was used to shift focus off
torture to concerns about innocence or guilt. Rather than naming torture for what it
is, terminology such as ‘abuse’ or ‘mistreatment’ was commonly used throughout
the decade of analysis.
The use of official channels to minimise outrage was apparent through the use of
official spokespeople, or investigations that only gave the appearance of justice.
There was also extensive evidence of the use of intimidation towards whistleblowers
and torture survivors in order to prevent them from telling their stories. Those
involved in torture were rewarded, commonly through promotion.
These tactics were enabled by networks of individuals, organisations and institutions
that carry out ideological, economic, practical or political functions to support the
facilitation and cover-up of state-inflicted torture. These networks include shallow
governments that deploy misleading political rhetoric related to torture and
terrorism, the increased role of militarism and covert operations, and the expansion
of the surveillance state. Therefore, challenging torture in the War on Terror requires
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broader structural and societal change to eliminate the pillars of support for torture.
Removing the structural support for torture may require the dismantling of the entire
network through a process of nonviolent resistance.
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Foreword
Everything that we see is a shadow cast by that which we do not see –
Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. (2001, p. 48).
Much of my work as an advocate has revolved around the protection of human rights
in an era of increased security. Indeed, whilst there are profoundly personal reasons
as to why I felt so strongly about the need to undertake this research, it has more
importantly been my professional advocacy work that has served as the catalyst for
the research. For over a decade, I have engaged in advocacy with those who have
been tortured as a result of the War on Terror. This advocacy has included suing the
US Government for documents, and I am evidently the first Australian citizen to sue
the CIA, FBI, State Department, Department of Justice and the Department of
Defense for documents concerning the US torture program. I have also taken several
Australian Government department’s to task over their continued secrecy regarding
Australian officials involvement in the torture program, and at the time of writing, I
have several cases pending against the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet,
and the Department of Defence over documents that I believe should be released in
the public interest. This is a battle that I am prepared to fight for as long as it takes –
until the truth is known.
On a personal level, I have continued to watch the devastating rebound impact of the
events that took place as a consequence of the War on Terror. Whilst the core of the
impact has affected the Middle East, it has become global in reach, and
subsequently, the majority of my work has revolved around raising awareness about
these issues and calling for accountability for the outrages on human dignity that
have been perpetrated as a result.
In the course of my advocacy, and my friendships with former prisoners and military
personnel, it has become clear that almost everyone has been destroyed because of
the path that Western governments chose in the post 9/11 world – the path of torture
and retaliatory violence. The intense pain of those who have been tortured and
suffered unspeakable injustice is life destroying – they will never be the same again.
Families continue to be shattered, nearly two decades after the event. I have also
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heard the pain of former Guantanamo Bay guards that, on their return to civilian life,
have been plagued by nightmares because of the things they have seen, and
sometimes done. Many are affected by substance abuse – some have been
imprisoned for taking their trauma out on people they love.
As I reflect on the War on Terror, I am reminded of a passage from an essay entitled
‘war is peace’ by Arundhati Roy.
Nothing can excuse or justify an act of terrorism, whether it is committed by
religious fundamentalists, private militia, people’s resistance movements –
or whether it’s dressed up as a war of retribution by a recognised government
(Roy, 2002, p. xiii).
The violent act that took place on 11 September 2001 was an horrific tragedy and I
strongly believe that those responsible should be held to account, just as any other
person who is accused of taking the life of another human being. However, this also
extends to those who have been responsible for acts of torture and terror perpetrated
in response to 9/11. The torture and indiscriminate loss of life, whether on US soil,
or in Afghanistan, Iraq or Pakistan, are just as significant, and respecting the inherent
dignity and worth of all human beings is imperative, including those who may be
accused of taking away the rights of others. Whilst condemning acts of terror is
important, condemning acts perpetrated against those who are detained under
suspicion of terrorism related offences must also take place with equal passion and
vigour.
The apparent controversial nature of calling for the universal respect for humanity is
something worth reflecting on as a globalised community. History demonstrates that
when society has subjugated certain rights for ‘others’ based on political
motivations, it has only ever served to cement greater division, and create the
dangerous situation of ‘us’ versus ‘them’. This us-versus-them mindset has led to
situations that give rise to serious human rights violations such as torture.
But there is a larger story at play that involves the machinations of the state, and the
manifestation of a network of support for state inflicted torture – a system which was
created in a way that rewards indignity and non-disclosure and lines the pockets of
weapons manufacturers and private military and security companies. This is the real
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story behind the exercise of power and the reason why people who were involved in
the torture of our fellow human beings have been elevated to the highest levels of
executive power.
If history has revealed anything, it is that the result of a continued ‘eye for an eye’
mentality is more anger, resentment and retribution. But political leaders keep doing
the same thing and expecting a different result. This is playing out with devastating
effect in Iraq, where Islamic State fighters, some of whom were tortured by US
agents, are now torturing their Western captives using the same techniques. Rather
than see how this has gone full-circle, President Obama vowed to use military might
to try and stop the violence; just like his predecessors, he thinks he can bomb the
world to peace. An even more scary thought is that they know military intervention
is not the answer, yet they continue to do it anyway under the pressure of those who
are literally making a killing out of war.
Only when political leaders set an example that includes acts of integrity such as
honouring humanity, acknowledging the torture that has taken place in the War on
Terror, and holding those responsible to account, can we begin to move through the
tangled mess the world now finds itself in. Learning from history and leading by
example is an important part of moving towards peace with justice.
It is for these reasons that I have chosen to focus on the issue of torture in the War on
Terror. Torture is insidious and its impacts are far-reaching. That is the nature of
torture – it is destructive and devastating, and as I will argue, a form of terrorism.
The following research examines the way in which authorities and the media use
tactics of reducing outrage in relation to torture in the War on Terror, the
mechanisms that support those outrage management tactics, and consequently the
facilitation and perpetuity of torture. This approach was taken in the hope that the
findings will provide a framework for understanding the complexity of torture and
the mechanisms that support the perpetration of crimes against humanity – hopefully
so the same mistakes are not continuously repeated. In line with this, the thesis is
written as a piece of scholarship that can also serve to support advocacy. Its purpose
is to raise consciousness around the public representations of torture in Australia and
the social and political meanings attached to torture in the Australian context, and
inevitably, how they get away with it. It was written to add reflection on Australia’s
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involvement in acquiescing and sometimes condoning and covering up the torture of
certain individuals and groups, and reflect on the social and political implications of
representations of torture and extreme violence, given already established
understandings of the root causes of torture. It is hoped that it will contribute to a
greater understanding of torture, by naming it and exposing ways in which it is
normalised and condoned so as to contribute to torture prevention.
Empathy is key - and understanding is crucial to empathy.
As a final point, it is important to note that I have referred to some personal
communications I have engaged in with several former prisoners and military
personnel over the years, and I have referred to them by their first names in the
thesis. These communications formed part of my advocacy work and were not part
of the research. Where I have quoted personal communications they have been
provided to the torture survivor or former military personnel referenced for approval.
I have also used the first name of people I have spoken to personally because I
believe it is important for survivors of torture to be acknowledged by their name,
rather than just a surname. Many torture victims and survivors were delegated as
numbers, and any personal reference was removed as a tactic of their imprisonment
and torture. In addition, it was common for newspaper articles examined as part of
this research to solely refer to torture survivors by their surname, usually in the
context of denigrating them. Therefore, as a sign of respect, I have used their first
name.
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Chapter 1: Theoretical Framework & Definitions 1
They are artists of torture, They are artists of pain and fatigue, They are
artists of insults and humiliation…Where is the world to save us from
torture? Where is the world to save us from the fire and sadness? – Adnan
Latif who died in Camp 5 of Guantanamo Bay on September 8, 2012. Adnan
was cleared for release in 2006 and the full circumstances of his death are
unknown (as cited in Falkoff, 2007, p. 52.).
This chapter introduces the rationale and overview of the research, and provides the
definitions and underlying conceptual frameworks used in the study. The complex
and problematic nature of defining torture and terrorism are introduced, including the
political and social aspects that may serve to constrain or skew definitions to favour
particular interests. The underlying foundations of human rights are examined, as
humanitarianism forms the basis of the research approach. This framework is
discussed as imperative given that many who are subjected to torture are cast as
‘others’ and deemed as unworthy of rights. The Backfire Model (Martin, 2007),
which is sometimes termed as an Outrage Management Model, forms the foundation
of analysis, and the five tactics usually employed by officials to stifle outrage at
injustice are introduced. Theoretical concepts such as social constructionism (Potter
& Wetherell, 1987), denial and outrage (Bandura, 1999; Cohen, 2001), and the
Propaganda Model (Herman & Chomsky, 1988) are discussed as key theories
integral to the research and analysis. The chapter finally details the structure of the
thesis to provide the reader with an overview of issues addressed throughout the
research.

Why Research Torture in the War on Terror?
Historically, torture was practiced as an overt tool of the state until the mid-1840s
when psychological forms of punishment became more prevalent, particularly
techniques that do not leave any physical marks (Rejali, 2007). State-sanctioned
practices such as incommunicado detention, sleep deprivation, stress positions and
solitary confinement were all examples of this shift towards psychological torture.
1

Parts of this chapter have been submitted as a part of another degree.
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However, the invisibility of torture has failed to result in the decrease of its
prevalence. According to reports by leading human rights organisations, torture is
still practised in many countries around the world and regrettably, the need for
effective torture prevention has not diminished (Human Rights Watch, 2013; UN
News Centre, 2014).
The War on Terror led by the United States (US) Government has been integral in
the practice, and indeed, justification for torture since the events of September 11
2001 (9/11), particularly in relation to those accused of terrorism related offences.
The denigration of human rights and civil liberties has continued in the years since
9/11 and although the torture of those detained as terror suspects is well documented,
accountability remains elusive (Danner, 2009).
In August 2014, President Obama admitted that he only banned “some [emphasis
added] of the extraordinary rendition techniques” (Obama, 2014a, p. 7), and torture
is still occurring under the official auspice of the Army Field Manual (Kaye,
2014d).2 In addition, the full implementation of the United Nations (UN) Convention
against Torture 1984 (CAT) is facing sustained resistance, and although Obama
signed an executive order prohibiting the torture of prisoners under control of the US
Government – including internationally – his Administration considered reversing
this decision, which is still used as a basis to block torture cases (Schulberg, 2014b).
While Obama’s 2009 Executive Order 13492 called for the closure of Guantanamo
Bay, the prison remains open and secret detention and the extraordinary rendition
program is also reportedly operating, as sanctioned by the Order (Brooks, 2009;
Obama, 2009a).
In 2014, the US Senate Intelligence Committee voted to partially release the
executive summary of a report into the CIA ‘interrogation program’ run by the Bush
Administration post 9/11, however, the full report, which reportedly contains
evidence of CIA black-sites, and evidence that points to members of the Bush
Administration misleading the public as to the effectiveness of the program, remains
classified (Leopold, 2014c). The CIA has even admitted to removing documents

2

When I use double quotation marks throughout the thesis, I am referring to a direct quote. When I
use single quotation marks, I am either placing emphasis on a word or phrase, or highlighting a
specific concept for ease of reading.
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from the US Committee review, hacking the computers of Senate Committee
members in order to skew the results of the report, and even impersonating Senate
staffers in order to access communications and drafts of the report (Gosztola, 2014a;
Mazzetti & Hulse, 2014; Office of the Inspector General, 2014).3 The Intelligence
Committee itself was comprised with individuals connected to the CIA and therefore
could hardly be seen as independent (Kaye, 2014b). The continued culture of secrecy
has resulted in anti-torture whistleblowers such as former CIA employee John
Kiriakou, being prosecuted and those who authored and oversaw the secret torture
program, remaining unaccountable (Kiriakou, 2014).
On 21 December 2011, the Obama Administration passed the National Defense
Authorisation Act 2011 (NDAA) (USA), that codified the executive practice of
detaining those suspected of terrorism related offences indefinitely (Human Rights
Watch, 2013). This has manifested in the continued detention of those held in
Guantanamo Bay (Gitmo), without charge, for over a decade and a half. Nine people
have now died in Gitmo (Human Rights Watch, 2013) and serious questions still
pervade the official narrative surrounding the cause of death of some of the men
(Denbeaux, Church, Gallagher, Kirchner, & Wirtshafeter, 2014).4 Throughout his
terms in office, President Obama continued to prohibit investigations into members
of the Bush Administration implicated in torture of those held in US custody,
hampering efforts to hold others to account elsewhere in the world such as Egypt and
Bahrain (Human Rights Watch, 2013).
Although the Obama Administration had appointed Special Prosecutor John Durham
to investigate the torture of one hundred men held in CIA custody, the focus of the
investigation was narrowed to only two cases in 2011, and eventually the
investigation was formally closed on 30 August 2012, with no charges being laid
(Human Rights Watch, 2013, p. 652). The Obama Administration argued that photos
and footage of men, women and children tortured in US custody should be kept
hidden from the public. For instance, in 2014 a US court ordered the release of 2,100
photos, however, the Obama Administration fought the release (Leopold, 2014d). In
3

Even though this was clearly an attempt for the CIA to obstruct justice by preventing the truth from
reaching the public, the Justice Department declined to investigate the matter (Mazzetti & Hulse,
2014).
4
When there are more than two authors, I will list them all for the first citation, then et al. for all
subsequent.
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2014, President Obama justified the use of torture by the CIA, contractors and
military personnel, telling the public not to “feel too sanctimonious” considering the
pressure they were under post 9/11 (Obama, 2014a).
The extrajudicial assassination of people in countries such as Yemen, Pakistan and
Afghanistan, as part of the Obama Administration’s drone program, continues to
occur and comprehensive details of the program remain largely secret. Without
charge or trial, at least two Australian citizens have now been killed as part of the
program, and the Australian Government appears unperturbed (Ludlam, 2014). The
role of the Australian Government in the drone program has also been called into
question given the use of the Joint Defence Facility at Pine Gap to track the
geolocation of radio signals. Investigative journalist Jeremy Scahill, says the
Australian Government is “fully aware of the extent to which the US is engaged in
an assassination program” (as cited in Dorling, 2014b, p. 1). However, the Australian
Government refuses to reveal its involvement.
The Australian Government’s involvement in the US Government’s torture program
also remains unaccounted for. In 2013, Australia was named one of fifty-four
countries involved in the CIA’s extraordinary rendition program (Open Society
Justice Initiative, 2013). There is a host of documented evidence that indicates the
Australian Government played a significant role in various conflicts in the War on
Terror, not only in a military capacity, but in relation to political support in the form
of pro-torture ideology which will be examined in this thesis. In addition, the
Australian military, which was involved in waterboarding a woman during the
Vietnam War (Burstall, 1990, Elkins, 1996),5 has been implicated in a number of
occurrences of torture in the War on Terror.
Attitudes towards torture have also taken a disturbing pro-torture direction.
Historically, US opinion polls from the early 1940s saw only 2-4 per cent of the
population view torture as acceptable, and this increased to 19 per cent in 1945,
when some people expressed views that supported the public torture and punishment
5

This case was highly publicised in the Australian media in 1968 when the Minister for the Army,
Phillip Lynch, told the public that there was not one “scintilla of evidence” of torture (Elkins, 1996).
However, an internal Defence Department report found that there was a breach of the Geneva
Conventions 1949, and other eyewitness accounts corroborated the victim’s testimony (Burstall,
1990).
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of Hitler, but did not support torture generally (Miller, Gronke & Rejali, 2014). In
line with the emerging human rights movement of the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, US
polls illustrate that there was little to no support for torture in the general community
(Miller, Gronke & Rejali, 2014). These widespread anti-torture viewpoints
continued, even under the Bush Administration (Miller, Gronke & Rejali, 2014).
However, studies demonstrate the acceptability of torture increased considerably
after the election of President Obama in 2009, and some believe this is a result of
torture becoming a partisan issue (Gronke, Rejali, Drenguis, Hicks, Miller,
Nakayama, 2010). For example, a 2014 poll found that almost 50 per cent of US
citizens thought torture was justified in cases where torture would hypothetically
protect the public (Amnesty International, 2014). This increased to a pro-torture
majority of 58 per cent in 2016 (Kahn, 2016; Pew Research Center, 2016). Similar
results are recorded in the Australian context. A 2009 Red Cross study found that 40
per cent of Australians, and 50 per cent of those in the Australian Defence Force,
believed that torture was acceptable in war-time if used to elicit important military
information (Australian Red Cross, 2009).
Globally, the numbers have also recorded a rise. A recent report into global attitudes
towards torture found that around 40 per cent of people believed that torture can be
justified in some cases to protect the public (Pew Research Center, 2016).6 This was
echoed in other studies, which found that people are generally against its use,
however, people in countries that experience high levels of political violence, such as
sub-Saharan Africa, India and Israel, are more likely to condone torture (BBC World
Service, 2006; Pew Research Center, 2016). Various global opinion polls
demonstrate the disturbing trend that sees more people now think that torture of
those deemed terrorist suspects is acceptable if it is viewed as necessary for a higher
moral purpose (Gronke et al., 2010).
The trickle-down effect of torture in the War on Terror is also starting to manifest in
troubling ways. Studies have found that techniques utilised during war-time are
commonly exported into the domestic sphere, whether in relation to family violence,
or returned soldiers who then work in local police stations, as prison guards or as
6

Obtaining accurate global figures pre-2001 has been difficult, as most surveys in the mid-1900s
focused on human rights and ethics, rather than torture specifically (Hertel, Scruggs & Heidkamp,
2009).
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security personnel (Rejali, 2007; Sarson & MacDonald, 2009). Examples of torture
techniques used against vulnerable individuals and communities being exported to
civilian contexts have already become apparent, including torture techniques used in
Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib being exported to European psychiatric
institutions and prisons (Vervaet, 2010).
Despite the many years which have passed since September 11, the need for this
research has certainly not diminished given that the War on Terror is far from over
and the residual impacts are yet to be completely realised. Therefore, to address the
persistence and increased acceptability of torture, it is essential to understand and
reflect on the context in which torture has been condoned and carried out since 2001,
and what systems have facilitated its use.

Research Question
Accordingly, this thesis examines the way in which authorities, their agents and the
media use tactics of reducing outrage in relation to torture in the War on Terror, it
examines the mechanisms that support those outrage management tactics, and
consequently, how this facilitates and perpetuates torture.
The thesis examines newspaper articles spanning 2002-2012 drawing on the Backfire
Model (Martin, 2007) as a framework for analysis, which identifies ways in which
those involved in human rights abuses such as torture inhibit outrage at injustice. As
explained later in detail, Brian Martin (2007) identified five main tactics authorities
employ to limit backfire, these are: covering up events, devaluing targets,
reinterpreting events, using official channels to give the appearance of justice and
intimidating or rewarding people involved. From this, the primary research question
asks:
Is there evidence that indicates authorities and the media use tactics to
‘inhibit outrage’ at the injustice of torture in the War on Terror in the
Australian context?
To answer this, the research examines the political environment and underlying
ideology operating in the Australian context, whether there were particular systems
or mechanisms that supported outrage management, and whether there was a
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correlation between the tactics used and the mechanisms in place. For example, if
cover-up was identified as a tactic used by those in authority, the research sought to
ascertain what mechanisms were put in place by authorities to support the facilitation
and cover-up of torture. Understanding popular narratives, underlying ideology and
the broader political environment was integral to answering the primary research
question. Hence, the research was conducted in two parts utilising a mixed
methodology, the details of which are outlined further in Chapter Four.

Key Definitions & Terminology
Victims and Survivors
It is important to note that those who were tortured as a result of the War on Terror
are referred to interchangeably as victims and survivors throughout the thesis. This
was applied for several reasons and as a result of many personal conversations and
experiences as an advocate over the years. Some people who have been subjected to
torture do not like being called victims, considering they survived, and would not
like to give perpetrators the satisfaction of knowing they succeeded in destroying
their spirit. Despite the continuing challenges, some people have attempted to move
forward with their lives and see themselves as survivors rather than victims.
However, other survivors have expressed that being referred to as a victim is an
important acknowledgement of their suffering which has been sorely lacking in the
public realm. Those who have lost their lives as a result of being tortured are referred
to as victims. Hence, the terminology victim/survivor is mostly used.

War on Terror
Whilst the terminology of the ‘War on Terror’ is used throughout the thesis, it is
certainly not intended to contribute to the legitimacy of a misleading narrative. The
reality is that there is no global war. ‘Fighting’ terrorism using the same methods
that cause non-state actor terrorism is not a war – it manifests in US-led invasions in
carefully chosen countries, a grab for resources and installing political leaders that
will be sensitive to US interests. The attacks on the United States in 2001 have been
used as an excuse to shamelessly invade other countries, strip their resources, line
the pockets of US corporations, and decimate human rights and civil liberties in the
process.
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In addition, killing other human beings is murder, no matter what the circumstances.
In this conceptualisation, calling the present situation a war is like saying that the US
Government

is

leading

a

war

against

murder.

Murder

perpetrated

by

people/organisations should be brought before a court in accordance with fair trial
procedures and sentenced accordingly as any other criminal act would. To treat
terrorist acts as special, and call it a ‘war’, only serves to single-out criminal activity
of a certain nature, and reinforce the false political narrative that has led to the
torture and death of so many people across the globe.
For the purposes of the thesis, however, the zeitgeist of the ‘War on Terror’
encapsulates the conflict and national security driven narrative that has pervaded the
response to the terrorist attacks in the United States; including the invasion and
occupation of Iraq, and the current conflicts and military intervention in Afghanistan,
Pakistan, Yemen and elsewhere.

Defining Torture
There are many different perspectives as to what constitutes torture and, as the
literature suggests, these are wholly dependent on whom you ask and the context in
which you are seeking to define it (Kenny, 2010; Rejali, 2007). The debate over
definitions takes place in a range of realms, including the legal (Parliament of the
Commonwealth of Australia, 2009), medical (World Medical Association, 1975),
philosophical (Miller, 2005), political (Greenberg & Dratel, 2005), and
psychological (Kagee & Naidoo, 2004). Narratives surrounding torture are not static
– like all things they morph with time and societal change (Foucault, 1969). Context
and politics play a large role in seeking to define torture. Indeed, some believe that
torture is indefinable and only describable because “it is impossible to define real
things, such as tables, rivers, kindness or unhappiness, since as part of the real world
they can change without becoming something else” (Brecher, 2007, p. 3).
Torture is usually defined in relation to three features: the identity of the torturer
(e.g. agent of the state), the purpose of torture (e.g. information gathering), and the
means (Kenny, 2010). Some see torture as purely an infliction of physical pain and
suffering for judicial purposes (Langbein, 1977; Silverman, 2001) by a state official
or an agent of the state (Rejali, 2007). Others take a broader view, which extends to
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general suffering or harm that may even be inflicted without the specific intention of
torture (Jackman, 2002; Miller, 2005; Wolfendale, 2009). This situation has proven
to be problematic, as the lack of agreement and clarity in relation to what exactly
constitutes torture has paved the way for actions that are cruel and inhumane, if not
torturous, to be sometimes deemed necessary and acceptable (Kenny, 2010).

The Legal Framework
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 (UDHR) unequivocally prohibits
torture, and it was formally codified in the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR) in 1966. The prohibition on torture is in the category of jus
cogens legal regulations; that is, they are non-derogable and subject to universal
jurisdiction (Wright-Smith, 2007). The United Nations Convention against Torture
and other Cruel, inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment 1984 (CAT)
defines torture as:
... any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is
intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or
a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a
third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or
intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on
discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at
the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or
other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or
suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions
[emphasis added], (para. 1).
The same prohibition on torture is also enshrined in UDHR and the ICCPR, a
binding covenant to which Australia is a party. Although not all governments have
signed and ratified the CAT, the Australian Government ratified the Convention in
1989 and, as part of its international obligations, several provisions have been
enshrined into domestic law, thereby making parts of the Act legally enforceable in
Australia. The prohibition against torture in Australia is domestically enshrined in
the Crimes Legislation Amendment Act (Torture and Death Penalty Abolition) Act
2009 (cth). This legislation was passed in response to significant criticism relating to
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the narrow interpretation of torture which was apparent in the Crimes (Torture) Act
1988 (cth), and has now been repealed. Whilst the elements of the offence of torture
are the same as the CAT, the legislation still does not include acts that are inclusive
of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. Instead, the definition of torture now
refers to “the deliberate and systematic infliction of severe pain over a period of
time” (Commonwealth of Australia, 2010b). The Act states that ‘severe’ indicates a
high ‘threshold’ of suffering must be inflicted.
The current Act states that a person commits an offence of torture if the perpetrator:
(a) Engages in conduct that inflicts severe physical or mental pain or suffering
on the person (the victim); and
(b) The conduct is engaged in:
(i)

For the purposes of obtaining from the victim or from a third person
information or a confession; or

(ii)

For the purpose of punishing the victim for an act which the victim or
a third person has committed or is expected of having committed; or

(iii)

For the purposes of intimidating or coercing the victim or a third
person; or

(iv)

For a purpose related to a purpose mentioned subparagraph (i), (ii) or
(iii); and

(c) The perpetrator engages in the conduct:
(i)

In the capacity of a public official; or

(ii)

Acting in an official capacity; or

(iii)

Acting at the instigation, or with consent or acquiescence, of a public
official or other person acting in an official capacity
(Commonwealth of Australia, 2010b, pp. 3-4).

In addition, the Act also implements a specific crime of torture under the
Commonwealth Criminal Code Act 1995 (cth), one that was missing prior to 2009.
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The offence has also been extended to anyone in Australia’s jurisdiction, regardless
of whether the offence was connected to Australia (Commonwealth of Australia,
2010a). The Australian Government has also extended geographical jurisdiction to
include torture committed by a non-Australian citizen outside of Australia, but only
with consent of the Commonwealth Attorney-General (Commonwealth of Australia,
2010a). This was coincidently changed when public debates regarding the torture of
Australian citizens in places like Guantanamo Bay arose. None of the provisions in
the recently introduced legislation have yet been tested.

Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment
One of the major criticisms of the current legislation is that it fails to criminalise
cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment (Human Rights and Equal Opportunity
Commission, 2008). The Committee against Torture’s General Comment on Article
II points out:
In practice the definitional threshold between cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment and torture is not clear. The conditions that give rise
to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment frequently facilitate
torture and therefore the measures required to prevent torture must be applied
to prevent cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.
Accordingly, the Committee has considered the prohibition of ill-treatment to
be likewise non-derogable under the Convention (UN Committee Against
Torture [CteeAT], 2008b, para. 3).
Whilst many human rights organisations and legal experts believe that cruel,
inhuman and degrading treatment should be criminalised, it remains unchartered
territory, even in relation to the Victorian Human Rights Charter (2006)(VIC) and
the Australian Capital Territory’s Human Rights Act (2004)(ACT). This means that
there is a major gap in human rights protections in Australia.
The European Court of Human Rights was the first to examine the distinction
between torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, in 1978 (Ireland v The
UK, 1978). The Court examined the ‘five techniques’ employed by the Northern
Irish Royal Ulster Constabulary against members of the Irish Republican Army
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(IRA) (Spjut, 1979). These included wall standing, hooding, subjection to noise,
deprivation of sleep, and deprivation of food and drink. The Court found that whilst
the five techniques did not meet the same threshold of inhumanity associated with
torture, they did constitute cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment (Spjut, 1979).
After the Bush Administration’s use of these techniques in combination with others,
such as waterboarding and the use of attack dogs, the definition of torture was revisited. In the US after September 11, the Bush Administration sanctioned what are
now notoriously termed ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’ to use on the so-called
14 high value detainees in secret CIA custody (Mayer, 2008). Upon investigation of
the techniques, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) noted:
Twelve of the fourteen alleged that they were subjected to systematic
physical and/or psychological ill-treatment. This was a consequence of both
the treatment and the material conditions which formed part of the
interrogation regime, as well as the overall detention regime. This regime
was clearly designed to undermine human dignity and to create a sense of
futility by inducing, in many cases, severe physical and mental pain and
suffering, with the aim of obtaining compliance and extracting information,
resulting in exhaustion, depersonalization and dehumanization. The
allegations of ill-treatment of the detainees indicate that, in many cases, the
ill-treatment to which they were subjected while held in the CIA program,
either singly, or in combination, constituted torture [emphasis added]. In
addition, many other elements of the ill-treatment, either singly or in
combination, constituted cruel inhuman or degrading treatment (International
Committee of the Red Cross [ICRC], 2007, p. 26).
In a general sense, the failure to link torture with cruel, inhuman and degrading
treatment, and the refusal to criminalise acts amounting to such, leads to a dubious
legal situation that opens the way for misuse. It may explain why practices that
amount to torture have been largely ignored in Australian narratives, and are
continuing to occur today.
Studies have shown that certain actions can cause even more damage than physical
torture, including being held in a life-threatening environment, the deprivation of
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basic needs, sexual torture,7 psychological manipulation, humiliation, exposure to
extreme temperatures, isolation, and forced stress positions (Basoglu, 2009; Reyes,
2007). This being so, acts that do not meet the restrictive legal standard are by no
means lesser crimes and certainly do not mean that survivors of those crimes are any
less affected.
Indeed, the United Nations Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons
under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment notes that “All persons under any
form of detention or imprisonment shall be treated in a humane manner and with
respect for the inherent dignity of the human person” (United Nations [UN], 1988,
para. 20). The principles also interpret cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment as;
...to extend the widest possible protection against abuses, whether physical or
mental, including the holding of a detained or imprisoned person in
conditions which deprive him [sic], temporarily or permanently, of the use of
any of his natural senses, such as sight or hearing, or of his awareness of
place and the passing of time (UN, 1988, para. 28).
At the same time, it should also be recognised that there must be a line drawn in
relation to what can be classified as torture. It would be unhelpful to include
everything. This is an extraordinarily complicated and subjective matter that experts
have debated for a number of years. In essence however, the legal objective in
defining torture is to interpret the CAT with the intended meaning. In effect, this
means that whilst case law provides a guide, it is also up to the judge to subjectively
interpret the acts which are brought before the court. Consequently, the role of the
legal system is to hold individuals and organisations to account who engage in
torture, which means that legal definitions are dependent on the intention behind the
legal definitions.

7

This includes the use of acts of a sexual nature being used to degrade, humiliate or cause pain to the
individual; such as a prisoner being forced to wear female underwear on their head or being sexually
assaulted with weapons. This definition is inclusive of sexual assault utilised as a weapon of war or
acts amounting to torture in the domestic sphere.
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The Extension to Non-State Actors
There are striking parallels between torture that occurs in the ‘public’ and
‘private’ domains in terms of strategies, process and resulting trauma, and
state acquiescence can occur at different levels (Nowak, 2010, p. 5).
International law clearly states that state parties can be held responsible for the
actions of non-state actors on the basis that they did not act with due diligence to
prevent or respond to the violation (Ball, 2012).
In addition, the language used in Article 1 of the CAT concerning ‘acquiescence’
clearly extends state obligations into the private sphere (Nowak, 2010). The Former
United Nations Special Rapporteur on Torture, Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, Manfred Nowak, argues that “the concept of acquiescence
entails a duty for the state to prevent acts of torture in the private sphere and the
concept of due diligence should be applied to examine whether states have lived up
to their obligations” (Nowak, 2008, para 68).
The European Convention on Human Rights holds positive obligations for states to
legislate to protect all citizens from torture (Directorate General of Human Rights
Council of Europe, 2007). This protection is extended to people who have been
subjected to torture by ‘private actors’ in an effort to protect the most vulnerable
members of society including children, those detained in prisons and psychiatric
facilities and the relatives of the ‘disappeared’.
It is a constant of case law that:
the obligation on the High Contracting Parties under Article 1 of the
Convention to secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and
freedoms defined in the Convention, taken together with Article 3, requires
States to take measures designed to ensure that individuals within their
jurisdiction are not subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment, including such ill-treatment administered by private individuals
(A. v. The United Kingdom, 1998).
In addition, the Court held in A. v. The United Kingdom (1998) (UK) that:

35

This judgement by the European Court of Human Rights holds that the
United Kingdom and other states—nations that are parties to the European
Convention on Human Rights and/or the UN Convention on the Rights of the
Child—must provide effective deterrents to ensure that the rights of children
under Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights to freedom
from torture, inhumane, or degrading treatment are not violated by private
individuals. This is believed to be relevant to the practice of non-therapeutic
circumcision of male children in the United Kingdom and other European
nations.
Under human rights law, although state parties, rather than individuals, undertake the
responsibility to ‘respect and ensure’ human rights (Alston, Steiner, & Goodman,
2008; Saul, 2008), both state and non-state actors are regulated by the Conventions
(Alston et al., 2008). However, the UN Human Rights Council notes that in the duty
to ‘ensure’ rights, states must protect individuals from ‘private violations of rights’
(Saul, 2008, p. 32) “in so far as they are amenable to application between private
persons or entities” (United Nations Human Rights Council, 2004, p. 2).
International law expert, Ben Saul (2008), states that “where a private act is not
attributable to the State, the State can only be held responsible for its own failures or
omissions” (p. 33).
International law clearly demonstrates that state parties can be held responsible for
the actions of non-state actors on the basis that they did not act with due diligence to
prevent or respond to the violation (Ball, 2012). The Committee against Torture’s
General Comment No. 2 regarding the implementation of Article 2 by State parties
postulates:

where State authorities or others acting in official capacity or under colour of
law, know or have reasonable grounds to believe that acts of torture or illtreatment are being committed by non-state officials, or private actors and
they fail to exercise due diligence to prevent, investigate, prosecute and
punish such non-State officials or private actors consistently with the
Convention, the State bears responsibility and its officials should be
considered as authors, complicit or otherwise responsible under the
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Convention

for

consenting

or

acquiescing

in

such

impermissible

circumstances. (Committee against Torture, 2008, sec. IV, 18)
A growing number of researchers have called on domestic legislation to reflect this
(Nowak, 2010; Sarson & MacDonald, 2009; St Vincent, 2011). Indeed, in the
Australian context, the definition of torture did not change as a consequence of the
detention and interrogation of ‘terror suspects’ as it did in the United States
(Greenberg & Dratel, 2005), and holes in the legislation still exist. The Australian
Capital Territory and Queensland are the only two Australian states or territories that
have specific torture offences, and Queensland is the only state to prohibit torture
carried out by non-state actors8. There have been several convictions for torture
offences in Queensland, including; the torture of a child in R v R & S, ex parte
Attorney-General (2000), a husband torturing his wife over a six month period in R v
HAC (2006), and a man who was convicted of the torture of a backpacker in R v
Cowie (2005).
Overall, legal definitions of torture, both in the international and Australian context
are quite narrowly focused and are ambiguous in their wording. This positivist
approach, in the strict legal sense, means that many institutional practices that may
amount to torture have been excluded from the legislative framework, particularly
cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment. The ambiguity of the legislation is also
problematic. Indeed, if the legislation in the Australian context was to align with
expert opinion, it would require an amendment to existing government policy. In
addition, the responsibility of states would be heightened, and there may be cases
where the Australian Government is forced to act in politically sensitive matters,
such as the treatment of asylum seekers.

Other Conceptualisations
Philosopher Paul Kenny (2010) has sought to provide a unambiguous definition that
distinguishes torture from other forms of violence. Kenny defines torture as “the
systematic and deliberate infliction of severe pain or suffering on a person over
whom the actor has physical control, in order to induce a behavioural response from
8

The US also has torture prohibition against non-state actors in two states, Sec 750.85 of the
Michigan Penal Code and Sec. 203 of California Criminal Code.
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that person” (Kenny, 2010, p. 131). This definition removes the need for ‘specific
intent’, which has more recently been used as a way of stifling criminal prosecution,
as was demonstrated in the now infamous Jay Bybee memo to US Attorney-General
Alberto Gonzalez which stated that for an act to constitute torture “the infliction of
pain had to be the defendant’s precise objective” (as cited in Greenberg & Dratel,
2005, p. 174).
The implication of the Yoo and Bybee memos was that an act can only be torture if
the actor “has no purpose beyond the infliction of pain” (Kenny, 2010, p. 142).
Kenny reflects on the distinction between a sadistic act and torture and notes:
“Sadistic acts, in which pain is inflicted to enhance the feeling of power the actor has
over his subject, are not themselves torture, but something else, as a behavioural
response (other than being in pain) is not sought” (Kenny, 2010, p. 142). Whilst this
distinction can be seen as imprecise, the idea of torture as the instrument rather than
the goal was an important distinction for Kenny. For example, it may be that a
person is tortured (instrument) into publicly providing a false confession
(behaviour). Kenny argues then, that an act such as female genital mutilation should
not be considered torture because the pain is only “incidental to the ritual” and an
“unpleasant side effect” (Kenny, 2010, p. 143). The UN Committee Against Torture,
human rights experts and many feminist researchers argue against this
conceptualisation, as well as the underpinning cultural relativist foundation (Human
Rights Watch, 2013; Miller-Mitchell, 2003, p. 21).
Kenny also posits that distinguishing psychological and physical torture is
unwarranted, which is indeed an important argument (Kenny, 2010). Pain, whether
physical or psychological, is key to the act of torture, no matter what the purpose of
the torture is. The Yoo and Bybee memo specified that for an act to constitute
torture, it must be severe pain, “equivalent in intensity to the pain accompanying
serious injury, such as organ failure, impairment of bodily function, or even death”
(as cited in Greenberg & Dratel, 2005, p. 172). In other words, they theorised that
any pain below the threshold of the suffering associated with organ failure would not
be classified as torture. This fails to recognise that death is not necessarily painful,
especially if you are unconscious.
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This concept also assumes that pain can be spoken of and measurable, and indeed
some have attempted to theorise this (Collins, Moore, & McQuay, 1997; Melzack &
Torgerson, 1971). In her striking book The Body in Pain, Elaine Scarry (1985) sees
torture as “a process which not only converts but announces the conversation of
every conceivable aspect of the event and the environment into an agent of pain”
(pp. 27-28). Jean Amery’s description of his experience of torture confirms this
approach;9 he stated: “[t]he pain was what it was. Beyond that there is nothing to
say. Qualities of feeling are as incomparable as they are indescribable. They mark
the limit of human capacity of language to communicate” (Amery, 1980, p. 33). The
removal of voice is an ensuing consequence of the torture (Scarry, 1985).
To count the physically triggered pain without taking into account the psychological
factors is analytically out-dated (Kenny, 2010). The use of psychological techniques,
including the threat of subjecting the body to the pain of torture, has been seen as
just as effective in producing the intended effect (Kamen, 1997). Therefore, the
distinction between physically and psychologically induced pain is problematic in
analysing torture.

Power
…takes us deep into that dark realm where eroticism and cruelty cohabit –
empowering the perpetrator, destroying the victim, and enticing the rest of us
– Alfred McCoy describing the juxtaposition of perverse tortures and
political power in Pier Paolo Pasolini’s “Salo” (2012a, p. 113).
Theorists have noted that the exercise of power plays a significant role in the
conceptualisation of torture, as torture is often intended to be “world-destroying”
(Parry, 2002, p. 150; Scarry, 1985). Cover (1986) notes that torture:
is designed to demonstrate the end of the normative world of the victim – the
end of what the victim values, the end of the bonds that constitute the
community in which the values are grounded…The torturer and the victim do
end up creating their own terrible “world”, but this world derives its meaning

9

Jean Amery was subjected to strappado, a process whereby the arms are bound together behind the
body and raised until they caused severe strain on the joints, or even dislocation.
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from being imposed on the ashes of another. The logic of that world is
complete domination (pp. 1601, 1603).
Torture, in this sense, is not just about the infliction of pain, but more the domination
of the body as an object of loss – in relation to the loss of personal integrity, and
being cast out of the sphere of citizenship. Indeed, during the act of torture in the
context of interrogation, the individual’s body becomes an object of blame – if the
individual wants the torture to stop, they must speak, if they do not speak, they are
then induced into inflicting pain on themselves by refusing to speak. The act ceases
to be about the infliction of pain on the body, but instead a function of power by
ascribing blame and reinforcing a complete invisibility of suffering. Assigning the
outcast body an entity of punishment, devoid of rights, emphasises the secretive and
invisible nature of torture.
Michel Foucault (1991) explores this invisibility as a function of power in detail in
his book Discipline and Punish. He postulates that the state used ritualistic public
displays of brutality, such as torture, in order to reinforce the power of the sovereign.
Public displays of torture became a mechanism to exact revenge and punish the
individual’s body as an object of shame for committing an offence against the
sovereign. However, this ‘backfired’ on the state when the victim became the object
of sympathy, and ‘torturer’ became the object of shame and blame. This led to the
state moving towards less visible punishment in the nineteenth century, and the birth
of the prison. Foucault argues that this became a more controlled method of
punishment reinforcing the invisibility of suffering – “the condemned man is no
longer to be seen” (Foucault, 1991, p. 13).
Torture then becomes a way of overcoming the vulnerability of the state by
removing and silencing any threats to its power, or the social order (Parry, 2002).
Indeed, Parry (2002) argues that, at times when the social order is threatened by
people seen as ‘outsiders’ or ‘subordinates’, torture may function as a ‘collective
assertion’ of power (p. 152). Torture of the body becomes an expression of the

40

tactical and scientific use of power – the infliction of pain is the strategy (Foucault,
1991).10
This is why the definition of torture is so important. If the function of torture is to
supress and silence through the exercise of power, and it is carried out in secret,
using methods that do not leave any physical scars – or methods that do not meet the
legislatively defined threshold of torture – this adds yet another layer of invisibility
for the victim/survivor. This extends to the use of language and the way that this
contributes to the exercise of power (Foucault, 1991). Indeed, the removal of torture
from community narratives reinforces the lack of visibility of the issue of torture; for
example, calling acts amounting to torture ‘abuse’, or ‘enhanced interrogation
techniques’, or minimising torture, contributes to this silence. Consequently, the
inclusion of acts amounting to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, or torture that
does not leave physical scarring, becomes crucial in defining and conceptualising
torture to address the exercise of power. Naming torture when it occurs becomes
extremely important. This phenomenon has been particularly apparent in the context
of the War on Terror, which will be explored in later chapters.

Holistic Torture Definition
The Torture Abolition and Survivors Support Coalition International, provides a
detailed definition of torture which includes techniques previously labelled as cruel,
inhuman and degrading treatment.11 They define physical torture as:
Any action or technique, or combination that would result in severe physical
pain when inflicted upon a human being. Severe physical pain means a level
of pain that a person would not voluntarily accept for himself or herself.
Physical torture includes but is not limited to the following: electric shock,
near asphyxiation, rape or sexual abuse, burning, beatings, stress positions or
dog attacks (Torture Abolition and Survivors Support Coalition International
[TASSCI], n.d., p. 1).
10

It should be noted that Foucault does not see power as a thing that can be possessed; rather, torture
becomes the exercise of power (Foucault, 1991, p. 26).
11
This definition encapsulates a more contemporary understanding of torture rather than the
traditional legal definitions because the CAT and UDHR have been criticised as being Eurocentric
by advocating vested Western interests and being so rigid and do not take into account societal
change or growth.
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And psychological torture as:
Any action or technique, or any combination thereof, which might result in
severe mental trauma or harm when inflicted upon a human being. This
includes but is not limited to the following: Death threat or threats of
immediate and severe physical pain, mock executions, rape or sexual abuse,
extended disruption of food and sleep, extended solitary confinement,
extended sensory deprivation, extended sensory disruption or overload, use
of hallucinogenic or other mentally disruptive drugs, threats against family
members, secret detention or "disappearances" of a loved one, forced
observance, by hearing or watching, of the mental and/or physical torture or
murder of another or forcible participation in the mental or physical torture of
others. Severe mental trauma or harm means a level of fear or trauma that a
person would not voluntarily accept for himself or herself, or which results in
prolonged mental suffering afterwards (TASSCI, n.d., p. 2).
This thesis draws on the above conceptualisation of torture to contend that torture is
the systematic infliction of severe pain or suffering on another person over whom the
person has effective control. This also encapsulates the deliberate denial of care,
such as leaving a person in isolation, withholding food, water or pain relief. In
addition, as outlined in the CAT, acts amounting to cruel, inhuman and degrading
treatment are usually those actions which lead to torture, if not amount to torture
themselves. Therefore, when torture is referred to throughout this thesis, it
inclusively refers to acts that amount to cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment.
This holistic definition also embraces a less positivist approach to torture by
affirming that the underlying function of torture relates to the exertion of power and
domination over the victim/survivor, whether at the hands of the state, or another
person. It acknowledges that the power exerted by the state, or a person who is
engaging in torture (whether through action or inaction), is world destroying. This
conceptualisation is important as it addresses the way in which the exertion of power
through the use of torture automatically ascribes blame to victim/survivor. Hence
there is no reference to a requirement of a behavioural response or specific intent as
outlined in international conventions and/or domestic legislation. As previously
explained, many definitions of torture require an outcome of some kind, such as a
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‘confession’. This places the focus on the action or the omission of action, which in
itself may amount to torture, and ignores the use of power.

Defining Terrorism
Whilst terrorist violence has been framed in the contemporary narrative as the
‘worst’ form of violence, it is worthwhile pointing out that every form of violence is
potentially terror-inspiring to its victim (Bassiouni, 1988). Defining terrorism is
contentious, and whole theses have been written in an attempt to define what
constitutes terrorism. This disarray in the literature seems to confirm the old adage
that ‘one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter’. One need only look at
recent history to see examples where calling someone a terrorist has been used to
stifle support for revolutionary thought and ideas, and prevent opposition to
oppressive governments. Nelson Mandela was labelled a terrorist for opposing
apartheid in South Africa, and was imprisoned for many years because of his
‘terrorist’ related activity (Mandela, 1994). In many Latin American and Middle
Eastern countries, state-sponsored terrorism has been a greater cause of death and
destruction than any anti-state terrorist activity. Defining terrorism is intensely
political and largely dependent on the narrative surrounding terrorism in the
particular context.
Terrorism, as a political narrative, entered the public realm in the late eighteenth
century relating to the systematic way that the Jacobins purportedly intimidated and
repressed opponents during the French Revolution (Saul, 2008).12 International law
expert, Ben Saul (2008) notes that ideas of terrorism as an instrument of state control
and oppression remained the norm until the end of the Second World War. Terrorism
only became referred to as an act perpetrated by non-state actors in the late
nineteenth century as a result of revolutionaries in tsarist Russia (Koufa, 2001).
Since that time, the politically and ideologically loaded term has taken on new
meanings depending on the social and political context. The difficulties in defining
terrorism, come with the fact that it is difficult to distinguish terrorism from other
forms of politically motivated violence such as riots, assassinations and guerrilla

12

Ironically the opponents of the revolution were labelled as anarchists.
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warfare (Saul, 2008). Legal definitions of terrorism differ jurisdictionally and appear
to be dependent on the politics of those defining it.
Whilst there is no distinct crime of terrorism under international law, there are
prohibitions on conduct that comprises terrorist acts, such as war crimes and crimes
against humanity, which are codified in international humanitarian law and human
rights law (Saul, 2008). Conduct that infringes on basic human rights outlined in the
UDHR is prohibited under international law, and many UN resolutions have stated
that terrorism is a threat to civil and political rights, as well as economic, social and
cultural rights (Saul, 2008).
Since the events of 9/11, and the subsequent military response, there has been a
significant push to find a common international definition. Indeed, terrorism was
only defined by law in Australia after this event (Burton, McGarrity, & Williams,
2013). Under Australian law, terrorist crimes are distinguished by a few key features,
including motivation and scale. For an act to constitute a terrorism, it must have the
intention of: 1. “advancing a political, religious or ideological cause”, and 2.
“coercing, or influencing by intimidation” the government (Australia or a foreign
government), or “intimidating the public” (Lynch & Williams, 2006, p. 15).
In Australia, for a group to be declared a terrorist organisation it must be either
proven in a court that the organisation is “directly or indirectly engaged in,
preparing, planning, assisting, or fostering” a terrorist act, or, an organisation can be
proscribed by the federal attorney-general (Lynch & Williams, 2006, p. 21). It is
worthy of note that a court may declare an organisation a terrorist organisation
without the organisation having carried out any terrorist attack. Indeed, the
proscription of a terrorist group has been decisively political, and there have been
controversies surrounding the Australian Government’s decision to call some groups
terrorists for political purposes, then change their minds when convenient.13

13

This was the case in relation to deeming the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) a terrorist
organisation, and yet providing them arms to fight ISIS in Northern Iraq (Pollard, 2014). Similarly,
when the Howard Government proscribed Lashkar e-Toiba as a terrorist group, questions were
raised considering that the group had condemned al-Qaeda and violence against Western forces, and
was wholly concerned with the conflict in Kashmir (Butler, 2003). Some believe that this had more
to do with the detention of David Hicks in Guantanamo Bay than any threat to the Australian
people. The political nature of the proscription of a terrorist group is fraught with difficulties.
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The Australian definition does appear to include acts of war, for example, the
bombing of civilian populations in Afghanistan and Iraq would likely be covered as
acts of terrorism under this legislation (Lynch & Williams, 2006). However, this has
never been tested in Australian court and, as is common in cases of terrorism
perpetrated by Northern liberal democratic states, the legislation has only been used
against individuals, not state-sponsored activities (Blakeley, 2009). Terrorism is used
by states both internally and across borders for a number of reasons, such as
maintaining order or quelling political dissent. This state terrorism has manifested in
many ways including illegal detention, disappearances, torture and assassination
(Blakeley, 2009). This includes violations of the Geneva Conventions 1949 (GCs),
including the torture of combatants, the targeting of civilians, assassination, using
specific types of weaponry (e.g. chemical weapons), unlawful detention and
kidnappings.
Ruth Blakeley (2009) defines state terrorism as a “threat or act of violence by agents
of the state that is intended to induce extreme fear in a target audience, so that they
are forced to consider changing their behaviour in some way” (p. 1). The core
concern here is that the act of violence was intended to cause intimidation to
individuals beyond those directly impacted in an attempt to change behaviour
(Blakeley, 2009, p. 36). Although evidence clearly demonstrates that state terrorism
causes many more deaths than non-state terrorism does, terrorist acts perpetrated by
the state are given far less attention in the mainstream media. The entrenched notion
of ‘legitimate’ violence perpetrated by the state has much to do with this and
scholars have argued about definitions of terrorism because of the assumed
distinction between ‘legitimate’ and ‘illegitimate’ violence.
The debate also extends to the assumptions around who constitutes a victim. In this
conceptualisation, complying with the GCs provides for legitimate acts of violence
to be perpetrated against an individual or group, thereby differentiating between
innocent civilians and combatants. This has caused much scholarly dialogue,
particularly as this then assumes that there are some acts of violence that can be
perpetrated ‘innocently’ on some individuals or groups by the state.

The

dichotomisation of ‘innocents’ compared to ‘guilty parties’ becomes problematic as
it then attributes worth to only some lives and further entrenches the legitimacy of
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violence in the community. Indeed, Rudolf Rummell (1994) estimates that between
170-200 million civilian deaths are attributable to state instigated mass murder,
forcible starvations and genocide in the twentieth century alone (Blakeley, 2009, p.
1).14 Despite the massive toll that state sponsored violence has taken on civilian
populations, they are rarely held to account for the death, destruction, and indeed
terror, caused to these communities, proving a disparity in the application of
terrorism related prohibitions. These arguments are further explored in Chapter Six.

Theoretical Frameworks
Human Rights 15
Conceptualisations of ‘human rights’ have been critiqued and philosophised for
decades by authors from political, philosophical and legal fields (Sen, 2004; Turner,
1993). The central principle of modern conceptions of human rights is that by nature
of being born human, a person has the inherent right to certain protections, such as
the right to life, and the right to be free from torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading
treatment (UN, 1948). Every person has rights by nature of being human, and the
indivisibility of rights means that no hierarchy exists. This means that by virtue of
being human, a person has as much right to be free from torture, as any other
enshrined right.
In essence, human rights are based on moral limitations that are placed on individual
and institutional behaviour to protect individuals and communities (Nozic, 1975).
The most commonly used definition of rights is enshrined in the UDHR. Although
the UDHR was drafted in the US, the values and philosophical underpinnings of the
enshrined rights stretch far back into history from all over the world and the concepts
have been taken from religious, cultural and philosophical texts that were drafted
long before there was ever a United Nations (Callaway, 2007; Smith, 2007).
However, as will be discussed further into the thesis, they have been appropriated by
Western nations in the current structure.

14
15

These figures are higher than other estimates.
A whole thesis could delve into debates around human rights, however, this brief introduction is
intended to provide the reader with an idea of some of the human rights narratives and the approach
taken in the thesis.
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More liberal approaches to human rights argue that the principles outlined in the
UDHR must not be seen as ‘set in stone’ (Briskman & Nipperess, 2009; Ife, 2008b).
They argue that human rights are not static, but are constructed and ever-changing
depending on the cultural, social and political context (Briskman, 2008; Ife, 2008b).
Jim Ife (2008), in particular, argues that human rights are discursive and constructed
through human interaction in ongoing discussions about what it means to have a
shared humanity. These views point out that formal documents form only one aspect
of the human rights discourse, and that discourse is never bound by words (Derrida,
1976). Whilst positivist notions of rights have been marred with controversy, these
more liberal approaches have also resulted in significant problems due to the lack of
clarity around definitions as a result of social change and the varying political
environment.
Despite these differing approaches, one of the core components of the human rights
framework is the notion of the universality and indivisibility of human rights (United
Nations General Assembly, 1993). In this framework, when examining issues
relating to torture through a human rights paradigm, the inherent dignity and worth
of every person forms a strong foundation for analysis, and the indivisibility and
universal application of rights follows. This is an important framework when
studying torture, as torture is most likely to occur to people who are marginalised
and considered ‘deviant’ by the general community (Office of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Human Rights, Association for the Prevention of Torture, &
Asia Pacific Forum on National Human Rights Institutions, 2010).
Taking a universal approach to rights does not automatically lead to an acceptance of
the way human rights have been used, applied, or have failed to be applied, in the
current structure. There are significantly important debates surrounding the
application of rights, including the unequal application of rights, Western-focused
notions of rights, gender-based interpretations, and cultural relativism. It is
acknowledged that human rights are often used as a political tool by powerful
individuals and governments to exert power over marginalised individuals and
communities. For example, Jacques Derrida (2001) notes that accusations of crimes
against humanity such as torture are used by powerful nations “often in the name of
human rights”, and are only employed “where it is ‘possible’ (physically, militarily,
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economically), that is to say always imposed on small, relatively weak States by
powerful States” (p. 52). Christina Schwenkel (2009) uses the example of US
intervention in Vietnam to argue that “the neoliberal state enacts a language of rights
to position itself as a guarantor of individual freedoms, such as freedom of choice,
property rights, free market and the right to prosperity” (p. 31). Similarly, the US
Government used the human rights narrative to engage in the 2003 Iraq invasion
(Bricmont, 2006). In this sense, human rights narratives are deployed not out of a
sense of common humanity but as a function of empire for states that frame
themselves as requiring “saving” from “savage” others (Derrida, 2001, p. 52).
These issues draw on debates concerning the exercise of power and the subsequent
manifestation of rights. In Leviathan, Thomas Hobbes (2016) defines power as the
“present means to secure the future”; in effect, power is then the means by which a
human being can secure future security, and therefore rights (as cited in
Birmingham, 2006, p. 38). Hobbes (2016) argues that self-interest and individuality
are the driving force, excluding the idea of humanity, an exclusion that political
philosopher, Hannah Arendt (1952) has argued had a disastrous effect in the
nineteenth century (Birmingham, 2006). Arendt (1952) postulates that humanity is
the sole constituting basis for human rights, and therefore provides the basis of
international law (Birmingham, 2006, p. 38).
Whilst humanity forms the basis of rights, Arendt (1952) argues that rights must be
politically secured, rather than merely proclaimed. In Origins, Arendt states:
The insane manufacture of corpses is preceded by the historically and
politically intelligible preparation of living corpses. The impetus, and what is
more important, the silent consent to such unprecedented conditions are the
products of those events which in a period of political disintegration suddenly
and unexpectedly made hundreds of thousands of human beings homeless,
stateless, outlawed and unwanted, while millions of human beings were made
economically superfluous and socially burdensome by unemployment. This
in turn could only happen because the Rights of Man, which had never been
philosophically established but merely formulated, which have never been
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politically secured but merely proclaimed, have, in their traditional form, lost
all validity (Arendt, 1952, p. 446).
Arendt argues that philosophically establishing and politically securing rights
“requires a new law of humanity” whereby “the right to have rights or the right of
every individual to belong to humanity should be guaranteed by humanity itself” (as
cited in Birmingham, 2006, pp. 5-6). One cannot rely then on the state to secure
rights, because, as Hobbes (2016) describes, the individual fundamental interest is to
secure power to obtain future security. So too, Arendt posits that the sovereign
power of the commonwealth is made up of “private individuals solely interested in
the desire for power; it embodies the sum total of private interests” (as cited in
Birmingham, 2006, p. 39). Therefore, it is only through “radical reformulation of
power, freedom, and the public space’ that it is possible to ‘sever human rights from
sovereign agency and sovereign state power’” (as cited in Birmingham, 2006, p. 40).
Despite the importance of issues relating to the interpretation and application of
rights, and the way in which human rights have been used to further imperialistic
aims and political agendas, it is important that the UDHR be acknowledged as the
foundation of human rights definitions in relation to this research to the extent that it
provides a basis to define rights. While acknowledging the cultural and imperialist
notion of rights in the Western context, this does not mean their application has to be
constrained by Western, cultural or gender-based interpretations. Rather, the
underlying humanitarian values that form the basis of human rights which stem from
culturally diverse communities and community based philosophies are instead
acknowledged, and the UDHR is seen as a manifestation of these inclusive and broad
based rights.
Human rights frameworks also take into account power, inequality, domination and
politics as central elements to the area of research, and examine the context and
meaning that is given to social problems (Finn & Jacobson, 2003; Ife, 1997, 2008b).
They also consider the philosophical, historical, legal, anthropological contexts of
issues (Briskman & Fiske, 2008). This is important when researching issues such as
torture in the War on Terror given its political nature and the historical aspects that
have impacted on the narrative. It is also essential considering that the predominant
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targets of torture in the War on Terror are men of Islamic faith from Middle Eastern
backgrounds.
Jim Ife (2008b) notes that understanding and investigating the structures and
powerful discourses that reinforce oppression and thereby prevent people from
reaching their ‘full humanity’ is an essential lens. The issue of structure is therefore
core in the analysis of the material. Indeed, examining issues from a human rights
approach also requires an acceptance of the issue as a political problem rather than a
‘private issue’ (Mills, 1970). This draws on the notion that a social issue only
becomes a public ‘problem’ when it is perceived as one in the public realm. Hence
the importance of research seeking to understand whether there is any evidence of
methods used to inhibit outrage and the structures that support the tactics. This also
extends to whether human rights abuses such as torture are seen as structurally
embedded or institutionally condoned violence, and therefore an individual solution
is inadequate. Notions of whether the issue is a public problem or private issue are
therefore central to the examination of torture in the War on Terror, as the way in
which torture is defined and the narrative surrounding torture becomes a driving
force as to whether it is seen as an issue that needs to be addressed.
Accordingly, the human rights framework utilised in this research holds that all
human beings are worthy of respect, dignity and of being free from torture and
conditions that give rise to torture, and that this is applied universally.

Othering
The concept of othering can be traced back to the philosophies of Georg Wilhelm
Friedrich Hegel (1998) and Jean-Paul Sartre (1956), but the term is most commonly
attributed to cultural critic Edward Said (1979), who discussed the use of othering by
imperialist Western governments to dichotomise the East through the process he
termed as Orientalism. Gavin Fairbairn (2009) notes that the way in which an
individual or group is represented publicly has a direct bearing on the public
response and whether, in fact, an action is seen as a human rights abuse. This
theoretical concept is important throughout the thesis as othering plays an important
role in the development of the identity of the individual and societies, and
consequently perception of the significance of torture. In the same way that notions
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of public and private ‘problems’ can have a significant impact on the way in which
issues are defined and responded to, the way in which individuals or certain groups
of people are represented in the mainstream can also lead to the creation of ‘the
other’ (Fairbairn, 2009). As aforementioned, torture is more commonly perpetrated
against marginalised and vulnerable individuals or social groups – whether this is on
the basis of political opinions, race, religion or sexual preference. Creating ‘the
other’ then becomes an important and integral tool in the participation of acts such as
torture, as it contributes to what Bandura (2002) termed moral disintegration. Put
simply, it is easier for human beings to engage in acts that inflict suffering on other
beings if they are viewed as different from the mainstream social group, or those
deemed as less than human (Bandura, 2006).
This conceptualisation of otherness stems largely from psychological theories where
researchers contend that human beings need to create an ‘other’ in order to identify
themselves, and in doing so, create groups that are ‘not us’ (Rowe, 1985). It is this
process of othering that Fairbairn (2009) explores as one reason why people can
torture or kill. For example, scholars have examined the types of training that those
in armies and defence forces around the world must go through in order for them to
be effective combatants and ‘efficient’ at killing (Bourke, 1999; Zimbardo, 2007).
The element of dehumanisation and separating the ‘combatants’ or ‘terrorists’ from
the civilian population is an important distinction made in order to separate those
who it becomes acceptable to kill or torture, from those it is not (McAlister,
Bandura, & Owen, 2006; Zimbardo, 2007). The level of perception as to whether the
person being killed or tortured is ‘guilty’, and thus whether sympathy can be
harnessed or suppressed plays a large role in this (Fairbairn, 2009).
The nature of evil actions, such as torture and genocide have also been explained as
being a result of the depersonalisation, or as Arendt (1952) stated, the banality of
evil. It is not the pathology of a person that causes evil acts, but the way that another
can be depersonalised and seen as a separate entity to the person or group carrying
out the torture or killing. However, studies have now shown that those committing
acts of evil are not as thoughtless as Arendt suggests (Reicher, Haslam, & Miller,
2014). Researchers now contend that people are aware of what they are doing,
however, they believe what they are doing is the right thing to do (Reicher et al.,
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2014). This comes from promoting identification with the cause. In the context of the
War on Terror this meant, amongst other things, promoting nationalism to defeat an
evil threat to ‘our’ civilisation, which even now is manifesting in the military actions
against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria.
This phenomenon was explored by Judith Butler (2012) in her book Frames of War.
Butler (2012) recounts the way that communities in Iraq and Afghanistan were cast
as unworthy of grief by US officials and the media. Butler (2012) posits that the
reason why images and narratives are controlled so extensively throughout times of
violence is because of the importance of framing the lives of those killed or tortured
as part of the instruments of war; their very bodies become pure vessels of attack
(p.xxix). Thus, life is cast as a divide between those who are considered precious and
‘grievable’, and those who form part of the instruments of war – they become merely
collateral damage (Butler, 2012).
The conceptualisation of ‘grievable’ lives is also supported by research into the
effects of watching graphic torture scenes. A 2014 study found that after students
watched the television program ‘24’, which depicted torture as effective, their level
of support for torture increased and they even signed a petition in support of their
stated beliefs (Kearns & Young, 2014). Watching torture recreationally functioned as
a mechanism to caste those tortured as fictional characters, devoid of humanity and
therefore unworthy of rights. Viewers became desensitised to their humanity.
Therefore, because of the emotions often attached to the issue of torture in a post
9/11 context, particularly when it involves those who have been accused of terrorist
or other violent activity and cast as pariahs, a universalist, inclusive and progressive
humanitarian foundation is important for research and analysis.

The Backfire Model
The Backfire Model (Martin, 2007) forms core of the analysis. The background to
the Backfire Model lies in the work of veteran nonviolent advocate Gene Sharp
(1973), who observed that when protestors were targeted by authorities, the actions
of authorities sometimes backfired on them, and the protestors were granted greater
support from the broader community. Sharp (1973) characterised this phenomenon
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as jujitsu – a term used in unarmed combat where the perpetrator’s energy is used
against them.
The Backfire Model was subsequently developed by Brian Martin (2007, 2012a) as a
tool for activists to oppose injustice after he observed that this backfire did not
always occur. So, he created a framework of tactics that attackers use to minimise
outrage at the injustice. Martin (2007) notes that when those who hold power
perpetrate an injustice, whether they be individuals, corporations or governments,
they are usually able to get away with it because they engage in the inhibition of
outrage. When this inhibition fails, the act can backfire on them. The model is
therefore sometimes referred to as the Outrage Management Model (McDonald,
Graham & Martin, 2010).
Powerful entities can get away with atrocities, because of their power. Martin (2007)
observed that certain events, such as the beating of Rodney King, had particular
features that resulted in backfire; there was an act of injustice, the act/s received
extensive media coverage, and the events ‘backfired’ on those involved (Martin,
2005). Backfire can involve adverse public opinion towards the perpetrators or a
‘blowback’ (Martin, 2007, p. 3). However, there must be the perception in the
broader community that an injustice has occurred and the awareness must be
conveyed to a significant audience. Indeed, backfire indicates that the actions the
perpetrator took must be counterproductive to their goals.
There are two conditions for backfire to occur; firstly, the action has to be perceived
as unjust, unfair, excessive or disproportional and secondly, information about the
injustice has to be communicated to relevant audiences (Martin, 2007). However,
backfire against the powerful is unusual, and Martin (2012b) states that there are a
number of steps that perceived perpetrators of injustice go through to inhibit outrage
at the acts they have perpetrated.
The five methods for inhibiting outrage over injustice include:
1. Cover up the action – this may involve the cover-up of acts that are
committed out of the public eye, hiding or destroying evidence, hidden
attacks, using proxies (e.g. private contractors), and censorship.
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2. Devalue the target – this element concerns lowering people’s view of the
victim or group of people. It may entail labelling the victim, personal attacks,
finding or creating dirt. This correlates with theories around ‘othering’ which
were just discussed.
3. Reinterpret what happened – some of the facts may be accepted, but they are
reinterpreted to mean something entirely different. Martin notes that it could
be a perpetrator denying the act occurred, denying knowledge of the act,
denying the act meant what others thought it did, or denying the intention to
cause the act. This would include lies about the event or actions of certain
officials, minimising consequences, passing the blame or framing the event
in a particular way.
4. Use official channels to give the appearance of justice – Martin notes that
official channels often give spurious legitimacy to injustice; this could be
opening an investigation that has a limited scope, lacks independence and
resources, or appoints ‘experts’ that may be influenced by those employing
them. Courts may only look at legal technicalities rather than the merits or
morals of the act/s. It also may entail an inquiry where the outcome would be
censored.
5. Intimidate or reward people involved – here Martin refers to people knowing
that the act occurred, but they are unwilling to do anything about it because
of the ramifications. This may involve intimidation against targets, witnesses
and campaigners. It also may involve incentives for acquiescence.
(Martin, 2007, pp. 4-5; 2012b, p. 8).
To counter these strategies, the Backfire Model suggests the use of ‘countermethods’
which include: exposing information about the injustice; validating the targets of
injustice; interpreting the events as unjust; mobilizing public support and either
avoiding or discrediting official channels; and refusing to be intimidated and
exposing the intimidation (Martin, 2007, p. 7).
For blowback against the perpetrator/s to occur, the timing and communication of
the message has to be carried out in a particular way. Timing in this sense is
concerned with the media coverage, whether there has been sufficient time delegated
to the story, and whether the audience is receptive to hearing about the injustice. For
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example, the death of Michael Jackson in 2009 saturated the media landscape and
overshadowed the coverage of the killing of civilians in Afghanistan (Engelhardt,
2009), demonstrating the importance of timing and receptiveness in the general
community.
The Backfire Model (Martin, 2007) has been used to examine injustice in many
contexts including studies relating to the genocide that occurred in Rwanda (Martin,
2014), the treatment of asylum seekers and refugees (Herd, 2006a; 2006b), corporate
disasters (Engel & Martin, 2006), climate change (Hodder, 2011), corruption
(Martin, 2012), defamation (Martin & Gray, 2006), censorship (Jansen & Martin,
2003), and other state-sanctioned violence such as the attack of Fallujah in Iraq,
Afghanistan, injustice that occurs in war time (Riddick, 2012; 2013), and massacres
(Gray & Martin, 2008).
Torture is a recognised case study for the Outrage Management Model, simply
because the tactics used by authorities are so blatant. For example, the model was
used to examine the outrage management tactics utilised by the US Government
when the Abu Ghraib photos were released in 2004 (Martin, 2007). The model was
also applied to the technologies of torture, such as those weapons employed for use
in inflicting pain on asylum seekers and protestors including, electro shock weapons,
Tasers, acoustic devices, armed robots and lasers (Martin & Wright, 2006; 2003). In
these cases, the model was employed to provide tactics for activists to promote
countershock and long term policy change strategies in order to deny states access to
tools of torture (Martin & Wright, 2003).
The theoretical underpinnings of outrage are also worth mentioning here. Outrage in
this model refers to members of the audience perceiving the injustice and some of
them wanting to do something about it.16 Many theorists have delved into the
conditions that are almost a pre-requisite to the feeling of injustice, and subsequently
wanting to take action. Martin (2007) believes that most people are concerned about
injustice and are willing to take action to promote justice (p. 180). The ‘just world’
theory posits that those concerned about justice believe that the world is inherently
just and that ultimately, people get their just deserts (Martin, 2007). This outlook is
16

Hessel (2012) states that one must reflect on outrage and it must be tempered by rationality and
knowledge otherwise it can be dangerous if based on hatred.
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fraught with problems in relation to torture because it leads people to believe that if
someone is tortured, they deserve to be. Indeed, one of methods employed by
authorities has been to shift focus off the torture and blame the survivor/victim by
alleging they are terrorists who got what they deserve.
Outrage has been described as anger directed outwards, which sometimes leads to
action (Martin, 2007). One of the main areas of research into outrage and wanting to
act on an injustice has been at the behest of psychologically based disciplines.
Psychologists have examined why some people are unconcerned with justice, and are
more susceptible to the methods of inhibiting or reducing outrage, such as
devaluation and official channels. As previously discussed, Bandura (2002; 1999)
examined the mechanisms of what he terms as ‘moral disengagement’ in relation to
atrocities such as killing and torture. Bandura (1999) believes that there are
psychological instruments that people use to minimise the moral concern about acts
like torture and killing. These include such mechanisms as: moral justifications for
an act, euphemistic labelling, comparisons between whose atrocities are worse,
displacement of responsibility, diffusion of responsibility, disregarding or
misconstruing consequences, attribution of blame to the victim, and dehumanisation
of the victim/survivor (Martin, 2007, p. 181-182). These mechanisms are intimately
linked with the Backfire Model (Martin, 2007), and many of the techniques overlap,
such as the use of labelling or the victim blaming technique.
Similarly, Stanley Cohen (2001) also examined social responses to atrocities like
torture and killing, and found that denial was core to the responses. Cohen (2001)
believes that people prefer to ignore or deny what is occurring by utilising five key
techniques: deny responsibility, deny the injury, deny the victim appropriate status,
condemn the condemners and appeal to higher loyalties. These techniques can also
be applied to the Backfire Model (Martin, 2007), particularly as denial that torture
occurred is apparent in many cases of torture in the War on Terror. However,
Cohen’s model focuses on denial at the psychological and government levels,
whereas backfire looks at the tactics (Martin, 2007).
The theories around denial and moral disengagement are relevant to the analysis in a
number of ways given the overlap between the methods used by authorities and
techniques of minimising outrage. Ultimately, the Backfire Model (Martin, 2007)
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was chosen as the framework for analysis due to its relevance to acts of torture, and
its applicability to the Australian context, but these overlapping theories are also
taken into account given their relevance to the topic.
There are some limitations to the Backfire Model. For example, one view could be
that focusing on the tactics does not sufficiently take into account the broader
political forces at play, and that these have direct relevance to the techniques
employed by authorities and the effectiveness of the strategy. For example, as the
research explores, the broader political structure played a significant role in the
perpetration of torture during the War on Terror because of the way the system had
been structured to craft, carry out, and subsequently cover-up the actions of
perpetrators. Further, because the political environment manifested in the rise of
nationalistic goals and pro-militarism, it meant that the social condition was ripe for
torture to occur. The role of the political environment was also important when
examining the evidence of inhibiting outrage at the injustice of torture. These
broader political considerations were therefore incorporated into the analysis.

Social Constructions and the Media
Social constructionism forms one aspect of the liberal human rights framework (Finn
& Jacobson, 2003; Ife, 2010) and is based on the notion that all knowledge is derived
from and maintained by social interaction and processes (Berger & Luckmann, 1991;
Burr, 2003). In this sense, language and social interaction convey and construct
meanings and versions of events that may be attached to certain phenomena, rather
than reflecting reality or accuracy (Potter & Wetherell, 1987). Social constructionists
are concerned with power, narratives, the use of language and the social and political
processes that shape people’s understanding of the world in which they live (Burr,
2003; Muehlenhard & Kimes, 1999). Whilst not coming from a postmodernist
foundation, this research recognises that the way in which issues are constructed
publicly – whether they are correct reflections of reality or otherwise – do have a
significant impact on the way people relate to phenomena such as torture. Indeed,
whilst there are interpretations of events, the interpretations are not necessarily
accurate, and may, in fact, be shaped for a particular purpose, whether that is to
subjugate certain groups of people in order to maintain power, or to exert political
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influence (Potter & Wetherell, 1987). For example, the legitimisation of the violence
perpetrated against Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people in Australia by
Europeans on the basis that they were ‘uncivilised’ is a pertinent example of this
(Lovell, 2014, p. 221).
Certainly, the way in which the media ‘frames’ concepts has been shown to play a
significant role in influencing and shaping world views and constructions of reality
(Dijk, 1988; Gamson, 1992; Iyengar, 1990; Klocker, 2004; Klocker & Dunn, 2003;
Oettler, Huhn, & Peetz, 2009). Jonathan Potter and Margaret Wetherell (1987)
provide an example of a media article entitled “Islamic terrorists blow up plane”.
They point out the negative connotations and stereotypical terminology used in the
article, such as ‘hijackers’, ‘gunmen’ and ‘terrorists’. They then go on to describe the
same actions by interchanging the language, and using terms such as ‘freedom
fighter’ who was acting in order to bring about necessary social change. The end
result is that political conflict is being paralleled by the linguistic conflict, and a
construction of reality has occurred, rather than a description of events (Potter &
Wetherell, 1987).
This example exemplifies the use of manipulative political rhetoric that is a core
business of politicians, supported by the mainstream media, and entirely relevant in
the War on Terror paradigm. The power of persuasion is reliant on a politician being
able to convincingly convey an argument (Uhr & Walter, 2014). The narrative set by
political rhetoric serves ideological functions (Uhr & Walter, 2014), whether this be
in relation to whom is deemed worthy of sympathy and respect, or framing an issue
that sits within a broader ideological framework that centres around nationalism. In
this way, there is a connection between narrative and how language is used
depending on the values and beliefs of the target social group, and what purports to
be a truthful account (Uhr & Walter, 2014, p. 123). Dominant political rhetoric
becomes extremely influential in normalising certain language, and can be used to
maintain the status quo of power relationships (Lovell, 2014). However, what is left
out of the narrative can be just as important as what is left in. Omissions and framing
play a major role in how the media reports on social issues, as many journalists are
provided with media releases that already set the tone of specific articles. Politicians
have a significant role in media stories and how they are framed.
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The mainstream media in particular is a powerful machine that can contribute to the
politicisation of an issue depending on the certain types of information that is
provided to the public, and the way it is conveyed (Bean, 2005; Kupchik & Bracy,
2009; Mutz, 1994). Aaron Kupchik & Nicole Bracy (2009) note that due to the
public receiving their information about social problems from the media, and
politicians who often have bias or hidden agendas that distort reality, this often
means that public fear is created about issues that they have no need to feel
concerned about. This has been no more apparent than the media sensationalism
around perceived terrorist threats post-September 11 2001. The danger of media
framing is that the public receives distorted information, which filters an unrealistic
reflection of reality to the viewing audience, and this can become a dangerous social
construct (Potter & Wetherell, 1987). Media framing is also integral in inhibiting
outrage at injustice if the victims are presented as less than human or somehow
deserving of the treatment.
It is also important to emphasise the established link between journalists, politicians
and military personnel. To receive ‘insider’ information, journalists can be corrupted
into writing reports using the language of the military or politicians providing a
media statement. This was demonstrated in Brendan Riddick’s (2013) research into
the siege of Fallujah which found that politicians, supported by the media, used
methods to minimise outrage and the community’s suffering. In the case of Fallujah,
the media reports echoed official accounts of the events and obfuscated the reality
for those who had suffered injury or death due to the actions of the US military and
private security contractors (Riddick, 2013).
Studies over the years have demonstrated that this is certainly not an anomaly. A
more recent example revealed that a former LA Times and current Associated Press
reporter, Ken Dilanian, collaborated with the CIA on stories he wrote (Silverstein,
2014). Dilanian provided the CIA press office with drafts of his stories seeking
approval before publication and even entered into discussions about how he could
manipulate public opinion in relation to drone strikes (Valania, 2014). Dilanian also
collaborated in a story that minimised the involvement of the CIA in the script of the
Hollywood movie Zero Dark Thirty, which promoted torture as effective
(Silverstein, 2014). Subsequent Freedom of Information (FOI) documents
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demonstrate that the CIA had asked for script changes in the film in order to portray
the agency in a “more favourable light” (Silverstein, 2014, p. 7).

The Propaganda Model
This link between the media and the protection and promotion of elite interests was
explored in Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky’s (1988) book Manufacturing
Consent. The Propaganda Model (Herman & Chomsky, 1988) outlines five filters
used to control what is reported in the mainstream public and how this marginalises
dissent and presents a centralised world view. The five filters include; the size and
concentration of media organisations, wealth and monopolisation of media
ownership, the use of advertising as the main source of income for media
organisations, the reliance on official sources for the reporting of media stories and
‘experts’ being provided by those with powerful interests, ‘flack’ as a means of
controlling the narrative, and anti-communism as a control mechanism (Herman &
Chomsky, 1988, p. 2).
Of course, one only needs to replace the fear around communism with the terrorism
hype in the post 9/11 environment to see the applicability and relevance of the
framework in the present context. In particular, the War on Terror has provided the
ideological means to create a new ‘national religion’ of anti-terrorism, replacing the
anti-communist political ideology utilised by the US Government to mobilise
military and political resources during the Cold War.
As will be explored in the thesis, the reliance on official sources by the mainstream
media is also of direct relevance to the issues facing the reporting of torture in the
War on Terror, given the removal of voice for the survivors who were taken to
facilities where they were unable to convey their suffering, as well as the general
framing of stories concerning their torture in the Australian context. This is an
important media filter explored in Chapter Five.
In addition, the protection of the economic interests of those who own and fund the
media are of direct relevance, whether in relation to the wealthy individuals and
corporations that own the major media organisations, or the advertisers who fund
these multinational corporations. The concentration of media ownership continues to
be an issue in Australia given the monopoly held by Murdoch’s News Limited
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(Pusey & McCutcheon, 2011). For example, the Propaganda Model (Herman &
Chomsky, 1988) would posit that pro-war narratives reported in Murdoch’s papers
protected the interests of the elite who fund them, and therefore reporting civilian
casualties and the bombing of hospitals and schools would not be considered
newsworthy (Riddick, 2013). The Model suggests that the monopolisation of the
media has also allowed for the control of the mainstream world view. For example,
when the media is controlled by a small number of individuals and organisations, the
media owner’s world view is sold to the public as the national opinion. In addition,
the close relationship between the mainstream media and government authorities
remains a significant issue. Herman and Chomsky (1988) argue that a structural
interdependence has manifested between the media and government due to media
organisations being reliant on government imposed regulations, media laws and
taxes. This interdependence becomes a concerning situation in relation to the
perpetration of crimes by state officials, because if the media is reliant on licencing
or other government legislation to produce maximum profits, they are more likely to
report a skewed narrative in order to protect the government and therefore their own
interests.
Given the link between the authorities and media, and the power they have in
shaping the public understanding of an issue like torture, the research sought to
understand the techniques used in inhibiting outrage at the injustice of torture. The
Propaganda Model (Herman & Chomsky, 1988) provides an important framework to
understand this phenomenon.

Thesis Structure
Chapter Two provides a background to the War on Terror. The history of the torture
program is explored as well as responses to the events of 9/11. The establishment of
detention facilities such as Guantanamo Bay is explained, and the interrogation
techniques used are examined. The concept of extraordinary rendition is presented in
this chapter, as is the expanded role that private military and security contractors
now have in the operations that were in the past left to traditional military forces.
The establishment of organisations such as JSOC (“jay-sock”) and their work with
the CIA are introduced. These facilities, techniques and organisations are central to
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the issues relating to torture in the War on Terror addressed in this thesis, and
provide context for the research.
Chapter Three delves into the Australian Government’s role in the War on Terror.
The background to the political situation in Australia under the Howard Government
highlights the rationale and social climate that permeated Australia at the time. The
murky world of the Australian Government and its agent’s involvement in the US
Government torture and detention program are also examined, and evidence of
Australian Government and military involvement in Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo
torture are presented. The cases of Mamdouh Habib, David Hicks and Joseph
Thomas are introduced, giving a background into the three main cases that
dominated the headlines at the time. And finally, the chapter explores Australia’s
counter-terrorism legislation, including the harsh control order regime and other
preventative detention measures.
Chapter Four provides methodology used in the research and the article selection
process. The database and newspaper selection is explained, and the process of
analysis utilising the Outrage Management Model (Martin, 2007) is presented. The
data results are presented in a pictorial format and the raw numbers are provided as
an overview. The spikes in the number of newspaper articles discussing torture are
indicative of world events that were influencing reporting at the time. For example,
there was a spike in 2004-2005 that was symptomatic of the release of the photos
that came out revealing the extent of torture that occurred at the Abu Ghraib torture
facility.
Chapter Five explores the results of the ten year newspaper analysis examining the
evidence of methods used to inhibit outrage at the injustice of torture. The chapter
delves into the substantial evidence that US and Australian officials and their agents
engaged in cover-up, including the destruction of tapes by the CIA, and the media
ran stories that uncritically quoted US and Australian officials. The second section,
and one of the more remarkable results given the substantial amount of evidence,
explores the use of devaluation as a method for inhibiting outrage. The evidence is
overwhelming in the Australian context, and numerous examples are provided to
exemplify this. The reinterpretation of events is also explored, and the methods that
the media and politicians utilised to shift focus off the torture that was occurring, and

62

their accountability for that torture. The use of official channels is the fourth method
examined, and the results included the many investigations that appeared to address
the problems arising from torture but, instead served to cover-up and obfuscate the
reality from the public. And finally, the use of intimidation to inhibit outrage was
demonstrated. Whether through the use of legal channels, or overt intimidation, the
results provide for numerous examples of this occurring over the years, including the
intimidation of witnesses and the rewarding of those involved.
Chapter Six expands on these findings to examine the support networks that
facilitate and maintain the perpetration of state-inflicted torture and the subsequent
cover-up. These vast torture support networks provide ideological, political,
economic and practical support for the perpetration of torture. The chapter explores
the ideology and politics of torture and terrorism, and the mechanisms by which the
state uses torture as a method of control and as a function of empire. The
mechanisms and the workings of the deep state are introduced as a system that
operates in secrecy and outside the control of any civilian leadership. The way the
state operates and cultivates a culture of impunity is also discussed. The spread of
militarism is identified as a theme in the findings, including the promotion of
‘legitimate violence’ when it is inflicted by the state. The politicisation of terrorism,
and how fear is used as a political tool, is discussed. The case that torture is a form of
state terrorism is presented, and the impacts of terrorism on the survivors, their
families and the wider community are discussed. Finally, the expansion of the
national security state is introduced as another way that torture is covered-up, and
countering voices are stifled. This is reinforced through the new shift towards cyberwarfare, which has emerged over the past decade in particular.
Chapter

Seven

explores

suggested

means

of

addressing

torture

using

‘countermethods’, such as; exposing the cover-up, validating and re-humanising
victims/survivors, emphasising the injustice, discrediting official channels, and
resisting intimidation. Theories around radical social change are discussed, and the
need for narratives that promote peace and the dignity and respect for all human
beings are introduced. The importance of promoting empathy is introduced, and the
need to shift the culture and structure of society from one that is individualistic and
legitimises some forms of violence, to one that is more community minded.
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Structural change is argued as the only way to address torture given the underlying
systems and mechanisms of support.
Chapter Eight presents the conclusion which reflects on the research questions and
the significance of the findings. A summary of the main findings is presented.
Finally, the postscript is intended to provide the reader with the most recent
information in relation to the situation for torture survivors and accountability.

Conclusion
This chapter provided an introduction to the research and explored the key
definitions and terminology utilised in the thesis. The problematic nature of defining
torture and terrorism was introduced, given that these concepts are usually subverted
by those with powerful interests. This extends to notions of human rights and the
problematic way in which rights have become a manifestation of empire, rather than
protecting the most vulnerable members of the community. Despite these issues,
humanitarianism was identified as forming the basis of the research given that the
framework sees all human beings as equal and rights are applied universally. This is
of particular importance when examining issues relating to torture given that it is
usually perpetrated against those who are considered as ‘others’ or social pariahs.
The Backfire Model (Martin, 2007) was presented as the core of analysis, and this
included a discussion around theories of outrage. The role of the media in shaping
the narrative was also examined, as was the applicability of Herman and Chomsky’s
(1988) Propaganda Model and Stanley Cohen’s (2001) theory around outrage and
denial, in the context of the War on Terror. Finally, an overview of the thesis was
presented to provide the reader with an outline of the main issues that will be
discussed and explored in the thesis.
The following chapter presents an historical overview of the War on Terror to
provide a background and context for the research. The complex political situation is
explored and the ideological and political mechanisms put in place by the Bush
Administration are introduced, including the legal justifications for holding
individuals detained in the War on Terror indefinitely and in conditions that amount
to torture. The issue of extraordinary rendition is explored, in addition to the rise of
private military and security contractors, and their link to covert torture.
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Chapter 2: Background to the War on Terror
…convinced that we lack moral or political principles to bind us together, we
savour the experience of being afraid…for only fear, we believe, can turn us
from isolated men and women to a united people. Looking to political fear as
the ground for our public life, we refuse to see the grievances and
controversies that underlie it. We blind ourselves to the real-world conflicts
that make fear an instrument of political rule and advance, deny ourselves the
tools that might mitigate these conflicts, and ultimately ensure that we stay in
thrall to fear (Robin, 2004, p. 3).
The military and political response to the September 11 terrorist attacks was
undeniably one of the most significant events to impact the Western world in the past
two decades. The fear that ensued, the devastating military response, and the
decimation of human rights and civil liberties, have all contributed to the current
political climate now faced in both the US and Australia.
The purpose of this chapter is to provide context for the research by exploring the
historical, political and ideological underpinnings of the War on Terror, including
the rationale for the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. The devastating military response
is introduced and the political impetus that allowed for the definition of torture to be
manipulated is examined. The history and methods of interrogation and torture are
explored in a way that provides a context for future chapters, which examine the
political and media rhetoric. The places of detention are introduced, including the
legal black-hole of Guantanamo Bay, and the CIA extraordinary rendition program.
Finally, the chapter explores the expansion of the US-led conflicts, including covert
operations such as the drone and extrajudicial assassination program.

The Birth of the ‘War on Terror’
Our response to 9/11 might have been wiser if only we had read history more
carefully – Julian Burnside QC (2007, p. 131).
On September 11, 2001 two planes crashed into the World Trade Centre buildings in
New York and another into the Pentagon, each target being an icon of US power.
This abhorrent act caused the deaths of 2, 977 people and created a chain of events
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that has led to incalculable death, destruction and devastation in different parts of the
world. The impact of the War on Terror waged by the United States Government and
its allies, including the Australian Government, has been devastating. Over the past
decade, hundreds of thousands of civilians have subsequently lost their lives in
retaliatory attacks (Bohannon, 2011; Burnham, Lafta, Doocy, & Roberts, 2006;
Moulton, 2004), there have been unlawful assassinations and mass assaults
(Soherwordi & Khattak, 2011; Wolverton, 2011), thousands of people have been
detained unlawfully for over a decade and denied due process (Amnesty
International, 2011), some have disappeared (Center for Human Rights and Global
Justice, 2005; Gimbel, 2011), and some have even been tortured to death (Allen et
al., 2006).
Although globally, a long and violent history has included acts of terrorism and
extreme violence to convey political messages, the astonishment of what had taken
place on US soil and the fear that followed seemed to overshadow any memories of
recent history. Leaders of the Western world appeared to forget the carnage and
chaos that has pervaded Africa, parts of the Middle East and Latin America for
decades; large-scale violence had now come to America’s own doorstep. Indeed, the
fear that ensued was insidious and permeated through the Western world, just as
quickly as the attacks took place.
There was little public consideration that 9/11 could have occurred as a result of US
interventionism in countless countries around the world (Johnson, 2007). Rather
than seriously reflect on US foreign policy, US and Australian commentators
reasoned that the attack was a result of individual psychology, or the “Muslim
worlds [sic] fragile sense of identity” which was threatened by “Western values” and
modernity (Robin, 2004, p. 5). Indeed, the narratives set by the Bush Administration
were firmly established within days of the attacks, and an emerging ideology saw the
role of the US as protecting “the innocent” and “advancing human rights” in the
world to counter the terrorist threat (Danner, 2009, p. xxiv). But this was nothing
new as the “terrorists” who “hated our freedoms” were in many ways the new
communists (Danner, 2009, p. xxiv). Indeed, the American policy of containment
that was active during the Cold War (Ikenberry & Slaughter, 2006), shifted to the
Bush doctrine of pre-emption during this period (Lieber, 2005). Conservative foreign
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policy analysts argued that deterrence could no longer be relied upon to face “nonstate actors with millenarian aims…potentially equipped with devastating weapons”
(Lieber, 2005, p. 26).
However, the US Government plan of global military domination was already in
progress when the events of September 11 occurred (Lieber, 2005), and critics saw
the attacks as an excuse for the US to expand its empire by pursuing military
dominance in the Middle East (Chomsky, 2003b; Olshansky, 2007). For example,
the 2002 National Security Strategy, outlined the official rhetoric around global
dominance which included US forces being “strong enough to dissuade potential
adversaries from pursuing military build-up in hopes of surpassing, or equalling the
power of the United States” (White House, 2002, p. 30). International affairs expert,
John Ikenberry described the declaration as a grand strategy that “begins with a
fundamental commitment to maintaining a unipolar world in which the United States
has no peer competitor” (as cited in Rappert, 2006, p. 31). The development of
having a military force that prevents adversaries from contemplating resistance was a
troubling development during this period (Kaysen, Miller, Malin, Nordhaus, &
Steinbruner, 2002). Indeed, Kaysen et al. (2002) have argued that the US was
actually proposing ‘preventive war’ as part of this strategy as opposed to ‘preemption’. Whilst pre-emptive war suggests that war is imminent and unavoidable,
preventive war is characterised as a war of choice to prevent a threat further in the
future (Kaysen et al., 2002, p. 3). Certainly, this characterised the invasion of Iraq.
The Project for a New American Century was well and truly underway.
The rhetoric set into place what Danner (2009) termed a “democratic tsunami” in the
Middle East that would use America’s unrivalled power to sweep away the
“fundamentalists” and bring freedom and democracy to the region (p. xxv). In the
place of ‘the Communists’, and even though they commanded no armies and
controlled no state as was the case with traditional warfare, a new enemy called ‘the
terrorists’ was successfully created (Danner, 2009). It was indeed, this ideological
framework that gave rise to the devastating military response to 9/11.
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The Military Response
The bombs are getting closer…thumping of anti-aircraft batteries all
around…the people look like lost souls in purgatory. Perhaps we are already
dead?...Fuck you George Bush…You wouldn’t send your children here…you
wouldn’t go to war yourself…This is terrorism. I’m terrified. This is so bad,
such a bad thing to do. The children are crying under the red sky. It’s not like
hell – this is hell…nothing is safe anymore. I want to hide but there is
nowhere to go. The whole world is in flames. I hate you Bush, because
you’ve made me hate. I cannot love anymore. I hate. And the world shudders
and burns because of it. Is this it? The women and children crying while the
sky bleeds…. - From the personal diary of journalist Paul Roberts who was
covering the Iraq invasion for the Globe and Mail (Roberts, 2004, p. 4).
The War on Terror included a ramping up of US military activities in the Middle
East. The Bush doctrine of “If you harbour terrorists, you’re a terrorist: if you aid
and abet terrorists, you’re a terrorist – and you will be treated like one” instigated the
bombing campaign against Afghanistan in October 2001, under the pretence of selfdefence (as cited in Gurtov & Van Ness, 2005, p. 31).17 The 2001 Authorisation for
the Use of Military Force (AUMF) was invoked by President Bush, which authorises
the President to use “all necessary and appropriate force against those nations,
organizations, or persons” responsible for 9/11 and those who “harboured such
organizations or persons” (Weed, 2013, p. 1). This included al-Qaeda and associated
forces. Whilst the reasons for attacking Afghanistan changed over time, and at one
point included ‘freeing’ the women of Afghanistan from the Taliban, the Bush
Administration claimed the right to self-defence (Robertson, 2006, p. 525) because
Afghanistan constituted a state that was harbouring an aggressor (McCormack,
2007). However, although a long line of reliable intelligence pointed to Osama Bin
Laden, the identity of those responsible for the 9/11 attacks was still not confirmed
when the bombing campaign started (Gurtov & Van Ness, 2005).18 For example,
even in 2002, former FBI director Robert Mueller testified before a Senate

17
18

It was later revealed that 15 of the 19 hijackers were from Saudi Arabia.
Mayer reveals that on September 12 a classified cable was sent by Cofer Black’s deputies to CIA
paramilitary operatives to kill Bin Laden, dismember him and to “send a few choice body parts back
to Langley” (Mayer, 2008, p. 29)
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committee saying “we think [emphasis added] the masterminds of [9/11] were in
Afghanistan, high in the al Qaeda leadership” (as cited in Chomsky, 2003b, p. 200).
Despite the uncertainty, the Bush Administration began its Operation Enduring
Freedom with ferocity and, regardless of international norms, did not seek any
authorisation from the UN Security Council (Robertson, 2006).
The US Government had provided assistance to the Taliban in Afghanistan from the
1980s right up to 2001,19 however the mission developed into boosting the Northern
Alliance and attacking the Taliban whom they believed acted as ‘protectors’ of alQaeda. As Mayer recounts in her 2008 book The Dark Side, on September 13 in a
meeting with the National Security Council that decided to initiate the war in
Afghanistan, Cofer Black stated “you give us the mission – we can get ‘em. When
we’re through with them, they will have flies walking across their eyeballs” (as cited
in Mayer, 2008, p. 31). Indeed, former US Secretary of State Colin Powell who was
also in the room at the time, later thought that “Bush seemed eager to kill” (as cited
in Mayer, 2008, p. 31).
International human rights lawyer Geoffrey Robertson argues that there was no
“imminent” danger posed to the US from Afghanistan and that the international legal
principles of self-defence that were relied upon were therefore unwarranted
(Robertson, 2006, p. 525). It turned out that Osama Bin Laden was in Pakistan when
he was assassinated in May of 2011 (Soherwordi & Khattak, 2011). Regardless, the
result of the war in Afghanistan was devastating – thousands of civilian casualties
were recorded (Bohannon, 2011), and the decimation of civil liberties began.
It was, however, the ‘preventive’ invasion of Iraq that significantly characterised the
dismantling of the rule of law in the War on Terror.20 Just in time for a midterm
election campaign in September 2002, the Bush Administration instigated what
Chomsky terms as the “manufactured fear” campaign in September 2002, in an

19

The US funded, armed and supported the Taliban (and Bin Laden) throughout the Soviet invasion.
This support continued even up to the Spring of 2001 when the US announced a $43 million grant to
the Taliban (the government of Afghanistan) for opium eradication (Mayer, 2008, p. 75). The
relationship apparently changed when they refused to hand over Bin Laden after September 11. The
civil war in Afghanistan between the Taliban and the Northern Alliance has caused much confusion
in the Western media, particularly as the lines were blurred between the Taliban and al-Qaeda the
terrorist group.
20
Chomsky (2003b) argues preventive war is a clear war crime.
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attempt to divert attention from domestic issues onto national security, which was
the Republican party’s strength (Chomsky, 2003b, p. 121). Along with North Korea
and Iran, Iraq was one of the countries named by George W Bush as being the ‘axis
of evil’ (Danner, 2009).
Although the threat of nuclear proliferation had been identified in the 2002 National
Security Strategy, just ten days later the UN Disarmament Committee adopted two
resolutions calling for stronger measures to “prevent the militarisation of space”, and
the second which reaffirmed the prohibition of “poisonous gasses and bacteriological
methods of warfare”, both of which the US abstained from (Chomsky, 2003b, p.
121). Paradoxically, it was the perceived threat of the tyrannical regime of Saddam
Hussein harbouring weapons of mass destruction (WMD) that provided the public
impetus for the US Government to attack Iraq.
The Bush Administration had already received advice from the CIA that although
there was little likelihood that Saddam Hussein would initiate any terrorist operation
against the US, if the US did attack Iraq, the threat would in fact increase (Gurtov &
Van Ness, 2005). In reality, numerous experts had warned the Bush Administration
that war with Iraq would increase the risk of terrorist threats and global anti-US
sentiments (Poynting & Whyte, 2012). However, according to several analysts,
having control over Iraq’s oil fields and the increasing desire for hegemony, were the
prevailing considerations in the decision to attack Iraq (Chomsky, 2003b), and
indeed, the ideology that the US must protect the innocent and advance human rights
certainly played a crucial role in the grand US plan for maintaining power and
military dominance (Danner, 2009).
Although Saddam Hussein’s regime was, without a doubt, brutal and tyrannical, the
impetus to invade was false, there were no WMDs and Iraq did not have ties to al
Qaeda (Lewis & Reading-Smith, 2008). However, straight-faced members of the
Bush Administration lied to a fearful public, stating that they should not wait for the
“mushroom cloud” before engaging in a pre-emptive strike (Hammond, 2007, p. 59).
So in March 2003, the US Government and its allies under the banner of the
Coalition of the Willing invaded Iraq – an act former Secretary General of the United
Nations, Kofi Anan, stated was contrary to international law (BBC News, 2004;
Doran & Anderson, 2011; Gillespie, 2004).
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What the US Government termed a ‘shock and awe’ campaign involved an initial 29,
200 air strikes on Iraq, and an additional 3, 900 over the next eight years (Swanson,
2013). The deadly payload included 400 tonnes of depleted uranium weapons as well
as cluster munitions (Human Rights Watch, 2003), and white phosphorous
(Swanson, 2013). Not only military targets were destroyed during the conflict.
Verifiable evidence has confirmed that civilians, hospitals, schools, electricity grids
and ambulances were hit, some indiscriminately21 (Doran & Anderson, 2011;
Mulhearn, 2010; WikiLeaks, 2010a), and some due to what Human Rights Watch
called an “unsound US targeting methodology” (Human Rights Watch, 2003, p. 6).
Doran and Anderson (2011) state that as of 2011, the death toll due to the conflict
reached between 600 000 and 1.2 million.22
It was the launching of George Bush’s “War of the Imagination” that Danner (2009)
states created the:
America the jihadists depicted: an imperial, aggressive, blundering power
that managed, by means of lurid, deathless images of tortured Muslims, to
prove to the world that all of its purported respect for human rights and
freedom was nothing but base hypocrisy (p. xxv).

The Torture Memos and Treatment of ‘Detainees’
All you need to know is that there was a ‘before 9/11’ and there was an ‘after
9/11’. After 9/11, the gloves come off – Cofer Black, former head of the
CIA’s Counterterrorist Center (CTC) (as cited in Mayer, 2008, p. 43).
The treatment of those held in US custody as a result of the War on Terror quickly
became an issue for the Bush Administration as the public pressure mounted to find
those responsible for the terrorist attacks. The fear that allowed for the bombing of
21

The issue of war crimes prosecutions has been widely covered. Although the US government
signed the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 2000, the Bush Administration
informed the UN that it would not become a party to the treaty. In addition, the Military
Commissions Act 2006 granted officials “retroactive immunity from war crimes prosecution”
(Doran & Anderson, 2011, p. 286). The Australian situation is clearer as the state ratified the Rome
Statute on 1 July 2002, and enshrined provisions into domestic legislation under the International
Criminal Court (Consequential amendments) Act 2002 (Cth.) (Doran & Anderson, 2011).
22
There has been criticism that this figure is incorrect (Bohannon, 2011). The numbers differ
depending on which source is utilised. For example, Iraq Body Count which documents publicly
reported deaths has the death toll between 113, 895 and 124, 724 (Conflict Casualties Monitor,
2013).
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Afghanistan and the unlawful invasion of Iraq similarly gave rise to the sanctioning
of torture by the Bush Administration. Researchers note that it was former US Vice
President Richard (Dick) Cheney and his advisor David Addington, who used the
crisis of 9/11 to further the agenda of enhancing presidential powers to a degree
never before seen in US history (Mayer, 2008). Convinced that the terrorists were
‘going to hit again’, an intelligence tool called the “Top Secret Codeword/Threat
Matrix” was introduced by Bush and Cheney in an effort to ensure that they would
never again be blindsided (Mayer, 2008, p. 5). Jane Mayer (2008) recounts how in
the days after September 11, Cheney and Bush received daily raw intelligence
briefings, however, “mistakes were made” simply because the data was not analysed
by intelligence experts and it was not corroborated or screened by those who had an
intimate knowledge of the situation; there was no filter (p. 5). The combination of
compounded fear, this new flawed Matrix, and the expansion of executive power
became a trifecta for disaster, and inevitably led to the enactment of policies that
allowed the sanctioning of “government officials to physically and psychologically
torment US held captives, making torture the official law of the land in all but name”
(Mayer, 2008, pp. 7-8).23
In the days after September 11, Cheney had already summoned lawyers from the
Department of Justice (DoJ) and the White House to work on legally justifying the
expansion of presidential power, relying on the know-how of White House Counsel
Alberto Gonzalez, Jay Bybee, John Yoo and David Addington (Sands, 2008). A host
of advice and memos were drafted in these initial few years after 9/11 and resulted in
counsel which deemed that the President could “defend the nation as he saw fit in
ways that were not limited to any laws”, and that he also “had the power to override
existing laws that Congress had specifically designed to curb him” (Mayer, 2008, pp.
46-47). This included pre-emptive military action,24 including action to prevent any
future terrorist attacks, extending war powers to the United States mainland to enact

23

It is important to note that torture has been systematically employed by the CIA and USG in past
conflicts as a weapon of terror. For example, torture played a central role in the CIAs counterterrorism program in Vietnam where they trained the South Vietnamese Police in the Provincial
Interrogation Center Program (PIC) to torture using horrific techniques including rape, gang rape
(using snakes, eels or hard objects), beatings, and electro-torture amongst other techniques
(Valentine, 2014).
24
This memo was entitled ‘The President’s Constitutional Authority to Conduct Military Operations
Against Terrorists and Nations Supporting Them’.
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martial law, the killing of civilians and the infringement of civil liberties such as
warrantless wiretapping (Gurtov & Van Ness, 2005; Sands, 2008). Whilst the legal
memos outlining these measures were kept secret at the time, by late September
2001 Bush’s public speeches began to show hints of the powers now provided to him
as president by White House lawyers. In a speech that reportedly reached 80 million
Americans, Bush suggested that, whilst the War on Terror began with al-Qaeda and
Bin laden, that it did not end there, there was a ‘global terror network’ that needed to
be eradicated (Bush, 2001).
This group of lawyers was also responsible for providing the highly contentious
advice which posited that those detained in the War on Terror would not be extended
the protections guaranteed under the Geneva Conventions 1949 (GCs). The GCs
were established after World War II to prevent the mistreatment of both civilians and
combatants in times of war. Because the US ‘terror suspects’, which according to the
lawyers included the Taliban, were not to be designated as Prisoners of War (POW)
as they were deemed irregular soldiers, and therefore outside the scope of
international norms, the memos authorised the secret capture and indefinite detention
of what they termed ‘unlawful’ or ‘illegal’ enemy combatants (Greenberg & Dratel,
2005).25 In effect, the advice suggested that by designating those captured as
‘unlawful enemy combatants’, the President could suspend the writ of habeas corpus
and therefore those detained could not challenge their detention before an
independent and fair authority (Greenberg & Dratel, 2005; Mayer, 2008).26 In
addition, US detainees could be ‘hidden’ from the International Committee of the
Red Cross (ICRC) and held indefinitely in incommunicado detention (Greenberg &
Dratel, 2005). It was at this point that the US became the first nation to authorise
violations of the GCs since World War II (Mayer, 2008, p. 9).27

25

Under the Geneva Conventions a lawful combatant was designated as a soldier who takes part in
hostilities. There is a category for unlawful combatants that includes spies and saboteurs which,
when drafted, had members of the French Resistance in mind (Mayer, 2008, p. 83).
26
This was extended to the use of military commissions to try terror suspects rather than civilian or
military courts under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). Cheney and Addington were
reportedly wanting to make it clear to the people that it was not a law-enforcement matter, but a war
(Mayer, 2008, p. 81).
27
It was the US government that was the ‘most ardent champion’ of the Geneva Conventions, and
indeed, principles in the Lieber Code formed part of the guidelines. The original manuscripts
currently lie within the US State Department (Mayer, 2008, p. 9).
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Amongst those practices determined as contrary to international law, the lawyers
also provided advice that covert paramilitary death squads and unlawful
assassinations targeting ‘terrorists’ could be employed by the US anywhere on earth
under the action of ‘national self-defence’ (Scahill, 2013). The need for
congressional oversight was also curtailed in the advice, as the interpretation meant
that only four elected representatives were required to be notified, and they could not
reveal to the public what they had learned (Mayer, 2008).
The use of a network of secret CIA prisons was also sanctioned (Scahill, 2013).
Although the US practice of extraordinary rendition began under the Reagan
Administration, the establishment of a network of “black sites” was created soon
after the events of 9/11 (Danner, 2009; Mayer, 2008) . In the past, rendition was
apparently used by the US Government as a tool to bring those who were suspected
of criminal activity to be tried before regular courts, but this changed after 9/11 to
rendering suspects outside the law in an attempt to gather information about crimes
not yet committed (Mayer, 2008, p. 108). The CIA black sites spanned globally,
including parts of Europe, Asia (including the Middle East) and Africa; and although
the exact figures will never be known, it is estimated that around 150 people were
rendered between 2001-2005 (Gimbel, 2011).
Out of public view and coordinated by the CIA, private military contractors as well
as US Government officials, many ‘terror suspects’ were taken to these secret
prisons to be subjected to ‘interrogation’ (Scahill, 2013).28 The most common
locations for these secret prisons were Egypt, Morocco, Syria, Jordan, Uzbekistan
and Afghanistan; all countries that have been identified by human rights groups as
breaching prohibitions on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
(Open Society Justice Initiative, 2013). When speaking about the rendition program
an unnamed US official was quoted by the Washington Post as stating “We don’t
kick the shit out of them. We send them to other countries so they can kick the shit
28

The process of rendition in itself was harrowing. For example, on December 18 2001, two Egyptian
asylum seekers seeking refuge in Sweden were snatched by around six men all dressed in black. They
had their clothes cut off with scissors, were forcibly administered sedatives anally, hooded, placed in
nappies and orange jumpsuits. They were then placed in a three-piece-suit, which is a term used to
describe leg irons and handcuffs joined at the waist with a chain, and shuffled onto a Gulfstream V jet
to be transported where they were to be rendered and ‘interrogated’ in a third country (Mayer, 2008).
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out of them”, a statement which encapsulated US Government policy and attitude at
the time (as cited in Pred, 2007, p. 373).
Indeed, it was the legal advice pertaining to interrogation and ‘intelligencegathering’ that proved an extremely concerning development in the response to the
War on Terror. Soon after September 11, former Vice President Dick Cheney was
asked on a US television program how the Administration was going to respond to
the continuing threat posed by ‘terrorists’. Cheney memorably responded that “We’ll
have to work sort of on the dark side, if you will…it is going to be vital for us to use
any means at our disposal…” (Cheney, 2001, p. 4). This dark side was manifested in
the broadening of CIA powers and the sanctioning of what the Bush Administration
lawyers termed ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’.
On November 19 2001, an order proclaiming a state of “extraordinary emergency”
allowed the US military to “detain and try any foreigner whom the President or his
representatives deemed to have ‘engaged in’ or ‘abetted’ or ‘conspired to commit’
terrorism” (Danner, 2009; Mayer, 2008, pp. 86-87; Sands, 2008). The order outlined
that defendants could be sentenced to death, have no right to appeal to independent
bodies, however, they would be treated humanely. Detainees, as opposed to
prisoners of war, would be granted “adequate food, drinking water, shelter, clothing,
and medical treatment” (Sands, 2008; Mayer, 2008, p. 87). The treatment of what the
Administration deemed as high-value detainees paved the way for more aggressive
forms of interrogation.
John Yoo, who was tasked with providing legal advice on obtaining more
‘actionable intelligence’, stated that the CIA was pushing for techniques that
amounted to torture and violated protections outlined in the GCs because, as he
stated unapologetically, “it works” (as cited in Mayer, 2008, p. 134).29 However,
other accounts point to a push by Dick Cheney and his lawyer David Addington
(Sands, 2008). Under Geneva Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners
of War 1949, “No physical or mental torture nor any other form of coercion may be
29

On September 8 2006, a Joint Senate Select Committee Report on intelligence countered the
argument that torture was effective. The report details that top Bush Administration officials had
known for years that in the case of al-Libi, bad intelligence was obtained because he was tortured.
Al-Libi stated that he was under pressure to admit ties between Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda in
Iraq.
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inflicted on prisoners of war to secure from them information of any kind…”
(Article 17). However, the justification for the treatment of those detained became an
issue of legal acrobatics, and the Bush Administration lawyers seized on any
loopholes they could to deny any protections. For example, the legal advice claimed
that even though Afghanistan was a signatory to the GCs, it was argued to be a failed
state, so therefore they would not apply (Duffy, 2005).
As aforementioned, the now infamous ‘torture memos’ authored by John Yoo and
Jay Bybee deemed that for an act to constitute torture, there had to be “specific
intent” to torture, and the physical pain must be “equivalent in intensity to the pain
accompanying serious injury, such as organ failure, impairment of bodily function,
or even death” (as cited in Greenberg & Dratel, 2005, p. 172). Any action or
treatment that did not reach this threshold was deemed as acceptable under Yoo and
Bybee’s interpretation. Upon this advice, techniques such as waterboarding, forced
nudity, sleep deprivation, isolation, wall slamming, environmental manipulation,
exploiting people’s fear of dogs and other animals, and stress positions were
authorised. Historian, Alfred McCoy (2012), who has researched US psychological
torture for many years now, likens the US definition of torture to a game of Cluedo.
He used the analogy of the murderer being Mrs White with the candle-stick in the
kitchen. Anything outside of that would not be deemed as murder (McCoy, 2012).
Unfortunately, his parallels are extremely pertinent and clearly demonstrate the
narrow definitions set into place so that the Bush Administration could attempt to
legalise what they were doing.
In light of the legal advice received by the White House, on January 18 2002,
Donald Rumsfeld sent an order to the Joint Chiefs of Staff declaring that “the
military no longer needed to follow Geneva’s rules in their handling of al-Qaeda and
Taliban prisoners” (Mayer, 2008, p. 123). In their warped reality, they were now able
to make up their own rules. A few weeks later on February 7, a directive sent by
President Bush extended this by stating that as a matter of policy “the United States
Armed Forces shall continue to treat detainees humanely” as long as it was
consistent with “military necessity” (as cited in Mayer, 2008, pp. 124-125).
However, the conduct of the CIA and other covert operatives were left out of this
directive.
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Despite these directives, and even before these techniques were authorised, treatment
that contravened human rights standards was already being employed by the US
military and others acting on their behalf. Accounts of those held in US custody in
Afghanistan soon after 9/11, including by the CIA, private military contractors and
American Special Forces, detail treatment that violated the GCs including
incommunicado detention, sleep deprivation, mock executions, forced nudity and the
denial of adequate food and water. For example, a Navy medic whose report became
declassified, noted that US citizen John Walker Lindh, who was captured in
Afghanistan, was kept sleep-deprived, naked, blindfolded and bound to a stretcher
with duct tape in a freezing cold shipping container (Danner, 2009). One document
quotes a physician stating that “sleep deprivation, cold and hunger” could be applied
to make Lindh talk (as cited in Mayer, 2008, p. 94).30 Unlike most detained in
Afghanistan at the time, Lindh was sent back to the US to face trial because he was a
US citizen.
Whilst the legal directives formed by the Bush Administration lawyers provided
justification for harsher treatment, these directives were already being employed by
those who were responsible for detaining ‘terror suspects’. Indeed, in 2005, President
Bush declared that the CAT did not apply to prisoners held overseas, and in the
process opened the door to immunity being provided to those operating in military
prisons, and the CIA black sites (Sands, 2008). These multiple flawed legal analyses
pervaded the treatment of those taken to Guantanamo Bay.

30

Confessions that were extracted from him during this time were to be used in the US court hearing
against Lindh, however, a deal was struck prior to trial because of the ‘mistreatment’ and because he
was a US citizen, he was allowed a trial in a US court and would not be subjected to military
commissions as other foreigners were/are (Mayer, 2008, p. 97).
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Guantanamo Bay

Figure 1: The first Camp X-Ray prisoners, 11 January 2002 (Source: McCoy, 2002a)

The United States is proud to call itself a nation ruled by law. But even a
nation of laws must understand the limits of legalism…War has its rules, of
course – but by those very rules our enemies in this War on Terror are
outlaws – Former Presidential speechwriter David Frum and Richard Perle,
former assistant Secretary of Defense (2004, p. 196).
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (Gitmo) was seized by the US Government under an
‘indefinite land lease’ in 1903, pursuant to the Platt Amendment as a result of the
Spanish-American war (Ratner & Ray, 2004; Rose, 2004). The Amendment
provided that the US Government had complete jurisdictional control over the
territory, and although the lease stipulates that the territory was only to be used as a
coaling station, the US Government at one point used it as processing station for
refugees fleeing Haiti (Ratner & Ray, 2004). Although the rent for the territory is
around US$4,000 dollars a year, the Cuban Government has refused to accept any
payments since 1959. Michael Ratner (2004), an attorney from the Center for
Constitutional Rights who represents many Gitmo prisoners, states that for “all
intents and purposes, Guantanamo is a colony or territory of the United States… the
applicable law in Guantanamo is the federal U.S. law. The United States has
complete control and jurisdiction over Guantanamo…” (p. 3). However, this legal
situation did not suit the needs of the Bush Administration after the events of
September 11.
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After 2001, the Bush Administration needed a place to detain those it saw as part of
the ‘global enemy’ in the War on Terror. In 2004, a top US official stated that Gitmo
was chosen because “the legal advice was we could do what we wanted to
them…they were going to be outside any court’s jurisdiction” (as cited in Roosevelt,
2008, p. 3). Indeed, an English Court of Appeal described Guantanamo Bay in the
early days as a “legal black hole” (Rose, 2004, p. 10). Despite the regular process
whereby those detained in the theatre of ‘war’ are able to go before tribunals to
establish their combatant or non-combatant status, on 28 January 2002, Donald
Rumsfeld visited Guantanamo and declared that “there is no ambiguity in this case.
They are not POWs. They will not be determined to be POWs” (as cited in Seelye,
2002, p. 1). Former President Bush determined that those detained in Guantanamo
Bay would be classified under a presidential order, as ‘unlawful enemy combatants’,
therefore devoid of any protections under the GCs and devoid of rights to appeal
their detention.
Since the first ‘detainees’ arrived at Gitmo on January 11 2002, the conditions and
treatment have been shown to violate basic human rights protections, which prohibit
torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment (Amnesty International, 2011;
Human Rights Watch, 2011). The 110 men and boys who made up the first arrivals
at Gitmo were flown in on a cargo plane where they were shackled to the floor,
hooded, handcuffed with a three piece suit, had earmuffs and goggles placed on their
already hooded heads, and were injected with sedatives before landing. Because of
the swift arrival of the men, appropriate infrastructure was not built to house
detainees. Instead, wire cages were erected on a slab of concrete, leaving detainees
exposed to the elements, and local wildlife, which included scorpions and rats
(Olshansky, 2007).
Gitmo has been described as “a twenty-first century Pentagon experiment”; it is an
interrogation camp designed to hold people outside the law without access to the
outside world (Ratner & Ray, 2004, pp. 3-4). Ratner (2004) says: “Guantanamo’s
purpose is to break down the human personalities of the detainees in order to coerce
them from whatever their captors want, to get them to confess to anything, to
implicate anyone. Guantanamo is a prison where cruel, inhuman and degrading
treatment – even torture – is practiced, and is utterly illegal” (Ratner & Ray, 2004,
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pp. 4-5). Colonel Donald Woodfolk, then commander of the Guantanamo Bay
prison, explained that “the detention program at Guantanamo was aimed at holding
the suspects not for punishment or for trial, but rather for gathering intelligence” (as
cited in Mayer, 2008, p. 199). It was clear from the beginning of Gitmo that a
psychological torture training ground had been established, and techniques that have
been long known to disintegrate the personality were utilised immediately.

Interrogation
I didn’t like it…when it went from me having to mentally prepare myself to
go do this, to go in and throw chairs against the walls, and break tables, and
sit there and leave a guy on his knees for two hours, to having to mentally
prepare myself to do that – to the point where I enjoyed doing it. Fuck yeah, I
got to the point where I enjoyed doing it – Former Bagram and Abu Ghraib
interrogator, Damien Corsetti (as cited in Risen, 2014, p. 165).
The historical context is important when understanding the techniques used against
US captives in Gitmo and elsewhere. A long process of honing psychological torture
practices began in the mid-1900s, and according to McCoy (2012b), has passed
through four basic phases; experimentation, propagation, perfection and impunity
(pp. 16-17).
After World War II, a prison in West Germany operated as a secret black-site where
“the CIA, other US intelligence operatives, and even former Nazi doctors hired by
the US, ‘tested LSD and other interrogation techniques on captured soviet spies’”
(Kaye, 2014a, p. 4). This continued during the Korean and Cold War, when the use
of psychological torture techniques became more prevalent. During the Korean War,
the CIA poured millions of dollars into researching how information could be
extracted through ‘coercive’ questioning. In 1949, CIA experiments investigating
mind control by utilising drugs and hypnosis began under the name of Project
BLUEBIRD (McCoy, 2012b, pp. 17-18). From the 1950s to early 1960s in
particular, experimentation exploring the use of psychological techniques that did
not result in physical evidence, such as bruising, intensified (Margulies, 2006;
McGuffin, 1974). For example, in the 1950s, Canadian psychologist Donald Hebb
from McGill University, performed experiments on students that involved sensory
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deprivation (McCoy, 2012b). He placed them in an air conditioned room with
goggles, ear-muffs and gloves and left them there for two days. The students
experienced virtual psychosis involving hallucinations, and within 48 hours, the
results indicated that they were losing their own identities (McCoy, 2012b).31
Self-inflicted pain such as forced standing and stress positions also became a popular
research subject in the 1950s when studies from Cornell University found that the
KGB’s most effective torture technique was not beating people, but forcing them to
stand for days at a time; it caused swelling in the legs, ulcerations, hallucinations and
eventually the kidneys shut down (McCoy, 2012b, p. 20). A study by Air Force
sociologist Albert Biderman found that forced standing was the most “excruciating”
since the “immediate source of pain is not the interrogator but the victim himself,”
thereby turning the “individual against himself” (as cited in McCoy, 2012b, p. 21).
This began the use of stress-positions.
In addition, during this period, studies on
non-human
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helplessness’ as a tool for psychological
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Figure 2- Abu Ghraib prisoner forced into a
stress position (Source: US Department of
Defense, 2003a)

helplessness’ is the reality that when a human or non-human animal has been
tortured for long enough, they will give up trying to avoid the pain because it
destroys the animal’s will to survive. Therefore, keeping beings in a state of constant
shock and disillusionment inevitably breaks the spirit, making false confessions a
core result.
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It is important to note that the evolution of sensory deprivation techniques used currently can also
be traced back to Stalin which was the first regime to seriously experiment with modern
interrogations techniques (McGuffin, 1974). These techniques were then used to break down
prisoners in Northern Ireland and eventually shared with US interrogators as part of the
Quadripartite Agreement (Wright, 1998).
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The result of the culmination of years of research was the CIA’s first training
manual, the 1963 CIA KUBARK Counterintelligence Interrogation Manual (McCoy,
2012b). Although the entirety of the manual is still classified, parts were released in
1997, and even more detail was released in April 2014 (Kaye, 2014a).32 The CIA
KUBARK manual outlined the use of interrogation techniques such as isolation,
stress positions, hypnosis, the use of mind altering drugs and sensory deprivation in
order to successfully interrogate detainees. The CIA even used the techniques on
their own recruits with devastating effects – most dropped out and refused to take the
course (McCoy, 2012b). The CIA also released similar torture manuals and training
in the 1970s and 1980s to Latin American torture teams and trained them at the
School of Americas. The most significant of the CIA training manuals in relation to
Guantanamo interrogations, was called the 1989 Human Resource Training Manual
that, whilst advising against torture, advocates ‘coercive questioning’.33 According to
this manual, the three major principles of coercive questioning are inducing
“Debility, Dependence and Dread (DDD) to ‘induce psychological regression’ in the
subject through bringing a superior outside force to bear on his will to resist”
(Central Intelligence Agency [CIA], 1963, p. 52)
Research into ‘effective’ interrogation programs was not limited to the CIA. After
the Korean War, the US Air Force developed a program called SERE, which stands
for Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape (McCoy, 2012b). The four phase
program recreated a situation in which captured air men were subjected to
interrogation during the Korean War. During the Survival phase, air men are left in
remote areas with nothing but a parachute. The Evasion phase culminates in the
SERE instructors hunting the isolated personnel within the remote area. The
following Resistance phase has been described as the most important part of the
training. Military personnel are “isolated, stripped of their clothing, deprived of food
and sleep, subjected to prolonged stress and duress techniques, humiliated and
subjected to long hours of questioning” (Margulies, 2006, p. 121). The program was
32

Obtained under a Freedom of Information request by Dr Jeffrey Kaye, the newly declassified
version of the KUBARK manual confirms that the CIA rendition program was not a product of the
post 9/11 era, but was practised long before. The report also points to ‘defector reception centres’
for Cold War defectors and refugees where “preliminary psychological screening” took place
(Kaye, 2014a, pp. 3-4).
33
The manual states that torture does not work, however, the author fails to identify practices such as
forced standing, humiliation and threats as forms of torture.
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so ‘successful’ that it was expanded to other arms of the military. Ironically, the
army described the program as necessary because whilst US military personnel are
covered by the GCs, “captors of American personnel have not treated [American
soldiers] in accordance with the spirit or letter” of the Conventions (Margulies, 2006,
p. 121). Instead, captors have resorted to a variety of “illegal” practices in an effort
to “exploit” American servicemen, including “psychological pressure”, “physical
mistreatment,” and “medical neglect” (Margulies, 2006, p. 121).
The techniques used in the SERE program expanded over the years to include sexual
and religious humiliation. Male soldiers have described being forced to walk naked
whilst female interrogators humiliate them, wear make-up and dress in a skirt, and
female soldiers have testified that they were nearly raped. The early 1990s saw an
escalation of sexually humiliating techniques when military personnel were forced to
recreate sexual acts on other captives, forced to wear and then remove a garbage bag
skirt and bend over the table, curtsy and “act like a girl” (Margulies, 2006, p. 122). A
form of waterboarding has also been used on personnel. A graduate described guards
swarming over the ‘prisoner’, cuffing his arms and legs to a board and covering his
face with a bandana whilst the other guard started “pouring water over the cloth.
[The prisoner’s] limbs strained at the cuffs as if he were being shocked. The
groaning, gurgling sounds were…awful…Every 20 seconds or so, the torturers
would remove the cloth so the commandant could ask a question” (as cited in
Shugar, 1988, para. 11).
According to the Pentagon, the goal of the SERE training is to “strip soldiers of their
identities” by recreating situations of extreme stress, anxiety and humiliation to
prepare them for captivity (Margulies, 2006, pp. 122-123). The 1983 Human
Resource Exploitation Training Manual – (Interrogations) described quite succinctly
the purpose of the techniques contained and refers to the learned helplessness
principles.
The purpose of all coercive techniques is to induce psychological regression
in the subject by bringing a superior outside force to bear on his will to resist.
Regression is basically a loss of autonomy, a reversion to an earlier
behavioural level. As the subject regresses, his learned personality traits fall
away in reverse chronological order. He begins to lose the capacity to carry
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out the highest creative activities, to deal with complex situations, to cope
with stressful interpersonal relationships, or to cope with repeated
frustrations (CIA, 1983, K-1).
Indeed, it was the ‘effectiveness’ of these techniques to break the spirit of the
‘detainee’ that led to psychologists and psychiatrists becoming part of the
Guantanamo interrogation program. Many Gitmo interrogators were trained by
SERE instructors or had experience in the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA),
which oversaw the SERE training. It was reverse-engineered SERE training that was
used against detainees in what would become a training ground for torture. The
techniques used against Gitmo detainees were not entirely the thoughtless actions of
some sadistic lower level troops; many of these techniques were calculated and
based on years of research into techniques that break the individual. Then head of
US Central Command (CENTCOM) General James Hill, confirmed that coercive
interrogation techniques drafted in October 2002 “resulted in the close collaboration
between experts from the Army SERE school at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and
interrogation teams at Guantanamo” (Margulies, 2006, p. 123). Therefore, the
Standard Operating Procedures of the prison and the interrogation techniques used
on Guantanamo detainees were a culmination of reverse engineered SERE methods
and other techniques developed by the CIA including forced standing, isolation,
sexual humiliation, dietary manipulation and sleep deprivation.
These techniques were ramped up under the authority of Major General Geoffrey
Miller after 2002, in an attempt to gain ‘actionable intelligence’. A year after the
prison opened, members of the intelligence community were shocked to find that
most of the detainees were not of any ‘intelligence value’, instead, they were
teenagers and men in their eighties who had to move with the aid of a walkingframe. Eighty-six per cent of ‘detainees’ had been sold for a bounty to the US
military, rather than being caught ‘on the battlefield’ as the Bush Administration had
said publicly (American Civil Liberties Union, 2014). A senior CIA intelligence
analyst was sent to Guantanamo in late 2002 to assess the intelligence situation. He
found a state of chaos, including prisoner files without names or prisoner details. He
stated that many had been caught in the dragnet: “they were not fighters... they
should not have been there” (as cited in Mayer, 2008, p. 183). His report stated that
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“he believed that the United States was committing war crimes by holding and
questioning innocent people in such inhumane ways” (as cited in Mayer, 2008, p.
185). The report caused alarm in the White House, as the assessment was not coming
from a human rights group, but as Mayer described, he was a hard and experienced
senior analyst who had spent his life fighting terrorism (Mayer, 2008, p. 185).
Rather than heeding the warnings, the US Department of Defense (DoD) pushed for
greater ‘flexibility’ in relation to Guantanamo interrogations (Mayer, 2008, p. 188).
Colonel Brittain Mallow, a former Military Police officer stated:
There was tremendous pressure to produce actionable intelligence. And that
has been, and was at the time, the number one priority... The pressure came
from the highest levels of our government…There is no empirical evidence
that tells you coercive or aggressive, physically coercive tactics are going to
produce results (Mallow, 2007).
In response to this situation, and given the close relationship between Miller and
Rumsfeld, the military then asked the DoJ for permission to go beyond already
established rules for interrogation that were outlined in the Army Field Manual
(Danner, 2008; Sands, 2009). The Army Field manual allowed for prisoners to be
subjected to a number of techniques that, either in isolation or combination, amount
to torture. There are also many loopholes in the manual that allow for subjective
interpretation.34 Of particular concern to human rights groups and the UN, are
techniques contained in “Appendix M”. These include the use of isolation, or
“separation”, as it is termed, in order to “prolong the shock of capture…and foster a
feeling of futility” (US Department of Defense [DoD], 2006, p. 10); forms of sensory
deprivation, which include the use of blindfolds, earmuffs and goggles to limit
sensory awareness; the use of drugs and sleep deprivation, which in the context of
the manual allows the Human Intelligence Collector (HUMINT) to only let detainees
sleep four hours a night over thirty days (Brooks, 2009, pp. 1-2). The use of “fearup” is also contained in the manual. This technique is used in conjunction with the
“separation” technique in order to create fear and hopelessness. The manual
34

For example, “complete deprivation of all sensory stimuli” is prohibited, however, this means that
depriving the detainee of one or two senses at a time (sight and sound) would be acceptable as long
as it’s not “excessive” (US Department of Defense, 2006).
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describes: “in the fear-up approach, the HUMINT collector identifies a pre-existing
fear or creates a fear within the source” (DoD, 2006, ch.8, p.10). In other words,
from a human rights perspective, the situation in relation to detainee treatment under
the Army Field Manual was still of concern;35 the difference is that military conduct
was bound by the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), whereas the CIA and
contractors had no oversight. The UCMJ prohibits treatment of detainees that
amounts to cruel or oppressive treatment (Mayer, 2008).
Despite these prohibitions, documents have since revealed that in 2002, the US
military was ramping up its interrogation practices, including using those outlined in
the SERE program (Mayer, 2008). Mayer (2008) described that “hooding, stress
positions, sleep deprivation, temperature extremes, and psychological ploys designed
to induce humiliation and fear suddenly seemed legion” (p. 190). Behavioural
Science Consultation Teams (BSCT, pronounced Biscuit) teams were also
introduced around this time. BSCT teams are comprised of a psychiatrist and
psychologist and are tasked to observe “interrogations, assess detainee behaviour and
motivations, review interrogation techniques, and offer advice to interrogators”
(Church, 2005, p. 19). Detainee fears and phobias were identified by the
psychologists, and they collaborated with interrogators to modify interrogation
techniques in an attempt to break the detainee down more quickly. By September
2002, the military held a number of brainstorming meetings to get ideas about how
to crack Gitmo detainees. Former Military Lawyer, Diane Beaver, recalled that the
television show 24 was one source of interrogation techniques as “it gave people lots
of ideas” (as cited in Mayer, 2008, p. 196). In 24, the fictional character Jack Bauer
tortures his captives in order to make them talk in a fictional terrorist plot.
The interrogation and treatment of Mohammed Mani Ahmad Sha’Lan al-Qahtani, a
twenty-six year old Saudi man, was documented in interrogation logs. Al-Qahtani
was subjected to a host of torture techniques, such as being tied to a leash and made
to act like a dog, told his mother and sister were whores, deprived of sleep for 48 out
of 54 days, held down while a female interrogator straddled him, forced to wear a
bra and thong on his head and doused with water 17 times (Grey, 2007). Evidence
35

The techniques outlined in the Army Field Manual are still being used against prisoners. When
Obama declared an end to torture practices when he was elected in 2009, the AFM became the core
interrogation document for the military (Brooks, 2009).
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suggests that Rumsfeld and high level Pentagon officials were ‘closely’ involved in
al-Qahtani’s case (Mayer, 2008). Indeed, Lieutenant General Randall Schmidt, who
was interviewed as part of an investigation of ‘abuse’ at Guantanamo, described
Rumsfeld as “personally involved” in al-Qahtani’s interrogation (as cited in Mayer,
2008, p. 195).36 It has since surfaced that Haynes and Rumsfeld were seeking legal
guidance from former Defense Department lawyer John Yoo and then head of the
Justice Department’s Criminal Division, Michael Chertoff in relation to the
interrogation techniques (Mayer, 2008, p. 194).
When the CIA found out that Al-Qahtani was accused of being involved in the 9/11
terrorist attacks, they wanted him handed over to them, as they were already holding
and interrogating the so called ‘high-value’ detainees in secret Black Sites. Mayer
describes an argument that took place between the then head of the CIA, George
Tenet, and Donald Rumsfeld, with Condoleeza Rice in the middle. A source within
the Pentagon stated that because Rumsfeld wanted to show they could be successful,
“that’s when the silly stuff started” (as cited in Mayer, 2008, p. 195).37

36

It must be recognised that people within the Pentagon were raising concerns about the treatment of
Guantanamo and other war on terror detainees. For example, records show that when Brittain
Mallow, the commander of the Task Force, became aware of what was going on after seeing
interrogation logs from the prison, he told Haynes that coercive questioning was “immoral and
unethical” (as cited in Jones, 2008).
37
David Becker, head of the Interrogation Control Element in Gitmo, also pointed to Rumsfeld and
those higher up the chain of command. He stated that “Most of the aggressive techniques [were] a
direct result of the pressure felt from Washington to obtain intelligence and the lack of policy
guidance being issued from Washington” (as cited in Mayer, 2008, p. 195).
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Torture Techniques

Figure 3- Satar Jabar connected to mock electrical shock devices under threat that stepping
down from the box would cause his electrocution at Abu Ghraib
(Source: US Armed Forces, 2003) 38

Guantanamo military interrogators had just returned from a SERE conference run by
the JPRA when the experimental techniques were used on al-Qahtani and others in
Gitmo.39 Waterboarding could be carried out as long as the “specific intent” was not
to cause prolonged mental harm (Greenberg & Dratel, 2005; Mayer, 2008, p. 201).
However, it was the techniques that were taken almost directly from the KUBARK
and the Human Resource Exploitation Manual that centred on the Debility,
Dependence and Dread (DDD) principles, that were most widely used, and arguably
caused the most psychological harm.
According to the DDD model, the goal of psychological regression begins at the time
of arrest. The person is “rudely awakened and immediately blindfolded and
handcuffed” (CIA, 2014). During transport to the detention facility, the person is
subjected to isolation, both psychological and physical. Humiliation also plays a part
in the period of regression. The person is stripped, photographed, showered and
subjected to a body cavity search. The prisoner is then to be provided with “ill-fitting
clothing”, as “familiar clothing reinforces identity and thus the capacity for
resistance” (CIA, 2014; McCoy, 2012, p. 102). Strict isolation plays a central role in
this process, so before the first interrogation, captives are strictly kept in the dark
38

This technique of forced standing can be traced back to Argentina, demonstrating that whoever
placed Satar Jabar in that position, knew the psychological effects it would have (Rejali, 2007).
39
Diane Beaver describes the military men in attendance at the conference becoming “glassy eyed”
when they realised how aggressive they were going to get. She said “You could almost see their
dicks getting hard as they got new ideas” (as cited in Mayer, 2008, p. 198).
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about their surroundings, where they are, and even what time of day it is. Colonel
Woodfolk, head of the Guantanamo prison at the time, maintained that to harvest
intelligence, detainees had to be kept in an atmosphere of “dependency” (Margulies,
2007, p. 26). It is widely accepted that solitary confinement is cruel and causes longterm and permanent psychological damage. Research has determined that the use of
solitary confinement alone can cause emotional damage, hallucinations, delusions,
depersonalisation and declines in cognitive functioning (Rejali, 2007). Due to this
evidence, solitary confinement was banned under Common Article III of the GCs.
The conditions of the cell are also important in the DDD model. The colour of the
cell, as well as access to natural light and temperature, should all be controlled by the
HUMINT. For example, keeping the lights on 24 hours a day will disrupt the
person’s sleeping pattern, and they will not know whether it is day or night. Bedding
should be kept to a minimum so that they are never comfortable, or able to recover
from the ‘shock of capture’. This manifested in Guantanamo in a number of ways.
For example, in Camp X-Ray, the men were held in small cages of wire that only
had a concrete floor. They were completely exposed to the elements, including the
heat of day. In other enclosed camps, the air conditioner is set to freezing and the
men are left in isolation with nothing more than a pair of shorts. Former prisoners
have described what they call ‘torture rooms’ where they are placed in stress
positions, so that the wrists and ankles are shackled to the floor, the air conditioner is
set to freezing, there are pornographic and macabre photos placed all over the walls
and the floor, loud heavy metal music is blasting and they are left in there for hours
at a time (Begg, 2007; Hicks, 2010). One man came out of that room with no hair
because he had pulled it out strand by strand (Hicks, 2010).
Threats are also used as part of DDD model to induce ‘cooperation’ (CIA, 2014).
The manual states that threats should not be made unless they can be carried out.
Some of these threats include public exposure, confiscation of property or physical
violence. Part of the Debility process is the purposeful attempt to disorient the
person and destroy their capacity to resist. For example, meals and sleep are not to
be at any discernible time pattern, so that the person is solely dependent on the
interrogator for all basic needs. This is even suggested to extend to the use of the
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toilet facilities, which were also tightly controlled at Guantanamo, particularly in
relation to the rationing of toilet paper.
Sleep deprivation as a form of torture stems back to the Catholic inquisition and the
Calvanist Church of Scotland in the 1600s (Rejali, 2007). They used sleep
deprivation to seek out ‘witches’ in the 17th Century. There is overwhelming
evidence that sleep deprivation is one of the cruellest and most painful forms of
torture. When someone is sleep deprived, the body’s resistance to pain is lowered.
The person also suffers from deep pains in the body; the pain usually begins in the
lower body and spreads upwards as the sleep deprivation sets in. It causes both
auditory and visual hallucinations and completely destroys the sense of self.
However, psychological experiments have demonstrated that the most ‘useful’ result
of sleep deprivation for interrogators is that it leads to the detainees becoming much
more suggestible. It has been used for years to gain false confessions. It was used by
the Nazis, the French in Algeria and the British in Northern Ireland (Rejali, 2007).
The US formally authorised sleep deprivation against ‘terror suspects’ for periods of
72 hours; although these guidelines were not strictly adhered to. They used programs
called ‘operation sandman’ and the ‘frequent flyer program’ where they would kick
inmates cells and scream at them every half hour, or they would physically move
them from cell to cell every ten minutes so that there was little time for deep
restorative sleep (Hicks, 2010).
Once the Debility and Dependence of the prisoner has been established, Dread
comes into play (CIA, 2014). Fear is the core concern with the Dread principle – the
Manual explains that the fear of anything vague or unknown ‘induces regression’.
Where pain is to be employed by the interrogator, the Manual recommends selfinflicted pain, such as forcing the prisoner to stand at attention or sit on a stool for
long periods of time, as this is “more likely to sap his resistance” (McCoy, 2012, p.
103). It has been established that threats during interrogations at Guantanamo
included the use of stress positions, where men were chained to the floor for hours at
a time, and made to urinate or defecate on themselves. Threats to detainee’s family
members have also been recorded in an attempt to create fear in the detainees.
These techniques were also employed in other places of detention, including
Afghanistan and Iraq. In fact, military personnel have testified that the torture of
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prisoners was so widespread and systematic that they used to beat prisoners (or
PUCs [Persons Under Control], as they would call them) for stress release (Human
Rights Watch, 2005). The US Army 82nd Airborne Division, at Forward Operating
Base Mercury, provided detailed testimony of how they routinely used physical and
mental torture in order to ‘gather intelligence’, including “smoking a PUC”, which
referred to sleep deprivation and depriving prisoners of all food except for water and
crackers (Human Rights Watch, 2005). They stacked prisoners in pyramids, tipped
cold water on prisoners and left them in the cold, beat them with baseball bats,
forced them to undertake extremely stressful exercises, and left them in outside
holding facility to be exposed to the elements (Human Rights Watch, 2005). These
accounts were consistent with other torture techniques being employed in other USrun facilities.
Former interrogator Damien Corsetti was nicknamed the “King of Torture” whilst he
was working at Bagram detention facility in Afghanistan (Risen, 2014, p. 171). He
describes how as time went on, he started his own experiments to try to find new
ways to break prisoners more quickly:
I used a combination of shit that I had seen during the handoff from the group
of interrogators that had been there before, and some that I came up with.
Like putting a guy at a 45 degree angle with your body straight and your head
against the wall, I came up with that. I sat down and I was like, the knees
[another stress position] aren’t doing it enough for me anymore. It’s not
quick enough. What can make them feel that fucking 20 minute knee pain in
about two minutes? And I figured that out, I sat there in the interrogation
booth, and put myself in different positions, and I did this and it was like, oh,
this one fucking sucks. So then you go and share it with other people, and
you go, hey guys, I just discovered this, it’s great. It’s like prison
experiments, what’s tolerable to you over time becomes more tolerable, and
limits get pushed further. You don’t even think about it (as cited in Risen,
2014, pp. 171-172).
Indeed, the conditions of confinement and the methods of interrogation at
Guantanamo and other US prisons all mirror the DDD and SERE methods of
‘interrogation’. The destructive nature of the psychological techniques employed has
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been ongoing, and whilst the public focus has been on torture techniques such as
waterboarding, little attention has been drawn to the psychological methods. Many
experts such as Dr Metin Basoglu (2009), now contend that psychological
techniques such as humiliation and exposure to aversive environmental conditions
have the same impact as physical torture, if not worse (Başoğlu, 2009; Basoglu,
Livanou, & Crnobaric, 2007; Medical Reporter, 2009; Reyes, 2007). These
techniques are much more insidiously destructive because there is not only the
complete annihilation of the victim or survivor, but also an additional element of
silence – you cannot see the scars and the public has to take the victim’s word for it –
which is made extremely difficult when they are called terrorists, liars or ‘evil’ in the
public domain as is discussed in Chapter Five and Chapter Six.

Military Commissions
I objected strongly to the Military Commissions Act that was drafted by the
Bush Administration and passed by Congress because it failed to establish a
legitimate legal framework… – President Obama comments on the 2006
Military Commissions Act (Obama, 2009b, p. 1)
On 13 November 2003, then Commander-in-Chief, President Bush, signed a
Presidential Military Order declaring that foreigners captured by the US could be
tried by military commissions (Denbeaux & Hafetz, 2009). US Military
Commissions are only applicable to non-US citizens due to the fact that US citizens
have constitutional protections, such as the right to a fair trial and the presumption of
innocence. The US Military Commissions are unlike any normal war crimes
tribunals, and whilst they are supposedly based on the UCMJ, they lack the same fair
trial protections. For example, children are allowed to be prosecuted, a practice
prohibited under international law (Duffy, 2005). The system was created
specifically to try those whom the Bush Administration deemed would not be
afforded protections under the GCs (Duffy, 2005).
Military Commissions have been widely condemned by the international legal
community, and several systems have been tried and replaced as a result of their
failure to comply with international fair trial protections (Duffy, 2005; Nicholson et
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al., 2007).40 The UN joined the condemnations when Martin Scheinin, the former
Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and
fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism stated “the MCA [Military
Commissions Act], contains a number of provisions that are incompatible with the
international obligations of the United States under human rights law and
humanitarian law” (Scheinin, 2006, p. 1). Close allies of the US Government have
also been critical. The former UK Attorney-General Lord Goldsmith would not
allow UK citizens to be subjected to a system that would not afford a full and fair
trial, and Lord Steyne likened Military Commissions to a kangaroo court which
makes a mockery of justice ("UK calls for Guantanamo closure", 2006). Even
President Obama expressed his displeasure with the system, remarking that the 2006
MCA was “fatally flawed” and that it “failed to establish a legitimate legal
framework” (Obama, 2009b, p. 1).
The reason why there has been such an outcry over commissions is because of the
overtly unfair processes and the fact that they are tainted by torture of the prisoners
(Colson, 2009). In the Hamdan case, Chief Justice Stevens’ verdict noted that
Military Commissions were not only unfair and illegal under both military law and
the GCs, but that the executive was bound by the rule of law and does not hold a
blank cheque (Hamdan v Rumsfeld, 2006). This is because successive Military
Commissions have allowed for retrospective and invented charges, hearsay evidence,
evidence obtained under ‘coercion’, the admission of secret evidence that the
defendant is prohibited from seeing, and extensive political interference (Colson,
2009; Denbeaux & Hafetz, 2009). For example, the Secretary of Defense has the
power to alter the rules of evidence as they see fit (Denbeaux & Hafetz, 2009). Rules
and procedures are decided before they are codified, and have been changed in order
to ensure the success of prosecutions. There is no independence because the judge,
defence and prosecution all work for the US Government. There is no presumption
of innocence, considering that the US Government has publicly stated that the men
detained are terrorists and the worst of the worst. Defence lawyers have lamented

40

Military commissions were deemed unconstitutional in 2006, so President Bush rushed through a
2006 Military Commissions Act. This has since been replaced by President Obama’s 2009 Military
Commissions Act. No matter how many systems are put in place the same issues of unfairness
remain.
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that the iguanas who call Guantanamo home had more legal protection as a protected
species than Guantanamo inmates (Denbeaux & Hafetz, 2009, p. 133).
Criticism has also come from both defence counsel and former military prosecutors
(Denbeaux & Hafetz, 2009). Emails were leaked from the Office of Military
Commissions in 2005 that quoted former prosecutors as saying that the Military
Commissions members were handpicked and that the process was “rigged” to secure
convictions (Gawenda, Debelle, & Shiel, 2005, p. 1). Former military prosecutor
Major Preston was so troubled by what he saw that he was awake at night worrying
about what they were doing (Gawenda et al., 2005). A leaked conversation has a
Bush Administration official stating that they could only have convictions, and
definitely no acquittals (Horton, 2008). Defence counsel, Yvonne Bradley, stated
that she “had quickly learned that the only real goal of the military commission
system was to establish a rigged court that would guarantee convictions”, because of
the fact that the system was made up as they went along (as cited in Denbeaux &
Hafetz, 2009, p. 173). Even if a prisoner was found to be innocent, under the
Military Commission rules, they could still be held indefinitely.
Many military lawyers from both defence and prosecution teams have resigned in
protest at the system, citing not only the unfairness of the process, but the political
interference in all of the cases (Denbeaux & Hafetz, 2009). Former chief military
prosecutor, Colonel Morris Davis, resigned because of the direct political
interference in the David Hicks case. He stated that the charge was a favour to the
Australian Government and that if it were up to him, David would never have been
charged (Leopold, 2011b). A more recent resignation was from Major Jason Wright
who accused the government of “abhorrent leadership” on human rights and due
process because of the torture committed against detainees, and said that the cases
were “stacked” ("Guantanamo defence lawyer resigns, says U.S. Case is 'stacked',"
2014). The level of political interference to encourage lawyers to strike plea-deals
has also occurred in several cases, including that of child soldier Omar Khadr
(Hicks, 2010; Horton, 2007). In Khadr’s case, his civilian defence lawyer was cut
out of the process of his plea deal (Edney, 2013). The plea deals in several cases
have included gag orders to prevent the former prisoners from speaking about certain
aspects of their detention for set periods of time (Hicks, 2010).
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Defence teams have commented that they have been left to defend their clients
effectively with their arms tied (Dratel, 2012). Detainees, because of their conditions
of confinement and their treatment, were too concerned with being punished and
having access to basic necessities such as food, to concentrate on issues relating to
their defence (Dratel, 2012). Attorneys have been left to try and prepare a defence
for clients who are so sleep deprived they are unable to concentrate (Dratel, 2012).
Attorneys have limited access to defence materials, and evidence to back up their
defence cases have been destroyed or lost (Denbeaux & Hafetz, 2009). Evidence
relating to torture and ill-treatment is considered classified, and attorneys are unable
to discuss issues pertaining to their own clients, including their treatment when
subjected to the CIA extraordinary rendition program (Colson, 2009). Witnesses
have been paid off in order to provide evidence of a certain slant (Edney, 2013).
There is evidence that Guantanamo detainees have been drugged when charges were
read to them. David Hicks’ lawyers testified that he was provided with a cocktail of
sedatives before he was read his charges (Dratel, 2012). The military guards
admitted to his attorneys that they had given him drugs, but reason provided was that
it was in order to “protect the officers from any of the detainees’ reactions” (Dratel,
2012, p. 7).
There is no such thing as attorney-client privilege in Guantanamo. Legal materials
have been stolen or photographed in detainees cells, nullifying any right to
privileged communication (Denbeaux & Hafetz, 2009). Books pertaining to
treatment and legal rights have been confiscated, including the Torture Papers which
contains Bush Administration memos, and the GCs (Denbeaux & Hafetz, 2009).
More recently, it was revealed that smoke detectors in the meeting rooms where
attorneys met with their clients in Guantanamo were actually listening devices
("Guantanamo defence lawyer resigns, says U.S. Case is 'stacked'", 2014). Defence
attorneys have limited access to clients, and they have been deliberately kept away
from the isolated military base at crucial times, for example when plea deals were
being struck (Edney, 2013).
Despite all of these issues, the Military Commissions remained in place under a
revised Military Commissions Act 2009 (USA) sanctioned by the President. The
2006 Act obtained three convictions, however, all three detainees Ali Hamza al-
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Bahlul, David Hicks and Salim Hamdan, had their convictions subsequently
overturned (Center for Constitutional Rights, 2013).
The Military Commissions system has also invented and reinterpreted several ‘war
crimes’. For example, whilst attempted murder is usually not considered a crime in
war time, the US Government has interpreted that anyone who was on the
‘battlefield’ during the time of the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 could be
charged with this crime, effectively stripping the right to self-defence (Duffy, 2005).
The charge of Providing Material Support for Terrorism has gained the most
controversy, as it is so broad in nature that merely being in the vicinity could have a
person being accused of providing material support, even if they have not been
involved in terrorism, or related activities (Nicholson et al., 2007). The charge is
important to the US Government because it is the only thing available with which to
charge the majority of Guantanamo detainees. President Obama’s 2009 Task Force
concluded that out of 154 detainees, 74 had been cleared for release, and another 54
would be held indefinitely without charge because there is not enough evidence to
prosecute. Since then, even more have been cleared for release, and out of the around
800 people taken to Guantanamo, only a handful have ever been charged with a
crime, and most who have been prosecuted, have had their convictions overturned
(Center for Constitutional Rights, 2013). This presents a precarious position for the
US Government.
Human rights groups and legal experts have contended for years that prisoners
should be brought before recognised civilian court systems, or article three courts.41
However, it is clear that due to the way in which ‘evidence’ has been obtained, that
is now impossible. The Military Commissions system continues to be a source of
embarrassment for the Administration, as it is clear that the system is more about the
appearance of justice, rather than the rule of law. The reason why the Obama
Administration stuck to Military Commissions rather than US mainland courts is
clearly as a result of the way so-called evidence was obtained. Torture remains the
primary reason as to why Guantanamo prisoners will never be afforded an article

41

An article three court refers to US mainland federal courts that are under the jurisdiction of the
constitution of the US.

96

three trial. To make matters more complicated for the Administration, some of the
prisoners were subjected to the extraordinary rendition program.

Figure 4- Prisoner being terrorised by a military dog at Abu Ghraib in Iraq
(Source: US Military, 2004)
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Extraordinary Rendition & Ghost Prisoners
We also have to work, through, sort of the dark side, if you will. We’ve got
to spend time in the shadows in the intelligence world. A lot of what needs to
be done here will have to be done quietly, without any discussion, using
sources and methods that are available to our intelligence agencies, if we’re
going to be successful. That’s the world these folks operate in, and so it’s
going to be vital for us to use any means at our disposal, basically, to achieve
our objective – Former US Vice President Dick Cheney, September 16, 2001
(as cited in Open Society Justice Initiative, 2013, p. 7).
Well, there is a polite way to take people out of action and bring them to
some type of justice. It’s generally referred to as a rendition – Former CIA
director Porter Goss (as cited in Grey, 2007, p. 18).
Alexander Solzhenitsyn described the Soviet Union’s network of prison camps as a
‘Gulag archipelago’. In Solzhenitsyn’s writings, he explained how a parallel unseen
world existed separate from the public reality. It was a world that swallowed up
millions of prisoners, and many never emerged alive. Stephen Grey (2007) describes
the US rendition programme as having “eerie similarities”, although not on such a
grand scale (p. 18). Rendition is a process whereby a person is sent to a third country
or jurisdiction for the purpose of ‘interrogation’, or to be ‘softened-up’ for
interrogation (Grey, 2007). Although it became more prominent as an issue of
concern recently in the War on Terror, it has been a practice of long standing in the
US intelligence field. Former CIA ex-deputy counsel John Rizzo commented in
March 2014 that “Renditions were not a product of the post-9/11 era…[they] are
actually a fairly well established fact in the American and world, actually,
intelligence organisations” (Democracy Now, 2014). The first renditions can be
traced back to the Clinton Administration in 1990s and were executed by way of a
court order (Scahill, 2013). Most renditions during this period were for the purpose
of extradition to the US so they could face trial, however, some were taken for the
purpose of ‘intelligence gathering’ and flown to third countries where they had no
legal rights (Scahill, 2013, p. 27).
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In late 2001, however, the CIA started the rendition programme on those deemed
terror suspects as part of the War on Terror. The clandestine programme was
designed to be carried out far from the US mainland and its legal protections. The
US Government programme of secret detention and rendition entailed the
extrajudicial abduction and detention of thousands of people, the transfer of
prisoners on flights to undisclosed locations, and the torture and unlawful
interrogation of prisoners. The flights were branded as “torture taxis” by some in the
human rights community (Scahill, 2013, p. 27).
The rendition programme in the War on Terror was closer to home than many would
like to admit. It has been revealed that secret facilities operated on each corner of the
globe including Africa, Europe, the Middle East and Guantanamo Bay. There are
probably many facilities that will never be revealed. Fifty-four countries have been
named as being involved in the programme, either directly, or through acquiescence,
including Australia (Open Society Justice Initiative, 2013). This includes either
“hosting CIA prisons on their territories; detaining, interrogating, torturing, and
abusing individuals; assisting in the capture and transport of detainees; permitting
the use of domestic airspace and airports for secret flights transporting detainees;
providing intelligence leading to the secret detention and extraordinary rendition of
individuals; and interrogating individuals who were secretly being held in the
custody of other governments” (Open Society Justice Initiative, 2013, p. 6).

Although the full extent of both the rendition and secret detention programme largely
remain secret, enough evidence has come to light to demonstrate the gross violation
of numerous international human rights and humanitarian law treaties and
conventions. President Bush acknowledged that the CIA held over 100 people in
secret ‘black sites’ in 2006, as well as the sixteen so called ‘high-value detainees’
that were then transferred to Guantanamo, where they remain housed in another CIA
black site called Camp 7 (Grey, 2007). The total number of people who have been
subjected to both programmes is still unknown. The Open Society Justice Initiative
(2013) documented the cases of one hundred and thirty six known cases in 2013.
After a long and protracted battle, a 2012 Senate Select Intelligence Committee
report into the CIA detention programme was released documenting the extent of the
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programme, as well as the effectiveness of the techniques used. The US Senate voted
to release parts of it, although they were redacted by the CIA (Glaser, 2014). The
Senate report is horrific reading, and details the torture of prisoners in black sites that
were far worse than first disclosed, including the torturing of prisoners to death,
mock executions, placing prisoners in ‘coffin like boxes’ for extended periods of
time, ice water baths, rectal feeding of prisoners to enact complete control over them,
and one prisoner was treated for symptoms that are consistent with violent anal rape
(SSCI, 2012). It also appears that the reason why the US Government fought against
the release of the report was because it concluded that the techniques used on
prisoners were not effective in gaining actionable intelligence, as was publicly
claimed (SSCI, 2012).
In addition to the disclosures of the Committee, it is now well documented that those
detained, including men, women and children, were subjected to conditions and
treatment that amount to torture. Countless testimonies recall stories of being
snatched off the streets, or abducted from family homes, bound and bagged, taken to
remote parts of Europe or the Middle East and subjected to horrific torture. The
documented torture methods employed against those detained range from beatings,
electric shocks and sexual assault with weapons, to techniques that conveniently left
no physical marks, such as the ‘German chair’,42 being placed in a ‘coffin like box’
for days at a time, and simulated asphyxiation (SSCI, 2012).
Testimonies also point to the torture of children by the CIA. In September 2002, the
two children of a so-called high value detainee, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, aged
seven and nine, were abducted and held in Pakistan. At a 2007 Military Commission
hearing, a Guantanamo detainee named Ali Khan provided testimony that his son
Majid Khan was held at the same facility as Mohammed’s children. He said: “[t]he
Pakistani guards told my son that the boys were kept in a separate area upstairs and
were denied food and water by other guards. They were also mentally tortured by
having ants or other creatures put on their legs to scare them and to say where their
father was hiding” (as cited in US Military Commissions, 2007, p. 13). The
testimony not only points to the torture and ill-treatment of children, but that it was
42

The German chair is a metal frame with no seat or back where a person is tied in uncomfortable
positions.
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sanctioned by the US Government. One of the Office of Legal Counsel memos
described placing a detainee in a coffin like box with insects to exploit detainee
fears, similar to what Khan describes as having been done to Mohammed’s children
(Greenberg & Dratel, 2005). This testimony is also similar to what others have said
to the ICRC about their interrogations, even though the organisation was prevented
from visiting black sites. Majid Khan also told his father that he was hooded,
subjected to repeated beatings, being strapped to a chair for long periods of time in
tight restraints, sleep deprivation, and what he described as a small room that was so
tiny he could not stretch out his legs or lie down properly (US Military
Commissions, 2007). This treatment only stopped when he said he would sign a
statement that he was not even allowed to read. After being subjected to rendition,
Majid Khan was eventually moved to Guantanamo Bay. He was abducted along with
his mother and infant niece.
Whilst President Obama signed an Executive Order to close CIA facilities upon his
election in 2009, there is a loophole that allows for rendition to occur on a ‘shortterm transitory basis’, and there is a secret camp in Guantanamo Bay that continues
to hold prisoners without independent oversight. It is in these facilities that the
deaths of three men is said to have occurred during interrogation in 2006. In 2014,
human rights lawyer Scott Horton (2014) released a report into the deaths that calls
into question the official story that the three men suicided, which is the official
government line. For example, the men were found with rags shoved down their
throats with their hands and feet bound (Khan, 2008). The bodies were returned to
the families almost a week after the deaths, with organs essential to reach a
conclusive autopsy result removed, such as the brain and throat (Khan, 2008). The
fingernails of the men had also been cut after their deaths, which would have
removed any DNA evidence (Khan, 2008).
It has been well documented that people have been subjected to a number of horrific
torture techniques whilst under secret detention and the extraordinary rendition
programme. These include but are not limited to wall slamming, waterboarding, dryboarding (use of rags in throats rather than water), beatings with implements
including rifle butts, wrenches, and sharp objects, electric shock (to all parts of the
body, including genitals), threatened and actual sexual assault (by humans and
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animals – dogs, and objects such as broomsticks, lights, batons, plastic implements),
burning with chemicals, being forced to listen and watch others being tortured,
sexual humiliation (interrogators smearing alleged menstrual blood on men, forcing
them to wear women’s underwear and dresses, being shown pictures of simulated
rape or other violence on family members or other detainees), sensory bombardment
with blaring music or other sounds such as croaking frogs, revving chainsaw
engines, death metal music or children’s music (Grey, 2007; Hicks, 2010; Mayer,
2008; McCoy, 2012; SSCI, 2012).
The ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’ used on the so-called high-value detainees
led to the ‘confessions’ of a man named al-Libi. His ‘confessions’ were used as
evidence that Iraq harboured Weapons of mass destruction, and were used as the
impetus to go to war.

Figure 5- US Army SSG Ivan Frederick sitting on an Iraqi prisoner
(Source: US Department of Defense, 2003b)
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Private Military and Security Companies: Immunity and
Contracted Torture
Fight terror with terror – Iraqi police commander to a US Embassy Official
("Searching for Steele," 2013).
The War on Terror has led to the considerable rise of private military and security
contractors (PMSCs), as opposed to using traditional military forces, which is
depicted in Figure 6. More armed PMSCs died in Afghanistan than US soldiers
(Brown, 2014).
Figure 6- US Troop, Coalition, and Contractor Levels in Afghanistan and Iraq

(Source: Watson Institute for International Studies, 2014)

This rise in the use of PMSCs has occurred for several reasons. Private security is
big business and the US Government is willing to pay big dollars in order to

103

outsource its dirty work. In addition, it is clear that PMSCs could engage in activity
that the traditional military was unable to because of agreements put in place with
host countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan (Pelton, 2006; Scahill, 2007). The Bush
Administration bypassed many of the traditional rules of conflict by outsourcing the
terror, and plenty of money was made in the process.43 The contracts in Iraq and
Afghanistan were deeply marred by corruption. For example, Kellog, Brown and
Root (KBR)44 was a subsidiary of Halliburton for which former Vice President Dick
Cheney was formerly C.E.O., and it also has ties to the Bush family (Yeoman,
2003). KBR was awarded the largest contracts in Iraq, including the contract for
Restore Iraqi Oil (RIO) and many contracts in Afghanistan to establish base camps at
Kandahar and Bagram, and in addition was contracted to build Camp 6 in
Guantanamo Bay. It is estimated that between 2002 and 2012, the DoD has spent
$160 billion on PSMC’s in Iraq and Afghanistan (Mehra, 2014, p. 1).
PMSCs provide various functions in conflict zones, including armed security,
logistical support and intelligence (Cusumano, 2011). They have been deployed to
every country involved in the War on Terror, particularly Iraq and Afghanistan.
Whilst most contractors have been deployed for non-combat related activities such
as construction, maintenance and transportation (Cusumano, 2011), the armed
contractors have been implicated in numerous human rights violations, including
torture, arms trafficking, child prostitution, sexual assault, fraud and extrajudicial
assassination (Pelton, 2006; Scahill, 2007; Center for Consitutional Rights, 2010).
Many of the military security companies are made up of former Special Forces (SF)
or other soldiers, and CIA agents. For example, Enrique Prado, the man who
oversaw the assassination units for Blackwater and the CIA, is himself a former
high-ranking CIA officer (Friedersdorf, 2012).45

43

As already discussed earlier in the chapter the expansion of Presidential power meant that the
assassination of anyone deemed a terrorist was justified on the basis of national self-defence. More
information on drones is covered in the postscript.
44
KBR trades under a number of names and industries, including engineering, construction,
Downstream (Petroleum industry), Private Military Contractor, Gas monetisation and infrastructure
just to name a few ("KBR: A global engineering, construction and services company," 2010). From
1995 to 2002, KBR was awarded contracts to build military bases.
45
The Atlantic reported that Prado was tied to seven murders carried out whilst he was working for a
narco crime boss, and that the CIA protected him from investigation (Friedersdorf, 2012).
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The war in Iraq was the epicentre of the rise of PMSCs, and many of the reported
incidents relate to torture of prisoners whilst in their custody. Their role in Iraq
included reconnaissance, target acquisition, intelligence, training Iraqi military and
police, as well as interrogation and detention (Cusumano, 2011). Titan and CACI
were outsourced as translators and interrogators at the now notorious Baghdad
Central Correctional Facility, more commonly known as Abu Ghraib prison
(Cusumano, 2011). Reports into the torture of prisoners demonstrate that individuals
from both companies directly participated in the torture of prisoners (Taguba, 2004).
CACI was contracted to Abu Ghraib to interrogate prisoners and obtain human
intelligence. The Taguba Report into ‘detainee abuse’ details how employees from
CACI provided military police with instructions on how to set ‘conditions’ to
facilitate interrogations that were not in accordance with applicable regulations
(Taguba, 2004, p. 48). In addition, the report points to Titan Corporation employees
who were contracted as interpreters being involved in the ‘abuses’.
These documented ‘abuses’ included threatening detainees with a charged 9 mm
pistol, breaking a chemical light and pouring phosphoric liquid on detainees, pouring
cold water on naked detainees, beating detainees with a broom handle and a chair,
threatening male detainees with rape, sodomizing a detainee with a chemical light
“and perhaps a broomstick”, and using military dogs to terrorise the prisoners
(Taguba, 2004, pp. 17-18). Military Police officers stationed at Abu Ghraib describe
how military intelligence and private contractors asked their supervisors to “loosen
this guy up for us”, “make sure he has a bad night” or “make sure he gets the
treatment” (Taguba, 2004, p. 19). This included coercing a prisoner to stand on a box
with supposed electrodes attached to his fingers, toes and penis, saying that if he fell
off the box he would be electrocuted. They also used a number of other techniques to
keep prisoners awake including playing loud music, chaining them in uncomfortable
positions, making them simulate sexual acts on other prisoners and engage in other
sexually humiliating behaviours, including having to wear women’s underwear on
their heads (Taguba, 2004). Not only were PMSCs involved in the torture of
detainees, they were also part of the cover-up. Reports demonstrate that they lied in
their statements and failed to report the atrocities as they were occurring (Taguba,
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2004). These practices went on for a number of years and some prisoners died as a
result of being tortured, including being beaten to death.

James Steel and his Wolf Brigade
In addition to Abu Ghraib, the US Government used contractors to oversee
interrogation facilities in other parts of Iraq. The investigative documentary
‘Searching for Steele’ explores how the Pentagon contracted Colonel James Steele, a
US Special Forces veteran of the Central American “Dirty Wars”, to set up and
oversee a number of secret interrogation facilities across Iraq in order to obtain
information from those detained ("Searching for Steele", 2013). During the Dirty
Wars, Steele oversaw a team of military advisors who trained El Salvador security
forces in interrogation techniques in the 1980s. Under his watch, horrific human
rights abuses took place.
During the Iraq war, the US Government provided funding, weapons and training to
those who volunteered to become militia fighters to defeat insurgents, under the
watch of former Major General David Petraeus ("Searching for Steele", 2013).
Steele became a civilian ‘advisor’ to an Iraqi paramilitary squad called the Wolf
Brigade which was formed in September 2004. The Wolf Brigade fought alongside
allied forces in Mosul from 2004.46 WikiLeaks documents reveal that US forces
handed over their captives to the Wolf Brigade for ‘interrogation’ during raids in
2004 and 2005 (WikiLeaks, 2010b). They took over the public library in Samara and
turned it into a detention centre. The Wolf Brigade has been reportedly involved in
some horrific human rights abuses, including torture and mass killings. There are
reports they targeted Palestinian refugees, raided Sunni homes and tortured
detainees. Reporters have recounted testimony of US soldiers who stood by and did
nothing when members of the Wolf Brigade beat and tortured prisoners, including
listening to the “screams of prisoners all night long” and being told by US superiors
not to intervene (Leigh & O'Kane, 2010; "Searching for Steele", 2013). They
watched prisoners being “strung up like animals” over a bar and being tortured
("Searching for Steele", 2013). A US medic recalls that it was widely known that
46

The Wolf Brigade was made up primarily of Shiites, and drew its recruits from Shia slums in Sadr
city. They were paid around the equivalent of USD$400 per month, which is comparatively large
sum when taking into account the median Iraqi wage.

106

prisoners were being “beaten, shocked and... raped... brutalised” ("Searching for
Steele", 2013).
In a 2005 interview with Steele in Samara, New York Times reporter, Peter Maass
recalled seeing blood dripping off a desk in an office and his interview being
interrupted by the “terrified screams of a prisoner outside” (Leigh & O'Kane, 2010;
"Searching for Steele," 2013). Maass said that Steele stopped the interview because
the screams were so loud, and went out of the room. Whilst he was gone, the
screaming stopped.
The testimony of those tortured in Samara with the oversight of Steele is harrowing.
One man recalls: “we would be blindfolded and handcuffed behind our backs. Then
they would beat us with shovels and pipes. We’d be tied to a spit, or we’d be hung
from the ceiling by our hands and our shoulders would be dislocated” ("Searching
for Steele", 2013). Another says “they electrocuted me, they hung me from the
ceiling, they were pulling at my ears with pliers, stamping on my head asking me
about my wife, saying they would bring her here…” ("Searching for Steele", 2013).
The prisoners also recall that torture techniques were changed in order to cover up
the actions of the police. For example, they were told to stop dislocating the
shoulders because prisoners would end up needing surgery when released. Former
Iraqi Interior Minister General Muntadher al-Samai states that children were also
tortured ("Searching for Steele", 2013).
Steele’s role was not limited to oversight. He provided the Iraqi police with names of
people to detain for interrogation. Steele would arrange for them to be transported to
a US run interrogation centre near Baghdad airport. Witnesses note that Steele saw
detainees hanging upside down by their legs, and that there was no way that he was
unaware what was going on there ("Searching for Steele", 2013).
The fact that the US military was handing people over to these torture facilities was
widely known. An official military order called Fragmentary Order 242 (FRAGO
242) was handed down in 2004 that directed the US military not to investigate the
torture of Iraqi’s by Iraqi’s, unless specifically ordered to by headquarters (Mooers,
2014). Captain Jarrell Southall of the US National Guard recalls coming across
prisoners who had visible signs of being beaten and electrocuted, and were ordered
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by US military headquarters to stand-down and not do anything. He said “the
commander called us all in there together, and told us what we saw didn’t happen
and to forget about it” ("Searching for Steele", 2013).
However, WikiLeaks files show that by July 2005 Washington was informed of the
torture that was committed by Iraqi police commandos. Steele himself wrote to
Donald Rumsfeld warning that the police commandos, armed and financed by the
US, “were effectively a Shia militia death squad” ("Searching for Steele", 2013).
Nevertheless, the police chief said to the US embassy official that they needed to
“fight terror with terror” and that “their forces need to be respected and feared”
("Searching for Steele", 2013).
One man who survived Samara and Nisoor Square said that people had died after
being tortured and their bodies were dumped on the streets of Baghdad. At one stage,
3, 000 bodies a month were being dumped in the streets of Iraq, some so badly
tortured that they could not be identified. These bodies were put in a dump in
unmarked graves and no one has been held to account for their torture and murder.
Steele and Petraeus left Iraq in 2005 but the legacy of torture remained.47

Blackwater
Another prominent PMSC operating both out of Iraq and Afghanistan was
Blackwater, which changed its name to Xe services, and is now known as Academi
(Academi, 2014). Blackwater, which is described as the world’s largest mercenary
army, was founded by Erik Prince, whom is said to be motivated by extreme rightwing ideology (Scahill, 2007). Blackwater operated under the guise of providing
diplomatic security and training to local security forces, however, they were also
known for their involvement in assassination and torture. For example, Blackwater
had contracts with the CIA to oversee interrogations in Iraq, Afghanistan and other
forums in the War on Terror (Scahill, 2007). Many of Blackwater’s actions remain
unreported. The most prominently reported incident was the Nisour Square
massacre, which was dubbed “Baghdad’s Bloody Sunday” (Scahill, 2014, p. 1). 17
civilians and police officers were killed and 20 people were injured when on 16
September 2007, Blackwater personnel opened fire on a crowded traffic circle
47

Steele was presented with a distinguished service medal from Rumsfeld upon his return to the US.
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(Mehra, 2014). It was this that led to the reprisal attacks in Fallujah. WikiLeaks
revealed that this was not an isolated incident, and that Washington had already been
warned of the activities Blackwater were involved in (WikiLeaks, 2010b). For
instance, it was known that Blackwater guards were keeping automatic weapons in
their rooms where they would often get intoxicated (Mehra, 2014).
Blackwater was also contracted by the CIA and the Joint Special Operations
Command (JSOC) for more covert and sinister operations. Whilst the CIA was
concerned with intelligence gathering, JSOCs mission was to kill or capture socalled high-value targets (Scahill, 2013, p. 178). This provided the members of
Blackwater’s SELECT division, who were made up of former US Special
Operations, with a central role in the operations (Scahill, 2013). In Afghanistan,
Blackwater controlled four Forward Operating Bases, which were used by the CIA
to conduct Special Operations missions with the benefit of deniability. Retired US
Army Intelligence Officer Anthony Shaffer said that the reason why Blackwater was
used was “to avoid oversight” (as cited in Scahill, 2013). Ex-Special Forces
personnel have confirmed that Blackwater was contracted to conduct assassinations
as early as 2008 in Afghanistan (Friedersdorf, 2012). It also trained police, security
forces and militia on the ground, including the Pakistani Frontier Corps, the federal
paramilitary force responsible for strikes in tribal areas (Scahill, 2007).
Blackwater/Xe was also contracted by the CIA and JSOC as part of the drone
program, which is discussed later in the chapter (Risen & Mazzetti, 2009). It is
responsible for arming countless drones deployed in Afghanistan and Pakistan that
have killed and maimed innumerable civilians in the extrajudicial assassination
program (Scahill, 2007; 2013). It has been reported that the company have been able
to subvert accountability for the drone activity by ensuring that, whilst the drone is
manned and operated by the PMSC, at the point of pushing the ‘fire’ button, the US
military officially takes over command (Cusumano, 2011).
PMSCs have also been involved in secret prisons and other torture facilities in
Afghanistan. The Salt Pit is widely known as a CIA black site, or dark prison, and is
located north of Kabul. Captives who have survived their time in the extrajudicial
prison have documented being beaten, injected with drugs and sexually humiliated.
A man named Gul Rahman was killed in the Salt Pit, reportedly from hypothermia
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after being left chained to the floor of his cell overnight (Siems, 2011). Rahman was
buried in an unmarked grave, and his family was never told what had happened to
him until they read about his death in a newspaper two years later (Siems, 2011). A
researcher and photographer of covert black-sites said he located and photographed
the facility only after he saw a goat herder wearing a KBR baseball cap (Paglen,
2009, p. 2).
Immunity and a lack of oversight mean that most of the activities of PMSCs remain
unaccounted for. Because of the arrangement between the US and the Iraqi
Government, Blackwater and other PMSCs operating in Iraq and elsewhere continue
to operate largely with immunity from prosecution for all criminal activities they
were involved in, including the torture and murder of civilians (Reese, 2014).
This culture of immunity has also extended to cover another clandestine group, the
US Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC).

Joint Special Operations Command
Contractors and especially JSOC personnel working under a classified
mandate are not [overseen by Congress], so they just don’t care. If there’s
thirty-four [other] people in the building, thirty-five people are going to die.
That’s the mentality…They’re not accountable to anybody and they know
that – Anonymous Military Intelligence Source (as cited in Scahill, 2013, p.
252).
JSOC was another covert military force expanded as part of the War on Terror
(Naylor, 2015). Also known as ‘snake eaters’ within the covert operations
community, JSOC is made up of personnel from a number of different elite Special
Forces units under the banner of the US Special Operations Command (USOCOM).
However, they operate differently to the normal Special Operations units because
their operations are covert. They have been described as one of the most lethal and
nationalistic organisations; one JSOC personnel member described themselves as
“people that have a true belief in the nation and our ideals” (as cited in Scahill, 2013,
p. 181). JSOC has been implicated in a number of cases of crimes against humanity,
including torture and extrajudicial assassination, and because they operate on such a
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secretive level, and they have the protection of the elected Administration, their
actions have been carried out with impunity.
JSOC takes orders directly from the US President or Secretary of Defense, and is
responsible for a host of ‘counter-terrorism operations’, most notably, the detention
and interrogation of those considered ‘terror suspects’ in Iraq, Afghanistan and
Guantanamo Bay and the assassination of Osama Bin Laden (Naylor, 2015; Scahill,
2013). JSOC has not only a military function as specialist commandos, but also an
intelligence gathering role; hence their involvement in the detention of so-called high
value detainees and their work with the CIA. Their job is to identify targets, track,
fix the location and kill, without being detected (Kelly, 2013). JSOC has been
described as operating effectively as a paramilitary arm of the Administration
(Scahill, 2013, p. 181). A retired Special Forces officer, Colonel W. Patrick Lang,
described JSOC as “sort of like Murder, Incorporated” (as cited in Scahill, 2013).
The Crisis Intelligence Action Center (CIAC) based in Virginia was opened in 2011
and serves as the command post for all JSOC operations around the world
(Ambinder & Grady, 2013). It also has bases in Qatar and Kenya. Whilst they
predominately operate in Iraq and Afghanistan, they also have operations in Somalia,
Algeria, the Philippines, Indonesia, Yemen, Pakistan, Thailand, Mali, Columbia,
Peru, as well as European and Central Asian countries (Scahill, 2013, p. 183). Since
August 2014, JSOC was under the command of Raymond Thomas, formerly the
Associate Director of the CIA for Military Affairs. Thomas succeeded Joseph Votel
who is now the head of USSCOM. He is succeeded by William McRaven (Naylor,
2015).
With global financial pressures and the perceived need to counter apparent ‘terrorist
threats’ since September 11, there has been a clear shift in US policy towards
clandestine espionage and covert action. It is estimated that since former VicePresident Dick Cheney and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld directed JSOC
operations in 2001 with about 2,500 personnel, JSOC expanded to approximately
25,000 by 2013 (Kelly, 2013). This formed part of a global strategy to “stay small
but highly effective” in relation to overseas intelligence gathering for the DoD
(Miller, 2014, p. 1). The amalgamation of intelligence and military personnel, and
the preference for covert missions, rather than traditional military deployments, was

111

part of the 2012 Pentagon plan to establish an espionage network under the Defense
Intelligence Agency (DIA) to train and deploy over 500 undercover officers to work
alongside JSOC and the CIA, and obtain orders directly from the DoD (Miller,
2014).48 Under the direction of a former CIA and Pentagon intelligence figure,
Michael G Vickers, and approved by Defense Secretary Leon Panetta and retired
Army General David Petraeus, the manifestation of this policy was the creation of
the Defense Clandestine Service or DCS. CIA agents are already deployed to various
US embassies to pose as diplomats. This plan would see the emergence of newly
trained spies to specifically work alongside JOSC and the CIA with a focus on
counterterrorism and national security (Miller, 2012). Whilst the CIA and JSOC are
authorised to engage in drone strikes and political sabotage, the DIA mainly serve
under military units as a cover to try to “persuade their foreign counterparts to
become American informants” (Miller, 2014). The DCS officers receive training at
the Farm with the CIA (Miller, 2014). Although the final numbers remain classified,
a 2014 report notes that the project was minimised because of Congressional
concerns about the purpose of the clandestine practices, and the lack of oversight and
funding. They are, however, still operating with JSOC and other private security
contractors.
JSOC are responsible for a number of covert projects or ‘kinetic operations’, from
capturing and interrogation, to surveillance and other intelligence related activities,
and capture/kill assassinations (Naylor, 2015). One of the most secretive elements of
JSOC is called Task Force Orange, or The Activity (Ambinder & Grady, 2013), and
this is said to be the basis of its Australian counter-part, 4 Squadron (Welch &
Epstein, 2012). The Activity collects signals and human intelligence before the
commandos are sent in. Part of the intelligence role of JSOC is to collect human
intelligence, and in order to collect this material, they conduct their own covert
interrogation program.
JSOC were trained in the reverse-engineered SERE techniques and were brought
into a classified interrogation program called MATCHBOX, or its unclassified name
of COPPER GREEN (Ambinder & Grady, 2012). MATCHBOX provided for direct
48

This was apparently in response to a classified study by the Director of National Intelligence that
found key intelligence priorities were being neglected due to the divide between the Pentagon’s
focus on military matters and the CIA’s “extensive workload” (Miller, 2014).
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authorisation to use ‘aggressive’ interrogation techniques such as stress positions,
barking dogs and sleep deprivation (Ambinder & Grady, 2012). These techniques
were used at all of the detention facilities under the control of JSOC.
One of these facilities was Camp Nama in Baghdad, where JSOC were reportedly
responsible for the torture of prisoners under the watchful eye of then commander,
General Stanley McChrystal (Cobain, 2013). Former UK defence personnel report
horrific abuses including Iraqi prisoners being hooded, kept in small cells the size of
dog kennels, electroshocked and being taken to sound-proof shipping containers,
only to emerge severely distressed (Cobain, 2013). JSOC also were responsible for
some of the interrogations in Bagram Airbase and Guantanamo Bay (Ambinder &
Grady, 2012).
There is a secret camp in Guantanamo known as Camp No, or Penny Lane (Horton,
2014). As previously discussed, it is here that some believe three men were killed at
the hands of the CIA or JSOC (Horton, 2010). A series of cover-ups surrounding the
deaths was discovered in 2014 when Seton Hall Law School and Scott Horton
uncovered documents that showed contradictions in relation to official accounts
provided by the military and the NCIS who were the investigating authority (Kaye,
2014c). The official government line is that the three men simultaneously suicided
by hanging, despite their hands being bound and cloth material or socks being found
shoved deep in their throats. This is consistent with a torture technique called dryboarding which induces asphyxiation.
Besides systematic torture, JSOC also operate on the basis of kill-lists. Just like the
deck of cards handed out to the military when they were attempting to capture
Saddam Hussein, the Bush and Obama Administration’s provided lists of targets to
JSOC for their kinetic operations. A JSOC operative has stated that the lists keep
expanding, no matter how many people they kill (Wolf, 2013). This was part of their
role in Afghanistan. US investigative journalist, Jeremy Scahill, found that JSOC
members were conducting night raids in the tribal belt where they had killed women
and children. In order to protect their identities and operations, they went as far as to
cut bullets from the bodies (Scahill, 2013). JSOC was also the group responsible for
the “wedding party incident” where hundreds of civilians died (Priest & Arkin,
2011b).
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JSOC does not work alone, and there is evidence that private security contractors
were involved in many JSOC clandestine activities. Blackwater was contracted to
work for JSOC in Afghanistan and Pakistan as part of the US Government drone
program. Blackwater SELECT members worked in “hidden bases in Pakistan and
Afghanistan, where the companies contractors assemble and load Hellfire missiles
and 500-pound laser-guided bombs on remotely piloted Predator aircraft (Scahill,
2013). Blackwater also was stationed at Bagram Airbase where they assisted in
“snatch and grabs” of so-called high-level targets (Scahill, 2013, p. 251). In addition,
they helped plan missions for JSOC against the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan.
The level of impunity proved to be an issue wherever contractors like Blackwater or
JSOC went, with bodies of civilians turning up in massive numbers.

The President’s Drone and Assassination Program
The world is a battlefield and we are at war. Therefore the military can go
wherever they please and do whatever it is they want to do, in order to
achieve the national security objectives of whichever Administration happens
to be in power – Anonymous JSOC operative (as cited in Scahill, 2013, p.
183).
Whilst already operating in the final years of the Bush Administration, the drone
program expanded dramatically after the election of President Obama in 2009
(Scahill, 2013). Under the Bush Administration, the main focus was to capture and
‘interrogate’, however, Obama took a different approach to counter-terrorism by
focusing on capture/kill.
The drone ‘signature strike’ program is run by the CIA and JSOC, and they also
employ PMSCs, such as Blackwater/Academi (Scahill, 2013). The authority to strike
usually comes from the Director of the CIA, whoever that may be at the time. The
use of drones to assassinate people outside a declared war-zone has come under great
scrutiny, especially from human rights advocates. Killing without trial contravenes
long held democratic rights including due process, and the cornerstone of the right to
life. However, because the US Government is not a party to the Rome Statute, it
continues to remain unaccountable. US Congress gives the Executive, in this case the
President, the power to kill anyone deemed a terrorist, without trial (Ambinder &
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Grady, 2013). It is hard to provide evidence of innocence after being killed by a
drone.
The day after President Obama was elected in 2009, the first drone strike under his
watch killed between seven and fifteen people, most of them civilians (Scahill, 2013,
p. 249). The second strike hit the wrong house in South Waziristan and killed
between five and eight civilians, at least two of them children (Scahill, 2013, p. 249).
These ‘mistakes’ were certainly not an anomaly as the civilian casualties and loss of
life continued and broadened under the Obama Administration; strikes on Pakistan
almost occurred on a weekly basis in the first part of his presidency (Scahill, 2013).
As of March 2014, the drone program had killed around 2,600 people, as far as
human rights organisations can tell (Tayler, 2014). Part of the problem in obtaining
reliable data is that many of the drone strikes are carried out in small villages where
it is unlikely that any international observers are recording figures. The other
problem with obtaining comprehensive data is the fact that much of the drone
program has been carried out in the shadows in Syria, Pakistan and Libya, under the
veil of the State Secrets Privilege.49
The Obama Administration largely prevented the release of official data that detail
the casualties of the drone strikes, or the number of targeted killing operations
(Tayler, 2014). In addition, President Obama was directly involved in locking-up
journalists who have reported strikes that have killed the wrong people (Scahill,
2013; Wolf, 2013). For example, after the US Government reported that they had
killed al-Qaeda members in al-Majala in Yemen, independent journalist Abdulelah
Haider Shaye visited the town. He found remnants of Tomahawk cruise missiles and
cluster bombs, with the label ‘made in the USA’. Fourteen women and twenty one
children were killed. After reporting what he found, Shaye was abducted, beaten and
imprisoned by Yemeni security forces, accused of terrorism and imprisoned.
President Obama personally called President Saleh to express his ‘concern’ over the
journalist (Scahill, 2013). Shaye was subsequently convicted of ‘terrorism’ related
charges, and was sentenced to five years imprisonment in 2010 (Saleh, 2013). He
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State Secrets Privilege is an evidentiary rule known to US law which allows the Government to
block cases that may disclose information that endangers national security.
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was eventually released in 2013 to serve out the remainder of his sentence under
house arrest (Saleh, 2013).
Among the concerning issues that are apparent as part of the drone program, is the
fact that these intelligence and military contractors can target anyone, without
probable cause. Under the drone program, the CIA deems that “military aged males”
who were in a specific area that may have had contacts with a suspected militant or
terrorist could be the target of a drone strike (Scahill, 2013, p. 249). JSOC also has
its own kill lists, and may work with the CIA in hitting a specific ‘target’. In both
programs, no positive identification process is needed.
Known drone strikes include the targeting of a wedding in Yemen, the killing of a
family on their way home from a local market, and an attack that killed 42 Bedouins
who were sleeping (Tayler, 2014). However, it was only when a US citizen was
killed that the program gained more prominent media attention. Anwar al-Awlaki
was a US citizen who was killed by a drone strike whilst in Yemen in 2011
(Ambinder & Grady, 2013). A few weeks after his assassination, his son 16 year old
Abdulrahman was also killed by a US drone, reportedly whilst he ate lunch with his
father’s friends (Ambinder & Grady, 2013). The father of al-Awlaki brought a case
before the US Government for killing his son, however, the State Secrets Privilege
was invoked. The government has argued in several subsequent cases that the need
for government secrecy outweighs any public evidence that a crime has been
committed, including in the case of torture and extraordinary rendition (Ambinder &
Grady, 2013). After years of court battles, the memos outlining the US
Government’s justification for killing al-Awlaki were released.
The first heavily redacted memo outlines that the US president has the authorisation
as commander in chief to use his authority to “protect the country, [and] the inherent
right to national self-defence under international law” under the AUMF (Department
of Justice, 2011a, p. 1). The second memo, released in September 2014, argues one
of the more controversial aspects of the memo – that un-uniformed ‘enemy
combatants’ are acceptable targets, even though the CIA itself does not wear
uniforms. The memo argues that the CIA operatives who might be considered as
enemy combatants by opponents are not war criminals whilst they comply with
international law (Leopold, 2014b). The AUMF and the “public authority
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justification” is again used as justification for the CIA killing an American citizen
(Department of Justice, 2011b, p. 1). According to this memo, the CIA
assassinations are lawful on the basis that they were authorised by the President
(Department of Justice, 2011b). These justifications are insufficient according to
international law experts (Leopold, 2014b).
The drone program continues, and many of its operations are coordinated from the
Ramstein base in Germany (Solomon, 2016). It was reported that in 2012 President
Obama provided a $250 million contract for Blackwater/Academi to provide services
to the CIA (Friedersdorf, 2012). It is certainly clear that it is the preferred method of
choice for the Obama Administration, which is troubling considering that it not only
operates with impunity, but also in the shadows.

Conclusion
This chapter has explored the birth of the so-called War on Terror in order to provide
a context for the research, and as an introduction to many of the covert contexts in
which torture occurs. Under the guise of national security, the Bush Administration
overturned years of legal protections against torture, extrajudicial execution, war and
unlawful detention in order to carry out the aims of the Administration. Practices that
were both contrary to international law and morally reprehensible were sanctioned.
This opened the door to a dark and murky underworld led by the Bush
Administration, and carried out by the CIA and paid contractors. Torture was
integral to all of the Bush Administration’s actions, whether in Iraq, Afghanistan,
Guantanamo Bay or in secret black sites. But the US Administration was not alone.
Several other countries joined the ‘coalition of the willing’ as part of the War on
Terror. The UK Government played a major military role in the conflicts under the
watch of former Prime Minister Blair, and assisted in the torture and interrogation
program, including CIA rendition (Open Society Justice Initiative, 2013). The
following chapter explores Australia’s involvement in the military interventions in
both Iraq and Afghanistan and the role it played in the torture and detention
programs led by the US Government. The background to the Australian
Government’s involvement becomes integral to the analysis of outrage management
techniques explored as part of the analysis in Chapter Five.
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Chapter 3: Australia’s role in the War on Terror
Australia has made a choice with terrible consequences. We have chosen lies
instead of honesty; self-interest instead of social conscience; hypocrisy
instead of decency. We have chosen a government that shows contempt for
human rights…that has made us relaxed and comfortable only by
anaesthetising the national conscience – Julian Burnside QC (2007, p. 130).
This chapter explores Australia’s involvement in the War on Terror to provide
background and context for the research. Along with the UK, the Australian
Government was one of the most deeply embedded states to take part in the US-led
War on Terror. Australia participated militarily in the conflicts in both Iraq and
Afghanistan, and it is evident that certain Australian officials were involved either
directly, through acquiescence or cover-up in the torture and ill-treatment of people
detained in the conflicts, including Australian citizens. In addition, there is evidence
of a direct link between Australian Special Air Service (SAS) forces, black sites,
torture and rendition.
The chapter introduces the context of Australia’s involvement, including the military
participation and the legal situation relating to the detention and treatment of
captives in Iraq and Afghanistan. The deep involvement of an embedded Australian
Defence Force member in the Abu Ghraib torture saga is explored. In addition, the
background and role of the Australian Government in relation to three main cases are
introduced; including those of Mamdouh Habib, David Hicks and Joseph Thomas.
The chapter then examines the domestic context, including the response of the
Howard Government that saw the passing of a raft of counter-terrorism laws. Finally,
the covert joint operations of the Australian and US military are introduced in light
of revelations of the clandestine operations of the SAS 4 Squadron and presence of
the US Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) in Australia.

Australia’s Military Involvement
The military alliance between Australia and the US has long been robust. Australia
has hosted US military presence since the early part of the Second World War in
1942 (McCaffrie & Rahman, 2014, p. 89). As of July 2014, the US military has
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access to twenty-four major facilities in Australia, including training areas, ports,
communications stations and the joint defence ‘facilities’ at North West Cape and
Pine Gap (McCaffrie & Rahman, 2014, p. 88).50 Pine Gap is described as the most
controversial of all bases as it is used for CIA activity (McCaffrie & Rahman, 2014;
Rosenberg, 2011, p. 97). Because of the level of secrecy concerning US military
bases, little is known about their functions. Despite strong voices of opposition to the
presence of bases in Australia during the Cold War period – in direct response to
concerns that Australia would become a target for nuclear war – the military alliance
is, according to some scholars, generally accepted in the broader community because
of the secrecy that surrounds it (McCaffrie & Rahman, 2014, pp. 96, 98). Indeed, the
Australian Government’s foreign policy has been intimately tied with US
Government interests which aims to achieve geostrategic dominance, and this
closeness has only increased over the years (McCaffrie & Rahman, 2014, p. 97).
Former Prime Minister John Howard was in Washington on 10 September 2001,
attending a celebration marking fifty years of the ANZUS treaty (Manne, 2006). The
ANZUS treaty, initially signed in 1951, binds the US and Australia (and to a lesser
extent NZ)51 to cooperate in defence matters and solidified the strong political and
military ties between the two nations.52 As he was still in the US when the events of
September 11 occurred, the already close relationship that the former conservative
Prime Minister shared with President Bush only strengthened. The events of 9/11
were said to impact John Howard “deeply” (Manne, 2011, p. 15) and, given the
already strong ties between US and Australia, the Howard Government invoked the
ANZUS treaty which formed the basis of Australia’s engagement in the US-led War
on Terror. According to former US National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice,
when war with Afghanistan was signalled as not far off, Australia “clamoured” to be
invited to participate in the invasion force (Manne, 2011, p. 16). Professor of
politics, Robert Manne (2011), stated that this was “the moment John Howard had
50

There was also a base at Nurrungar, near Woomera however, this was closed in October 1999
(McCaffrie & Rahman, 2014, p. 94).
51
In 1985, a disagreement arose because New Zealand refused to allow US war ships into its ports for
fear that they were carrying nuclear weapons. The US refused to confirm whether it was carrying
the weapons. This created tensions between the two countries, even to the point where the US
declared NZ a friend but not an ally.
52
McCaffrie and Rahman (2014) state that ANZUS was enacted in response to concerns raised by the
Australian Government in relation to the US-Japan peace treaty, and the increased bases associated
with strategic reconnaissance in the southern hemisphere (p. 93).
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been waiting for his whole political life” (p. 16). Consequently, Australian troops
participated in the wars both in Afghanistan and Iraq.53

Detention and Treatment of ‘Detainees’
Australia’s involvement in the detention and interrogation of those detained in the
US-led War on Terror is not widely known. Australian forces played a central role in
the capture and detention of those deemed terror suspects in both Iraq and
Afghanistan as part of the Coalition. The role of certain military members and
Australian officials in the cover-up of the torture of prisoners in Abu Ghraib,
Guantanamo Bay, black sites or other detention facilities has been documented in a
number of cases (Brooks, 2014; Public Interest Advocacy Centre [PIAC], 2011). The
involvement goes to the top levels of both the Australian and US Governments, as
well as Australian Defence Force (ADF) members who are now in high ranking
positions. Whilst the formal detention policy provided that the ADF should hand
over detainees as soon as possible to the US or UK, there have been instances where
Australian military personnel have been closely linked to a number of events that
violated international law.

Formal Arrangements
From the outset of military operations it became increasingly clear that there were
disagreements between the US and Australia about how those detained by Australian
forces should be treated. The Australian military assumed that the US would be
responsible for any prisoners of war and that they shared the same view as to the
application of the Geneva Conventions 1949 (GCs). The Australian military has long
operated within the confines of the GCs, however, the Bush Administration’s
interpretation of Article V of GC (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons
in Time of War 1949, caused some disagreements, as it provides that some detainees
are able to be held outside the protections of the GCs in certain circumstances.54 Due
53

A 2011 article by Doran and Anderson sets out a case for Australian war crimes trials based on the
alleged involvement of Australian forces in the perpetration of war crimes. Doran and Anderson
point to the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) support of the use of cluster bombs on civilian
populations during the initial Iraq invasion in March and April 2003 and the Australian
responsibility for the assault on Fallujah in 2004 (Doran & Anderson, 2011, p. 287).
54
This includes being “definitely suspected of or engaged in activities hostile to the security of the
State…or Occupying Power” (as cited in Public Interest Advocacy Centre, 2011c, p. 12).
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to the skewed interpretation of this clause, as well as other dubious legal advice, the
US Government believed that suspected al-Qaeda or Taliban forces should not be
afforded protections under international law (Duffy, 2005). One Australian military
officer, Colonel Mike Kelly, noted that the US was abusing article V, and “stretching
it to breaking point” ([Redacted], 2004, p. 2).
In response to these differing views, and with the onset of Operation Anaconda in
Afghanistan, the Chief of the ADF, Admiral Barrie, prepared an interim detainee
policy. After negotiations between the US and Australian Governments, the final
agreement stated that the US military was to take full legal responsibility of any
detainees and that officially the ADF was not “regarded as having formally detained
captives if US soldiers were present with the ADF” (Public Interest Advocacy
Centre, 2011a, p. 10). The subsequent impact of this policy was that the presence of
just one US military representative meant that Australian forces could, in their
flawed logic, negate any legal responsibility for the detention and treatment of those
captured. It also allowed the US Government to designate captives as ‘unlawful
enemy combatants’, and therefore effectively hold them outside of the GCs. This
agreement between the US and Australia bridged both the conflicts in Afghanistan
and Iraq.55

The Trilateral Arrangement
Seeking to clear up any jurisdictional issues between the governments involved, on
23 March 2003, the Australian, US and UK Governments signed a Trilateral
Arrangement entitled An arrangement for the transfer of prisoners of war, civilian
internees, and civilian detainees between the forces of the United States of America,
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and Australia. This
agreement stated that:
•

the arrangement will be implemented in accordance with the Geneva
Conventions and customary international law;

55

Indeed, Australia played a role in the detention of Iraqi citizens. Australian forces detained Iraqi
captives on the HMAS Kanimbla in the early days of the war, and relied on the agreement that was
made regarding detainee treatment with the US (Public Interest Advocacy Centre, 2011a).
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•

a Detaining Power can transfer prisoners of war, civilian internees and
civilian detainees to an Accepting Power;

•

a Detaining Power will retain full rights of access and can request the
return of any detainee transferred to the Accepting Power;

•

the release, repatriation or removal to territory outside Iraq of a detainee
can only take place with the agreement of both the Detaining Power and
Accepting Power;

•

the Detaining Power is solely responsible for classifying a detainee as a
POW under the Geneva Conventions; and

•

where there is doubt as to which party is the Detaining Power, all parties
are to be jointly [emphasis added] responsible
(as cited in Public Interest Advocacy Centre, 2011a, p. 13).

The late signing and lack of implementation of this arrangement by the Australian
Government had a profound impact on the way in which the War on Terror played
out in the public arena, and perceived responsibilities in the theatre of war. The
arrangement was not made public until 2011, after the Australian Government had
repeatedly told the public that it was not the detaining authority in Iraq and
Afghanistan. Human rights groups raise the possibility that it was never the
Australian Government’s intention to invoke the agreement, and instead always hand
over detainees to US or UK jurisdiction (Public Interest Advocacy Centre, 2011a,
pp. 15-16). Numerous cases over the years highlight the way in which the Australian
Government had given the impression that Australian forces were not the detaining
authority, particularly when things went wrong. The death of Tariq Sabri al Fahdwi,
also known as Tanik Mahmud, was an exemplary case.

Torture and Black Sites
In April of 2003, 66 men were detained by Australian Special Air Service (SAS)
forces in Iraq. Even though it was Australian forces that detained the men, the ADF
asserted publicly that the US was the detaining authority due to the presence of one
US military representative who was embedded with the troops. As part of the
arrangement, Australian SAS troops transferred custody of the men to the UK. If
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operating under the Trilateral Arrangement, Australia would have retained the
responsibility to ensure the safe arrival of the detainees to US custody.
It was discovered that Mr Tanik Mahmud, one of the 66 detained men, died whilst
on board a UK helicopter on route to a secret US detention centre called H1 in Iraq
(Gillespie, 2003). A UK squadron leader later reported that the men were handed
over by the Australian SAS forces with their thumbs bound together, and the UK
then taped hessian bags over their heads (Cobain, 2012). According to official
documents, by the time they flew to the secret US facility, two of the men were
unresponsive after being forced to the floor and knelt on, apparently to subdue them
during the flight (Cobain, 2012). It was during the flight that the man died. Soon
after, a Guardian report noted that a complaint had been filed with the RAF police
that Mr Mahmud had been kicked and punched, however, the UK and US
government refused to provide the full details of his death. An independent autopsy
was also refused (Cobain, 2012).
Before the death was made public, Iranian officials contacted the Australian
Government to inquire about four of its citizens. Australian officials told them that
they were not the detaining authority and that they did not know the whereabouts of
these citizens, even though Australian SAS troops had captured them. A Minute
authorised by the Chief of the ADF, General Peter Cosgrove, to the Minister for
Defence, Robert Hill, noted the concern that any “public disclosure of the death may
be damaging to the US and UK governments” (Cosgrove, 2004, p. 2). So the death
was kept quiet in order to protect the US and UK governments from any scrutiny.
However, leaks and subsequent reports detail the extent of the cover-up. The
Australian Government misled the public in relation to the death and Australia’s
involvement in transferring prisoners to black sites. Whilst they publicly stated that
they were not the detaining authority, and the ADF was not involved in handing over
detainees to secret prisons, documents released under Freedom of Information (FOI)
demonstrate this was false. A Task Force Dagger Memo clearly stated that the
detainees (including Mr Mahmud) “were handed over to the UK [forces] for transit
to an EPW [Enemy Prisoner of War] handling facility at H1” (Gillespie, 2003, p. 1).
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The H1 holding facility was a secretive Forward Operating Base of a US Special
Forces unit called Task Force-20 (Cobain, 2012). A US report details that whilst the
US had tactical control, an Australian SAS unit called Task Force 64, and a British
Special Forces brigade called Task Force 14, were an integral part of operations at
H1 (Cobain, 2012). A former UK regiment trooper who was based at H1 told a
reporter from The Guardian that when prisoners were brought to the facility, they
were handed over to “other authorities” (Cobain, 2012). Whilst it is unknown who
these authorities are, a Human Rights Watch report notes the CIA worked with Task
Force 20 in many operations under JSOC, and they have been responsible for “some
of the most serious allegations of detainee abuse” (Human Rights Watch, 2006, p.
1).56 These include detainees being bruised from head to foot from severe beatings,
being held in stress positions and having electrical burns all over their bodies
(Human Rights Watch, 2006, p. 6).57

Subsequent reports detail the use of

waterboarding and other humiliating torture of prisoners under the detention of Task
Force 20 – such as a 73 year old woman who was placed in a small room with no
food or water, and was later “forced to crawl around on all fours as a “large man
rode” on her, calling her an animal (United States Army Criminal Investigation
Command, 2004, p. 4). She testified that she was harassed with dogs, touched
inappropriately, and had a stick forced in her anus whilst she was on the ground
(United States Army Criminal Investigation Command, 2004, p. 5). Posters were
apparently placed strategically around the Task Force detention facilities that read
“NO BLOOD, NO FOUL”, which reflected their attitude that “if you don’t make
them bleed, they can’t prosecute you for it” (Schmitt & Marshall, 2006, p. 2).
Despite Australian Government assurances, the initial investigation into the death
undertaken by the UK Royal Air Force (RAF) lacked any credibility. When the US
autopsy results were released in 2012, it revealed that the initial RAF investigation
was so superficial, that they failed to identify the deceased man correctly; Mr
Mahmud’s name was actually Tariq Sabri al Fahdwi, a 36 year old man from
Baghdad (Cobain, 2012). In addition, the death certificate appeared to obfuscate
where the body of al Fahdwi was buried in what appears to be an attempt to hide
56

Task Force 20 has changed its name several times over the years, first to Task Force 6-26, then
Task Force 145 (Cobain, 2012).
57
According to the Human Rights Watch (2006) report, these instances were recorded at a number of
US detention facilities including Camps Nama, Cropper and Bucca (Human Rights Watch, 2006).
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their knowledge of the black site, and the Australian Government’s knowledge and
involvement (Cobain, 2012).
The Australian Government’s knowledge of the ghost prison, enforced
disappearances, and the involvement of Australian Special Forces in running the H1
facility was nothing short of troubling. Ghost prisons are prohibited under
international law in order to ensure that all war-time activities are transparent, and
detainees cannot be mistreated. However, it was clear from documents released
under FOI that the Australian Government was more concerned with protecting the
US from embarrassment than upholding its obligations under international law. This
protection of foreign interests in lieu of international law was also linked to the
torture and ill-treatment of prisoners at Abu Ghraib.

Abu Ghraib
The point is there’s children who no longer have mothers and fathers because
they’ve been killed. If someone’s feelings are going to be hurt for [a] short
period of time in order to get that information, then personally I think you’ve
got justification – Australian Major George O’Kane (as cited in Department
of Defence, 2004c, p. 17).
Photos showing the humiliated men of Abu Ghraib shocked the conscience of many.
For the first time, allegations of torture became an undeniable reality that could no
longer be shrugged off as fabrications or stories made up by supposed al Qaeda
members in order to defame American soldiers, as
suggested by some Australian and US politicians. The
tortured men suddenly had faces, and the world was
provided a glimpse of the atrocities committed by US
personnel. There for all to see, were their twisted and
contorted bodies smeared with faeces, they were forced to
perform sexually explicit acts and to pose naked for the
camera. The grotesque posing of US soldiers over dead
prisoners was laid bare in all its confronting reality. The
impact of the photographs was significant, and over a

Figure 7- Sexual
Humiliation, Abu Ghraib
(Source: US Military,
2003)
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decade after the 2004 release of photos, the Obama Administration fought the release
of around 2, 100 additional photographs as they are said to be even more disturbing
than the original ones (Walker, 2014).
An Australian Army Major, George O’Kane, was stationed in the US office of the
Staff Judge Advocate, at Combined Joint Task Force Seven (CJTF-7), Camp Victory
in Baghdad (Public Interest Advocacy Centre, 2011d). Although O’Kane’s superior
was a UK Lieutenant General, he worked very closely with the US military as an
embedded legal officer. O’Kane had a number of responsibilities, including
providing legal advice on proposed interrogation techniques, rules of engagement,
and other detention/internment issues as part of the Combined Joint Task Force
(Pezzullo, 2004a).

Interrogation
…they exploit the Geneva Convention and take refuge in the civilian
population as a non-combatant in order to launch their attacks – well, they
don’t get the protections that are in GC III …and that is specifically in
Geneva Convention IV Article V…That’s what it says, they don’t get the
privileges – Major George O’Kane (as cited in Department of Defence,
2004c, p. 21).
After a prisoner died in Afghanistan under the ‘care’ of the 205th Military
Intelligence Brigade, and while the brigade was under investigation because of the
death, the US commanding officer sought legal advice on proposed interrogation
techniques so they had “top cover” and legal authority to go ahead with
interrogations of so-called high value detainees (Pezzullo, 2004a, p. 29). In was in
this context that Major O’Kane was tasked with providing legal advice on whether
the interrogation company’s intelligence gathering techniques complied with the
GCs (Public Interest Advocacy Centre, 2011c). It would be later discovered that the
205th Military Intelligence Company was at the centre of the infamous abuse and
torture photos released from Abu Ghraib.
The techniques proposed included “sleep management, dietary manipulation and,
possibly, sensory deprivation”, which were already outlined in the US Army Field
Manual (Pezzullo, 2004b, p. 2). Major O’Kane’s advice was that the proposed

126

interrogation techniques “substantially [emphasis added] complied with the Geneva
Convention” ([Redacted], 2003, p. 1), however, he failed to provide limitations or
adequate detail (Public Interest Advocacy Centre, 2011c). O’Kane noted “An
interrogation TTP [Tactics, Techniques and Procedures], like any physical or
psychological duress, will eventually amount to inhume [sic] treatment”, however,
no thresholds were discussed, and he took the view that it was up to the interrogator
to determine the acceptability of the techniques based on their individual experience
and training ([Redacted], 2003, p. 1; Department of Defence, 2004c).58 O’Kane also
indicated in a subsequent interview that these techniques were appropriate given the
situation in Iraq. He stated “interrogation is not for kicks; interrogation is for
information to save lives tomorrow or the next day. But that’s the underlying
rationale for it is for saving lives that are going to be lost if you don’t get that
information” (Department of Defence, 2004b, p. 73).
However, techniques such as sleep and sensory deprivation are generally regarded as
breaching protections under the Convention against Torture 1984 (CAT) and the
GCs. As detailed in the previous chapter, the inevitable consequences of these
techniques are horrific. To prevent prisoners from sleeping, guards would kick on
their cage doors, play loud music, scream at them, strip them naked and give them
cold showers, and leave lights on 24 hours a day (Fay, 2004). Prisoners were chained
in uncomfortable positions, left in hot or cold cells, sometimes naked and with no
way of regulating temperature, and some were left in total darkness (Fay, 2004).
Despite prohibitions under international law, the techniques were used on prisoners
after legal advice, provided by Major O’Kane, stated that the interrogation
techniques only substantially complied with the GCs (Public Interest Advocacy
Centre, 2011c).
It is of note that these interrogation techniques were already in use at Guantanamo
Bay under the direction of General Geoffrey Miller, who was sent to Abu Ghraib to
‘Gitmoise’ the prison in September of 2003. Documents detail that Miller was
brought to the prison “to show how to run a prison and get more information from
detainees” (Pezzullo, 2004b, p. 2). Indeed, in a subsequent interview, O’Kane

58

Redacted references refer to documents released under Freedom of Information where a name, or
names have been removed by the Department of Defence to protect the author.

127

acknowledged that the thresholds for interrogation techniques he authorised would
be lifted as a result of Miller’s involvement (Pezzullo, 2004b, p. 2). Despite this, he
failed to raise concerns to his superiors.
In addition to the problematic interrogation techniques, a further troubling aspect
was the attitude O’Kane expressed towards prisoners, and the ambivalence as to
whether mistreatment of detainees was absolutely prohibited. He stated that the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) “call it ill treatment, but we call it
successful interrogation techniques” (Department of Defence, 2004c, p. 15). At one
point during an interview with an Australian Investigator, O’Kane called the un-tried
prisoners “the most dangerous, violent people in Iraq” and that the interrogators
“should be…getting them into a position where…they’re persuading them to
cooperate” in order to save lives (as cited in Department of Defence, 2004c, p. 15). It
appears from the records of interview that this attitude, which regarded all prisoners
as hardened terrorists that needed to be treated harshly, permeated the culture of the
prison. It is understandable then, to see how the GCs were subverted.
Further, O’Kane’s involvement ran a great deal deeper than simply providing legal
advice in relation to interrogation techniques. When allegations of torture and other
ill-treatment were raised in a report from the ICRC, Major O’Kane’s role was to
respond on behalf of US Brigadier General Karpinski to the ICRC. Under the GCs,
the ICRC’s role is to ascertain the conditions of confinement and interrogation
ensure that the detaining authorities are complying with the laws of war.59
The full contents of the ICRC report that O’Kane responded to have never been
released, however, there are some allegations mentioned throughout documents
released to the Public Interest Advocacy Centre under the Freedom of Information
Act 1982 (cth). These included threats during interrogation, insults and verbal
violence during transfer in Unit 1A, sleep deprivation (loud music, light on in the
cell during night), walking in the corridors handcuffed and naked except for female
underwear over the head, and handcuffing either to the upper bed bars or doors of the
cell for three to four hours (Pezzullo, 2004a, p. 21). Some detainees presented
59
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physical marks and psychological symptoms, compatible with these allegations. The
ICRC delegates witnessed the following:
1. Some detainees presented significant signs of concentration difficulties,
memory problems, verbal expression problems, incoherent speech, acute
anxiety reactions, abnormal behaviour and suicidal ideas. These symptoms
appeared to have been provoked by the interrogation period and methods;
2. Some detainees were kept in total darkness in their cells;
3. Some detainees were kept naked in their cells;
4. Obvious scars around wrists, allegedly caused by very tight handcuffing
with ‘flexicuffs’;
5. Some detainees wore female underwear;
6. Some were provided with one jumpsuit and no underwear;
7. In some cells beds were without mattresses and blankets
(as cited in Pezzullo, 2004a, p. 21).
Instead of making an attempt to speak with the prisoners and thoroughly investigate
the veracity of their allegations, O’Kane only went to the prison to speak with US
officials to ask for their assistance in drafting a response to the claims. Major
O’Kane not only failed to take the reports seriously, but also failed to independently
investigate the allegations that were made. In an interview with Mike Pezzullo, who
at the time headed up the Australia’s Iraq Detainee Fact Finding Team (IDFFT),
Major O’Kane said:
If you’ve got 5000 or 6000, you know, Saddam Fedayen, former regime
elements, Islamic extremists, you know, a couple of terrorists, you know, all
thrown in there and then you don’t need to read that report to know that
they’re not going to be complimentary about the treatment, ’cause these
people hate the Americans with a passion… and sure some will complain…
So, in that context there is – to me it’s obvious, but maybe it’s not obvious to
other people and of course they’re going to complain about their treatment to
the ICRC (as cited in Department of Defence, 2004b, p. 45).
Unsurprisingly, the final report that O’Kane drafted in response to the ICRC,
“glossed over” the treatment of detainees (Fay, 2004). A contributing factor may also
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lie in O’Kane’s relationship with a civilian interrogation contractor from the private
military company, CACI – Mr Steve Stephanowicz (Smith & Cosgrove, 2004).
O’Kane and Stephanowicz met during the transfer of a so-called ‘high-value
detainee’ in December 2003 to Abu Ghraib (Department of Defence, 2004a).
Following that initial interaction, in which they discussed a mutual acquaintance in
Australia, the two men were involved socially (Department of Defence, 2004a).
Stephanowicz was deeply involved in the ill-treatment of prisoners at Abu Ghraib
given his role as a civilian interrogator. The Taguba report (2004) found that
Stephanowicz had instructed MPs to set conditions for interrogations that were not
authorised, and that these instructions equated to physical abuse. Indeed, the report
later noted that Stephanowicz made false statements to the investigation team
regarding the location of his interrogations, the activities he employed during his
interrogations and his knowledge of the abuses (Taguba, 2004). Despite this, O’Kane
and Stephanowicz shared a friendship that included having photos taken at the prison
on several occasions, and email contact when the two were back in Australia. This
raises a number of questions as to the extent of O’Kane’s knowledge of the torture
that was taking place at the hands of interrogators, and indeed his independence in
reporting abuses, given the relationship between the two men.
O’Kane’s involvement in dubious activity extended to hiding prisoners from the
ICRC, which is strictly prohibited under international law. Whilst O’Kane was based
at Camp Victory, he was instructed to prevent the ICRC from visiting nine prisoners
from cell-block 1A, because they were under “active interrogation” (Department of
Defence, 2004b, p. 57). In a subsequent statement, O’Kane said “if you break
someone down, or persuade them to give up information you don’t need them
drawing strength from an ICRC visit” (as cited in Public Interest Advocacy Centre,
2011b, p. 7). The ICRC visits were regarded as an inconvenience and described as a
“necessary evil” by O’Kane, (as cited in Department of Defence, 2004b).
As a result of an interview between O’Kane and Brigadier Steve Meekin from the
Defence Intelligence Organisation, it was also revealed that O’Kane became aware
that the US was secretly detaining a man called Hiwa Abdul Rahmna Rashul, known
to them as ‘Detainee Triple X’ (Smith & Cosgrove, 2004, p. 1). Notwithstanding
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previous interviews, O’Kane had never mentioned Rashul when discussing the
Fragmentary Order60 to prevent ICRC access to the prison.
Rashul was detained in Iraq and rendered to Afghanistan for ‘interrogation’ by the
CIA as a so-called high value detainee. In 2003, O’Kane was shown a classified
order provided by then US Commander in Iraq, Lieutenant General Ricardo
Sanchez. The order detailed that ‘Detainee Triple X’ was not to be placed on a roster
of detainee names and that he was not to be registered with the ICRC (Public Interest
Advocacy Centre, 2011b). O’Kane states that he reported this to US superior Colonel
Marc Warren, not because he was concerned about the breaches of international law,
but because he feared that if this became public, it would embarrass the US
Government (Smith & Cosgrove, 2004, p. 2). O’Kane also reported it to his
Australian superior, a Lieutenant Colonel who was an intelligence officer.
Regardless of these concerns, Australian officials failed to raise the issue of unlawful
detention, treatment and breaches of international law with the US Government
rather, Australia only raised ‘attention’ to the issue of Rashul’s detention (Public
Interest Advocacy Centre, 2011b, p. 12).

The Australian Government Response
Even in the face of the significant involvement of O’Kane in the Abu Ghraib saga, a
thorough and independent investigation has never been undertaken, and no one has
been held to account. Although an Iraq Detainee Fact-Finding Team (IDFFT) Report
was ordered by General Cosgrove, it was weeks after the Australian Government
knew the treatment of detainees had become an issue (Public Interest Advocacy
Centre, 2011d). In addition, whilst giving the appearance of accountability, the
IDFFT was not tasked with making findings or recommendations, thereby ensuring
that it would not result in any significant outcome (Public Interest Advocacy Centre,
2011d).
The investigation process itself was also marred with incompetence. The interview
transcripts between O’Kane and Mike Pezzullo, who headed up the IDFFT,
demonstrate the gravity of the situation was not taken seriously considering that they
60
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“joked with him, asked leading questions, and omitted significant questions such as
when did Major O’Kane first become aware of investigations of abuse?”, rather than
allegations of abuse [emphasis added] (Public Interest Advocacy Centre, 2011d, pp.
16-17). The general attitude towards the investigation was also lacking in
professionalism. For example, when Mr Pezzullo was referring to the ICRC
allegations of abuse, he made the comment “Some detainees were kept in total
darkness – well I’m not scared of the dark” (as cited in Department of Defence,
2004c, p. 13). At its conclusion, the IDFFT was only provided nine days to draft its
report, and there were some errors in the data presented to the Senate Estimates
Committee (Public Interest Advocacy Centre, 2011d). It appears that the
investigation was more of a face-saving exercise, rather than actually intending to
hold anyone to account.
Indeed, it is clear from released documents that the Howard Government actively
sought to avoid having to investigate any allegations of mistreatment by US-led
forces in Iraq. Email correspondence within the Department of Foreign Affairs and
Trade (DFAT) demonstrates this avoidance:
The correspondent quotes Mr Downer [then Minister for Foreign Affairs] as
saying in recent DFAT/NGO consultations on human rights that DFAT
“would be willing to follow through on particular cases of alleged human
rights abuses carried out by US-led forces in Iraq to establish that these are
properly investigated and appropriate action taken. We will need to get
around this somehow [emphasis added] ([Redacted], 2005, p. 1).
In other words, although members of the Australian Government were providing
assurances to the public that any allegations of mistreatment would be investigated,
it was clear that behind the scenes, everything was being done to ensure this did not
occur. For example, in a Senate Committee Hearing in 2004, the Howard
Government relied on the reports from O’Kane that prisoners were being held in
conditions that complied with the GCs, and chose to ignore other members of the
ADF who had raised concerns (Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade
Legislation Committee (Shane Carmody, Department of Defence), 2004). Therefore,
as the public record stands, the Australian Government position is that US
interrogation techniques used in Abu Ghraib complied with the GCs (Evidence to
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Senate Foreign Affairs (Simon Harvey, Air Commodore), 2004). Nothing was ever
corrected or clarified by the Australian Government, and the advice was never
publicly released. Former Defence Minister Robert Hill was later forced to admit
that whilst O’Kane’s situation reports did not raise issues of abuse, it was clear that
this was inaccurate (Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, 2004a, p. 84).
O’Kane was also completely shielded from an independent investigation. The
Howard Government went as far as protecting him from testifying before an
Australian Senate Committee (Public Interest Advocacy Centre, 2011d). The excuse
given at the time was that it was “not usual practice”, and that he was only a “junior
Officer” (Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, 2004b, pp. 25-29). In
addition, O’Kane was protected from appearing before the US investigation into Abu
Ghraib ‘abuses’ led by US Major General Fay. The Australian Government only
provided written responses to the allegations, and these were provided too late for
them to be included in the report (Fay, 2004, p. 67).
Obtaining complete, un-redacted reports and documents is still an issue, and has
been marred with ongoing secrecy and silence. Consequently, the information
documented above in relation to Abu Ghraib forms only the tip of the iceberg
considering the amount of material that has been classified as material exempt from
release on national security grounds, or due to a supposed threat to international
relations. This move towards further secrecy permeates the War on Terror, some
term it the shadow war.

The Dark Matter: SAS, 4 Squadron, JSOC and the New
Shadow War
We’re the dark matter. We’re the force that orders the universe but can’t be
seen – Anonymous Navy SEAL & JSOC member (as cited in Priest & Arkin,
2011b, p. 1).
Under the leadership of former chief of the US Special Operations Command
(USSOCOM) Admiral William McRaven, the Joint Special Operations Command
(JSOC) expanded its global reach. With a boost in funding from US$2.3 billion in
2003 to $10.4 billion in 2013, covert US special operations are now the preferred
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method of warfare. Part of this strategy was the delegation of Special Operations
Command "liaison officers" to ten embassies world-wide, including Australia
(Andrew Davies, Jennings, & Schreer, 2014) . According to McRaven, the purpose
was to "to advise indigenous Special Forces and coordinate activities with those
troops" (McRaven, 2013, p. 6; Schmitt & Shanker, 2013). This strategic move on the
part of the US has led to an expansion of Australia’s covert military, security and
intelligence operations and increased SAS-JSOC cooperation.
Whilst Australia has always taken part in covert military operations with the US, the
events of September 11 were the catalyst for even deeper involvement. This has
extended not only in relation to information sharing within the intelligence
community, but also in joint military activities, particularly in relation to Special
Forces (SF) troops. To coordinate efforts in the War on Terror, Australia’s Special
Operations Command (SOCOM) was established by the Howard Government in
2003. It is from here that many of Australia’s SF operations are headquartered.
Since the Iraq war, Australia’s private security industry has boomed, and security
companies play a quietly influential role, particularly in Iraq (Brown, 2014). One of
the biggest industries has been the guarding of Australian diplomats either visiting
overseas, or stationed at embassies. Whilst the US State Department’s Bureau of
Diplomatic Security takes care of US diplomats, Australia does not have an in-house
service, so DFAT contracts out to UK based Hart Security (Brown, 2014). In
Afghanistan, the mega company G4S, made up of former UK SAS forces, guards
Australian Federal Police compounds. The reason for this expansion again rests with
the risks (and headaches) involved in having armed personnel having to engage in
these situations. The Australian Government, like the US, would rather contract out
the problems to less visible armed soldiers in order to avoid any messy political
situation that would occur if, for example, an Australian military member was
involved in torture or deaths of civilians. When a contractor is killed in Iraq or
Afghanistan, there is no military funeral and no publicity to cause political
embarrassment (Brown, 2014).61 In direct response to the issues detailed earlier in
Iraq in relation to Blackwater and other US contractors, those PMSCs guarding
61
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Australians in Afghanistan have official diplomatic passports and are afforded the
same protections as a diplomat, including security clearances that give them access
to intelligence briefings (Brown, 2014). In Baghdad, Iraq, the Australian PMSC
Unity Resources guards the Australian embassy for a $77 million contract. Like the
US, most Australian PMSC are former Special Forces.
One of the greatest problems to occur in relation to torture, ill-treatment, and a lack
of accountability has been the apparent amalgamation of practices between US
forces and Australia’s SAS. More regular joint training exercises and operations
have resulted in interrogation techniques and other detention operations being
dominated by US directed practices, and these have encroached on traditional roles
and practices of the ADF. Joint exercises are now held regularly, including twice
yearly exercises with US Sea Air and Land (SEAL) teams that include Arctic
missions, where commandos parachute from aircraft, and swim into nuclear subs
beneath the ice (McPhedran, 2011). A 2012-13 Defence Annual Report notes that
Australian SAS forces held a joint patrol exercise with JSOC Combat Operations
Group in December 2012 under the title of Night Eagle (Department of Defence,
2013, p. 7). Whilst nothing is known about the details of training JSOC and other US
contractors provide to Australian forces in relation to interrogation techniques,
allegations of abuse at the hands of Australia’s SAS forces appear to demonstrate the
level of interoperability, particularly in light of their involvement in the black site H1
as described earlier.

Australia’s Special Air Service
Australia’s SAS forces have been described as some of the most highly trained
soldiers in the world (Macklin, 2014). Reminiscent of SERE training for US Special
Forces, part of the SAS training includes what has been termed “hell week”, where
they are subjected to sleep deprivation, starved and soaked with water for twenty
three hours a day (McPhedran, 2011). This kind of training is known to have
deleterious impact on the psychological health of soldiers, and it also impacts on the
way they are trained to respond to those detained in the theatre of war. Most SAS
missions are conducted in secret, and involve reconnaissance and other
military/intelligence operations (Macklin, 2014). However, with secrecy comes a
lack of accountability.

135

It is in the public realm that Australia’s SAS forces were on the ground in
Afghanistan shortly after September 11, and they fought together with the US
SEALS at the battle of Anaconda in Afghanistan (McPhedran, 2011). Capture/kill
missions such as these formed an integral role in relation to Australia’s involvement
with US SEALS in Afghanistan and Iraq as part of JSOC operations. It was not until
2013, however, that whistleblowers from within the ADF contacted reporters as a
result of their concern about the actions of the SAS, including their role in carrying
out capture/kill missions in Afghanistan and involvement in torture and ill-treatment
(Wroe & Snow, 2013).
In the event of capture, detainees were brought to the Initial Screening Area in the
international Tarin Kowt base. It is here that allegations of ‘mistreatment’ surfaced,
including the death of a man cruelly dubbed “Abdul Kaput”, who was allegedly
handed over to US interrogators for about two hours, died, and his corpse was placed
in a taxi and driven out of the base because no one wanted to take responsibility for
his death (Wroe & Snow, 2013, p. 1).
Other detainees were reportedly brought to the base by Australian SAS forces with
visible injuries, including bloody noses and mouths, and bruises to the face (Wroe &
Snow, 2013). Sources from within the base also alleged that they were pressured to
“condition” prisoners for interrogation by “gagging them, keeping them awake,
denying them exercise and disorienting them through sensory deprivation” (as cited
in Wroe & Snow, 2013, p. 2). A whistleblower stated Special Operations Task
Group (SOTG) “and intelligence pressured us to gag and hood the detainees…the
[ISA] CO fought that hand over foot, saying if we gag and hood these guys, someone
will die” (as cited in Wroe & Snow, 2013, p. 2). These interrogation techniques are
reminiscent of those used by US interrogators in Guantanamo Bay, Abu Ghraib and
elsewhere in the War on Terror.
In addition, the SAS handed over prisoners to forces known to engage in torture
(Wroe & Snow, 2013). The Provincial Response Company was under the control of
an Oruzgan police commander, Matiullah Kahn, a warlord well known for his
treatment of captives. When the Provincial Response Company turned up in the
Australian base to detain some Afghan prisoners, one whistleblower stated “these
guys just got the look of death in their eyes. They were shitting themselves” (as cited
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in Wroe & Snow, 2013). The UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan released a
report in 2011 documenting the wide-scale torture of prisoners across Afghanistan,
including women and children (United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan,
2011). Observers found “a compelling pattern and practice of systematic torture and
ill-treatment at a number of NDS [National Directorate of Security] and ANP
[Afghan National Police] detention facilities” (United Nations Assistance Mission in
Afghanistan, 2011, p. 49). The documented methods of torture included electric
shocks, methods of suspension, beatings to the soles of feet with electric wires,
rubber hoses and sticks, twisting genitals, stress positions, removal of toenails, and
sexual abuse (United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, 2011, p. 49).
Whilst Australian reports stated that no prisoners had been transferred to detention
facilities suspected of abuse, the issue of who was classified as the Detaining
Authority again came to the fore due to the fact that the presence of personnel from
Afghan police units on joint operations meant that the detainees were designated
under Afghan control.
The case of a juvenile who arrived at the international Tarin Kwot base looking for
his father further contradicted claims by the Australian Government that Australian
forces had not been involved in transferring prisoners to torture. The teenager was
the son of the man labeled “Abdul Kaput” who was killed and driven out of the base
in a taxi. Whilst the Australian Government stated that the juvenile was not
mistreated or transferred to US custody, whistleblowers have confirmed that the boy
was handed over to US custody (Snow & Wroe, 2013). The whistleblower said “it
was clear as anything in the ‘prisoner under capture’ book…he was handed over to
the US for interrogation...the flight sergeant [who detained the boy] told me they’d
given him to the Americans” (as cited in Snow & Wroe, 2013, p. 2). Afterwards, he
was apparently escorted off the base by RAAF security police.
There were also investigations into Australian SF killing civilians and labeling them
insurgents in Afghanistan. A 2013 report, noted a case where Australian SF were
conducting a joint operation with the Afghan police where a civilian man and his
child nephew were killed (Blenkin, 2013; Snow & Wroe, 2013). The joint Australian
Special Operations Task Group wrongly labeled the man as an insurgent, and his
nephew was found tucked and huddled next to the man. The final report noted that
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Australian forces lacked rigor in their identification process (Wroe & Snow, 2013).
Other unexplained civilian deaths have also been reported in Afghanistan, one 2006
incident left a woman blind and another seriously injured (Wroe & Callinan, 2016).
Disturbingly, there have also been cases where Australian SF have been linked to
mutilations. For example, in April 2013, SAS soldiers cut off the hands off dead
bodies in Afghanistan, reportedly for identification purposes (Wroe & Callinan,
2016). These, and other unreported incidents, have prompted the Chief of Army,
Lieutenant-General Angus Campbell, to announce a review of special operations by
the Inspector General of the ADF in 2016 (Wroe & Callinan, 2016).

4 Squadron
There is another aspect to Australia’s involvement in the War on Terror that has left
many international law and human rights experts even more concerned; that is the
creation of clandestine military/intelligence organisations that lack oversight, and
that are deploying to parts of the world where Australia is not currently engaged in
war, such as the Horn of Africa (CIA News, 2013; Welch & Epstein, 2012).
In 2005, a special branch of the SAS called 4 Squadron was reportedly created by the
Howard Government (Welch & Epstein, 2012). 4 Squadron is said to be based on the
role and operations of JSOC, and has purportedly worked alongside them as an
equivalent operation. Like JSOC, 4 Squadron has a joint military and intelligence
role, which was authorised in late 2010 by former Defence Minister Stephen Smith
(Welch & Epstein, 2012).62
FOI documents reveal the establishment of the Joint Interagency Liaison Office
(JIALO) in Canberra in 2009, the purpose of which is to “facilitate interaction
between SOCOMD [Special Operations Command] and specific Other Government
Departments and Agencies to enhance the effectiveness of SOCAUST’s contribution
to the whole-of government response to domestic security operations, particularly
counter-terrorism” (Redacted, 2009, p. 1). The adjusted function for JIALO also
reflects the Army’s growing focus on interagency operations” (Redacted, 2009, p. 1).
Consequently, it appears JIALO was created to coordinate the joint US-Australian
62

Although the involvement of Task Force 64 suggests that they may have already been involved in
these activities previously.

138

activities of 4 Squadron and JSOC. Whilst their specific training is unknown, it has
been reported that they have been training in long-range intelligence gathering with
ASIS on Swan Island, a counter-terrorism training facility located off the coast of
Victoria (Welch & Epstein, 2012).63
Although most of the activities of 4 Squadron are secret, reports have indicated that
they have engaged in joint missions with JSOC and CIA operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan (Welch & Epstein, 2012). Like JSOC, members of 4 Squadron do not
wear combat uniforms. Fairfax reports that since 2012, 4 Squadron has been
operating in Kenya, Nigeria and Zimbabwe, without the presence of ASIS and in
countries where Australia is not at war (CIA News, 2013; Welch & Epstein, 2012).
These countries have also been the target of JSOC operations (Scahill, 2013). For
example, there is evidence that suggests JSOC provided arms to local warlords in
order for them to kill those on a secret kill-list in Somalia (Scahill, 2013). As
previously explored, whilst JSOC once solely operated on targeting those on
President Obama’s kill-lists, now the program has expanded to sanction the killing of
anyone in a ‘targeted area’, or a male of fighting age (under 70 years old) (Scahill,
2007). This has played out in drone strikes killing thousands of people, including the
16 year old child of American citizen Anwar al-Awlaki and the killing of Australian
citizens.
This raises a number of issues not only in relation to 4 Squadron’s activities on the
ground, but their murky status under international law considering that Australia is
not currently at war with any of these countries. For example, if a member of 4
Squadron was caught in one of these countries undertaking surveillance operations,
they could be prosecuted under domestic legislation covering espionage, which in
some cases, can enact the death penalty (Welch & Epstein, 2012). In addition, the
secretive nature of the group means that their activities lack oversight. This means
that, as in the case of JSOC operations in Iraq, they are operating with impunity. The
fact that the public is being kept in the dark about what is being done in these
African nations, and there is no trace of evidence about their on-the-ground
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operations, is encroaching on dangerous territory. In effect, 4 Squadron is acting as
secret police would.
If the Australian equivalent is based on JSOC, ascertaining whether members of 4
Squadron have been provided the same training, and the extent of their involvement
in JSOC activities are legitimate and pressing concerns, especially since there have
already been reports that some SAS regiments have allegedly been involved in the
mistreatment, torture and mutilation of prisoners, and capture/kill missions in
Afghanistan. Indeed, it is of grave concern that the recent passing of the National
Security Legislation includes provisions for criminal immunity for intelligence
organisations and “affiliates” (Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia,
2014b).
However, obtaining any formal information about JSOC and 4 Squadron has proven
to be difficult. An FOI request I submitted in 2014 was denied on the grounds that
confirming or denying the existence of documents “would cause damage similar to
disclosing the document itself” (Davidson, 2014). When the request was filed,
separate FOI documents revealed that meetings were called within Joint Operations
Headquarters, and concerns were raised about the filing of the request by an
individual “without clearance”. The matter is now being heard at the Administrative
Appeals Tribunal.
Besides the serious lack of transparency and independent oversight, the more
concerning aspect was the person responsible for denying the request. As discussed,
since his time in Iraq, Lt. Col. O’Kane, who was involved in the Abu Ghraib torture
scandal, was promoted, and is now the Chief Legal Officer for the Office of the
Chief of Army. O’Kane was responsible for denying the request into 4 Squadron.
This situation raises significant questions about the evolving nature of secretive
operations, unchecked powers, and the blurred lines between the military,
intelligence and executive branches. Australian officials are so deeply embedded
with the US military and their foreign policy interests, it is easy to see how the role
of representing the Australian people and the national interest can be subverted.
In a 2014 Senate Estimates Hearing, Greens Senator Scott Ludlam asked about the
existence of 4 Squadron after four peace activists were detained on Swan Island

140

during a peaceful protest against the Iraq war. Senator Ludlam was met with disdain
from defence personnel, who refused to answer questions put to them about whether
4 Squadron exists, despite the fact that the Senator did not ask about operational
matters which would clearly encroach on national security issues (Parliament of the
Commonwealth of Australia, 2014a). Senator Ludlam stated that it was hard to see
why the Australian parliament is not even allowed to know whether the Squadron
exists (Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, 2014a).
It is unknown if the military personnel who detained the peace activists were from 4
Squadron, however, their treatment clearly constituted a breach of human rights
protections against cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment. All four of the activists
were reportedly hooded and violently tied with flexi-cuffs, the same techniques that
are regularly employed in theatres of war. One of the activists, Greg Rolles, recounts
that the person who detained him shouted “welcome to the bag mother-fuckers”
when he had a hessian bag placed over his head (Rolles, 2014, p. 2). He also
described having his pants pulled down, and was threatened to be raped with a stick
if he did not provide the information asked of the military personnel member (Rolles,
2014). All of the protestors describe being hit, kicked and having their arms twisted
in unnatural positions that caused significant pain. The Australian Department of
Defence conducted an ‘internal investigation’ into the incident, however, the final
report was heavily redacted and did not include the protestor’s testimony (Kelly,
215; Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, 2014a). The report, prepared by
Lt-Col. M. A. Kelly, noted that the protesters “did not suffer any indignity” from
having their pants removed, and the actions of the soldiers were “reasonable”, and
that there was just a “perception” from protestors that the soldiers were “heavy
handed” (Kelly, 2015, p. 52 & 55).64 Predictably, the conclusion of the report stated
that “allegations of mistreatment made by the arrested persons are not able to be
substantiated” (Kelly, 2015, p. 61).

64

There was more in the report about protecting the ADF from adverse publicity, and amending
training for future defence personnel so they are aware of their ability to make a citizen’s arrest
(Kelly, 2015).
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Australia’s role in the cover up of US torture, CIA
Extraordinary Rendition and unlawful detention of Australian
Citizens
The Australian Government played a direct role in the overseas detention and torture
of three Australian citizens during this period; Mamdouh Habib, David Hicks and
Joseph Thomas. According to their own testimony, and that of other eyewitnesses
and experts, all three men were subjected to conditions and treatment that amount to
torture. The story of Mamdouh Habib and David Hicks gained substantial notoriety
in the years after 2001 because they were both held at Guantanamo Bay. Although
copious amounts of evidence has established that conditions and treatment
amounting to torture were common place in Guantanamo Bay, the Australian
Government refuses to independently investigate what happened to the two men
whilst detained by US forces, and whether Australian officials knew of their torture
and ill-treatment. The Australian Government went as far as to say that torture did
not occur in US facilities, even though evidence to the contrary is substantial and
admitted by US officials themselves. The same situation has occurred in the case of
Joseph Thomas, even though he was held in black-sites. This section provides a
background to their detention and torture to serve as background for the results
covered in Chapter Five.

Mamdouh Habib
Mamdouh Habib is an Egyptian-born Australian national who was subjected to
extraordinary rendition. Mamdouh was initially detained in Pakistan in October 2001
and subsequently handed over to US forces who rendered him to Egypt (Open
Society Justice Initiative, 2013). It has been demonstrated that Australian officials
interrogated Mamdouh whilst in US custody, and it has been further alleged that
Australian officials were present when he was being tortured in Egypt. An Egyptian
intelligence officer claimed that an Australian official named ‘George’ was present
for a medical check performed whilst Mamdouh was naked and shackled (Open
Society Justice Initiative, 2013). Mamdouh was eventually transferred to
Guantanamo Bay. Whilst in Egypt and subsequently Guantanamo Bay, Mamdouh
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states he was subjected to horrific physical and psychological torture including;
being beaten, electro shocked and hung from metal hooks in walls, mock executions,
stress positions and subjected to forced medication (Habib & Collingwood, 2008).
Whilst detained in Guantanamo, Mamdouh was subjected to treatment that also
amounted to torture, including sleep deprivation, environmental manipulation,
sensory deprivation and isolation (Habib & Collingwood, 2008).
Mamdouh Habib was released from Guantanamo in 2005, after pressure had
mounted on the Australian Government due to his rendition. It is believed that this is
why Mamdouh was released, and the other Australian, David Hicks was left in
Guantanamo.
Mamdouh Habib reached an out-of-court settlement with the Australian Government
in December of 2010 after alleged proof of an Australian officer’s presence in Egypt
was provided to the Australian Government, and an investigation into Australia’s
involvement in his torture in Egypt was conducted. The full classified report was
never released to the Australian public, although the unclassified version concluded
that Australian officials had no involvement or knowledge of Mamdouh’s treatment
in Pakistan or Egypt (Thom, 2011). Remarkably, the report did not address
Mamdouh’s treatment in Guantanamo Bay, or at the hands of US agents and
military. However, he is the only Australian citizen to have some form of an
‘investigation’ into his case, and be compensated for the torture that occurred whilst
he was detained.

David Hicks
David Hicks was sold by the Northern Alliance to the US military in Afghanistan for
around US$5,000. Whilst in US custody, David Hicks was beaten severely during
transit to Guantanamo, and then subjected to conditions that included sleep and
sensory deprivation, sensory bombardment, isolation, stress positions, mock
executions, temperature extremes, medical experimentation as well as other
psychological torture techniques. David first saw Australian officials when he was
detained on the USS Pelelieu in 2001.65 During a recorded interview, that has still
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This was publicly confirmed by Australian government officials
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not been released publicly, David states that he told Australian officials of the
mistreatment he endured at the hands of the US military, civilian contractors and the
CIA (Hicks, 2010). Over the five and a half years of his detention in Guantanamo,
members of the Australian Federal Police (AFP), Australian Security and
Intelligence Organisation (ASIO), and Australian consular officials, including Mr
Tucker and Mr McAnulty, interviewed David, and were provided detailed
information about how he was being treated (Hicks, 2010). Instead of thoroughly and
independently investigating this treatment, the Howard Government relied on two
investigations conducted in 2004, after the Abu Ghraib scandal broke. These two
investigations (not publicly released) were conducted by the Naval Criminal
Investigative Service (NCIS), on order from Paul Wolfowitz and the US Department
of Defense. Whilst the report summary concluded that there was evidence that David
was ‘roughed up’, the body of the report contained statements from witnesses
corroborating his torture testimony. The NCIS (2006) report pointed to a cover-up
where it also noted that ‘men in suits’ had removed his medical records from the
ships where he was detained en-route to Guantanamo. Publicly, the Australian
Government not only discredited any allegations David made, but also protected the
Bush Administration from any independent scrutiny. Prime Minister Howard stated
that he could bring David back to Australia whenever he wanted to, but refused to do
so because investigations into David’s conduct revealed that no crime had been
committed, and so there was nothing that he could be charged with in Australia
(Leopold, 2011).
After years of delays, David Hicks (2010) stated that he was forced to choose
between freedom or indefinite detention in Guantanamo Bay. In 2007, testimony to
the Federal Court stated that he signed a plea deal in Guantanamo under duress
(Hicks, 2007). David pleaded Alford for the charge, Material Support for Terrorism,
a crime unknown to international law (Nicholson et al., 2007). The Alford plea
meant that he could plead guilty without admitting to any of the alleged evidence
presented by the Prosecution.
The Military Commissions Act 2006 (USA), under which he was convicted, was
replaced, because, as President Obama noted, it “failed to establish a legitimate legal
framework” (Obama, 2009, p. 1). Anecdotal evidence suggests that the US offered to
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repatriate David, however, the Howard Government was pushing for him to be
charged with something (O'Brien, 2011), and they thought a plea deal would be a
“win/win” situation (MacDonald, 2007, p. 1).66 Documents released under FOI
demonstrate the significant pressure that the Howard Government put on the US
Government to charge David by mid-February of 2007 before calling the federal
election, because the case had become a political liability (Owens, 2007, pp. 1-2). An
additional element of the plea deal was a clause in which he had to agree that he was
not treated illegally whilst in US custody, and a one year gag order was imposed.
David was also placed on a Control Order upon his release from Guantanamo, a
move that he was told he could not appeal (Hicks, 2010). A court of Military
Commissions appeal vacated David Hicks’ conviction on 19 January 2015. An
independent investigation has never been carried out into David’s treatment whilst in
US custody, and he is yet to be compensated for his torture and ill-treatment.

Joseph Thomas
Joseph Thomas was another Australian caught up in the events of the War on Terror
when he was arrested in Pakistan, as all foreigners were, after 9/11. Joseph was
disappeared for the first two weeks, then flown to a military bunker and subsequently
driven to Karachi. Joseph was held in various locations and black-sites in Pakistan
and interrogated by Pakistani, US and Australian officials over a period of
approximately four months.
During his detention, Joseph was subjected to isolation, placed in what he described
as a dog kennel about the size of a toilet, was left without food, subjected to
suffocation and strangulation during interrogation (his hood was twisted so he could
not breathe), threats of electrocution, and threatened that if he did not cooperate that
he would be sent to Guantanamo and subjected to indefinite detention (Maxwell,
Buchanan, & Vincent, 2006). Joseph’s interrogations by Pakistani officials and the
CIA included mock executions and threats to rape family members (personal
communication, 28 November, 2014). Joseph recalled that the Americans would also
stand and watch whilst the Pakistani officials would humiliate him and verbally
abuse him (personal communication, 28 November, 2014). He made a number of
66

Documents I requested from the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet under FOI pertaining to
the offer of repatriation have been blocked for years.
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“confessions” during this period. He stated “You say anything when you’re being
tortured. I would tell them my mother was al-Qaeda if it would make the pain stop”
(personal communication, 28 November, 2014).
The conditions in the black-sites were “horrible” and “soul-destroying”, and he still
cries when describing them. Joseph described that he was provided with a bucket for
human waste that was infested with flies and other bugs. He described the welts from
the insect bites from the uncovered buckets filled with faeces as one of the worst
things, apart from the “horrific smell” (personal communication, 28 November,
2014). He said that one of the worst parts of his imprisonment in the CIA black-site
was being completely reliant on his torturers for his daily needs. After months of
being kept away from natural light, and any form of nature, he became so distressed,
he asked for a plant in his cell. Joseph also described the CIA threatening to torture
him with what they called “a new chair”, in which they would tie him up, and place
his testicles in a vice so that he could “hear them pop” (personal communication, 28
November, 2014).
Whilst he was detained in Pakistan, Joseph told Australian officials (ASIO) that he
had been suffocated by having his hood twisted from the side, and was shackled
“like an animal” to the floor with a three piece suit (personal communication, 28
November, 2014). Disturbingly, Joseph says he was told by ASIO officials that they
could not control what other detaining authorities did (personal communication, 28
November, 2014).
After a political battle ensued back in Australia, Joseph was repatriated in June 2003.
A year after his return to Australia, and after he had gone back to normal family life,
albeit with psychological scars from his torture, the Australian Government
attempted to use his ‘confessions’ obtained under torture in an Australian court. His
conviction for terrorism related offences was later quashed (Maxwell et al., 2006).67
The Court determined:
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Joseph was convicted of passport fraud after he removed the Taliban visa from his passport because
the Government had fallen after 9/11. Joseph has stated that he had no choice if he was to get home
to his family, as the Pakistan military was surrounding the Australian embassy, and he could not
access the building without risking detention and torture.
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where a person has been subjected to interrogation over an extended period in
a foreign country by foreign intelligence agents who are not averse to
‘torture’ or threats of torture in order to extract ‘intelligence information’, it
is almost inevitable that any ‘evidence’ subsequently obtained in a police
record of interview, whilst the person is still under the control of these
foreign intelligence agents, will be contaminated by the coercive process
applied by those agencies. As a consequence the evidence will be
inadmissible in a court of law in this country (Maxwell et al., 2006, p. 5).
To add insult to injury, and in a highly politicised move, after his conviction was
quashed, Joseph was the first Australian to be placed on a Control Order which
included daily check-ins to police stations, limited use of telephones and the internet
as well as restricted movement. The move exacerbated his PTSD as a result of his
torture and life was never the same again for Joseph.
No investigation has ever been ordered into Joseph’s torture and ill-treatment
overseas, and there certainly has never been an investigation into the Australian
Government’s knowledge or involvement of his treatment. Not one US, Pakistani or
Australian official has ever been questioned or called to account for the crimes
committed against him.

Australia’s Counter-Terrorism Legislation
Another aspect of Australia’s involvement in the War on Terror, has been the use of
the supposed terrorist threat to pass draconian terrorism legislation. Human Rights
advocates note that the former US and Australian Government’s used the attacks in
the US to shred already existing human rights protections (Burnside, 2007). The
view that human rights need to be set aside to combat a ‘new’ threat of terror became
the calling card for the governments of John Howard in Australia, George W Bush in
the United States and Tony Blair in the UK. The manifestation of this was a long line
of anti-terror legislation that was passed hastily in early 2002, and without much
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reflection on necessity or proportionality (Walker, 2011). Australia has passed
harsher Counter Terrorism (CT) laws than most other Western countries.68
The putative emergency has lasted longer than either of the two World Wars,
and both combined. No legislation can be regarded as permanent. But the CT
Laws in substance if not in form ought to be seen as a regime of intended
indefinite duration (Walker, 2011, p. 6).
Australia’s extraordinary CT laws have been criticised as unnecessary, stifling
human rights and civil liberties, and placing a special status on acts that were already
covered in existing criminal laws. The current CT laws provide for ‘exalted status’
for those who commit terrorist related crimes, and Walker (2011) suggests that this is
a dangerous way to view any criminal activity, which is in fact ordinary. Existing
legislation has long covered the destruction of property, murder or other violence
that would encompass terrorist activity. However, after 9/11, the narrative was so
fear-driven and pervasive that the Australian Government decided to expand the
legislation to cover these so-called ‘special crimes’, and in the process provided
security and intelligence organisations expanded surveillance powers and the ability
to detain without charge. In reality, more people die in car accidents, from domestic
murders and bee stings in Australia than terrorist attacks. However, the resources
provided to prevent domestic murder, car accidents and bee stings are
proportionately miniscule compared with the mammoth resources given to CT
(Walker, 2011). One could hardly imagine a war on bees occurring any time soon,
and therefore, it can be concluded, that the CT laws have been largely politically
driven, rather than as a result of the need for legislation against new criminal acts.
The political nature of the laws is reinforced by the concurrent boost in the polls for
elected leaders when they capitalise on national security issues. In 2011, the Labor
Government installed an Independent National Security Legislation Monitor (ISLM),
Bret Walker QC, in order to review the effectiveness and implications of Australia’s
counter terrorism and national security legislation (Walker, 2011). However, the
Abbott Government placed a number of oversight agencies like Walker’s in jeopardy
68

In 2015, a siege took place at the Lindt Café in Sydney. Some media reports have described this
siege as a terrorist attack; others noted that the perpetrator was suffering from mental illness and had
a long line of violent convictions, and questioned the terrorist label.
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in what it said were cost cutting measures (Maley, 2014).69 Despite the three years of
reporting, Walker suggests that the government failed to respond to the concerns
raised in the reports, and the issues raised at the Council Of Australian Governments’
(COAG) Review of Counter-Terrorism Legislation which took place in 2013
(Walker, 2014). In his final report, Walker notes “When there is no apparent
response to recommendations that would increase powers and authority to counter
terrorism, some scepticism may start to take root about the political imperative to
have the most effective and appropriate counter terrorism laws” (Walker, 2014, p. 2).
This failure to respond continued until the Abbott Government was at an all-time
low in the opinion polls and subsequently a ‘terrorist threat’ again became a political
issue due to the rise of ISIS in Iraq. During mid-2014, the Abbott Government
sought mass expansion of the legislation. The legislation is explored below.

The 2002 Legislation
Much of the CT legislation is quite complex, is broad in scope, and includes many
details that are concerning to human rights advocates. The initial amendments were
under Divisions 101, 102 and 103 of Part 5.3 of the Criminal Code 1995 (cth) which
concerned conduct relating to committing and/or planning a terrorist act/s (Burton et
al., 2013; Lynch & Williams, 2006). Some of the most controversial and draconian
powers, however, were those given to ASIO. ASIO already had substantial powers
pre-9/11 under the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (cth) that
mandated the federal attorney general to sign off on warrants allowing ASIO to
monitor phone calls, access people’s computers, use tracking devices or inspect the
mail of a person of interest to ASIO (Lynch & Williams, 2006). In 2003, after
lengthy debate in parliament, the Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation
Legislation (Terrorism) Amendment Act 2003 (cth) was passed.70 The legislation
gives ASIO the power to not only coercively detain those suspected of terrorist
activity, but people it feels might “have information of use to the government”
(Lynch & Williams, 2006, p. 29). In effect, this legislation allows the intelligence
organisation to detain and interrogate a ‘non-suspect citizen’, from the age of 16
69

Here I refer to the defunding of the Information Commissioner’s position which will make it more
difficult for people to obtain government records under Freedom of Information legislation.
70
There is a sunset clause that is currently set to expire in July 2016 unless parliament renews the
provision (Burton et al., 2013).
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years and over, for twenty four hours who is not even suspected of involvement in
terrorist related activity (Burton et al., 2013). This twenty four hour period is only
made up of questioning time, so, this can be carried out over a number of days, and
can be extended by the Proscribed Authority if they are “satisfied that …there are
reasonable grounds for believing that permitting the continuation will substantially
assist the collection of intelligence that is important in relation to a terrorism
offence” (“ASIO Act”, s 34R(4)).71
Changes were also made to the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act
1979 (cth) that allowed ASIO to seek a warrant to intercept the communications of
an innocent party, who is not suspected of involvement in any criminal activity, but
someone who can “assist the Organisation in carrying out its function of obtaining
intelligence relating to security” (Lynch & Williams, 2006).
Control orders were introduced as a means of detaining and monitoring a person,
even when they have not been convicted of an offence. Control orders have a
number of provisions that include restriction of movement and association, the
monitored phone and internet usage and parole-like reporting conditions. As of 2014,
only two Australians had been subjected to a control order, Joseph Thomas and
David Hicks.72 Both Joseph and David were required to use only one telephone, and
the line had to be approved by the Australian Federal Police (AFP). They could not
use the internet. There were also restrictions on where they could live or stay, and
permission had to be sought when not staying at an approved address. Permission
had to be sought for approval to travel interstate, and approval times would
sometimes take months. There were also weekly reporting requirements to a local
police station and curfews. These are particularly draconian measures considering
that a person need not be convicted of a crime. There have been more people placed
on control orders since the Lindt café murders.
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Previous versions of the amendments proposed by the Howard government were even more
draconian, and included, the ability to seek a warrant for people under 16 years, a week long
detention period that could be renewed indefinitely, in effect allowing for ASIO to hold a person ‘of
interest’ who also does not have the right to silence under the legislation, and refuse to allow them
to contact their family members (Lynch & Williams, 2006). Those detained would only have the
right to legal representation after 48 hours of custody.
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There have been several control orders placed on people since the Lindt café siege and the increase
in support of the “Islamic State” organisation.
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Legislation as of 2014
This is an area of law that changes significantly and quickly. The 2014 changes
made Australia’s CT laws even more stringent and provided for broad-scale
surveillance and a crack-down on whistleblowers. In August 2014, the AttorneyGeneral and Prime Minister announced that they would seek to introduce further
measures in order to “give security agencies the resources and legislative powers
needed to combat home-grown terrorism and Australians who participate in terrorist
activities overseas” (Australian Government, 2014c, p. 1). The Abbott Government
announced the provision of over $600 million in additional funding for the AFP,
ASIO, ASIS, Office of National Assessments (ONA) and Customs and Border
Protection, the broadening of the definition of terrorism and what it means to
‘advocate’ or ‘encourage’ terrorist activities (such as on Twitter or Facebook),
enabling the easier cancellations of passports, lowering the standards of proof for
evidence admissible in Australian courts, and broad based data collection (Australian
Government, 2014c, p. 2).
The first tranche of changes relate to the National Security Legislation Amendment
Bill (No. 1) 2014 (cth). It has provisions that allow ASIO to obtain an “Identified
Person Warrant” on the basis that it believes that they are “suspected of engaging in
activities prejudicial to security” (Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia,
2014b, p. 89). This wording is extremely broad and interpretations of security may
mean that advocates or those opposed to Australia’s foreign policy could potentially
be caught up in the application of the legislation. An Identified Person may not be
suspected of anything terrorist related, however, ASIO may deem that they are likely
to assist in the collection of intelligence relevant to security (Parliament of the
Commonwealth of Australia, 2014b, p. 89). This enables ASIO to take multiple
actions against the person, including multiple warrants for a duration of six months,
and to only advise the person after that six month period that they have accessed
their property. The execution of a warrant now provides ASIO permission to enter
third party premises to allow access to the target premises, ‘reasonable force’ in the
destruction of property due to the execution of the warrant, or installation of
monitoring devices. The use of force is also extended to individuals. Section 33(3) of
the legislation even allows for the use of surveillance equipment without a warrant. It
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states; “a person acting on behalf of the Organisation does not act unlawfully by
installing, using or maintaining a surveillance device, with or without a warrant…”
(Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, 2014b, pp. 100-101). This could
potentially include foreign intelligence services.
The broader wording in the legislation allows for the monitoring of both a single
computer (which includes phones, PCs, laptops etc.), and entire networks. Indeed, it
effectively provides for intelligence organisations to monitor the entire Australian
web. In addition, the Act provides that ASIO will be permitted to disrupt, “add,
copy, delete or alter” data on an individual’s computer, as well as a third party
computer “or communication in transit” (Parliament of the Commonwealth of
Australia, 2014b, p. 10). This is not only a significant breach of privacy, but also has
the potential to implicate and target innocent people.
One of the most troubling aspects of the legislation is the immunity provided for
ASIO and its “affiliates” for Special Intelligence Operations (Parliament of the
Commonwealth of Australia, 2014b, p. 18). The Act states: “A participant in a
Special Intelligence Operation is not subject to any civil or criminal liability for or in
relation to conduct that: (i) causes the death of, or serious injury to, any person; or
(ii) involved the commission of a sexual offence against any person; or (iii) causes
significant loss of, or serious damage to, property…” (Sheehan, 2014, p. 1). This
allows for evidence obtained illegally by ASIO and affiliates to be used in court.
Several legal experts raised the issue of the above provisions essentially making
ASIO immune from torture (Sheehan, 2014), and whilst in response, the AttorneyGeneral introduced a provision to explicitly outlaw torture, the use of affiliates
causes concern, particularly as cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment prohibitions
are less clear.
ASIO affiliates are not clearly defined by the legislation, but may include private
security or military contractors, or foreign intelligence services. The legislation now
explicitly sanctions the cooperation of ASIO with organisations outside the
government. Indeed, the legislation is so broadly worded that it provides immunity
for a person ‘connected’ to a Special Intelligence Operation, even if they are not an
authorised participant, and not in Australia (Parliament of the Commonwealth of
Australia, 2014b). This is extremely concerning given the way that the US contracted
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its torture to private security companies post 2001, and the increasing presence of US
forces on Australian soil. There appears to be a direct correlation between the
passing of this legislation and US presence in Australia. For example, the definition
of security in the legislation includes mention of Australia’s responsibilities to any
foreign country (Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, 2014b, p. 76). There
are also provisions for ASIS to cooperate with foreign authorities in providing
weapons training and self-defence techniques to “approved agencies” (Parliament of
the Commonwealth of Australia, 2014b, p. 33).
The legislation also effectively provides political protection for the Attorney-General
due to the condition that he need not be advised of any Special Intelligence
Operation, and no ministerial or judicial approval is required for these operations
(Sheehan, 2014, p. 2). This provides for plausible deniability in relation to the
actions of Australia’s security personnel, which has been used for less than
honourable means in many cases in the War on Terror.
There are also restrictions on whistleblowers, journalists and researchers. The first
provision provides that “an employee or a person who has entered into a contract,
agreement or arrangement with ASIO, ASIS, Defence Signals Directorate (DSD),
DIGO, Defence Intelligence Organisation (DIO) and ONA intentionally copies,
transcribes, retains, removes or deals with a record in any other matter” will be liable
for ten years imprisonment, even outside Australia’s jurisdiction (Parliament of the
Commonwealth of Australia, 2014b, p. 35). Publishing the identity of an ASIO
employee, or affiliate is now punishable by a ten year sentence (Parliament of the
Commonwealth of Australia, 2014b, p. 52). This includes publishing details in
relation to Special Intelligence Operations (SIOs), which the person may or may not
know are SIOs at the time of publishing the material. The whistleblower provisions
provide for a two to ten year sentence for any unauthorised communication. This is
largely in response to the leaks by NSA whistleblower Edward Snowden, which will
be explored further into the thesis.
In addition, the 2014 INSLM report raised concerns over the Defence Act 1903 (cth)
which “may generally be described as empowering and regulating the call out of the
ADF in case of specified emergencies, including a terrorist threat” (Walker, 2014, p.
4). The legislation in effect authorises the ADF to shoot down an airline, killing
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innocent passengers and crew as part of the call out powers (Walker, 2014, p. 1).
Walker (2014) argued that the use of force must be reasonable and at all times
comply with international human rights obligations – and the right to life is the most
fundamental of all of these. Consequently, the INSLM raised concerns about the
application of the legislation and called for the legislation to exclude permission to
kill innocent passengers and crew (Walker, 2014, p. 7).
Given these expansive powers, problems arise with the CT laws for a number of
reasons. ASIO remains largely unaccountable for its activities. A person is unable to
request files from ASIO under FOI laws. This means that those subjected to
investigations may never know, and will never have the opportunity to correct any
false information that ASIO may have collected.
Much of the wording of the legislation is broad and not specifically defined. For
example, there is a clause in Division 101 that creates an offence if an individual
‘intentionally’ possesses a ‘thing’ or ‘collects or makes a document’ that is
“connected with preparation for, the engagement of a person in, or in assistance in a
terrorist act” (Lynch & Williams, 2006). On the basis of recklessness, this may allow
a person to be prosecuted for downloading information from the internet that may
have nothing to do with a specific terrorist attack (Lynch & Williams, 2006). So too,
there is no clear definition of what ‘intelligence’ actually means in relation to the
ASIO legislation (Burton et al., 2013). The subjective interpretation of the legislation
is then open to misuse.
There are also issues around independence between the executive and judiciary.
Under the current legislation those delegated the power to grant questioning and
detention warrants to ASIO, the Issuing Authority, are appointed by the AttorneyGeneral. As Burton et al. (2013) quite rightly point out, the Attorney-General can
appoint anyone as an Issuing Authority, regardless of their experience or
independence, even an ASIO officer or a member of the executive. The level of
independence of the information provided to the Attorney-General is also of concern.
If the Attorney-General relies on information provided by ASIO in order to consent
to a detention order, then the final decision to make the order is signed off by an
issuing authority, who is appointed by the Attorney-General, in the initial step. This
involves a complete lack of independence and oversight.
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The lack of independence extends to the level of scrutiny placed on the decision to
obtain a warrant. The Issuing Authority’s role is not to scrutinise the evidence upon
which the Attorney-General has sought the warrant (Burton et al., 2013). This
provides a situation where information that may have been obtained inappropriately,
or that has not been examined independently, could be used to detain someone who
is not suspected of involvement in or knowledge of a terrorist act (Burton et al.,
2013). The Special Powers provision also does not require any proof of the threat of
an imminent terrorist attack, or that the intelligence sought “is capable of preventing
a terrorism offence before coercive questioning is permitted” (Burton et al., 2013, p.
446).
Some have argued that the Special Powers granted to ASIO effectively enable
indefinite detention (Law Council of Australia, 2008). There is a provision in the
legislation that means that time is not taken into account when the person first
appears for questioning; and breaks in questioning (thirty minutes for every four
hours for adults and two hours for minors); and “any other time determined by a
prescribed authority before whom the person appears for questioning” (as cited in
Burton et al., 2013, p. 442). In addition, if a person requires an interpreter, they can
be questioned for twice as long, for a maximum of 48 hours73.
Coercive questioning has also been flagged as a human rights issue. Under the
current legislation, failure to appear for questioning, to refuse to answer questions, or
provide false or misleading information, or to refuse to provide ASIO with requested
material or things is a criminal offence punishable by five years’ imprisonment
(Burton et al., 2013). There is no protection in relation to self-incrimination and the
right to silence under the legislation. A number of civil libertarians and human rights
advocates believe that these provisions undermine the right to the presumption of
innocence (Burton et al., 2013; Roach, 2008).
Sometimes, at the heart of CT prosecutions, is information that has been gathered
covertly and, may in-fact be deemed to jeopardise national security, or the
relationship with a foreign government if the defendant is allowed to access this
information (Lynch & Williams, 2006). Courts have thus found the balance between
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the common law tradition of open justice and the protection of national security
information a challenge (Walker, 2011).
An expert report has suggested that the legislation and extraordinary powers given to
ASIO do not protect Australians from terrorism (Walker, 2011). As Walker suggests,
‘defeating terrorism’ will not come from passing of CT legislation (Walker, 2011, p.
13), rather it will only serve to divide and further marginalise those already feeling
like pariahs in their own society. The case of Dr Haneef was a primary example of
this.

Dr. Mohammed Haneef
The whole of my career has been ruined, my family has been put into trouble
and made to suffer, and my reputation has been dragged through the mud –
Dr Mohammed Haneef (as cited in McKenna, 2008)
In July of 2007, Dr Mohammed Haneef, a 27 year old medical registrar, was arrested
at a Brisbane airport by AFP officers whilst attempting to board a flight to India
(Chappell, Chesterman, & Hill, 2009). AFP officers at the time said that they
detained Dr Haneef due to his supposed links with a terrorist attack that had taken
place in Glasgow earlier that year, namely a SIM card found in the wreckage of the
bomb blast (Chappell et al., 2009). Dr Haneef was interrogated and held without
charge for two days under Australia’s counter-terrorism laws, specifically, section
23CA of the Crimes Act 1914 (cth) (Chappell et al., 2009). After his arrest, and a
barrage of media coverage, Dr Haneef’s workplace and home were subject to search
warrants, and persons known to him were questioned. Dr Haneef was finally charged
on 4 July with “intentionally providing resources (a SIM card) to a terrorist
organisation” and being reckless as to whether the organisation was a terrorist
organisation. The maximum sentence for this crime is 15 years imprisonment
(Chappell et al., 2009, p. 233).
As with the Joseph Thomas, David Hicks and Mamdouh Habib cases, however, it
was the ‘overreaction’ by law enforcers and the political involvement in matters of
law that became a cause for concern for human rights advocates (Burnside, 2007;
Chappell et al., 2009). In the hours after Dr Haneef’s release on bail, then
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Immigration Minister, Kevin Andrews revoked Dr Haneef’s visa on “character
grounds after receiving undisclosed information about his association with the
alleged terrorists” (Chappell et al., 2009, p. 233). The executive then circumvented
the magistrate’s decision to release Dr Haneef on bail, and he was taken back into
custody (White, 2007).
It was later established that the two central tenets on which the case was based were
unfounded; Dr Haneef had vacated a flat before the terror suspects arrived, and the
SIM card was found in Liverpool, not at the scene of the terrorist attack in Glasgow
(Chappell et al., 2009, p. 233). On July 27, after it became publicly known that the
legal case against Dr Haneef was precarious, he was released and his passport was
returned to him, but without work authorisation. Dr Haneef left Australia and
returned to India.
A subsequent judicial inquiry ordered by the Labor Government was particularly
scathing of the involvement of the former Immigration Minister Kevin Andrews in
revoking Dr Haneef’s passport, particularly as it destabilised the important civil right
of the presumption of innocence (Clark, 2008). In addition, the conduct of certain
law enforcement officials in the AFP, notably Ramzi Jabbour, was highlighted in the
report as being unprofessional (Clark, 2008). This case led to recommendations that
Australia’s CT legislation be amended because of serious concerns about breaches of
basic civil liberties (Clark, 2008).
The laws, however, remain in place and are continually expanding, and concerns
over the overreach of intelligence agencies have not been addressed. If anything, an
expansion of the laws occurred after the election of Tony Abbott in September 2013
and under the subsequent Turnbull Government. In response to criticism of the laws,
and to ensure that Australia’s CT laws are consistent with its international human
rights obligations, a national security legislation monitor was appointed in April of
2011 (Walker, 2011). Bret Walker QC was tasked with reporting yearly in relation to
the effectiveness of the CT laws and, whether any amendments need to occur.
Attorney-General George Brandis was due to abolish the role, however, was forced
to reconsider the decision after a raft of new legislation was introduced in 2014. The
laws remain controversial and the subject of debate, particularly around human rights
issues.
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Conclusion
This chapter explored the background to Australia’s involvement in the War on
Terror, and provides a context for the analysis of tactics used by authorities and the
media to inhibit or lessen outrage at the injustice of torture in the War on Terror.
Whilst the September 11 terrorist attacks occurred in the US, there have been farreaching impacts, including wars in both Afghanistan and Iraq, the establishment of
unlawful detention programs and the torture and in some cases, deaths, of those
detained. The political response was particularly important, as this provided the
rationale for passing draconian CT legislation which decimated civil liberties, and
provided the impetus to go to war.
The Australian involvement in the War on Terror is deeply embedded in its political
alliance with the US. Not only was Australia involved in the wars in Afghanistan and
Iraq, but it has now been established that the Australian military was involved in the
detention and interrogation of those deemed ‘terror suspects’. The involvement of
some members of the Australian military and Government in the sanctioning and
cover-up of torture in both Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay is now well
established. The Australian Government continues to refuse to investigate the actions
of those involved. Along with actions overseas, they passed a raft of CT laws which
have increased the powers of intelligence agencies that have little oversight, and
have decimated civil liberties.
The following chapter builds on the background to the research by providing an
outline of the methodology used in the research and the research question. The
article selection is presented in pictorial format to provide an overview of the
number of articles examined as part of the analysis.
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Chapter 4: Methodology & Article Selection
Chapters Two and Three explored the background to the War on Terror and an
introduction to the politics surrounding the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the
torture and ill-treatment of those detained. The US Government’s detention and
interrogation program was introduced, and the legal justification for denying those
deemed terror suspects protections under the Geneva Conventions 1949 was
explored. The Australian Government’s involvement in the War on Terror was
presented, and the significant issues relating to torture were examined, including the
treatment of those held overseas and the lack of oversight, and the broader political
and legal context operating in Australia.
This chapter presents the research design and method, including the selection of
newspaper articles and the process of qualitative analysis. The chapter presents the
procedures used to identify relevant articles for the study, including the keywords
which eliminated irrelevant material from the database cache. The chapter then
explores the analysis and organisation of data, which utilises the Outrage
Management Model (Martin, 2007) to identify tactics used by authorities to
minimise outrage at the injustice of torture in the War on Terror. Following from
this, it explores the qualitative process used to ascertain the broader themes and
structures in operation through a content analysis of the relevant newspaper articles.
Finally, the chapter presents the article selection results in pictorial format to provide
the reader with an overview of the quantitative results.

Methodology
The methodology builds upon a similar analysis conducted by Kupchik & Bracy
(2009) in their research exploring media reporting of school crime and violence in
the United States, and Brendan Riddick’s (2012a) studies into the communication of
political violence in Fallujah using the Backfire Model and content analysis (Berg,
2007).
Using Australian and New Zealand ProQuest Newsstand database, a broad search
was conducted for relevant mainstream Australian newspaper articles from 2002-
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2012. The key words searched were ‘terror’ and ‘torture’ or ‘abuse’ or
‘mistreatment’ or ‘ill-treatment’, and results were excluded that included the terms
‘church’, ‘animal’ and ‘child’. There were some issues around narrowing to
Australian newspapers, as sometimes New Zealand papers were included in the
results.
The newspapers included in the analysis were; The Australian (National), The
Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), The Daily Telegraph (Sydney), The Sun Herald
(Melbourne), The Herald Sun (Melbourne), The Age (Melbourne), The Sunday Age
(Melbourne), The Advertiser (Adelaide), The NT News (Darwin) and others covering
Australian news. This represents both media conglomerates in Australia, Fairfax and
News Limited. Although an extremely important issue and one that needs further
investigation, results that referred to child sexual abuse and the torture of animals
were excluded as these were not relevant to this study. Relevant articles included
those that pertain to the ‘War on Terror’, including those discussing the actions of
Western military or intelligence agents, debated conditions of confinement, torture
and its use, the treatment or personal character of those detained, legal issues
surrounding War on Terror or accountability for torture, and the War on Terror
extending to other countries (whether through military intervention or using the same
torture techniques). The articles were sorted by relevance. After the first 50 or so
articles for each year, the subsequent articles tended to be irrelevant or duplicates
due to the fact that most Australian newspapers run the same articles under different
headlines.

Process
The first stage of processing was the quantitative recording of the data. An Excel
spread-sheet was utilised to record the findings about the numerical data, including
the year of analysis, how many articles referred to torture, and whether these
references were in the title of the article, or the body. Results were collected in
yearly intervals. These findings were then converted into tables to provide a pictorial
analysis of the raw data.
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The second step involved qualitative analysis which examined whether there was
any evidence of the five methods of inhibiting outrage. This was documented by
organising the data into yearly intervals in Word documents under the headings of:
cover-up, devaluation, reinterpretation, official channels, and intimidation/rewarding
people involved, and other points of interest were noted. In addition, key events and
semantics within the narrative were examined and these were noted on the Word
documents. Any words, phrases or quotes of relevance were recorded on Word
Documents and broader narratives were noted on a separate Excel spread sheet74
(Braun & Clarke, 2006; Huberman & Miles, 2002; Singer & Hunter, 1999). Latent
themes were also noted during this part of the process (Attride-Stirling, 2001).
Content analysis is described by Berg (2007) as “a careful, detailed, systematic
examination and interpretation of a particular body of material in an effort to identify
patterns, themes, biases and meanings” (p. 303). Specifically, the data was examined
to ascertain key messages and concepts that were being communicated through the
language used (repetitive words or phrases); covert messages; the visual
representations (Van Leeuwen & Jewitt, 2001) of torture; who is represented as
experts or ‘reliable’ (truthful) sources on torture; the way in which the
victim/criminal/perpetrator is portrayed and the labels used; and whether methods of
reducing outrage are revealed or exemplified (Martin, 2007).
The primary research question seeks to answer:
Is there evidence that indicates authorities and the media use tactics to
‘inhibit outrage’ at the injustice of torture in the War on Terror in the
Australian context?
Subsequent questions examine:
 What broader mechanisms, if any, support the outrage management
techniques?
 How is torture defined and referred to? Who is defining it? If torture is not
used as a descriptor, what words, metaphors or analogies are used instead?

74

Note: I am not a linguist, and this will not form a large part of the analysis. The main aim is to
understand the key themes being conveyed, and how and where tactics have been used to inhibit
outrage.
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 What attitudes are displayed towards the victims, perpetrators or the concept
in general?
 What narratives are operating?
 What is the underlying political and social context?
 What is the effect of this ideology?
 Are there any omissions in the article?
Taking into account the social and political context, and the structures supporting the
tactics, the organising themes were arranged into groupings creating ‘thematic
networks.’ A pictorial thematic map (Braun & Clarke, 2006) was created to display
connections between common themes and emergent trends, drawing upon texts that
demonstrate the theme (Bryman, 2009; Richards, 2009). Emerging global themes
were explored, summarised and interpreted utilising a human rights framework until
saturation occurred (Attride-Stirling, 2001; Braun & Clarke, 2006).
The material was synthesised into dominant themes and the main issues of relevance
were noted, along with key events and the broader political situation operating at the
time. It was clear that many of the articles examined did not contain ‘factual’
information, and what was claimed by official agencies was inconsistent with other
documented evidence. Thus, the information contained in the articles examined was
also compared with documents that have been obtained over the years under FOI in
Australia or the US, or information from formal government reports. For example,
when media reports quoted Australian Government officials saying that they had
performed ‘welfare checks’ on Australian citizens in US custody, this was crosschecked with material obtained under FOI to see if the visits had, in fact, taken place
and what the result of the visits were. Other public claims reported in the newspapers
were also checked with formal records that are not available to the public such as
David Hicks’ medical records, consular reports, and the much cited NCIS report into
his torture conducted by US Government officials. It is also important to note that
this process of research occurred as a result of over ten years of advocacy in this
area, and many personal conversations with former US captives and military
personnel. Primary sources were used without incurring the need for formal
interviews with torture survivors as part of the research process.
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This research method was chosen for several reasons. Personal interviews were not
carried out because any re-traumatisation of the torture victims needs to be avoided,
and enough information was already known to me through my advocacy work, or
was already in the public realm about the events that have occurred. It was also
chosen because there has never been a broad-ranging study seeking to identify the
tactics used to inhibit outrage at the injustice of torture in the War on Terror in
Australia. As aforementioned, some studies have used the Outrage Management
Model (Martin, 2007) to identify the techniques used by authorities and the media in
relation to the Abu Ghraib torture photos and torture technologies, however, these
were internationally focused rather than solely within Australia (Martin, 2007;
Martin & Wright, 2006; 2003). Identifying methods used in the management of
outrage in the Australian context was therefore important in establishing the
occurrence and extent of the use of these techniques, as well as the identification of
the broader themes that were occurring as part of a larger operating system. This is
pertinent in ensuring that there is not only awareness about the extent to which
authorities have gone to in employing these tactics, but also in contributing to
strategies around torture prevention. It was also necessary to establish the general
engagement with torture in the War on Terror in the Australian context, and
newspapers were chosen because they inexorably report on television interviews, so
they covered the main media realms. Hence, the examination of content in Australian
newspapers for evidence of outrage management tactics and broader themes provides
an overall picture of Australian engagement with the issue, as well as a view of the
use of these methods employed by authorities to minimise outrage.
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Article Selection
This section presents the quantitative findings that include the number of articles
found in searches of the ProQuest Australia and New Zealand Newsstand Database
over the period 2002-2012. The newspaper articles searched included both major
media conglomerates in Australia, including News Limited and Fairfax, as well as
some independent media, such as Mx. The following data includes articles from New
Zealand as well as Australia, however, these were filtered in the main analysis.
Figure 8- Number of articles with the words ‘torture’ and ‘terror*’ or the phrase
‘War on Terror’

Figure 8 provides an overview of the number of articles containing the words
‘torture’ and ‘terror’ or the phrase ‘War on Terror’. The results demonstrate that the
terminology is used quite liberally, as the majority of the articles were completely
unrelated to the subject matter. For example, there were a number of articles about
travel to Panama in 2012, and they happened to contain words such as war and
torture when describing the history of the country.
When the search was narrowed down to articles that contained the words ‘torture’ as
well as ‘terror’ or ‘War on Terror’, the results were indicative of a low level of
engagement. As Figure 8 demonstrates, only a few results were identified in the
database and many of these results were also irrelevant. For example, in 2002 there
were back-packers found murdered, and this led to an article about their deaths.
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Figure 9- Number of articles containing the words ‘torture’ or ‘mistreatment’ or
‘abuse’ or ‘ill-treatment’ and ‘terror’ or ‘War on Terror’ in the title

Figure 9 demonstrates the small number of articles found during a search using the
words ‘torture’ or ‘mistreatment’ or ‘abuse’ or ‘ill-treatment’ and ‘terror’ or ‘War on
Terror’ in the title of articles. Of the above results, the majority of articles were
related to the treatment of those held as terror suspects on the War on Terror. There
was a spike in articles in 2004, due to the pictures leaked which depicted the tortured
prisoners at Abu Ghraib, and subsequent discussion about the treatment of
Australian citizens held in Guantanamo Bay. The total number of relevant articles is
displayed in Figure 10 below. It also demonstrates that the media coverage of torture
lessens greatly after 2004, and there are only one or two relevant articles with search
terms in the title from 2008 onwards.
Figure 10- Number of articles containing the words ‘torture’ or ‘mistreatment’ or
‘abuse’ or ‘ill-treatment’ and ‘terror’ or ‘War on Terror’
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Figure 11 displays the results of the search for articles containing the words ‘torture’
or ‘mistreatment’ or ‘abuse’ or ‘ill-treatment’ and ‘terror’ or ‘War on Terror’ in the
whole of the article, not just confined to the title. The results again show a spike in
2004 and again in 2005, when Mamdouh Habib was released and 2007, when David
Hicks was released from Guantanamo Bay.
Figure 11- Number of articles containing the words ‘torture’, ‘abuse’, ‘mistreatment’
or ‘ill-treatment’ in the body of the Article

The above search turned up the greatest number of articles. There was a peak in
articles around 2005 again, coinciding with the Abu Ghraib photos being released
and the subsequent discussion around the treatment of Australians in US custody.
2005 also marks the year that Australian Mamdouh Habib was released from
Guantanamo Bay, which may also account for the increased numbers, as well as the
discussion about the NCIS report into David Hicks’ treatment whilst in US custody.
The results also demonstrate another spike in 2007 which coincides with David
Hicks being released from Guantanamo Bay, and some articles briefly mention his
treatment whilst in US custody.
However, it is important to note that the majority of the articles identified were, in
fact, not relevant to the study. The mainstream media would commonly use words
like terror or abuse in articles about child sexual abuse, which became prevalent over
the course of the decade. There were a number of articles about child sexual abuse in
institutional settings, particularly within the church. In addition, there were instances
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where torture at the hands of non-state actors was covered in newspaper articles,
whether in relation to the torture of non-human animals, or children. Articles that
addressed torture occurring in Iraq and Afghanistan at the hands of Coalition
‘enemies’ such as the Taliban, also turned up in the results. These instances were
more likely labelled as torture by the newspapers than as abuse or mistreatment,
particularly in the case of Saddam Hussein’s torture of people in Iraq.
Having identified articles relevant to the study of outrage management tactics in
relation to torture in the War on Terror, the following chapter explores the qualitative
results of the analysis. It presents the major findings of the research, focusing on the
articles in light of the categories identified in the Outrage Management Model
(Martin, 2007) including; cover-up, devaluation, reinterpretation, the use of official
channels and the intimidation of victims or rewarding of people involved. The
findings were categorised by year, and major themes were identified, such as
whether there were indications that torture had been hidden from the public. Whilst
primarily seeking to identify the methods of outrage management, the method
included a systematic analysis of the major and latent themes in order to provide a
broader understanding of the narratives, and the larger operating systems. Therefore,
the following chapter explores the key research question which seeks to identify
whether there is evidence of methods of reducing outrage at injustice in relation to
torture in Australia in a post 9/11 environment.
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Chapter 5: Evidence of Inhibiting Outrage at the
Injustice of Torture
We tortured some folks – President Barack Obama (2014a).
These are the words uttered by President Obama at a press conference in August
2014 when asked about the release of a redacted summary of a report into CIA
torture. President Obama’s comments on that day inadvertently summarise the
process of outrage management demonstrated in this chapter in several ways. First of
all, when it became clear that the US Government could not engage in traditional
cover-up anymore, and the extent of deception was exposed, the official rhetoric
switched to the use of devaluation techniques and the reinterpretation of events. The
casual remarks served to shift focus off the horrific ramifications of the US
President’s admission that the US Government engaged in torture.

President

Obama’s emphasis on the term ‘folks’ meant that there was a connotation that those
subjected to torture were somehow common or less educated; there was a clear
attempt to distance himself from not only the admission, but also the humanity of
those who were tortured. The reference to ‘some’ folks also deflected any discussion
about the actual number of people tortured by US officials and their agents.
The fact that Obama did not describe the survivors as ‘people’ was also important.
Whilst they were ‘folks’, they were not human beings with names, or brothers,
fathers, sisters and children, and they certainly were not called victims. The US
Government cast those who had been tortured by the CIA as ‘others’, who were
different. The emphasis was also quickly shifted off the admission of torture to the
fear that was felt in the US after 9/11 in order to justify the actions of those involved.
Obama was quick to state: “It’s also important not to feel so sanctimonious in
retrospect” and he noted the “tough job” that the intelligence community had (Elliott,
2009). Indeed, the position of the US President was clear, remember the fear, forget
those responsible for torture and, more importantly, forget the victims because they
are not worthy of empathy let alone humanity. This outrage management strategy of
cover-up, reinterpretation and devaluation is characteristic of many of the following
results.
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This chapter provides a discussion of the evidence of techniques used by authorities
and the media to reduce or inhibit outrage at the injustice of torture in the War on
Terror from 2002-2012 in the Australian context. The chapter explores rhetoric and
that way that language was used to manipulate, reframe and justify torture, not only
by politicians who use the power of persuasion on a daily basis (Uhr & Walter,
2014), but also the media who are powerful at shaping the narrative and are highly
influential in the casting of an issue as a social problem.
A vast amount of material was used to compile the factual basis against which the
content analysis was compared. This includes primary source material obtained over
the course of a decade through FOI requests, official government reports, eyewitness
testimony, and through advocacy work with US torture survivors/victims. The
analysis examines Australian newspaper articles from 2002-2012 and looked for
evidence of techniques used to stifle or minimise outrage including; cover-up,
devaluation, reinterpretation, the use of official channels and intimidation of
victims/survivors (Martin, 2007). The results were organised into these outrage
management categories for the purpose of analysis and presentation of the findings.
Crossover between techniques is apparent in many of the categories. For example,
cover-up is usually the first technique employed by authorities however, when this is
unsuccessful, or they are unable to lie to the public anymore, other methods – such
as devaluation of the torture victim and their torture testimony, or the reinterpretation
of events – are used by authorities in order to shift attention off the perpetration of
torture or official involvement. For instance, the following section on cover-up
explores some of the deaths that have occurred in US detention facilities – when they
could no longer hide the deaths, many of the techniques used by authorities in the
aftermath focused on the reinterpretation of events. In order for text flow, the overlap
has been identified in the various sections, but it is important to note that most, if not
all of these categories, contain some form of overlap with other techniques of
outrage management.

The Cover-up of Torture
A key tactic employed by authorities to inhibit outrage over injustice is cover-up,
and it appears to be the preferred technique used by the US and Australian
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governments in the first instance. As introduced in Chapter One, traditional cover-up
may come in many forms, including acts that are committed out of the public eye,
hiding or destroying evidence, hidden attacks, using proxies, and censorship. There
are also many layers to cover up, and it is important to recognise that there are
different elements of cover-up visible to different people. For example, it is still not
widely known to the general public that at least 100 people have died in US
detention facilities such as Guantanamo (Greenwald, 2009), so that is why some
deaths are included in the cover-up section. Indeed, in the course of my advocacy in
this area over the past decade, it has become apparent that many people in Australia
think that Guantanamo closed years ago.75 It is also still not accepted in some
sections of the community that torture occurred in US run facilities as the official
narratives were powerful in presenting and reframing events to suit the needs of
authorities.
Even though some members of the public have been concerned about the US torture
program, mainstream cover-up was successful in relation to the broader community
by reframing the treatment of prisoners as humane and preventing a major blowback
to the US Government. These examples are referred to in the following section as
‘mainstream cover-up’ because whilst authorities have employed techniques such as
reinterpretation, their goal was cover-up for the mainstream public who were not
going to delve behind the public comments made, or official explanations.
Comparatively, people who have been closely following the US torture program over
a number of years would see cover-up operating in a different way. For example, the
blatant removal of evidence from crime scenes, and the use of official channels to
hide the truth about what is happening behind closed doors; such as the creation and
subsequent reporting of mock prison cells in Guantanamo that were nothing like the
reality for those detained, as depicted in Figure 12 on the following page. Some in
the human rights community are aware that these mock cells in Guantanamo were
set up for the purposes of propaganda; however, the general public may not be aware
of the extent of deception by the US Government.
75

For example, in the course of my university teaching and advocacy work, it has become apparent
that many in the general community are unaware of Guantanamo’s existence, or if they do know
about the facility, they believe that Obama closed it years ago. It has made advocacy in this area a
challenge in Australia.
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In addition, because of the pattern of tactics
used by authorities in relation to torture, it is
clear that the tactics of mainstream and
traditional cover-up described in this section
are more than likely used in conjunction with
other techniques, most notably, devaluation
and reinterpretation, after cover-up is no
longer sufficient. This means that there is

Figure 12- One of the cells set up with
‘comfort items’ for reporters in
Guantanamo
(Source: Billings, 2007)

significant overlap with the categories of reinterpretation and devaluation in this
section, whether referring to ‘mainstream cover-up’ for those who do not follow the
issue closely, or more traditional cover-up that concerns actions being carried out
specifically to hide the truth from the public, such as the destruction of evidence, or
failure to release information to the public. Consequently, it is necessary to include
both mainstream and traditional forms of cover-up in this section that overlap with
other techniques.
Likewise, it is important to recognise that cover-up by its very nature means that a
great deal of information does not make it to the public realm. For example,
anecdotal evidence suggests that more people have been tortured and killed in black
sites than has been reported in the public realm. Most of the information released
about people being tortured – sometimes to death – has come about through
unofficial leaks, whistleblowers and FOI requests, years after the events have taken
place. The nature of cover-up means that the reality of the US torture program is
unlikely to be ever widely known, and it is important to remember that these results
are based on what was reported in Australian newspapers. For instance, if deaths
were never recorded, there will be no documented evidence and no account will be
reported in mainstream newspapers.
Some of the instances of cover-up that didn’t make it to the newspaper analysis have
already been explored in Chapter Three; including one instance where Australian
officials, notably Sir Peter Cosgrove, was involved in purposefully hiding the death
of Tanik Mahmud from the public in order to protect the US and UK Government
from embarrassment (Cosgrove, 2004, p. 2). Also explored, was the evidence that
points to Australian military personnel being involved in the killing of civilians that
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were wrongly labelled insurgents (Blenkin, 2013), the deliberate or reckless transfer
of prisoners to organisations or countries that would engage in torture (Snow &
Wroe, 2013), and the mutilation of bodies in Afghanistan (Wroe & Callinan, 2016).
Whilst these instances did not make it to the mainstream media as part of the
analysis, they still form part of cover-up given that awareness of the events were
deliberately kept from the public realm.
The cover-up of the US Government enacted torture program commenced from the
very beginning of the War on Terror. As described in Chapter Two, the program
itself was created behind closed doors, in the White House by those at the highest
levels of the Bush Administration. It took years before the public was made aware of
the brutal methods authorised and advocated by members of the Bush
Administration, because evidently the public was not meant to know.
Torture in the War on Terror was carried out in secret locations, in black sites and in
dark rooms that were not even classified as detention facilities. They were out of the
eye of the public for the simple reason that the US Government did not want the
public to know what they were doing to people detained. Those who were subjected
to rendition, and even those who were transported to places like Guantanamo, were
subjected to torture by proxies, such as private security companies, or shuffled
between jurisdictions, such as torture ships, in order to cover-up what was really
going on. Those rendered to third countries were at the mercy of the military,
PMSCs or intelligence agencies in places like Morocco or Egypt, and they were
disappeared from their family and friends. Some torture victims were returned to
their families after being dumped on the side of a road by private security contractors
after being held in black sites for months, and sometimes even years. It is likely that
some renditions have never been reported for fear of retribution. There is much
shame attached to torture, and this has resulted in many victims refusing to speak
about their experience.
As described in Chapter Two, the increased use of PMSCs has resulted in the coverup of torture for the reason that many of their activities are carried out covertly.
There was minimal coverage of torture carried out by these contractors until the later
years of analysis, and because they operate with impunity in countries like Iraq and
Afghanistan, many of the cases still remain hidden from public view. The torture of
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prisoners in black-sites was widespread and evidence that points to the use of these
private contractors being involved in torturing prisoners to death has been revealed
over the years.
Even detention facilities deemed by authorities as ‘legitimate’, like Guantanamo,
were subject to censorship. Prisoners were unable to communicate their suffering to
the outside world and authorities even kept some prisoners away from the ICRC,
whose members were tasked to ensure captives were being treated humanely, and
who are bound by strict confidentiality agreements. In all cases, the torture
survivor/victim’s voice was removed, not only through the ‘act’ of torture and the
inability to convey the pain of torture, but the fact that they were unable to
communicate their suffering to the outside world because the brutal actions were
conducted in secret locations, and out of the public eye. For example, even when
journalists were allowed in to places like Guantanamo, torture victims were
deliberately prevented from communicating with journalists and the reality of their
suffering was prevented from being conveyed to the public.

US Government Cover-up
The examples of cover-up in the US have been numerous over the years, and many
were reported in Australian newspapers over the ten year period analysed; even
though the majority were never reported as an actual ‘cover-up’. As previously
mentioned, many of the instances of cover-up also utilise the technique of reframing,
or the reinterpretation of events, which served to keep the mainstream public in the
dark about many of the actions being perpetrated by officials, and only those who
worked closely on the issue were aware that there was cover-up occurring in specific
instances.
Particularly in the early years, and to engage in mainstream cover-up, Bush, Cheney
and Rumsfeld would state that prisoners detained were being treated “humanely” and
there were outright denials that the US Government and its agents tortured prisoners
("Access to P.O.W.'s eases concerns over conditions - War on Terror", 2002). As
early as 2002, Rumsfeld stated, “There’s no doubt in my mind that it is humane and
appropriate and consistent with the Geneva Convention for the most part [emphasis
added]" (as cited in Gardiner, 2002). And on another occasion he said: "We're going
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to treat them properly. It's not going to be a country club, but it will be humane".
"They are being treated vastly better than they treated anybody else over the last
several years and vastly better than was their circumstances when they were found"
(as cited in "Prisoner may face trial here," 2002a, p. 4). The admission that the Bush
Administration almost as an aside, noted that prisoners would be treated “in the spirit
of”, rather than “in compliance with” the Geneva Conventions 1949 (GCs) was
overlooked in many articles, and the emphasis on “humane” treatment as a
subjective term was not explored. When former President Bush visited Australia in
2003, he stated, “We don't torture people in America and people who make that
claim just don't know anything about our country" (as cited in Kerin, 2003). Indeed,
US authorities even went as far as saying that prisoners in US custody were being
“pampered” because they have access to “bug spray”, with “halal meals and are
provided with free copies of the Koran” (Murdock, 2002). This rhetoric served
cover-up in the general community by stifling debate about the treatment of
prisoners, and given that officials were spouting claims of humane treatment, there
were many who did not question the official comments.
Besides outright denial, the more overt methods of mainstream cover-up came in
several forms over the years. This ranged from US officials’ reinterpreting events by
denying that black sites existed ("Terror suspects ‘held on island'", 2008),
disallowing media or other independent bodies into all parts of detention facilities,
refusing access to all prisoners within detention facilities, and destroying or
supressing evidence of torture. For example, in 2007, it was revealed that the CIA
destroyed videotapes depicting the interrogation of prisoners ("Torture tape denial",
2007). US officials denied that any of the tapes contained evidence of torture;
however, it was hard to believe given the context of the tapes being destroyed, and
the admissions from US officials and agents that the US Government did in fact
sanction the torture of people. Martin (2007) states that the first instinct of most
criminals is to ensure they leave no evidence of their crimes, and then to try not to
get caught. The destruction of tapes and the prevention of independent scrutiny of
the crime scenes were clear and blatant over the years.
In the early years of the War on Terror, definitions of what actually constituted
torture also served to both cover-up and reinterpret events, by barraging the public

174

with arguments over semantics rather than the war crimes and cruelty that was
occurring. This was extensively repeated in the Australian press. For example, there
was much debate over the use of waterboarding and whether it constituted torture,
much of this is covered in more detail later in this chapter. Rather than denouncing a
particular technique as torture, US officials would instead, refuse to answer one way
or another. For example, Brigadier-General Thomas Hartmann, refused to say
whether waterboarding constituted torture and whether evidence obtained using the
controversial interrogation method would be used to prosecute prisoners in
Guantanamo Bay (Davies, 2007). Rather, there were word-plays with the semantics
of ‘abuse’ and ‘coercion’.
One of the more alarming examples of the cover-up and reinterpretation of torture
involved the deaths of three men in Guantanamo Bay, which was introduced in
Chapter Two. On 10 June 2006, then Guantanamo commander, Rear Admiral Harry
Harris, reported that three ‘detainees’, Salah Al-Aslami, Yasser Talal al-Zahrani, and
Mani Shaman al-Utaybi, had committed suicide the night before, and were found
hanging in their cells. This is despite the fact that the men were found with rags
shoved down their throats, and their hands and feet were bound (Khan, 2008). The
official narrative touted by Harris was, “I believe this was not an act of desperation,
but an act of asymmetrical warfare waged against us” (as cited in Rose, 2004, p. 64).
The official rhetoric was immediately shifted off the deaths of the three men to the
crafted narrative that they were, even in death, engaging in act of war from the grave.
Whilst officially, the US Government stated that investigations would take place into
the deaths, events were set into motion to ensure that no credible investigation would
be successful. For example, no conclusive independent autopsy could be carried out
on the men because their bodies were returned to the family almost a week after their
deaths, which meant that toxicology reports would be affected (Khan, 2008). Most
disturbingly, organs essential to ascertain the cause of death had been removed,
including the larynx and brain, and finger and toenails were cut and cleaned shortly
after death so that no DNA evidence could be retrieved (Khan, 2008). The results of
the autopsy on Salah al-Aslami were troubling, despite the limitations. The coroner
found evidence of injections, bruising on the back of the hand, a punctured vein and
that one of Salah’s teeth had been broken, while he was still alive (Khan, 2008). The
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US Government and its military were powerful enough to set the narrative that the
men killed themselves as an act of warfare, and this inevitably shifted focus off the
suspicious nature of the deaths, the injuries sustained to the bodies and the fact that
body parts were removed so that no independent oversight could be conducted. They
had complete control of the information that was released to the public, and worked
quickly to set a particular narrative.
In 2010, a brave whistleblower named Joseph Hickman came forward to counter the
official narrative and provided eye-witness evidence that he had seen ‘packages’
being transported from a secret black site within Guantanamo, called Penny Lane, or
Camp No, as in ‘no, it does not exist’ (Hickman, 2015; Horton, 2010). It was
established that prisoners were subjected to torture in these secret camps within
Guantanamo at the hands of “non-uniformed government personnel” believed to be
private contractors and the CIA (Horton, 2010). Despite this, the official narrative
was reported uncritically in Australia, and the deaths were called suicides even
though evidence to the contrary had surfaced. The military was also using the tactic
of designating anyone who called the deaths into question as conspiracy theorists,
and even human rights organisations became reluctant to label the deaths as murders
rather than suicides.76 This is another key tactic used by authorities to devalue torture
claims.
A high-level of cover-up also occurred in the form of sham
investigations. Even when investigations were ordered after
people in US custody were tortured to death, the full reports
were kept from the public by US authorities. For example, the
deaths of two men, known as Dilawar and Mullah Habibullah,
on 4 December 2002, at Bagram airbase were only made
apparent to the public when redacted documents from a report
conducted by Admiral T. Church (2004) were leaked in 2005.

Figure 13- Sketch by
Thomas Curtis showing
how Dilawar was
chained to the ceiling
(Source: Golden, 2005)

The US Government’s refusal to release the full report was
regarded as a cover-up in the US (Leopold, 2009). It turned out that the men had died
two days after Rumsfeld had authorised “aggressive interrogation techniques”, and
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I worked for a human rights organisation at the time, and was prevented from publishing an article
denouncing the deaths as murders.
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they were handcuffed to fixed objects to keep them awake, and subjected to kicking,
punching and “compliance blows” to the legs by interrogators (Leopold, 2009). As
depicted in Figure 13, it was discovered that Dilawar was chained to the ceiling by
his wrists for around four days, and a guard tried to force him to his feet, but he
could no longer stand because his legs had been “pummelled” by guards (Jehl,
2005). He died chained to the ceiling with legs so badly injured that if he survived,
they would have been amputated because, as the coroner noted, they were similar
injuries to a man whose legs had been run over by a bus (Armed Forces Regional
Medical Examiner, 2003; Jehl, 2005).
Eventually, documents released under FOI three years after, demonstrated that the
blunt force trauma to the legs was implicated in the deaths as a result of pulmonary
embolisms (Leopold, 2009). The summary of the released report was called a whitewash by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) because its conclusion was
that there was no evidence that US policy condoned abuse or torture of prisoners
(Leopold, 2009). However, if it were not leaked to the public, there was no way that
the deaths of the two men would have made it to the public realm. After a long
battle, in March 2003, a coroner ruled that deaths which had occurred at Bagram
airbase were homicides (Campbell, 2003). The media reported that the US military
was subsequently holding an investigation into the deaths. Upon completion of the
investigation, the military would decide whether charges should be laid. Of course,
by the time the report was handed down, many in the public realm had either
forgotten about the reported deaths, or the outrage had been watered-down through
negative reports of the men’s personal characters. In a blatant act of reinterpretation,
after the coroner’s report was handed down pointing to homicide, a spokesperson
from the Pentagon stated that just because the deaths had been ruled a homicide, it
did not necessarily mean that the person had been unlawfully killed, thereby
attempting to legitimise the brutal torture and death of the men involved (Campbell,
2003). Besides the obvious problems with the Pentagon investigating their own
colleagues, the blatant cover-up was clear.
The US Government systematically attempted to cover-up the deaths, and tried to
prevent the public from being made aware of the details. When the pages were
released, a protracted legal battle for the un-redacted and full report ensued for years,

177

utilising official channels to further stifle the outrage. Independent authorities were
prevented from accessing the crime scene and evidence was tainted. In a clear use of
official channels to minimise outrage, it was the military that made the final decision
as to whether charges would be laid and as expected, only a few lower level soldiers
were charged; but most of the charges were later dropped (Jehl, 2005). The others
involved were simply demoted or given a letter of reprimand (Jehl, 2005). The
process was drawn out, so that the outrage had been minimised. Journalists were not
provided access to facility at Bagram, and therefore the public was completely
reliant on the military explanation for the deaths that occurred. Most prominently,
denial became a central feature of the cover-up due to the military reinterpreting the
event to mean that just because men had died, it did not mean that any misconduct
had taken place.
This was certainly not an anomaly, and the cover-up of abuse and torture also
occurred with the release of other official reports into ‘detainee treatment’, which
were either leaked years after the torture or death of prisoners, or carried out with the
obvious intention that the public would never know about it. In the later years, and
after a number of non-independent investigations were carried out,77 the reports still
white-washed the experience of prisoners, to the extent that even when evidence
from the soldiers themselves was presented to investigators, they still called into
question the reliability of the accusations, or concluded there was no evidence of
abuse in order to protect those higher up the chain of command (Apuzzo, 2007;
Naval Criminal Investigation Service, 2006). Countless examples can be provided,
including:
o The Schlesinger Report (2004) which concluded that out of 300 cases of
‘reported abuse’ in all US detention facilities, only 66 were substantiated.
The report noted that “There is no evidence of a policy of abuse promulgated
by senior officials or military authorities” (as cited in Greenberg & Dratel,
2005, pp. 908-975).
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I say non-independent because the investigations were largely carried out by government officials,
or the same military forces accused of torturing prisoners. For example, the NCIS report into David
Hicks was a report that was authored by the Navy, and they were investigating their own colleagues
who had taken photos of David naked, hooded and shackled (Naval Criminal Investigation Service,
2006).
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o The 2003 death of Dilar Dababa which implicated US forces in Iraq
(Leopold, 2009).
o The death of a man at the Special Forces Compound in Iraq, termed “the
disco”. He was subjected to physical assaults, like kicking, his jumpsuit was
filled with ice, he was hosed down and made to stand for long periods of
time, subjected to a cold air-conditioner, he was forced to lie down and drink
water until he vomited or near asphyxiated, his head was slammed against a
hot steel plate during interrogations, and forced to do leg-lifts with bags of
ice tied to his legs (Leopold, 2009).
o The investigation into the death of Abed Mowhoush who died of
asphyxiation after he was bound in a sleeping bag by US forces during an
interrogation in 2003 (Leopold, 2009).
These deaths only made it to the media in the US around six years after the torture
and deaths occurred, and only because the ACLU filed FOI requests. Prior to the FOI
documents being released, the public was unaware of most of these investigations,
and they were rarely reported in Australian papers, if at all. If they were reported,
they were just minor re-print articles written by US staff writers. In addition, as is
consistent with reinterpretation, even when prisoners were tortured to death, the US
mainstream media referred to the deaths as abuse, or assault, rather than torture
(Golden, 2006; Jehl, 2005).
A similar situation occurred when the photos of tortured men at Abu Ghraib were
released in 2004, and the Bush Administration used cover-up tactics in a number of
ways in an attempt to inhibit outrage at injustice. The cover-up began long before the
photos were released, and it is likely that the public would not have been aware of
the torture that occurred if it were not for the photos being released in the first place.
The torture techniques used on the men were devised behind closed doors and the
media was certainly not allowed into the facility. When the photos were released,
however, the Bush Administration switched from cover-up to using other methods of
minimising outrage, such as reinterpretation and devaluation. Bush appeared on
televisions around the world reinterpreting events by stating that “we don’t tolerate
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these kinds of abuses”, and said there was a big difference between what Saddam
Hussein did and the actions of the US military (as cited in "Rumsfeld must bear cost
of abuse damage," 2004). Bush used the technique of comparison here by attempting
to assign legitimacy to the brutal actions of the US military, and contrasting them to
that of the “extreme torture” perpetrated by Saddam Hussein (“Saddam’s execution
the wrong option for many Iraqi’s”, 2007). Following this strategy, Bush stated that
“in a democracy…mistakes are made. But in a democracy those mistakes will be
investigated and people will be brought to justice” (as cited in "Rumsfeld must bear
cost of abuse damage", 2004). The official investigation that ensued, targeted lower
level soldiers and failed to hold to account any of the officials who ordered or carried
out torture. There was also some level of censorship in the investigation, and the
public was not made privy to the events that led up to the torture of prisoners until
well after the events.
The intelligence community was also at pains to distance themselves from the
photographs, and FBI memos were released demonstrating their concern over
techniques such as sleep deprivation, use of military dogs, environmental
manipulation such as the use of loud music and "sensory deprivation through the use
of hoods, etc." (Davies, 2004). These protests did not change the fact that many FBI
employees were involved in the interrogations and torture that occurred in different
US detention facilities. Up until this point, they in fact aided in the cover-up by
either standing by in complicit silence, or largely failed to step-in and stop
techniques they thought had crossed the line.
The tactics of mainstream cover-up extended to the legal system, particularly in the
later years when the Obama Administration refused to prosecute those involved in
torture, including the authors of the so-called ‘torture memos’ (Elliott, 2009). Heads
of state and officials from several countries over the years emphatically stated that
they did not know that prisoners were being tortured in US custody; however, as the
years went on, and documents were released or leaked, it became clear that they
were fully aware that prisoners were being tortured. For example, in 2010, a
document in Tony Blair’s handwriting was released referring to UK prisoners being
“ill-treated” just months into the War on Terror (Doyle, 2010; "Spy boss denies
cover-up - Torture claims are false", 2010). This document as well as others, point to
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the Blair Government being aware of the extent of abuses occurring in places like
Iraq and Afghanistan, including the participation of some UK soldiers in the
atrocities being committed.
Another form of cover-up operated through official channels: either by denying FOI
requests, stalling the release of material, or releasing material that was heavily
redacted on the grounds that it would compromise national security. In 2011 alone,
ninety-two million documents were classified as ‘restricted’ in the US, as they were
said to contain official secrets (Coll, 2013). FOI requests both in the US and
Australia have been stalled for years whilst government bodies ‘consult’ with those
involved in the US torture program, and government agencies provide them with an
opportunity to censor the documents prior to release.78 The use of the legislative
clause that allows governments to hide information from the public on ‘national
security’ grounds, or to protect ‘foreign relations’, has prevented a host of documents
from being released in Australia and the US. Technicalities are used to prevent the
release of material that would cause embarrassment to officials. For example,
requested documents have been redacted or refused because officials have narrowly
interpreted terminology such as ‘torture’ or ‘abuse’. Some agencies have refused to
process requests all together on practical grounds, stating that it would take up too
many resources to search for documents. Other agencies have stated that officials
took emails with them when they left office, so there are no records pertaining to the
request.
In the case of photos depicting prisoner ill-treatment and torture, the Obama
Administration prevented the release of the photographs citing concerns over
national security and the safety of US forces ("America must face ugly truths of 'War
on Terror'," 2009). The release of a US Senate Intelligence Committee report into the
Bush Administration’s interrogation program was continually stalled. Reports have
confirmed that the CIA hacked into the computer network established for the inquiry
and removed approximately 1, 000 pages, including an internal CIA review (Glaser,
2014). The CIA blamed the White House for the removal – the White House denied
such a claim (Glaser, 2014).
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For example, after successive appeals, I have been waiting four years for documents requested from
the Prime Minister’s office in Australia.
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In relation to Guantanamo prisoners, defaming the prisoners, or pressing charges
against them were further techniques used to swamp the public with counternarratives that contributed to the cover-up of torture in the general community. For
example, a week after the CIA admitted to waterboarding some prisoners, they
charged Khalid Sheikh Mohammed with war crimes in order to shift the focus off his
torture (Balogh, 2008). The results demonstrate this was a clear strategy used by the
authorities as it was employed a number of times over the years, including with the
Australian torture survivors/victims.
The US Government went to great lengths to prove that Guantanamo prisoners were
being held in humane conditions, particularly after the Abu Ghraib photos were
released. The spin doctors set up mock cells to show the media, complete with items
such as clothes, shoes and books. Former prisoners, including Australians, would
later testify that the items shown to the media were deemed ‘comfort items’, and that
in the early years, they were not given access to many of the items put on show for
the media to report – including toilet paper (Hicks, 2010; "Hicks kept in kennel, says
lawyer", 2002).

Australian Government Reinterpretation that Contributed to
Mainstream Cover-up
Australian PM Howard and his cabinet are steadfast in their support for USG
policy…John Howard and his government have taken pains to defend our
actions consistently, even if it costs them short term political points – Cable
generated by the US Consulate in Melbourne in 2006, released by WikiLeaks
(US Consulate Melbourne, 2006)
The rhetoric and obfuscation used by the US Government to cover-up crimes against
humanity ultimately filtered down to Australia, in large part, so that Australian
officials could coordinate public spin and stifle any blowback to the US
Government. In fact, evidence suggests that Australian officials went to enormous
trouble to cover-up the torture committed by the US Government and its agents in
the War on Terror. There are a number of specific examples of this cover-up that
predominately centre around the way in which torture is reframed and reinterpreted
(by the media, the US and Australian Government). This ties in with the tactic of
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reinterpretation and the formal mechanisms that could have placed independent
scrutiny on the actions of the US and Australia, but instead, have been avoided or
softened by the Australian Government and media.
Probably one of the most pertinent examples was exposed during 2006, when it was
revealed that the Howard Government was using speaking notes provided by former
US Defense Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, to defend the treatment of former
Guantanamo Bay prisoner, David Hicks. Former Attorney-General Philip Ruddock
denied that David was being held in solitary confinement, rather, he used Rumsfeld’s
terminology, calling his confinement “single celled occupancy” (Baker, 2006). This
was apparent on several occasions over the years.
There are numerous examples of the Howard Government defending the US
Government’s treatment of prisoners, including Australians. The majority of
comments made by the Australian Government were outright denials that anyone
was being ‘mistreated’, let alone tortured. Whilst credible and voluminous testimony
was surfacing about the torture occurring in Guantanamo Bay, Howard Government
Ministers obediently stated “there has never been any evidence of abuse or
maltreatment” ("MP denies abuse talk", 2006). The papers compliantly reported and
ministerial statements were left largely unchallenged in relation to Australian
prisoners (Debelle, 2006; "'Torture' of Aussies blasted by lawyers", 2004). There
were even denials that Australian prisoners were complaining about their treatment
and torture: "David Hicks has never complained about mistreatment to us at all," Mr
Kemish [from DFAT] said. "He has described his treatment as fair and professional"
(as cited in "US probe on torture claims by Aussies", 2004). Subsequent FOI
documents, testimony, WikiLeaks releases and legal evidence has demonstrated this
was not the case, and all of the Australian prisoners, Mamdouh Habib, David Hicks,
Ahmed Aziz Rafiq and Joseph Thomas, reported their mistreatment and torture to
Australian officials.
In 2008, the Australian Government was in damage control over the rendition of
Mamdouh Habib to Egypt. The Australian Government vigorously denied that they
knew Mamdouh was taken to Egypt. However, it was later revealed in a Senate
Estimates hearing that the former ASIO head, Dennis Richardson, was personally

183

involved in discussions about the “hypothetical possibility” of Mamdouh being taken
to Egypt (O'Brien, 2008a). In fact, documents tabled in Federal Parliament clearly
demonstrated that rendition was discussed with senior officials at a meeting in
Canberra on 23 October 2001 (O'Brien, 2008a). But for years the newspaper articles
relating to Mamdouh Habib focused on his alleged personal conduct, rather than the
Australian Government’s actions or knowledge of his treatment. This was effectively
a cover-up to the general community because many believed the official narratives,
and it was not until years later, after most had forgotten the event, that the truth was
finally revealed to the public.
As aforementioned, the misrepresentations about torture at Abu Ghraib went even
further when it was revealed that George O’Kane, an Australian military legal
officer, was involved in providing legal advice in relation to interrogation techniques
used at Abu Ghraib (Brooks, 2015). The Howard Government protected O’Kane
from testifying at any US investigations, and from any scrutiny in Australia.
Although “Mr Howard said neither Major O'Kane nor any Australian Defence
Forces member witnessed any mistreatment” (McPhedran, 2004), it was later
revealed in Senate hearing documents and documents released under FOI that this
was, in fact, untrue (Public Interest Advocacy Centre, 2011d).
Perhaps even more disturbing than outright denial and blame-shifting, was the
Australian Government lamenting US Government assertions that it would not use
torture. In 2006, former Attorney-General Phillip Ruddock stated, “The point the
United States has made is that it will not use torture and those instructions have been
given to their agencies and that may well limit the capacity of intelligence
organisations in the future..." (as cited in Sproull, 2006). In October 2006, Ruddock
went a step further when he declared “I don’t regard sleep deprivation as torture” (as
cited in Smiles, 2006). This assertion made headlines, given he was wearing his
Amnesty International badge at the time, and even members of the Australian
military came out to publicly lambast the former Attorney-General’s assertion.
Ruddock’s comment also prompted a pro-torture article that stated “If sleepdeprivation meant saved lives, would we seriously object to it?... We know there are
rooms without windows where there are things done in our name to preserve the
values we take for granted…” (Schembri, 2006).
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The reinterpretation and mainstream cover-up did not only occur as a result of the
blatant misinformation provided to the public, there was also lying by omission. For
example, when David Hicks was returned to Australia from Guantanamo Bay, one
article stated that he was “‘elated’ to be in solitary confinement” (Debelle, 2007).
The journalist from The Age, Penny Debelle, failed to report that David was
suffering from PTSD as a result of his torture and that, at the time the article was
written, he was denied blood tests requested by family members in order to ascertain
what drugs he had been injected with in Guantanamo (Hicks, 2010).
Reducing outrage about the torture of people in Middle Eastern countries was far
more effective in the mainstream, as not much information made it to Western
newspapers. A few newspaper articles detailed that people were kidnapped and
tortured by US security forces from different parts of the world over the ten year
period studied here. For example, in 2010, an Iranian nuclear scientist reported that
he was kidnapped from Medina by US agents (Karimi, 2010). However, the
Advertiser touted it as a propaganda campaign launched by Iran against the US and
the allegations were never taken seriously. Many more people have disappeared and
sustained injuries consistent with being tortured, yet the public will never know
about them.
A common theme in the material examined was the technique of powerful entities
controlling the narrative by preventing the truth from getting into the public realm,
holding sham investigations and stalling the outcomes which only focused on lower
ranking soldiers. The evidence also demonstrates that shifting the focus off any
mention of torture was used as a tactic of minimising outrage. The use of
denigration, or techniques to remove the credibility of the person making the
accusation was employed in many of the cases examined. The emphasis was always
placed on the accusations levelled against the torture victims, rather than their
torture.
Torture was conducted in black-sties and places of detention out of the public eye,
such as Guantanamo, Bagram and the Salt Pit. Whilst Guantanamo was the most
visible of all US detention facilities, authorities went to great lengths to hide what
was really happening behind closed doors. Not only have journalists been prevented
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from seeing the reality of many US detention centres, when they have gained access,
it has been a sanitised and misleading view of the true situation for those detained.
Sending people to third countries for rendition, or using private military and security
contractors was common. Both Joseph Thomas and Mamdouh Habib describe being
tortured whilst US agents watched. Blatant cover-up has included the destruction of
documents and videotapes that depicted interrogation, such as the CIA destroying
their interrogation tapes. FOI requests have been either stalled, heavily redacted or
denied in order to prevent the truth reaching the public, both in the US and Australia.
And finally, censorship has been used to prevent people from finding out the truth
about what has really occurred. State Secrets Privilege, and other national security
clauses, have been used to prevent cases from going to the courts. Consecutive US
administrations have passed legislation to prevent torture survivors from bringing
cases against their torturers – and those who ordered torture remain covered by
diplomatic immunity.

Devaluing the person/s who are tortured
Shackled like wild animals, deprived of sight, sound, smell and touch, alQaeda terrorists kneel before their American guards in the Guantanamo Bay
prison camp (Lowther & Rosenberg, 2002).
Devaluation involves lowering people’s view of the victim or group of people
(Martin, 2007). It may entail labelling the victim, personal attacks, and finding or
creating dirt. The overt and widespread devaluation of those who have been tortured
in the War on Terror is one of the most troubling findings of the research, and of all
of the methods of stifling outrage identified in the Model, this area contained the
most examples in the Australian media landscape. Evidence demonstrates that not
only have many Australian officials and journalists been overt in their denigration of
torture survivors and victims, but they have also failed to hold perpetrators to
account. Even those who would be termed the more ‘liberal’ or ‘left-leaning’
journalists, have been equally responsible for denigrating torture survivors and
toeing the official line. In fact, the denigration of torture victims by media outlets
like the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) could be seen as worse, given
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that they are generally seen as a more ‘reliable’ and credible media source (Roy
Morgan, 2004).
Howard Bloom (1995) argues that as a condition of survival, animals, including the
human variety, are genetically programmed to ‘dispose’ of those who are different.
He describes the story of Bertha Krupp, whose son ran a concentration camp and
was responsible for the torture and murder of countless human beings in Nazi
Germany. She saw herself as a compassionate and caring person – she cared for the
sick and was kind and charitable. The differentiating feature in the circle of her
concern was that Jewish people were seen as less than human; she called them
‘stuke’, meaning livestock. In the Australian context, the response to animal cruelty
has been strong and decisive, compared to the response when allegations of torture
were revealed against those detained by the US Government in the War on Terror.
This denigration of certain human animals to non-human animal status can been seen
throughout history as an excuse to kill, torture, maim because they are different from
‘us’.
Throughout history, removing the humanity of the ‘torture target’ by the state has
been a central practice. In Chile, targets were named ‘humanoids’ to distinguish
them from human beings (Bloom, 1995). Race has been central in separating those
who deserve to be tortured from the humans who deserve rights. The torture of
African-Americans demonstrated by lynchings was a part of designating them
slaves, inferior to white masters. White Australian history is also one founded on the
torture and massacres of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities
(Reynolds, 2013). Historical accounts document the way that the Europeans who
invaded and occupied Australia used the excuse that they were civilising the socalled ‘savages’ (Reynolds, 2013). In the same way that African-Americans were
lynched and left on display for the whole community to see, Australia’s First Peoples
were subjected to public and private displays of torture in order to reinforce their
lack of humanity (Brooks, 2014).
Whilst Aboriginal people are still the target of racist policy, more recent times have
seen the focus of xenophobic ‘othering’ in the mainstream rhetoric shifted towards
migrants and those seeking asylum. With the War on Terror, it is those of Islamic
faith that have become the target of this process (Gordon, 2014). Being of Muslim
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faith has been conflated with racial origins; the terminology ‘of Middle Eastern
appearance’ is now commonly heard alongside stories about crime, violence, and
most prominently, terrorism.
Understanding the social climate is important in understanding the origins of the
devaluation process in the Australian context at the time. Under the leadership of
John Howard, nationalism grew in the years prior to September 11 and this was
connected to the further denigration of Australia’s First Peoples and asylum seekers.
Howard’s policies took a hard line on asylum seekers arriving by boat in what many
saw as an attempt to gain voter support (Briskman, Goddard & Latham, 2008). What
was termed the ‘children overboard scandal’ took place at this time. In the lead up to
a federal election, when a boat carrying asylum seekers was intercepted nearing
Australian waters, the Howard Government lied to the Australian people and said
that asylum-seeker parents had thrown their children overboard (Briskman, Goddard
& Latham, 2008). This, of course, caused a media flurry and outrage ensued as
people tried to come to terms with how ‘those people’ could throw their children off
a boat. Implying the depravity of those seeking asylum was a technique used by the
Howard Government to show that they did not share ‘Australian values’ and justify
their incarceration and exclusion from the country. Famously, Prime Minister
Howard stated “we will decide who comes to this country and the circumstances
under which they come” (Howard, 2001). Pauline Hanson’s right-wing One Nation
party had also emerged a few years before this incident, and racism and xenophobia
were rife.79
It was little wonder then, that after the events of September 11, the fearful rhetoric
struck a chord with an already divided community. Lebanese Australians describe
being spat on and called terrorists in the days after September 11 (McDonald, 2014).
People of Middle Eastern descent, Muslim and Christian alike, began having to
defend themselves and their allegiance to Australia after countless headlines that
conflated people of Middle Eastern appearance with criminals, terrorists and Islamic
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Many argued that this started with the Gulf War when many Australians of a Middle Eastern
descent were asked to declare their allegiance to Australia. There is a famous incident where a man
on Kerri-Anne Kennerly’s former morning television program was aggressively asked to clarify
whether he was “Australian first” (as cited in McDonald, 2014).
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extremists (McDonald, 2014). Young men in particular became disenfranchised and
more like pariahs in their own country.
To make it worse, the passing of the counter-terrorism legislation disproportionately
affected those from the Muslim community and the media was quick to bandy
around the term radical Islamists (McDonald, 2014). This caused divisions and
tensions, even within already diverse Muslim communities in Australia. The
demonisation ramped up after the 2002 Bali bombings in a Kuta nightclub where
nearly 100 Australians were killed. The media saw this as an attack on Australia
itself, as many young Australians went for holidays to Bali. Given this background
in Australia, it was little wonder that, when the first pictures of the men in
Guantanamo Bay were released, there was little sympathy for their plight.

Examples reported in Australian papers
Capitalising on the fear after the 9/11 attacks, world leaders were quick to describe
everyone who was detained by Coalition forces or government agents as terrorists,
and evil. Prisoners were deprived of names and stories, and labelled as “detainees”,
who were “dangerous” and “deadly” (Murdock, 2002). As the quote at the beginning
of this section demonstrates, comparing those imprisoned and tortured human beings
to dogs and other non-human animals occurred almost instantaneously (Dunn,
2003b; Lowther & Rosenberg, 2002). Pictures immediately surfaced that
dehumanised prisoners and cast them as having lives unworthy of grief (Butler,
2010). Indeed, without having any allegations tested in a court, nor any means to
prove their innocence, all prisoners were
labelled by politicians, officials and the media
as “committed killers”, “al-Qaeda fighters”,
“terrorists”,

“uniquely

dangerous”

and

“traitors” (Johnston, 2002; "Prisoner may face
trial here", 2002; Schlink, 2002). Guantanamo
prisoners were described as “some of the most
dangerous men in the world ("Access to
P.O.W.'s eases concerns over conditions - War
on Terror", 2002), and Rumsfeld described

Figure 14- Pvt. Lynndie England
holding a prisoner by a leash at Abu
Ghraib
(Source: US Army, 2003)
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them as “among the most dangerous, best trained, vicious killers on the face of the
earth” (as cited in Stuart, 2003). Brigadier-General Rick Baccus who was reportedly
in charge of prisoners declared “they’re all killers – they were all were carrying
weapons against United States servicemen” (as cited in Stuart, 2003). John Walker
Lindh, who was a high profile prisoner being a US citizen, was labelled the
“American Taliban” and “Johnny Jihad” ("The view of the American Taliban's legal
team: No way should he be treated like this", 2002).
In Australia, David Hicks was immediately labelled an “al-Qaeda terrorist” or an
“Aussie Terrorist” who was “prepared to kill innocent people” (Ahwan, 2002;
Albrechtsen, 2002; "Prisoner may face trial here", 2002a). It was claimed that he
may have “been part of a conspiracy to kill thousands of Americans” (Hall, 2002).
The Prime Minister, Foreign Minister and Attorney-General immediately told the
Australian public that David was a terrorist despite the fact nothing was proven
(Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 2002; 2003). One article described David as
having “an obsession with guns and violence” and accused his “unstable background
and drug abuse” as leaving no “moral barrier to fighting for causes including
terrorism” ("Hicks faces up to legal ramifications", 2002). One of the common and
more deceptive labels that David received from the media over the years was that he
was a “kangaroo skinner”, which inevitably conjured up images of a blood-thirsty
killer who would even murder innocent iconic Australian animals for pleasure. It did
not matter that it was not true. There was even a story that surfaced in the early
years, which asserted that David was such a monster he tried to chew through the
electrical wire to bring the plane down on transit to Guantanamo (Hicks, 2010).
The media capitalised on statements made by other prisoners under torture in an
attempt to discredit David. Probably the most remarkable example peddled by the
media was that of Feroz Abbasi who said a number of false things about prisoners,
including that David was al-Qaeda’s golden boy, and that he wanted to go back to
Australia to rob and kill Jews. In 2004 Abbasi released an explanation of the false
statements including the effects of his torture and injections that:
(i) caused a growth on my right testicle which I still possess to this day (my
25th birthday); (ii) paranoia; (iii) a disjointed female voice in my head; (iv) a
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deterioration in my capacity to control my thoughts, feelings and actions – all
of these became detached from myself and took on that of the disjointed
female’s voice’s; (v) resulting in eventual “panic attacks” in which I literally
thought I was being raped, repeatedly… (Abassi, 2004).
Three years after Abbasi released the statement explaining why he made the false
accusations, the Australian media was still repeating his torture-induced claims in the
newspapers (Balogh, 2007b).
There was also a strong message from the government and repeated in the media that
if people detained by the US and its agents were tortured, they deserved it. The
torture of one Guantanamo prisoner was described as “…getting a taste of his own
medicine” (Coorey, 2003), and other articles pointed to the attitude that the “abuses”
torture survivors experienced were “terrible, but what they have done is worse”
(Devine, 2004). Newspaper articles repeated official claims that “mistreating”
captives deemed to be Taliban members in Afghanistan was justifiable because they
were responsible for torturing civilians (Dodd, 2008; “Top Taliban Official Killed”,
2002). Conveniently for comparison purposes, articles describing the torture of US
POWs who served during the Gulf War, surfaced around this time, and were strong
in condemning their treatment. Their treatment at the hands of the Iraqis was always
described as torture and given the weight it deserved in the media. One article
described: “Former Gulf war POW remembers his 15 days of torture at the hands of
Iraqis. He was beaten daily – suffering a perforated ear drum, torn knee ligaments
and severe bruising – and even endured several mock executions when a gun was put
to his head and fired past his brow” (McKenna, 2003). Similarly, newspaper articles
of the time also presented torture as unjustifiable when it was perpetrated by
government agents in countries such as China and Russia (Hodge, 2011; Miraudo,
2002; McDonald, 2005). Torture at the hands of the Pakistani Inter Service
Intelligence Agency (ISI) and other government agents was also presented as
‘legitimate’ in papers (Hodge, 2011; “Kids freed from school torture cell”, 2011).
In contrast, when War on Terror prisoners described very similar treatment, the
headlines read “Terrorist torture claim” (Wockner, 2003), or “torture debate
overlooks real villains” (Parkinson, 2005). The same phenomenon appears to have
occurred in relation to Guantanamo prisoners from the UK, when articles from
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Britain republished in Australian papers described their treatment as abuse rather
than torture. Papers in Australia were more likely to use US Government language.
To further discredit and devalue the torture survivors or victims, words such as
‘alleged’, ‘abuse’ or ‘mistreatment’, were commonly used instead of torture,
downplaying their lived experience. In relation to “mistreatment allegations”, one
columnist noted the “US is also the victim of some fairly scurrilous myth-making...
Likewise, the false and damaging story of a Koran supposedly flushed down a toilet
at Gitmo” (Parkinson, 2005). Actually, these techniques and related ones were
commonly used on prisoners to humiliate and break them according to prisoner
testimony (Begg, 2007), US investigations, and testimony of former Guantanamo
guards that they engaged in religiously insensitive behaviours and beat prisoners
(Neely, 2011).
In addition to ‘myth-making’, torture allegations were even played-down to the
extent that they were likened to fairy tales. A 2004 headline referred to an Australian
prisoner’s torture experience as a “tale of abuse”, and there was a concerted effort to
downplay the severity of the allegations throughout this article by labelling torture as
“mistreatment” and “abuse” ("Pentagon probe into Hicks tale of abuse", 2004).

Devaluation of Torture Claims
Devaluation was a central tool used by government officials and journalists to
discredit allegations or assertions of torture made by people detained in the War on
Terror. In 2002, when reports began surfacing that prisoners were being tortured,
then Guantanamo Bay camp Commander stated “the more lurid allegations
about torture and sensory deprivation are false...We're talking about some of the
most dangerous men in the world, who have in the past displayed murderous and
suicidal tendencies, and often together…” (as cited in "Access to P.O.W.'s eases
concerns over conditions - War on Terror", 2002).
In Australia, Mamdouh Habib was one of the central targets of discrediting, and
questions over the veracity of his experience persisted for years with headlines such
as “Judge questions torture claims” (2008). When Mamdouh was released from
Guantanamo Bay, he gave an interview detailing his torture to the Australian
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television programme 60 Minutes. After the interview, an article was released
describing the interview that took place. The first line read, “speaking in a paid
interview with Channel 9’s Sixty Minutes, Mr Habib said he was tortured with
electric shocks, beatings and sexual humiliation involving dogs” (Harvey, 2005).
The mentioning of the payment in the same line as his torture testimony served to
discredit his testimony. Indeed, the fact that he received payment was again
mentioned in the last line of the article, implying it had undermined his testimony:
“Mr Habib is believed to have been paid $200,000 for last night's interview”
(Harvey, 2005). Rather than focusing on the startling revelation that an Australian
official allegedly watched Mamdouh’s torture in Pakistan, the journalist in the next
line, instead focuses on his lack of response to questions about why he was in
Afghanistan, and then adds that Mamdouh’s passport was cancelled because of
ASIO concerns. Regardless of whether his passport was cancelled, or if he was a
‘person of interest’, his experience of torture should have been treated as legitimate.
This same experience was clear in the David Hicks case, however, his case was far
more prominent and there are abundant examples of blatant discrediting. In 2004,
when detailed information surfaced about David’s mistreatment and torture, then
Prime Minister Howard stated “We do have to ... take those allegations with a grain
of salt”, immediately calling into question his reliability (as cited in Larkin, 2004). In
a 2007 article, purportedly about his torture, the journalist lambasts David as a
terrorist, mentions his so-called ‘admissions’ and disregards the fact that statements
made in Guantanamo were unreliable as a result of his years of torture (Neighbour,
2007). Articles commonly detailed his ‘admissions’, ‘confessions’, or alleged actions
and associations before briefly mentioning his treatment (Dunn, 2007). For example,
a 2007 article presents the common narrative about David when one commentator
details his view of David’s personal character and alleged actions. Finally, at the end
of the article, almost as an aside, he notes “None of this means he deserves the
treatment he's been subjected to since he was captured in Afghanistan in late 2001
and taken to Guantanamo Bay. Even ratbags are entitled to justice” (Hyland, 2007).
Whilst David was in custody he was unable to correct the record and journalists such
as the ABC’s Leigh Sales took liberties to print misinformation purporting to be his
story (Sales, 2007b). Sales told a Sydney Institute audience that she wrote her book,
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Detainee 002 about David to dispel the “myth” that “Hicks was tortured at
Guantanamo Bay” (Sales, 2007a). She said that “Interrogators at Guantanamo Bay
never had to use any harsh techniques on Hicks because he sang like a canary from
the first day he was captured” (Sales, 2007a). “He never faced some of the
questionable techniques which have caused the Bush Administration so much grief –
the dogs, the strobe lights, the sleep deprivation, the loud music and so on”, further
she says that “other prisoners at Guantanamo did” experience those techniques, “but
Hicks didn’t” (Sales, 2007b). Of course, Sales does not clarify that her sources for
her apparently authoritative assertions were US and Australian Government officials.
In fact, one of David’s civilian lawyers, Joshua Dratel wrote a letter to Sales in 2007
before the book was released and stated:
It would be unfortunate if your book adopted a negative slant, and accepted
unconfirmed claims by persons with agendas that do not reflect the facts,
because David and his lawyers have declined to cooperate with you in
assembling your book. There are a multitude of prudent legal and other
reasons why David is correct in choosing this path… (Dratel, 2007, p. 1).
The fact that Sales uncritically used US and Australian Government sources was
reflected in the language she used. For example, she states that David had been
“roughed up” but not tortured, which correlates with the white-washed US
Government NCIS report that also used the language that he was “roughed up”
(NCIS, 2005; Sales, 2007b). The book and her articles therefore misrepresented and
minimised David’s treatment, spread false information, and denigrated his personal
character; in effect, Sales was the virtual mouthpiece of both the US and Australian
Governments at the time. Sales went as far as to say that Australian officials worked
tirelessly to bring David home (Sales, 2007c). Sales has never spoken with David;
her book was rushed to the press just prior to his release.
Even when information came to light about the torture of people held in Guantanamo
Bay, there was a clear disjuncture between what was being reported and its
application to David. For example, in 2007, a report outlining the torture of prisoners
in Gitmo was released. It included a detailed list of some of the techniques prisoners
were subjected to, including; “chaining detainees for long periods, insulting the
Koran, using dogs to intimidate detainees and employing sexual intimidation…”
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("FBI reveals Cuba camp abuses", 2007). Despite these revelations of “camp
abuses”, one headline in Australia read “FBI report outlines torture of prisoners in
Gitmo – No link to Hicks” (2007). The idea that all prisoners in Guantanamo were
subjected to “abuses” except for David is odd to say the least.
There were also commentators that wrote as if any allegations made by David
against his captors were lies. In 2007, a columnist from The Australian stated,
“Hicks's robust physical and mental condition when he appeared before the military
tribunal last week, and the news that he has been able to study mathematics while in
detention, gives the lie to the allegations of abuse levelled against his captors” ("Plea
bargain is less than perfect justice", 2007). The columnist obediently reported US
Government statements that David was being treated humanely, and effectively got
off lightly after a plea deal was signed. Indeed, anyone who felt concern or
compassion for David’s “supposed mistreatment” was told their compassion was
“misguided” and focusing on “his plight further narrowed and corrupted our moral
thinking” because, the columnist states, “Hicks” supported the “most heinous
terrorists on Earth” (Bagaric, 2007).
Inevitably, by the time David was released, the media narrative had already been set
by the US and Australian Governments, and they certainly were not going to admit
they made a mistake, particularly about his torture. So, David was commonly
referred to as being “caught on the battlefield”, a member of al-Qaeda or the Taliban,
or that he fought against US and Australian troops, none of which were correct. In
addition, the media regularly called David a “convicted” or “confessed” terrorism
supporter, which, even if the US Military Commissions system was regarded as
legitimate, is an incorrect and misleading assertion, given that David pleaded
“Alford” in which he made no admissions to his guilt or actions.
The same misreporting extended to the imagery the media used when reporting on
David. The Australian public was bombarded with an image of David holding an
unloaded rocket propelled grenade launcher. The media would often report that he
was photographed fighting with al-Qaeda, referencing the well-used photograph.
What they did not report, partly because most reporters had not bothered to check,
was that the photo was actually taken in Albania with a few of his friends, certainly
not on any battlefield, let alone in Afghanistan. The photo commonly used in the
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media stories was also cropped to cut out the other people in the photo, most notably,
the one wearing slippers. Instead, the photo was used as a tool to taint people’s
perceptions of David and manipulate his story to suit their own agendas.
The discrediting became worse for David when he tried to correct the record a few
years after his release from Guantanamo, first with his book, and then a media
interview. Even before the book was released commentators were already
questioning whether the public should even read the book and hear “the self-serving
excuses that spill from the lips of a man that is so full of hate and a lust for bloody
warfare and mass murder that he went in search for it?” ("At long last he will be free
to tell his story, but should we listen?", 2007). Others questioned the reliability of
David’s account (Banham, 2010), even though they had not read it yet. These
journalists who presented themselves as “authoritative” sources were not in
Afghanistan or Guantanamo Bay with him, but still presented themselves to the
public as if they had inside knowledge or were more expert on his life and
experience than he was.
When David’s book was eventually released, and after years of misreporting and
hyperbole, rather than admit where they had made errors, many media outlets,
officials and journalists instigated an all-out attack on David’s credibility, and in the
process, devalued his experience of torture. Headlines of articles by people who had
supported David’s return to Australia had words like “delusion” scattered through
them (Loewenstein, 2010), and one headline even went to the extent of saying “He
can’t handle the truth” (Neighbour, 2010). One particularly discrediting article by
Sally Neighbour from the ABC, said that David’s personal account was “not frank”
and one of “wilful blindness”, “deceptive”, “self-serving, sanitised and
disingenuous” (Neighbour, 2010). Neighbour protested that David had not spoken to
any journalists and chose instead to write the story himself “thereby avoiding the
discomfort of having his version of events questioned” (Neighbour, 2010). His
PTSD as a result of his torture was never mentioned as a reason as to why he would
not want to be interrogated by a hostile journalist. The conclusion of the Neighbour
(2010) article then provides a timeline littered with inaccuracies and, in what can
only be described as deliberate ploy to further discredit David’s testimony, accuses
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him of being expelled from school, a petty criminal and, of course, the well-used
kangaroo skinner misnomer.
But even when David participated in interviews, he was largely met with the same
treatment.80 ABC’s Australian Story (Grasswill, 2011) program was a perfect
example of the level of collusion between government and media, and the lengths
they went to discredit David’s torture testimony. At the beginning of filming,
producer Helen Graswill swore to David that his torture would be core to the story,
because David said, “I wanted the public to know what really happened to me so that
it doesn’t happen to someone else” (personal communication, 13 November, 2010).
Things turned sour, however, when a whistleblower within the ABC called David
and told him that the script had been changed after an Australian Government
official put pressure on the ABC to treat David harshly because of a two page spread
in The Australian newspaper complaining about taxpayer money going into the
program. Obediently, Graswill’s script was changed and despite David’s serious
PTSD taking a turn for the worse at the time, the ABC went ahead with the program.
They even changed the usual Australian Story format of the individual telling their
own story to have Grasswill read her version of events over David during the
program, giving the impression that he consented to the presentation of his story.
What the public did not know was that David was suicidal at the time of filming, and
Grasswill had spent weeks interviewing him, sometimes from the morning until late
evening, under extremely stressful conditions and whilst David was in a deep
depression. It was no wonder then, that after a full-days’ worth of questioning and
given the lights shining in his eyes, which were triggering his PTSD, David faltered
on answering some questions and had to take a number of breaks. Throughout the
numerous interviews with David, Graswill would ask leading questions several
different ways because David was not giving the answers she wanted to fit in with
her script.
The result was a disaster for David. David’s family and friends called the ABC
stating they wanted to be removed from the program prior to it going to air and
David withdrew his support. Even after high-level meetings, the head of News and
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David’s first television interview was with a program called The Project, which aired on Channel
10. They gave his torture testimony the weight it deserved.
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Current Affairs refused to pull the program, even though there were serious concerns
that David was at the point of suicide. The program contained a number of gross
omissions and distortions, especially around David’s time in Afghanistan. Graswill
refused to include material that would have rebutted the government’s assertion he
attended terrorist training camps, because she said at the time “it would open a can of
worms” (personal communication, 2 July, 2011). The editing of the program made it
look like David said things that he did not and was refusing to answer questions that
he had answered several times before. One particular scene had David asking to look
at his book to refresh his memory of an event that took place over ten years prior;
this was after a full day of questioning with lights shining in his eyes and the retriggering of his PTSD, yet they aired this scene which served to discredit his
testimony. After Grasswill had told David that the program will only spend about ten
minutes pre-Guantanamo, it ended up taking up around 45 minutes of the hour long
program, giving the impression that his alleged actions pre-Guantanamo were more
important than the serious crimes against humanity committed against him. Graswill
and the ABC also organised for US and Australian Government insiders to be part of
the program, which only served to further discredit his torture and denigrate him
personally, including inviting Leigh Sales to give her point of view. Rather than the
program being a forum for David to tell his story as the title suggests, Australian
Story instead became a forum for officials to push pro-torture agendas and gave
more voice to the official government narrative around David’s case, which served
to dampen outrage at the injustice of torture he was subjected to.
To make matters worse, after the program went to air, the Australian Government
tried to use the interview that was aired as evidence in a ‘proceeds of crime’ case
against David. When David’s legal team tried to subpoena the transcripts, the ABC
fought to have them kept from the public; one can only imagine it was to protect
themselves from the fact they aired misleading interview material due to the heavy
editing. The transcripts have never been released to the public. After filming had
finished David commented:
All Helen could do was tell me she wanted a Walkely [journalism award] for
the story and that she thought she was qualified to write a book about me.
She couldn’t care less whether I was breaking down and having flashbacks;
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she didn’t care I was tortured, she just wanted to rewrite my story to back-up
her mates at the ABC. I was just lied to and used and then they [the ABC]
lied to the public and said it was my story. I was just used for her own gain
(personal communication, 1 August, 2011).
After the interview was aired, the newspaper commentary was scathing of David
because of the way it was edited and questions about the veracity of his torture were
immediately aired. One article in The Australian headed with “Close the book on
Hicks tall tales of victimhood” and asserted that his “ordeal” was of his “own
making” (Kenny, 2011). Chris Kenny, who worked for Alexander Downer at the
time David was imprisoned, concludes the article by stating that Hicks should get on
with his life and “allow us to commemorate the real victims [emphasis added] of the
war on terrorism” (Kenny, 2011). Even Cynthia Banham, known for her more liberal
views, printed a story that called into question the veracity of David’s testimony due
to the part of the interview where he had to refer to his book (Banham, 2011).
Journalists should be aware that PTSD, as a result of torture, can be triggered by
bright lights and hostile questioning, and that the condition causes cognitive
impairment, particularly problems with memory. Instead, without doing a fact-check,
Banham further discredited David by asserting that “Hicks was lucky” not to be
tortured like other Guantanamo prisoners (Banham, 2011).81
The devaluation of David occurred even with the release of the WikiLeaks
Guantanamo files in 2011. Whilst many media articles pointed to the fact that much
of the contents about Guantanamo prisoners was inaccurate, when it came to David,
they were quick to quote from the US military files notes that called him
“deceptive”, even though the media organisations were provided with a 16 point
media release that demonstrated the numerous errors in his file (Keene, 2011).
Disturbingly, the collusion between the Australian, UK and US Government to
denigrate David and his treatment became even more apparent when David
attempted to gain British citizenship in an attempt to seek release from Guantanamo
Bay. FOI documents revealed that the US embassy in London sent a cable to
81

I questioned Banham about this article at a human rights conference she presented at a few years
later. To her credit she apologised for the distress she caused David and for not knowing the story
behind the interview. She did not, however, publicly correct the record.
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Australia on 1 March 2007 asking for information to refute David’s allegations of
torture and to “provide a broader portrait of Hicks as a danger to society” (DFAT,
2007). David was granted British citizenship, however, it was revoked on the same
day by the British Government. The use of the denigration tactic was utilised by all
three governments in a systematic effort to stifle any outrage about David’s
treatment and to unashamedly shift attention onto their portrait of him as a terrorist
and a danger to society.
Joseph Thomas had a similar experience when it came to his torture being reported
in the Australian media. The results demonstrate that the focus of media articles
related to what he was accused of doing, rather than his rendition to and torture in
CIA black sties. Even after Joseph was cleared of terrorism related charges,
journalists still referred to him as “Jihad Jack” (Price, 2006), and even a “freed
accused terrorist” (Bachelard, 2006; Munro, 2006). His torture was reinterpreted by
one article as him only being “threatened with torture” (Allard, 2006), and they
ignored the asphyxiations and well-known psychological torture he experienced. The
same article explained his detention and questioning as if it was conducted in a
routine domestic law enforcement forum; the paper quotes: “He was detained and
questioned by Americans and by Pakistanis before being visited by an Australian
consular official on January 22, 2003. Thereafter he was interviewed by Australian
and Pakistani officials and returned to Australia on June 6, 2003” (Allard, 2006).
There was no mention of the horrific and inhumane conditions under which he was
held, his torture, or the fact he was disappeared.
Even when the media did mention Joseph’s torture, it was minimised. For example,
an article in the Daily Telegraph claimed that people critical of Bush’s torture policy
were actually protesting actions by interrogators that were not actually torture.
Miranda Devine (2006) stated “Bush declared the US does not use torture to extract
information from terrorists, a topic preoccupying Guardianistas, who deem torture to
be when an interrogator showed Jihad Jack Thomas a letter from his wife.
Diddums!” The journalist then laments that the CIA torture program is under threat
because of a court decision outlawing “outrages on personal dignity” (Devine, 2006).
The implication is that Joseph’s torture was not ‘real’ torture, and the only thing that

200

ever happened to him was that letters were read to him, and Bush and the CIA are
the victims in the War on Terror because they cannot do their jobs.
Another 2006 article gave the impression that the public needed to be protected from
Joseph and that despite being cleared of terrorism charges, he still posed a threat to
the community ("Thomas's liberty curtailed so we can sleep at night", 2006). The
denigration and devaluation of Joseph was either blatant or more covert. A more
overt example of denigration was when one paper quoted a Liberal party nominee
saying “I have no sympathy for Thomas at all. Isn't (it) time we brought in the death
sentence…They are not true Australian's [sic]…It's time to take their lives before
they take ours. Together we can get rid of these arseholes” (Bachelard, 2006). Even
after a court found that Joseph’s so-called confessions were made as a result of
‘coercion’, newspapers still claimed the line that “it’s difficult to feel much
sympathy for Thomas” (Price, 2006). One commentator even suggested that Joseph
was lucky that the AFP were protecting his rights when he was being tortured in
Pakistan by the CIA (Sheridan, 2006).
Ironically, the whole reason Joseph ended up in court the second time was because
he was talked into doing an interview with an ABC 4 Corners journalist who Joseph
said, told him it was his opportunity to “correct the record” (personal
communication, 28 November, 2014). Joseph was horrified when the program went
to air. Despite the journalist bringing her son around to play with Joseph’s children,
and promises that the public would finally have the truth, the story presented a
“skewed” version of events and discredited his torture (personal communication, 28
November, 2014). In a personal communication, Joseph said he felt the ABC
journalist, Sally Neighbour, was “exploitative and manipulative” in her reporting of
his torture and that the public is still unaware of the complete situation he went
through overseas (personal communication, 28 November, 2014).
Much of the coverage of Joseph’s case was either dismissive of the torture he
sustained at the hands of government agents, or simply did not mention it to begin
with. Instead the focus was on Joseph’s alleged activities and associations, and
denigrating his personal character. Even those in academic circles mainly focused on
the legality of the charges and case and minimal attention was placed on his torture,
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or the serious questions around the Australian Government’s knowledge and
involvement in his treatment overseas.
Other people were also targeted by the Australian newspapers. Hany Taha is a
Victorian man who was charged with terrorism related offences in 2005. Despite
Taha being cleared and released back into the community, he was still subjected to
devaluation techniques by the authorities and media. When Taha began legal
proceedings to protest his treatment whilst in custody, the Australian media was
quick to devalue his claims. One headline in the Herald Sun read “Terror trial
‘suffering’: Cleared suspect seeks compo” (Hadfield, 2011). Calling Taha a “cleared
suspect” was clearly a negative framing designed to remove the focus off his
treatment. Placing the word “suffering” in quotation marks also appears to be an
attempt to call into question the veracity of his claims. When describing his
treatment, the paper stated “Hany Taha, 36, wants the State Government to pay for
the pain and suffering he says he has endured as a result of his time in custody. He
says he was ill-treated, abused and assaulted on remand from November 2005 to
September 2008, and suffered psychiatric injury” (Hadfield, 2011).
Whilst placing the emphasis on his treatment merely being an allegation, the paper
failed to mention that the detention of people on remand for terrorism related charges
had been raised as an issue in a UN Committee against Torture report into
Australia’s human rights obligations in 2008 (UN Committee against Torture,
2008a), and the numerous human rights and ombudsmen reports that called into
question the conditions of detention and treatment of prisoners in Australia (Brown,
2008; Human Rights Law Resource Centre, National Association of Community
Legal Centres, & New South Wales Council for Civil Liberties, 2007). Indeed, the
treatment of people held on remand had been raised on another occasion in 2007
when a Victorian Supreme Court judge announced that thirteen men could be
released on bail after their legal team notified the Court of their treatment in custody,
which included being left in an unventilated vehicle and another prisoner being
grabbed so hard by prison guards he was bruised (Munro, 2007). These allegations
are in line with issues raised in the Committee against Torture report, however, they
were not reported in the article.
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The failure to ‘connect the dots’ was a common theme in the reporting of the
Australian media, particularly when it came to evidence of torture being released in
the US. Many journalists failed to connect events which occurred in the US with
former Australian captives who had been held in overseas custody. Whilst the
Australian media was focusing on the accusations levelled against the prisoners and
in the process downplaying concern about their torture, the vast amount of material
that substantiated many of their experiences of torture was not reported. For
example, when a Council of Europe report was released into CIA prisons, the
Australian papers barely mentioned it, let alone made connections with the former
Australian CIA prisoners (Spolar, 2007). There were of course some notable
exceptions, such as articles by Natalie O’Brien who exposed many torture
revelations in relation to the Mamdouh Habib and David Hicks cases (O'Brien,
2008b).
Whilst the former Australian prisoners appear to receive the harshest and most
comprehensive coverage compared to prisoners from other countries, the results of
the media analysis show that international prisoners of the War on Terror were also
subjected to devaluation by the Australian media. It must be said however, that most
of the articles about other prisoners were written by US staff and simply reprinted in
Australian papers. Regardless, it is clear that the devaluation of the prisoners and
their torture took place in an extended and comprehensive manner.
The media analysis demonstrates that the Australian media took the US official line
of referring to Guantanamo prisoners as terrorists and even tried to excuse their
torture by claiming that they are “not normal felons” (Rabkin, 2007). This is
particularly the case with those referred to by the US Government and media as
‘high value detainees’. The reporting of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed’s charges and
‘trial’ have spanned the decade of results, even though he has never been brought to
a regularly constituted court. Although he has never been convicted of anything,
Mohammed is commonly referred to in the media as a “confessed master terrorist”
(Toohey, 2011), or “Terror Master” (Munro, Allard, & Jackson, 2007). Many of the
articles refer to his “confessions”, even though they know these admissions have
been made under torture, and after he was waterboarded (Munro et al., 2007).
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Further, it is still unclear whether Mohammed made these claims as a result of
serious mental health problems, as other prisoners have been known to do.
Other Guantanamo prisoners have also been given the terrorist “mastermind” label,
even when describing their torture in detail and before being convicted of any crime
("US seeks death penalty for 'mastermind' behind bombing of navy ship", 2008).
Abu Zubaydah, who was also tortured in CIA black sites, was commonly described
as a “top terror suspect” in media articles, even in articles describing his torture
(Mannion, 2007). Zubaydah was waterboarded more than 80 times, even though the
US Government later admitted that they were wrong in their assessment of him as a
top al-Qaeda operative. There is a clear intimation that if someone is accused of
terrorism, they are not entitled to be treated like everyone else, they are different or
‘master’ terrorists.
Former Guantanamo child prisoner, Omar Khadr, was also discredited in the
Australian media. One particularly devaluing headline read “Kill me, terror boy begs
interrogators” (Noronha, 2008). The article revealed that he was subjected to sleep
deprivation and was crying for his mother when he was being interrogated by US
agents. Calling Khadr ‘terror boy’, not only devalued his personal character, but also
his experience of torture in Guantanamo Bay. Khadr was a teenager when first
detained, and there are serious questions around his treatment whilst in US custody
given that evidence was destroyed in his case (Edney, 2013), and if detained as a
POW in normal circumstances, he would be rehabilitated as a child soldier, rather
than punished (Duffy, 2005, p. 383).82

Figure 15- Omar Khadr crying and pulling his hair during an interrogation at Guantanamo Bay
(Source: JTF GITMO, 2003)
82

Under international law, children (under 18 years of age) are granted special protection. Camp
Iguana was a special camp established in Guantanamo to hold children (Duffy, 2005; Hicks, 2010).
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Devaluing torture by promoting certain narratives
Comparatively, and in a typical case of manipulating the narrative, the tables were
turned when it came to holding to account those who carried out torture. A primary
example was when it became known to the media that a former US army reservist,
who was allegedly involved in the torture of prisoners in Iraq was living in Australia.
Instead of focusing on the accusations against the man, the former interrogation
contractor for CACI was described as a “patriot” who was accused of “terrorist
torture” (O'Brien, 2004). The veracity of the claim that prisoners who were tortured
by CACI in Iraq were all terrorists was never called into question. Instead, he was
presented as just doing his job, despite the allegations against those described as
terrorists never being tested in a court.
Indeed, there are many examples where the narrative has been switched to make the
perpetrators victims. In 2007, the Sunday Mail ran an article quoting Alexander
Downer as saying he “did not appreciate being abused and denigrated” by those who
were campaigning for David Hicks’ release from Guantanamo Bay (as cited in
Balogh, 2007a). Downer, by describing his treatment as being abusive and
denigrating whilst, at the same time, defending the appalling treatment of an
Australian citizen in Guantanamo Bay, sought to shift the narrative and, in the
process, trivialise torture.
A similar situation occurred when it was revealed that members of the Australian
military serving in Afghanistan were detaining captives in dog cages ("The dog pens
used for Taliban", 2008). An ADF spokesperson said that people were held for 15
hours in enclosures that were previously used to house dogs. The steel cages were
1.4 meters high and only 1.2 meters wide and deep. In response to the complaints by
the prisoners, then opposition Defence Minister Nick Minchin stated that it was “unAustralian” to complain about the way that Australian troops treated prisoners. He
commented, "It's pretty outrageous for any Australian to complain about the
behaviour of Australian troops in relation to these Taliban extremists who not only
treat other troops but their own people with such degradation, cruelty and appalling
procedures… in this case, I think Australians should give our troops a bit of slack”
(as cited in AAP, 2008, p. 1). The treatment by the Australian soldiers was therefore
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untouchable, and the focus was placed on the personal character of those detained. It
was never proven that the men that were placed in the cages were Taliban forces
either. The message was: the troops are the victims here.
There was a resurgence of pro-torture articles around the time of each 9/11
anniversary. Newspapers published articles written by 9/11 victims’ families who
were angry that anyone would have sympathy for those tortured in US custody. For
example, in 2006, The Australian published a particularly vicious attack on David
Hicks and Joseph Thomas with the author stating that he was angry with “dogooders” who are defending their right to a fair trial and to be free from torture
(Rintoul, 2006). What the paper did not point out was that neither Joseph, nor David
had anything to do with the tragic death of his family member. But the implication
saw readers ultimately conflating the two as being mutually exclusive.
The same narrative re-occurred around the time of Osama Bin Laden’s assassination
in 2011, which also coincided with the ten year anniversary of 9/11. The Australian
media was quick to jump on the torture bandwagon, and published US Government
assertions that it was torture that led to the assassination of Bin Laden and that
torture made the public safer. An article in the Daily Telegraph cited Donald
Rumsfeld describing “intensive interrogation” techniques as leading the US to Bin
Laden’s courier, and that before the techniques were employed the “9/11
mastermind…wouldn’t talk about future attacks” (as cited in Devine, 2011). Devine
states “with the luxury of hindsight, the techniques were condemned as torture” but
that after the particular prisoner was subjected to these “interrogations”, he was
“very helpful” (Devine, 2011). Cheney was also quite vocal around this time in
calling for “harsh interrogation methods” to be reinstated, and advocated for
waterboarding to be authorised by the Obama Administration ("Cheney: Bring back
waterboarding", 2011).
That same year, Bush’s former speech writer, Marc Theissen, was sent to Australia
to ask Australian public to lobby the Obama Administration to reintroduce
‘enhanced interrogation’. Theissen’s central message to Australians was that
torturing “terrorists” worked and could save lives (Theissen, 2011). None of the so-
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called terrorists he referred to had faced trial and been proven to have involvement in
terrorism.83
Australian newspaper articles reveal that devaluation was one of the key methods
used by those in authority to inhibit outrage: US and Australian officials, and the
media, engaged in a campaign to lower people’s view of the victim/survivor or group
of people. From the beginning, derogatory labels were applied to individuals
detained in the War on Terror, including calling them terrorists, killers and
dangerous. Personal attacks on torture survivors were voluminous over the ten year
period. Many of the examples outlined above demonstrate the way that an individual
was personally attacked, and that many journalists simply relied on official sources,
never actually speaking to the individuals themselves. Finding and creating dirt was
also significant, particularly in the case of the Australian torture victims.

Reinterpretation of Events
For in the world in which we live it is no longer merely a question of the
decay of collective memory and declining consciousness of the past, but of
the aggressive [assault on] whatever memory remains, the deliberate
distortion of the historical record, the invention of mythological pasts in the
service of the powers of darkness – Yosef Hayim Yerushalmi (1989, p. 105).
This section outlines evidence of the reinterpretation of events from the data
analysis. The reinterpretation of events as a tactic of minimising outrage can take
many forms including that some of the facts may be accepted, but they are
reinterpreted to mean something entirely different. Martin (2012) notes that it could
be a perpetrator denying the act occurred, denying knowledge of the act, denying the
act meant what others thought it did, or denying the intention to cause the act. This
includes lies about the event or actions of certain officials, minimising consequences,
passing the blame or framing the event in a particular way.
The reinterpretation of events by governments and media that surround torture in the
War on Terror has been ubiquitous over the ten year period studied. Given the
83

When I confronted Theissen at the Festival for Dangerous Ideas in Sydney about whether he would
find it acceptable for his own children to be subjected to these so called “enhanced interrogation
techniques” if they were captured by ‘the enemy’, he obfuscated, and would not answer the
question.
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overlap in the tactics used by officials, many examples have already been provided
in the sections on cover-up and devaluation, such as the denial that torture occurred
and the passing of blame to lower level soldiers. There is clear evidence of what can
only be described as the state’s deliberate attempt to discredit what the survivors say,
and manipulate the truth, with the support of a mostly compliant media. The
manipulation is extreme when it comes to Guantanamo. It is important to remember
that the traditional purpose of holding combatants during war is to prevent them
from taking part in hostilities – it is not a crime to participate in conflict under the
GCs. However, as already discussed, Guantanamo bypassed many international law
protections, particularly prohibitions against torture, and other cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment.
There are many examples where military spokespeople reframed the narrative in
order to present a different view of the reality of the prison. For example, it is widely
known that most of the prisoners have been kept in solitary confinement for years,
including being locked in a concrete cell for 23-24 hours a day, for months or years
at a time (Rodriguez, 2011). However, rather than describing solitary for what it is,
the US military, and Government officials use the term “single celled occupancy”
(Baker, 2006). The sad reality is that solitary confinement is one of the most
destructive forms of torture that has extremely deleterious consequences to the
integrity of the person emotionally and psychologically (Rodriguez, 2011).
To protest their indefinite detention, and the years of torture, a core group of men at
Guantanamo have engaged in a long-term hunger strike. The US policy is not to call
them hunger-strikers, but instead characterise their refusal to eat as “non-religious
fasting” (Leopold, 2014a, p. 1). The Standard Operating Procedure documents in
Gitmo completely changed the terminology, removing any reference to hunger
striking, instead naming it “Medical Management of Detainees with Weight Loss”
(Leopold, 2014a). In addition, the US military decided not to publicly divulge the
numbers of men on hunger strikes because “the prisoners had become too successful
in attracting attention to their cause” (Leopold, 2014a, p. 2).
Despite US Government statements and many reports in the mainstream media, such
as The Australian, Guantanamo prisoners are treated even more harshly than those
who are detained at the Hague whilst undergoing trial at the International Criminal
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Court (ICC) (Schulberg, 2014a). The Hague is the detention centre for the ICC
where those accused of war crimes are held for trial. In 2014, the ICC held former
Serbian President, Slobodan Milosevic, and Bosco Ntaganda, from the Democratic
Republic of Congo. Milosevic died prior to the completion of the trial; however, if
Ntaganda is found guilty, he will be transferred to a prison, as the Hague detention
centre is not intended as punishment. Comparatively speaking, the Hague treats
those suspected of criminal activity as they should do; as ‘detainees’ who are able to
move about the complex freely by day, with access to tennis courts, kitchen, library
and a computer lab. They have a computer in their cells, are able to make phone
calls, attend religious prayers, write letters, see family members, and are even
allowed conjugal visits.84 In the Hague, people can see and talk to their lawyers
without the risk of being filmed or recorded. They are not there as punishment as
they have not been convicted of a crime.
For Guantanamo prisoners, the situation is very different, particularly those held in
Camp 7 (Schulberg, 2007). Prisoners are kept in solitary confinement where they
have no access to the outside world, except for the contact with guards, and visits
from lawyers. They are refused permission to pray communally. When they leave
their cells to see lawyers or the ICRC, they are subjected to invasive strip-searches.
They are recorded when seeing their lawyers; there are no private communications.
They have no access to computers, or communal facilities. They are unable to see
their families, now for over a decade and a half. The letters that they do receive are
read and redacted by the US military – words such as love or other encouragement
are removed in order to foster a sense of futility and hopelessness. Apart from these
conditions, there are ongoing issues of interrogations, and ongoing hunger strikes
(ICRC, 2007).
Despite this, articles studied demonstrate that Guantanamo was largely described as
a ‘normal prison’ where standard interrogation processes were enacted to seek out
actionable intelligence. This was widespread over the ten years of articles, and even
the more ‘reliable’ sources were likely to repeat the US Administration’s claims that
inmates were being treated humanely and in accordance with the GCs, rather than
examine the conditions under which information was being obtained.
84

Liberian warlord Charles Taylor fathered a child whilst on trial for war crimes.
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Outside of Guantanamo, there is evidence that points to political leaders and the
media distorting and inflaming the threat of terrorism in the general community in a
disproportionate way, and this has served to exaggerate the threat posed from
Guantanamo prisoners. After the criminal acts of 9/11, the Howard Government
released a terrorism public threat alert system, which was purportedly aimed at
providing the public a way of ascertaining the level of threat faced by the
community. This was closely based on the Bush Administration’s colour-coded
threat alerts system. The Australian Government’s “National Public Alert System”
was set at medium for over a decade, reporting that a “terrorist attack could occur” at
any time (Australian Government, 2014a). During the period when the Howard
Government was trying to pass the national security legislation in 2002, fridge
magnets, an advertising campaign and public bill boards were also rolled out under
the banner of “be alert but not alarmed”. One national security safety brochure
encouraged the public to remain vigilant and suspicious of “unusual videotaping or
photography…suspicious vehicles near significant buildings or in public
places…suspicious accommodation needs…[or] unusual purchases of chemicals
[such as] beauty products” (Australian Government, 2014d, p. 2). The intended
impact was clearly a heightened sense of fear in the Australian community. The
political reaction was disproportionate and concerning. This has more recently been
used by the Abbott and Turnbull Government’s which coincidently have tried to pass
draconian counter-terrorism legislation including mass data retention and expanded
the definition of terrorism.
There is also evidence that law enforcement agencies have been involved in creating
a terrorist threat by preying on vulnerable members of the community. One Human
Rights Watch (HRW) report demonstrated the way in which the FBI was targeting
those of Muslim faith and in their undercover operations, creating terrorists by
“suggesting the idea of taking terrorist action or encouraging the target to act”
(Gillan, 2014, para. 1). The report outlines several cases where the FBI has either
encouraged, pressured or even paid people to engage in terrorism related activity,
and most disconcertingly, targeted people with intellectual disabilities (Human
Rights Watch, 2014a). For example, in the case of the “Newburgh Four”, the
government “came up with the crime, provided the means, and removed the relevant
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obstacles, and had in the process, made a terrorist out of a man whose buffoonery is
positively Shakespearean in scope” (Human Rights Watch, 2014a, p. 1).
The case of Rezwan Ferdaus was also particularly troubling. Even though the FBI
told Mr Ferdaus’ father that he “obviously” had mental health problems, they
targeted him in a sting operation (Human Rights Watch, 2014a, p. 1). His health
deteriorated significantly whilst the “fake plot” was unfolding, his psychological
health worsened, he lost bladder control to the point where he had to wear adult
nappies and he suffered seizures (Human Rights Watch, 2014a, p. 1). He was
eventually charged with material support for terrorism, and sentenced to 17 years in
prison (Human Rights Watch, 2014a, p. 1). HRW points out that “individuals who
perhaps would never have participated in a terrorist act on their own initiative and
might not even have the capacity to do so, were prosecuted for serious, yet
government-created terrorism plots” (Human Rights Watch, 2014a, p. 1). The US
Government even went as far as to claim that those innocent of terrorism offences
that are caught up in prosecution are “collateral damage”. For example, in 2005 a
spokesperson was quoted as stating “That innocent people get caught up in the
prosecution of a terrorist cell, well, in war there is always collateral damage” (Bruni,
2005).
Overall, the events of 9/11 were interpreted by US officials and newspapers as the
worst attacks to occur in history, and newspapers often labelled it as the day that
changed the world (Jackson, 2002; Norington, 2011). Although comparatively, the
response initiated by the US Government has resulted in an immeasurably higher
number of casualties, the murder of people on 9/11 was used as a political tool to
capitalise on fear. This occurred to the extent that any comparisons made were seen
as offensive and even treacherous. For example, when a short film was released
depicting Chile’s 9/11, which saw a coup d’état ushered in by the Nixon
Administration, which included the widespread and systematic use of torture, there
was outrage that it was compared to the US 9/11 (Zwar, 2002). This reinterpretation
was used in an attempt to stifle any comparisons.
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Reinterpretation of Torture
The US Government regularly stated, and Australian media habitually reported, that
the US does not torture. Torture was reinterpreted as only amounting to physical
techniques, such as severe beatings and whipping. In 2002, Brigadier General Mike
Lehnert stated “…there is no torture, whips, there are no bright lights, drugging. We
are a nation of laws” (as cited in "US defends procedures at Camp X-Ray", 2002).
Instead, the US claimed it carried out “enhanced interrogation”, “stress and duress”,
“harsh interrogation” or “tough-tactics” (Coorey, 2003; Lowther, 2006; Phillips,
2003a). The Daily Telegraph even called interrogation “quizzing” ("US admits
quizzing injured detainees - War on Terror: Patriot games", 2002). Torture was
commonly referred to as “mistreatment” or “abuse”. In relation to the capture of one
prisoner, a US Senator told an Intelligence Committee “We don’t sanction torture,
but there are psychological and other ways that we can get most of what we need”
(as cited in Coorey, 2003). One story quoted a US official stating that Khalid Sheikh
Mohammed is “…experiencing…the most persuasive interrogation techniques
legally available to the Central Intelligence Agency. Former American military
interrogators say Mohammed won’t be subjected to overt torture, but he is likely to
face acute psychological pressure and low-level violence” (Patrick, 2003). Another
report said that Mohammed would not be subjected to “traditional torture” but that
the “US will have drugs and procedures” that will make the prisoner talk (Corbett,
2003). However, one journalist labelled the approach as “soft torture” (Phillips,
2003b), and another as “torture-lite” ("Basic justice is under duress", 2006). Indeed,
papers commonly quoted officials and academics that downplayed the torture of
Mohammed who is still detained in Guantanamo as of September 2016. A 2003
article quoted Dr Wright-Neville as saying that brutal physical torture was
“unlikely”, and that instead “investigators would seek to twist Mohammed’s mind
into shedding its secrets, rather than beating it out of him”; instead they will use
sleep and sensory deprivation and cold temperatures, which the article purported
were not torture (as cited in Phillips, 2003a). The paper quoted “experts” as stating
that “interrogation was likely to stop just short of outright torture” (Phillips, 2003b).
One article stated that techniques experienced by Mohammed were only “akin” to
torture, and others pointed to the fact that all prisoners were provided with “ample
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food, water, heating and a bed”, and therefore they were not being tortured ("Basic
justice is under duress", 2006; Johnston, 2002). Many articles were unquestioning of
these statements from the US Government and its agents, particularly in relation to
the treatment of individual prisoners.
In the early years after 9/11, the Bush Administration stated that prisoners were
being treated in the “spirit” of the GCs, or “consistent” with them, “for the most
part”, whilst at the same time stating that prisoners were being treated humanely
(Gardiner, 2002). One of the earliest examples of this misrepresentation was just
after photos of shackled Guantanamo prisoners were released to the world. Amongst
other measures, the boys and men transported to Guantanamo were blindfolded and
had mitts placed on their hands. US military officials stated that this was because “it
gets pretty cold on a C-141, hence the hat and mittens for comfort” (Gardiner, 2002);
nothing was mentioned about the sensory deprivation protocols. When it became
known that prisoners had been shaved upon processing, the US military stated “They
have been living in caves and tunnels for months and were infested with lice and
other parasites” (Lowtger, 2002); again, nothing was mentioned about this being
fundamentally a humiliation technique used to prolong the shock of capture. When
the first prisoners arrived at Guantanamo, they were held in cages in Camp X-Ray
that were exposed to the elements. Rather than describe the cages, newspapers used
terminology like “open air shelters” (Murdock, 2002). Another row erupted when
photos of men being wheeled on stretchers to interrogation surfaced. The reason
given by the US military, and reported in Australian newspapers, was that “only
injured prisoners were being wheeled to interrogation” ("US admits quizzing injured
detainees - War on Terror: Patriot games", 2002), and they gave the impression that
the US military were doing it out of concern rather than as an interrogation tactic that
ensures prisoners feel completely reliant on their captors for their survival.
The focus was commonly shifted away from the treatment prisoners were
experiencing, to what kind of threat they allegedly posed to the public. One example
of a common statement was “This government does not torture people. We stick to
US law and our international obligations”, whilst at the same time stating that those
detained were “extremists and terrorists” that will be questioned by “professionals
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who have trained to get information that will protect the American people” ("Bush
denies torture", 2007).
When the US Government admitted that it would not allow the ICRC to speak with
all Guantanamo Bay prisoners, it stated that “The vast majority [emphasis added] are
treated consistent with the Geneva Conventions. There is a very small, limited
number that are not” ("Red Cross steps in over 'unknown' detainees", 2005). The
paper stated that this was “because of the extraordinary threat they pose” ("Red
Cross steps in over 'unknown' detainees", 2005). In other words, the focus was
shifted off the fact that officials had defied international law, and hidden prisoners
from the ICRC who were tasked to check their welfare. Even when ICRC concerns
about torture were published in the papers, US officials were quick to dilute any
controversy. For example, US Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld advised
journalists that reports of prisoner abuse were nothing more than “isolated pockets of
international hyperventilation” (as cited in Manne, 2004).
The interrogation of Saddam Hussein also came into the spotlight in the early years
of data. Papers stated that Hussein would be questioned about what happened to his
“nuclear, chemical and biological weapons programs and any co-operation with the
Al-Qaeda terrorist network” (Landay, 2003). US officials commented to the press
that Hussein was “cooperative, and several experts said they did not think it would
be difficult to keep him talking” (Landay, 2003). The same article went on to say
“US interrogators abandoned harsh methods, such as torture, years ago…” (Landay,
2003), but claimed that Hussein would be kept in “shabby surroundings” and that
they would be “occasionally depriving him of sleep” (Landay, 2003).
When there were some concerns raised over Hussein’s treatment, and others in US
custody, a multitude of articles jumped to the defence of the US military stating that
they were merely unproven allegations. For example, Tony Parkinson (2005) stated
that there is an “eagerness to believe the worst about the US”, and shifted the focus
off the victims of torture, to have the reader feel sympathy that the US Government
and military had been accused of unproven actions – and they were inevitably the
victims of “scurrilous myth-making” (Parkinson, 2005). Indeed, it was pejoratively
unfavourable to call into question any actions by the US military, and intimated that
those detained should be happy to be in places like Guantanamo. For instance, when
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there were calls for David Hicks to have a fair trial during 2006, one commentator
stated that he should be “grateful” that he was in US custody where he was treated in
the “spirit” of the GCs (Taranto, 2006).
From 2004, there was a noticeable shift in the reinterpretation designed to inhibit
outrage; this was after the Abu Ghraib photo releases. One article described the
killing of Iraqi civilians in Haditha, Mahmoudiya and Abu Ghraib torture as “small
blips on the radar” and a “slip up” (Bruni, 2006).

The article headline read,

“Soldiers under duress sometimes break” (Bruni, 2006). The torture perpetrated
against men, women and children at Abu Ghraib was commonly minimised as only
amounting to ‘abuse’ or ‘mistreatment’. The Australian Government went to great
lengths to parrot the US Government line that it was an “aberration” and that the US
does not condone torture (Manne, 2004). Former Prime Minister John Howard
described the torture that took place in Abu Ghraib as an anomaly, and a
“misbehaviour” of some US troops (as cited in AAP, 2004, para. 9). Howard not
only belittled and minimised the experience of the torture victims by saying that “far
worse” had been done under Saddam Hussein (as cited in AAP, 2004, para. 5), but
immediately defended and indeed endorsed the actions of the US by saying that they
had admitted it was a problem and that those responsible had been court martialled,
using the official channels tactic.
Meanwhile, Bush Administration politicians were in overdrive in an attempt to
defend their position. Cheney’s comments about waterboarding were one of the
central features of reporting about torture in 2006. Cheney described waterboarding
as a “dunk in the water” (as cited in "Cheney backflip on 'water torture' 2006",
2006). Australian politicians followed suit with reinterpretations such as these. As
aforementioned, one of the more striking assertions made by former Attorney
General Philip Ruddock was that sleep deprivation was not torture. Rather Ruddock,
who has legal training, stated sleep deprivation was, instead, a form of coercion
(Smiles, 2006). Howard also clarified his position on sleep deprivation by stating “If
you’re asking me that every piece of interrogation that involves sleep deprivation of
some degree (if) that’s torture, I don’t necessarily agree with that” (as cited in
McPhedran, 2006). Howard went further in defending the actions of the US
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Government, by denying that prisoners were tortured in Guantanamo, but was vague
in the definition of torture (Smiles, 2009).
Whenever there were revelations that people were tortured in US custody, articles
were released saying torture was a positive or normal occurrence, or that it was not
really that bad. One columnist stated “yes, the ‘abuses’ were terrible, but what they
have done is worse…” and went on to suggest that torture was carried for the
public’s protection (Devine, 2004). The Executive Director of the Australian
Defence Association, Neil James, was quoted in the Weekend Australian as saying
that judicial torture can no longer be dismissed as an eccentricity, and the argument
about torture is worth having (Hope, 2005). One commentator went even further and
stated that preventing torture “comes at a price”, because all states want to be able to
“extract information out of their own citizens” (Ignatieff, 2006). He went on to argue
that ‘coercion’ is not the same as torture; he claimed there is “a necessity of using
coercive methods on a small category of terrorists who may have information vital to
saving the lives of innocent people” (Ignatieff, 2006). Of course, the author did not
delve into the methods of establishing whether the individual being tortured is
actually a terrorist.
Then there were outright absurd articles that portrayed torture as “compassionate”
and an “essential life-saving tool” (Bagaric, 2008). Dean and Professor of Law,
Mirko Bagaric, had a number of articles published in The Australian newspaper that
reinterpreted the inhumane and barbaric practice of torture as an act of compassion
for the greater good. Bagaric (2008) posited that those tortured are “wrongdoers” and
any pain inflicted on a person being tortured would be outweighed by the lives
saved. When articles about torture surfaced, Bagaric claimed that any compassion
shown towards prisoners was “misguided” (Bagaric, 2007). Bagaric used the highlydiscredited ticking time bomb theory (Card, 2010) in a number of his articles, and
attempted to induce the audience into believing that there had been a case where
interrogators only had hours to find out information necessary to save lives before a
bomb exploded.
Former Foreign Minister Alexander Downer also released an article in 2009
claiming that it was “dilemma” about whether or not to torture people (Downer,
2009). He obediently asserted the same line as the Bush Administration that “lives
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were saved” because of the torture of one man in US custody, despite the fact that
this was disproven later. Downer (2009) also expressed confusion about whether
waterboarding and sleep deprivation amounted to torture under international law,
giving the public the impression that these techniques were unclear under the CAT.
Downer went on to say “if [torture] saved the lives of your own children would it
worry you their lives were saved because someone was ‘waterboarded’?” (Downer,
2009). Downer did not ask the reader to ponder whether they would be accepting of
their own children being waterboarded if they were the ones deemed terrorists who
supposedly had information to ‘save lives’.
Torture was also presented as necessary to protect civilians in a 2004 article (Shiel,
2004). The author called for torture to be legalised so that there is some
“accountability” (Shiel, 2004). The same line was taken in 2009 when a Queensland
federal MP called for torture to be legalised in Australia, but, he said on the
condition that it was done in an “appropriate way” and “appropriate context”
(McManus, 2009). Another article claimed torture was a problem not because it
flouts international law, creates resentment, and destroys the moral fabric of society,
but because it can be used as a “recruitment tool for terrorists” (Bruni, 2005).
When the US Government admitted to holding people in black sites, the narrative
switched from outright denial, to stating that they had ‘no choice’ but to condone the
CIA program of extrajudicial seizure, transportation and interrogation of suspects.
On a visit to Europe in 2005, Condoleezza Rice stated that the CIA’s rendition
program “saved innocent lives” and “prevented attacks in Europe” (as cited in Hope,
2005). Despite damning evidence that had already been released detailing victims’
testimony, Rice defended the US Government’s human rights record, and stated that
the US “does not authorise or condone torture” (as cited in Hope, 2005). The UK
Government also engaged in reinterpretation, and defended MI5s involvement in the
“abuse” of “suspects overseas” saying that they had to get help in order to prevent an
“imminent” attack ("We had to work with torture agencies, insists MI5 chief", 2009).
As in the US and Australia, the torture of prisoners was reinterpreted as ‘abuse’ or
‘mistreatment’ and torture was framed as necessary to save lives. If newspapers did
use the word torture rather than ‘abuse’ or ‘mistreatment’, it was common for articles
to place torture in quotation marks. For example, headlines read “‘Torture’ of
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Aussies blasted by lawyers” (2004), or “‘Torture’ exposed at Guantanamo” (2004).
This is theoretically akin to newspaper articles placing rape in quotation marks in a
story relating to a vicious sexual assault.
Whilst the Australian Government repeated publicly that the US Government does
not torture, documents later obtained under FOI revealed that Australian officials did
not seek clarification as to whether the US Government’s interpretation of torture
was the same as the Australian definition. The Australian Government simply stuck
to the US line that lives were saved by the use of particular techniques.
These claims became particularly pertinent again after Bush released his memoirs in
2009 and extracts were published in Australian newspapers. An extract in the
Weekend Australian focused on Bush’s perspective on the torture program. Bush
stated that he was assured that interrogations would be carried out by medical
professionals, and “medical personnel would be on site to guarantee that the detainee
was not hurt” (Bush, 2010). He further stated that he requested the DoJ to conduct a
legal review of the techniques the CIA wanted to use, and that they “concluded that
the enhanced interrogation program complied with the Constitution and all
applicable laws, including those that ban torture” (Bush, 2010). Bush claimed that
doctors assured him that waterboarding did not cause long term harm, and that
therefore it would not reach the torture threshold (Bush, 2010). Bush also claimed
that had he not authorised waterboarding, there would be a greater risk that the
country would be attacked. This included false statements that the interrogation
techniques proved “highly effective” (Bush, 2010), taking the focus off the blatant
breach of international law and the fact that he had admitted to authorising criminal
behaviour.

Omissions from Guantanamo reports – Confessions under torture
and the reinterpretation of events
Omissions in articles relating to torture that occurred as part of the Guantanamo
interrogation program were significant and served to reinterpret events. For example,
as already mentioned, a number of articles refer to David Hicks, Joseph Thomas and
Mamdouh Habib as “confessed” terrorism supporters. The stark omission in the
majority of the articles was that the men were subjected to conditions and treatment
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that amounted to torture, and therefore none of their statements obtained whilst in the
custody of the US or their agents could be relied upon. As explored in Chapter
Three, even before arrival in Guantanamo, both Mamdouh Habib and David Hicks
were subjected to beatings, sensory deprivation/bombardment, being spat on, kicked,
hit, sexually abused, threated with rape, sexual assault and sleep deprivation,
amongst other cruelties. It has now been revealed that all Guantanamo prisoners
were drugged. More specifically, upon arrival to Guantanamo, it has been now
proven that most, if not all prisoners, were administered a treatment dose of the US
military developed anti-malarial drug called Mefloquine (Nevin, 2012).85
Researchers have been troubled by this due to the fact that Mefloquine has been long
associated with severe psychological impacts such as hallucinations, depression,
suicidal behaviour, anxiety and the prospect of neurotoxicity (Nevin, 2012, p. 1282).
Researcher and medical practitioner Dr. Remington Nevin (2012), stated that the
administration of the drug “suggests the troubling possibility that the use of
Mefloquine at Guantanamo Bay may have been motivated in part by knowledge of
the drug’s adverse effects...” (p. 1281). However, this was not the only drug given to
prisoners over the years. There are a long line of reports from former prisoners and
their lawyers that point to the mass administration of different pills that had strange
physical and psychological effects on detainees (Begg, 2007; Hicks, 2010; Dratel,
2012). Many newspaper articles assert that confessions were being attained, but there
was little interest in the conditions under which the statements were obtained.
The passing of legislation also served to reinterpret events, in most part because it
appeared to confuse many journalists writing about torture given their lack of
expertise in international law and torture prohibitions. These omissions manifested in
articles presenting skewed stories that reinforced official narratives. For example in
2007, papers reported that Bush passed an executive order that would “allow harsh
questioning of suspects” but ban “cruel and inhumane treatment” ("Bush clears way
for CIA interrogations", 2007). Whilst on face value, it appeared that the treatment
amounting to torture would be prohibited, the legislation had gaping holes that still
allowed prisoners to be subjected to conditions and treatment amounting to torture.
Under the legislation, CIA officials were also still immune from prosecution, so
85

David Hicks’ medical records confirm that he was definitely given the drug.
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whilst the legislation gave the appearance of preventing torture, it allowed cruel and
inhumane treatment in other forms.
Interestingly, in 2009, when the Rudd Government announced that it wanted to
introduce legislation prohibiting torture carried out overseas, the ADF publicly
raised concerns over their ability to carry out their roles because they work so closely
with the US military (Banham, 2009). No concerns were raised over what that might
mean, and how Australian troops were being put in the position of working with
international forces who were torturing prisoners in overseas settings – or whether
they were engaging in such behaviour themselves. The problem was presented as
being the legislation, not the actions of the military or US forces.
Government reframing and interpretation was uncritically transmitted by the media
in a number of ways. Some of the inadequate coverage was not deliberate on the part
of all journalists: some were simply ill-equipped to understand the complexity of the
situation and convey it to the public. For example, I attended a press conference in
2011 during which David Hicks and his lawyers announced they were appealing his
Military Commissions conviction in the US. After the conference, I was standing
near a journalist from a major Australian news network who was giving a grab to the
camera to introduce the story. The grab was littered with inaccuracies, including the
journalist stating that David had pleaded guilty, and that he had been released from
Guantanamo on bail. This gave the impression that he had been through a normal
court process, signed a plea deal admitting guilt, and been convicted in a civilian
court with rules disallowing evidence obtained through torture. I stopped the
journalist half way through the grab and provided him a list of the inaccuracies that
he just conveyed to the Australian people. The response I received was telling. He
stated, “we need to simplify it for the public…they just wouldn’t understand the
facts”.
The same shortcomings affected many of the stories printed in Australia that aided in
the misrepresentation of torture, many of the journalists saying they just did not have
sufficient understanding of the issues they were reporting. They were also time poor,
and did not have the time to thoughtfully report the complexity to the public. Other
journalists used the excuse that their editors changed the stories after they had
written them. The torture victims and their families were essentially powerless when
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these occurrences of misreporting happened, and no one was held to account because
the public was unaware of what had occurred because victims simply did not have
the platform to correct the record.86
Overwhelmingly, the newspaper stories over the ten year period studied show
evidence of the reinterpretation of events by government officials and the media.
From the time the first prisoners were detained in the War on Terror, it was clear that
the framing of their treatment was being manipulated to stifle any outrage, including
the conditions of detention and treatment and whether they were being held
according to the laws of war. Consistent with Cohen’s (2001) theory detailed in
States of Denial, there are many examples of the perpetrators denying that torture
occurred, and the results demonstrate that the Australian Government followed suit.
The denial of knowledge of torture was also a regular feature in the stories.
Numerous examples showed members of the Howard Government purposefully
avoiding questions about the US definition of torture, or simply repeating US talking
points about the conditions of confinement of Australian prisoners. There is also
evidence that officials defined torture to suit their own agendas, in particular,
excluding sleep deprivation and waterboarding. Indeed, even when the US agents
had been caught red-handed torturing prisoners, it was blamed on a few ‘bad apples’,
or portrayed as an aberration. There was also plenty of evidence of lying about
certain events, including the torture of prisoners at Guantanamo, Abu Ghraib and
other black-sites. This in turn was used by authorities to minimise the consequences
of the actions – they were after all just ‘terror suspects’. When the photos of Abu
Ghraib were released there was also ample evidence of blame shifting, with officials
blaming lower ranking soldiers for mistreating prisoners. The media was quick to
present torture narratives that focused on the victims’ alleged activities in order to
shift the focus off their torture. There was also evidence that the media framed
torture as legitimate in some circumstances, and not in others.
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This was exacerbated because many former prisoners have avoided social media forums such as
Facebook and Twitter, and therefore had no way of correcting the record in a way that bypassed the
mainstream media.
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Use of Official Channels to Give the Appearance of Justice
It is a natural that people want to trust authority and avoid complicated and
disturbing issues (Chomsky, 2003a, p. xxv). It is certainly the case over the years
that the governments involved in the War on Terror have counted on people’s trust in
order to shift the focus away from torture that has occurred either at the hands of
their agents, under their watch, or by turning a blind eye. This section examines
whether there is evidence that ‘official channels’ have given spurious legitimacy to
injustice. When perpetrators are powerful, official channels such as investigations,
can be used as a means of providing the public with the illusion of justice, when in
fact, they have only served to further obfuscate the reality of the situation. Official
channels dampen outrage because it is generally accepted that they provide justice,
and therefore outrage is dampened when they are utilised (Martin, 2007).
The use of official channels can take many forms; it could be opening an
investigation or senate hearing that has a limited scope, lacks independence and
resources, or appoints ‘experts’ that may be influenced by those employing them.
For example, a US Military Commission system could be seen as an official channel
that gives the impression of justice, even though its members are all employed by the
same institution, and it is orchestrated to prevent torture testimony from being heard.
If the official channel is the legal system, courts may only look at legal technicalities
rather than the merits or morals of the act/s. The use of an official channel also may
entail an enquiry where the outcome is censored, such as the Inspector General of
Intelligence and Security (IGIS) investigation into Mamdouh Habib’s torture.
Official channels may also be used pre-emptively in order to legitimise an attack on
a victim, or provide a means of shifting focus off the torture that has occurred, and
devalue the victims. For example, the proceeds of crime case initiated against David
Hicks could be seen as a means to legitimise the Australian Government’s attacks on
his personal character, even though he had been cleared of any known crime. The
Australian Government also dropped proceedings after an affidavit detailing his
torture was filed with the court, pointing to officials not wanting his torture
testimony to be aired publicly.
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It is also worth noting that challengers of injustice often use official channels as a
means of exposing perpetrators thinking that the system will hold those who
perpetrated the offences to account. For example, using the court system may have
its advantages in exposing information to the general public, but it is also fraught
with issues that serve to dampen outrage such as protracted duration, bias,
technicalities and dependence on experts who may have vested interests. For
instance, a perpetrator of torture may escape prosecution because they have
diplomatic immunity under legislation, or, if a lower ranking member of the military
has been convicted of assault, as they were in the case of Abu Ghraib, they may
simply receive a letter of discharge rather than a lengthy prison sentence. These
techniques shift the focus off those who ordered torture and aided in the cover-up.
The previous sections have already touched on many examples of these occurrences,
including the use of so-called ‘experts’ pushing pro-torture agendas, or the
technicalities in FOI cases, however, this section seeks to expand and provide further
evidence collected from the data. As was evident in the previous sections, there are
many examples that overlap with previous tactics, particularly reinterpretation and
devaluation.
There are numerous examples of the use of official channels to give the impression
that justice was achieved, or that credible investigations had taken place. During the
early years of the War on Terror, the US Government mainly used higher-ranking
officials to publicly state that torture was not being used and that prisoners were
being treated humanely. For example in 2002, Donald Rumsfeld stated in a press
conference that reports that a man was being tortured were “wrong and
irresponsible” (as cited in "New US terror suspect", 2002), and Condoleezza Rice
was quoted as saying that any allegations of torture would be “investigated and
violators punished” (as cited in "UK law lords ban torture evidence", 2005). There
were many occasions when Australian newspapers reported US official claims that
they will investigate allegations of torture which had the effect of dampening outrage
(“Torture order denied”, 2004). The US Government would also bring out “senior”
lawyers for the Pentagon who stated that the US would not “permit, tolerate, or
condone any such torture” (“US crackdown on torture”, 2003).
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Many press conferences were held with men
in military uniforms, giving the appearance of
a trusted and credible source (Gallup, 2016;
Marnzaria & Bruck, 2014). The claims of
humane treatment were then either reported in
Australian papers without challenge, or they
were repeated by Australian and British
officials who defended the actions of the US
military and other US Government agents,

Figure 16 - Lt. Gen. Anthony Jones
speaking at a press conference about
prisoner ‘abuse’
(Source: Ward, 2004)

coincidently, using the same language. For example, as early as 2002, British
officials reported that Guantanamo prisoners were in good health. They stated that
there was “No sign of any mistreatment” ("Access to P.O.W.'s eases concerns over
conditions - War on Terror", 2002). Similarly, Australian Attorney-General Philip
Ruddock echoed US claims that Australian prisoners were “in good health and being
treated humanely” (as cited in DiGirolamo, 2003), and stated that no claims of
torture had been made, even though later released FOI documents demonstrate that
this was not the case.
When the Abu Ghraib photos were released, official channels were used as a method
of stifling outrage in the US. A US Senate Armed Services Committee investigation
into the torture of prisoners in Iraq was used as a way of reinterpreting what
occurred, whilst at the same time, utilising the official channel as a means of
misleading the public into thinking that the investigation would provide justice.
High-ranking military officials used the platform to blame a breakdown in military
leadership, and stated that the occurrences were “extremely rare” an “aberration” and
not reflective of the “men and women of honour” who serve in the US military
(Daniels, 2004). But the outcome of the investigation failed to provide any real
justice for the victims.
When evidence of torture surfaced contradicting the official claims of the US
Government that prisoners were being treated humanely, the Australian Government
went to great lengths to protect their reputation at the expense of revealing the truth
about torture. One of the most striking examples was when it became known that
previously discussed military officer George O’Kane was involved in hiding
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prisoners from the ICRC at Abu Ghraib prison and knew about the torture of
prisoners. Whilst Australian officials publicly stated that they would investigate
claims of torture, privately they were working out ways of protecting the reputation
of the US. FOI documents show that a DFAT official commented they would “need
to get around this somehow”, and were more concerned about preventing the
embarrassment to the US Government (Doc 59, as cited in Public Interest Advocacy
Centre, 2011b, p. 13). Many times, it seems that Australian officials were able to
bypass acknowledging claims of torture and mistreatment, simply by not asking the
question.87 Indeed, Prime Minister Howard denied that any Australian military
officials had witnessed any mistreatment in Iraq, and even criticised the publication
of O’Kane’s involvement in Australian newspapers (McPhedran, 2004). Howard
also protected O’Kane by preventing him from testifying, both in Australia and the
US, before any committee’s investigating the torture of prisoners. Official channels
were certainly used to dampen outrage about Abu Ghraib, whilst inexorably
protecting those involved.
The use of official channels to provide legitimacy to the torture of Australian citizens
in US custody was an effective way of inhibiting outrage at the conditions and
treatment they were subjected to. In Mamdouh Habib’s case, after years of civil
litigation in the Australian courts, it was reported that he had obtained a statement by
an Egyptian official confirming that Australian intelligence agents were present for
his torture. Not long after this, the Gillard Government arranged an out of court
settlement and ordered an investigation by the former IGIS, Vivienne Thom (2011),
into his transfer to Egypt. This inhibited outrage in several ways.
Firstly, the investigation by the IGIS meant that the material examined by Thom was
secret from the public. There was no formal public judicial hearing where people
were called as witnesses, and names of those involved were not made public. Even
when the report was released, the public only gained access to a redacted version due
to ‘national security concerns’ (Thom, 2011). Secondly, the scope of the
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More recently, the former Foreign Minister Bob Carr was asked whether he had any knowledge of a
grand jury investigation into Australian citizen Julian Assange, who at the time of writing is stuck in
the Ecuadorian embassy in London because he fears extradition to the US, and subsequent torture
whilst in US custody. Senator Carr said he was not aware of any investigation by the US law
enforcement agencies, however, when further pressed by Senator Scott Ludlam, he admitted that he
did not ask because, the fate of the Australian had nothing to do with the Australian Government
(Dorling, 2013).
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investigation did not cover any investigation into Guantanamo Bay, or any of
Mamdouh Habib’s mistreatment at the hands of the US Government. This was not
made clear to the general public, which is problematic given that the involvement of
the US military is paramount, considering he was held without charge for years in
Guantanamo. Thirdly, part of Mamdouh’s settlement with the Australian
Government was a confidentiality clause – the details of which have not been made
public, which is a form of cover-up. Curiously though, after this was offered,
Mamdouh publicly stated that the ‘real’ torture occurred in Egypt. One could
surmise that part of the agreement was that he would not speak of his torture at the
hands of the US Government and its contractors. These issues were not raised in the
media, and little attention has been given to the fact that not one person has been
held to account under the CAT for Mamdouh’s torture.
The use of official channels to give the appearance of justice was also apparent in the
case of David Hicks. After the Abu Ghraib photos surfaced, an investigation into
David’s treatment was ordered by Donald Rumsfeld after pressure mounted on the
Australian Government to investigate. Rather than order an independent Australian
investigation, the Australian Government relied on the US military, including those
who were accused of torturing him, to conduct the investigation. The result was a
Naval Criminal Investigation Service (NCIS) report, the scope of which was limited
to an investigation of assault that occurred prior to arriving at Guantanamo;
including his detention in Mazar a Shariff, Kandahar, and when he was flown by
helicopter to Pasni, in Pakistan. His treatment aboard the two prison ships, the USS
Bataan and USS Pelelieu, were excluded from the investigation. The investigation
and report were delayed for years, and the report was never released to the public.
Despite this, the Howard Government stated that the report had found no evidence of
mistreatment. Ruddock was quoted in 2006 as saying he had no “knowledge of
evidence” backing the “claims” (as cited in “No evidence of Hicks torture, says
Ruddock”, 2006). FOI documents later obtained by the author in Australia
demonstrate that it is still unclear as to whether anyone within the Howard
Government actually read the report. Most communications between Australia and
US officials at the time talk of the summary of the report, not the contents. For
example, the report itself contains statements that are blatantly inconsistent with the
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conclusion of the report, and the summary points to inconsistencies that confirm
David’s account which means that either Ruddock did not read the report or
summary, or that he lied to the public.
Obtained by the author under FOI in the US, the NCIS (2005) report reveals:
o Sworn evidence from navy brig members that ‘men in suits’ had come to
ships, taken photos of the prisoners, and removed David’s medical records,
preventing any evidence of his or other prisoners bruises being provided to
the investigator. One brig member said he was told by one of the men “we
were never here”.
o Photos of David and other prisoners when they were hooded and shackled
were taken by USS Bataan crew members, and included in the report.
o Several interviews with US military personnel backed up David’s experience,
including witnesses who saw his hood and overalls covered with spit, dust
and vomit, corroborating testimony that he was beaten by civilian forces at an
offshore location.
o Dusty footprints were seen on all of the prisoner’s overalls, including David
after he was brought onto the USS Bataan.
o Interviews pointed to evidence that David was bleeding from the head after
being taken off the ship and subjected to beatings in Pasni, which
corroborated his statements that his head had been rammed into the concrete.
o Prisoners were only referred to by number and the Standard Operating
Procedures allowed for them to be bound by their biceps and had sandbags
placed over their heads.
o There was an acknowledgment that prisoners were deprived of sleep and
food.
o One military member states that David had complained about spit in his food.
o One brig member recalled “when the detainees first came aboard the USS
Bataan circa Nov/Dec01, some of them had cuts and bruises, and one
detainee was missing a portion of a leg” (p. 127).
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o Other prisoners, who cannot speak English, described the same events as
David. One prisoner who was with David at the time recalled “5 or 6 other
detainees were subjected to kicking, hitting, spitting and having urine thrown
on them by the “Americans” (p. 10). [Redacted] also stated when they were
moved from the ship to land, heavy bags were placed over their heads. This
made it very difficult to breathe, and he could not see anything” (p. 369).
o There were inconsistent statements about Marines carrying batons, guns and
other weapons that were used against prisoners.
Despite the contents of the report corroborating David’s statements, his torture was
continually framed by Australian officials and the media as ‘claims of mistreatment’.
This is in spite of the NCIS (2005) report noting that conveniently no log-books
were kept at the time in relation to the guards, or the prisoners; and many of the
Marines who were on duty were unable to be located for the investigation. The
report stated: “Inquiries aboard the USS Pelelieu have determined that no records
exists aboard the ship regarding [Hicks] detention there…no medical records…were
generated prior to his arrival in GTMO” (NCIS, 2005, p. 3). It was also clear that no
great attempt was made to locate those who had taken the prisoners offshore for the
beatings. There were several references to the processing of prisoners being
documented on film, however, the film had supposedly gone missing. The
‘investigation’ and subsequent commentary from the Australian Government was a
clear attempt to use official channels to present a picture to the public that claimed
there was no evidence of torture, despite the substantiated statements in the report. In
fact, a cable from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT)
demonstrates that the Australian Government asked the US Government for
“speaking points” so that former Foreign Minister Alexander Downer could tell the
public that there was no evidence of mistreatment (DFAT, 2004). In addition, the
definition of abuse was never clarified in the NCIS report.
This obfuscation extended to situations where members of the Howard Government
claimed that people had visited David over the years in Guantanamo to conduct
‘welfare checks’. In 2004 Prime Minster Howard dismissed claims of torture, and
told the public he had “confirmation” of David’s welfare from the Australian
Ambassador and the Consul-General in Washington (as cited in Shaw, 2004).
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Documents reveal that Howard Government ministers were misleading the public
when they stated David was in good health and they had sent someone to check on
his welfare. For example, in 2005 David handed a list of complaints to the Australian
consular official, including complaints about the use of ‘noise machines’. A later
cable saw the US explain that the noise was attributable to ‘construction noise’,
despite the fact David had conveyed that the US military were leaving chainsaw
engines revving outside the concrete cells for hours at a time (Hicks, 2010). Consular
records and other cables obtained under FOI demonstrate that David’s mental health
had seriously deteriorated, he was in chronic back pain, was suffering from sleep
deprivation due to the 24 hour lighting, and that he had been prevented from seeing
the sun for an extended period. Despite this, Howard Government ministers told the
public that he was in good health. In January 2007, Downer told the public that there
was “no evidence” that David’s mental health was suffering, and that “I know of
somebody who saw him last week – and there’s no evidence he’s in some sort of
mental tumult…he’s in good health” (as cited in Australian Broadcasting
Corporation, 2007).
The consular records tell a different story. David refused to talk to the Australian
official on a number of occasions after he realised that they were not doing anything
about his situation. In addition, David’s medical records demonstrate that at the time
Downer was claiming publicly that David was in good health, he was in fact suicidal,
refusing to eat and not showering. The situation dramatically deteriorated again in
January 2007, and cables between Washington and Canberra discuss everything
from the rationing of toilet paper to matters of concern about David’s health and
welfare. Despite this, the public was assured that David was being treated humanely.
In other words, officials lied, and kept shifting attention of attention by telling the
public that he was dangerous.
The cables also point to the way in which official channels were used to stifle debate
about the treatment of Guantanamo prisoners. There was no discussion about the
clarification of the definition of abuse until later years of the Australian’s detention,
and the tone of the cables suggested that a number of informal discussions had taken
place before anything was put on paper. None of the cables released clarified
whether the US had provided the definition, and cables generated within the
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Attorney-General’s Department suggest that it was clear that the Australian
Government’s definition of torture was different to that of the US Government.
Simultaneously, the Australian Government ministers were telling the public there
was no evidence of abuse.
The fact that David Hicks was even put through the Military Commissions system
also played an enormous role in giving the appearance that he was treated in
accordance with the law. Although it is well-known that the plea deal was politically
orchestrated (O’Brien, 2011), and that he was forced to plead guilty to an invented
war crime that was applied retrospectively (Dratel, 2012), the Australian media
continually referred to him as a war criminal and convicted supporter of terrorism. In
other words, in the public realm the only justice that needed to be served in his case,
was holding him to account for his supposed involvement in terrorism – not the fact
that he had been held in conditions and was subjected to treatment that amounted to
torture, which subsequently meant that he signed a plea deal to get out of
Guantanamo. Heavily redacted cables between Washington and Australia released in
2014 demonstrate that the admissibility of evidence obtained under torture and
coercion was discussed within the Attorney-General’s Department as an area of
concern, and more importantly, that the Military Commissions were acknowledged
as not in compliance with international fair trial standards. Instead, the AttorneyGeneral’s Department played word games in their public talking points, and stuck to
the line that commissions were ‘similar’ in nature to international criminal tribunals,
like the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, but they
acknowledged that they did not provide the same fair trial standards. Despite this,
members of the Howard Government were selective in what they told the public, and
continued to publicly state that they were satisfied that the Australian would be
subjected to a system that no US citizen would ever be exposed to.
The Australian government’s involvement in David Hicks’ transfer to Guantanamo,
his subsequent torture and Military Commissions conviction has never been
investigated. Rather, when the campaign was mounting for an independent
investigation, the Australian Government launched action under the proceeds of
crime legislation to shift the focus off its own actions. Whilst this is an important
piece of legislation that prevents people from profiting from their criminal activity,
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in David’s case, it was used as a diversion to take the focus off the evidence that was
coming to light about his torture. The lead up to the case was highly stressful,
however, David was pleased that he would finally have his day in court. Before this
case, he did not have the opportunity to go before a regularly constituted court,
where fair trial protections were in place. However, the case was dropped by the
Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions (CDPP) after his legal team
submitted an affidavit outlining the torture he experienced in Guantanamo. So,
whilst the official channels appeared to prevent further injustice, in effect, all that
occurred was that the public was given the impression that he was convicted of a
crime, and again they were prevented from hearing his torture testimony, and
evidence about his treatment was never tested in a court. Interestingly, because
proceedings were launched against David, his publisher was told that many of his
books were pulled from the shelves. In this way, his detailed torture testimony was
again prevented from hitting the mainstream.
Former Guantanamo child prisoner Omar Khadr was also a victim of official
channels in relation to his Military Commission ‘trial’. In 2010, Khadr was brought
in front of a US Military Commission in the attempt to give the appearance of justice
to the American people, as well as inhibit outrage at his torture. One of the most
important examples of this was when Military Commissions Judge Parrish decided
that the “confessions” Khadr made under torture at both Bagram airbase and in
Guantanamo could be heard as part of the case against him ("Military judge allows
alleged confessions", 2010). In April 2010, federal agents testified that they had
subjected then 15 year old Khadr to techniques such as “stress positions and sleep
deprivation”, and threatened his rape in order to “influence the detainee” ("Military
judge allows alleged confessions", 2010). Khadr was later forced to take a plea deal
in much the same way as David Hicks, despite his torture and ill-treatment in US
Government custody. Evidence to support his case was also destroyed (Edney,
2013).
The prosecution of prisoners who were labelled as high-value detainees in
Guantanamo was also used to divert people’s attention off their torture through the
use of official channels. Prisoners such as Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri were central in
the US Government campaign to instil fear into the community, and convince the
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public that they were undeserving of trials which could not use statements obtained
under torture. Nashiri was charged in 2010, and was one of the prisoners the CIA
admitted to waterboarding. Despite this, articles focused on US Government
assertions about his alleged actions, rather than his torture ("World snapshot trial for
terror suspect", 2011). He has still never been convicted of a crime.
The obfuscation was not confined to Guantanamo prisoners: there have also been
countless situations where Australian Government officials relied on diplomatic
assurances that those held in the custody of countries known for permitting torture
were being treated humanely, despite the clear evidence to the contrary. For
example, Australian man, Talaal Adrey was tried and convicted of terrorism related
offences in Kuwait in 2005, and although there were serious allegations that the
evidence used to convict him was obtained under torture, the Australian Government
relied on diplomatic assurances and an investigation ordered by Kuwaiti officials
that he was not tortured. This is despite the fact there was evidence that he was
tortured so violently his fingernails had been ripped out (Bruni, 2005). Parliamentary
secretary for Foreign Affairs, Bruce Billson was reported as saying that that the
investigation was “comprehensive” and that “medics found no evidence of torture”
(Bruni, 2005).
This Australian Government collusion with other torture sanctioning countries
occurred frequently over the years. After allegations of torture surfaced over the
treatment of Riduan Isamuddin Hambali and others detained on suspicion of the
Kuta nightclub bombings in Bali, Australian authorities relied on Indonesian
authority’s investigations to diminish any concerns over their torture. One paper
stated “investigators will use trickery, falsehoods, rewards and silence in an attempt
to get Hambali to divulge what he knows about terrorist plots”, but Australian
officials told the Australian public that the final outcome of the report was that “no
evidence of torture had been used in any interrogations” (Dunn, 2003).
In addition, Australian officials used official channels to inhibit outrage in relation to
cases involving Indonesian security forces. Detachment 88 was created after the
2002 Bali bombings as a specialist force to prevent terrorism. Funding and training
for the unit has come directly from the Australian and the US Governments (Human
Rights Watch, 2010). After allegations surfaced that Detachment 88 were torturing
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its ‘terror suspects’, Australian papers reported that an investigation was to take
place (Allard, 2010a). Dissidents who have been detained by Detachment 88
describe being severely beaten, sometimes for weeks at a time (resulting in broken
bones), beaten with wire cables and wooden bats, kicked, stripped naked, forced into
stress positions, having weapons pointed at them during interrogations, having
plastic bags placed over their heads, nearly suffocating them, being pierced with
nails, and forced to eat raw chillies (Human Rights Watch, 2010). To counter any
outrage from the allegations, the Australian Government reportedly sent “an official”
to Maluka to investigate the brutality and torture experienced by people in West
Papua (Allard, 2010a). It was initially reported that Detachment 88 would be
removed from Ambon, a key province (Allard, 2010c), but that they would stay in
West Papua, where it had a “legitimate role” to play in the simmering “independence
campaign” (Allard, 2010b). This gave the impression that the Australian
Government were acting on concerns, when in effect, nothing changed.
Sham investigations were not confined to the US or Australia. The UK also held
inquiries into claims its agents were involved in the torture of prisoners overseas.
Whilst the investigations gave the appearance that something was being done about
the unlawful conduct of intelligence agencies, they also served to cover-up the UK
Government’s involvement in torture. Australian papers reported the investigations
of the intelligence officials, however, little was made of the Blair Government’s
knowledge of the torture of people in US custody ("Cameron orders torture inquiry",
2010). This was again apparent after the Diego Garcia affair surfaced, and it was in
the public domain that CIA jets had landed on the British controlled territory, with
permission from the UK Government (UK Intelligence and Security Committee,
2007). Although many cases have been documented by lawyers and advocates for
former prisoners, the full extent of UK involvement is still unknown to the
mainstream public because the reports effectively served to obfuscate and stifle
outrage.
The passing of legislation or the hearings of Senate Committee’s in the US were also
used to dampen outrage at the injustice of torture. Over the years, many pieces of
legislation were passed with the purported implication that torture would be
prevented. The reality was however, that methods and treatment that amounted to
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torture continued because of the loopholes in the legislation, or because, even if
torture was reinterpreted as ‘organ-failure or death’, those responsible were immune
from prosecution. In 2006, it was reported that Bush had finally put an end to torture
by passing anti-torture legislation, whilst simultaneously introducing a bill that
would allow the parts of the CIA to continue using “coercive interrogations”
(Sullivan, 2006). The bill not only granted retroactive immunity to officials who
ordered torture in the years post-9/11, but also allowed evidence to be used in
Military Commission trials that was obtained under ‘coercion’ if a military judge
decided ("Few changes to terror trial rules", 2006; Sullivan, 2006). In 2010,
President Obama signed an executive order allowing for the indefinite detention of
those held in Guantanamo Bay, giving the appearance that the American public
needed to be protected from some of them who were too dangerous to be released
("Review plan for Gitmo inmates", 2010).
Whilst US Senate committees appeared to ask the tough questions from members of
the Bush Administration, they also provided a platform to give the impression that
their actions were being scrutinised and therefore, held to account. Whilst there is
some merit to the argument that information demonstrating the cover-up of torture
was revealed during these Senate hearings, it was also clear that those officials who
lied or obfuscated disclosure, were never held to account. For example, in the early
years of the War on Terror, then Attorney General John Ashcroft appeared before a
Senate Committee stating unequivocally that the US does not torture, whilst at the
same time refusing to release Justice Department memos that contended the
President was not bound by anti-torture laws (Coorey & Anderson, 2004). During
the same appearance, Ashcroft stated that torture would be investigated, if it was
“outside military jurisdiction” (Coorey & Anderson, 2004).
Courtrooms did not provide much relief for torture survivors and victims either.
Whilst several cases were taken before mainly European courts, those responsible for
torture have continued to evade responsibility. For example, in 2009, 23 US citizens
who were involved in the extraordinary rendition program were convicted in Italy of
kidnapping ("Italy convicts secret CIA terror force", 2009). The US citizens were
tried in absentia, and no one has served any time in European prisons given that the
US Government refused to cooperate with the trial. Even when European lawyers

234

tried to bring cases against former Bush Administration officials they have been
pressured to drop proceedings. This was demonstrated in the Spanish case against
Mr Alberto Gonzales, former Under-Secretary of Defense Douglas Feith, former
Vice President Dick Cheney's chief of staff David Addington, Justice Department's
John Yoo and Jay Bybee, and Pentagon lawyer William Haynes ("Spain torture case
considered", 2009). WikiLeaks documents later revealed that the case was dropped
because of the political pressure that the US Government placed on Spanish officials
(Tremlett, 2010).
Although US officials regularly promised the public that those responsible for torture
would be investigated and then held to account, there were many examples that
demonstrated that this simply did not occur, and if it did, it was only lower level
troops, not those who ordered torture. For example, when it became public that the
CIA had destroyed 92 videos depicting the ‘interrogation’ of certain prisoners, the
head of the CIA stated that there would be full accountability for those who
destroyed the tapes ("CIA chief pledges 'full accounting' for destroyed interrogation
tapes", 2007). No one was ever held to account. The same occurred when President
Obama released the so-called torture memos in 2009 (Smiles, 2009). Releasing the
memos provided the appearance that justice was being served, and that the Obama
Administration was proactive in holding torturers to account, however, no one was
ever prosecuted or held responsible. Although Australian newspapers ran headlines
such as “Criminal probe into US torture”, President Obama told the media that he
preferred to “look forward, not back”, and that he would not be prosecuting anyone
(as cited in Devlin & Hess, 2009).
Whilst the role of the United Nations is theoretically one of global oversight, it
remains unable to enforce decisions. For example, whilst the US Government has
signed and ratified the CAT, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights 1966, which include prohibitions on torture, the government made
reservations to their compliance, and even if they are found to be in breach, the
decisions are unenforceable and largely disregarded. This was demonstrated when
US Government delegates appeared before the UN Committee against Torture
(UNCAT) for the four yearly review of their compliance with the CAT in November
2014. Whilst one US delegate stated that the US had “crossed the line” and “had not
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lived up to its values” in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, others said the US had taken
necessary steps to “ensure adherence to its international obligations” (Office of the
High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2014, p. 1). However, whilst the US
Government delegates stated that people involved had been held to account, the
reality of the situation is much different. The Committee raised the fact that the John
Durham investigation into detainee abuse had not interviewed any former detainees,
used the States Secrets Privilege to negate any responsibility, invoked claims of
immunity for government officials, and failed to result in any prosecutions (Office of
the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2014). In addition, the continued use of
black sites on a ‘short-term transitory basis’ and the failure to register detainees with
the ICRC was also raised (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights,
2014). The US delegates were grilled on the continued situation in Guantanamo, and
the extraterritorial application of torture prevention legislation. The situation for
Guantanamo detainees that were being held without charge or trial, and were being
forcibly fed was also raised.
One Committee member noted that the US Government was playing “verbal
gymnastics” in its attempt to obfuscate its responsibility under international law
(Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2014). For example, whilst the
US reported that they had taken all steps to ensure accountability, the State Secrets
Privilege was invoked as a reason to prevent many cases from judicial scrutiny. The
US delegates stated that torture was prohibited under all circumstances, however, the
reality was that taking detainees to other jurisdictions enabled the avoidance of
responsibility because of the wording of the legislation. These omissions were
largely left out of the public domain and served to cover-up torture in the general
community.
Despite the UNCAT raising the above issues of concern about the US torture
program, the outcome of the hearing was unenforceable and the situation has not
changed. The official channel inevitably became a forum for US officials to spout
narratives that distorted and omitted the reality of the US Government’s refusal to
investigate and prosecute those who ordered torture and lie to the public about their
respect for human rights. Little media attention was provided about the UN hearing,
and even less was aired about the concerns raised by the UNCAT.
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Australia has also disregarded decisions made by UN human rights bodies such as
the Committee against Torture. In the David Hicks case, the Human Rights
Committee found that the state of Australia violated his rights (United Nations
Human Rights Committee, 2016). However, using the official channel ultimately
only served to gain minor media coverage – it was a far cry from any semblance of
justice. The Committee’s investigation took years to be adjudicated, was limited in
scope, and the ruling was inevitably unenforceable in Australia. David was not
compensated, nor did he receive an apology from the Australian Government.
The same situation is apparent in relation to the ICC. The US Government is not a
party to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 2002, so it cannot be
brought before the ICC on war crimes charges. It is not Western governments that
are brought before the ICC, it has largely been people from African nations. In the
end, these international official channels serve to further dampen outrage because
there is an assumption that they are able to hold violating states to account, when in
reality, it is merely the illusion of justice.
There is ample evidence that official channels continue to give the appearance of
holding to account those responsible for ordering and carrying out torture. Whilst
some European countries have held a number of investigations that have exposed the
use of black sites and the torture of people on European soil ("Europeans to probe
CIA prisoner claims", 2005), the European parliament was still calling for the
European Union to undertake a fact finding mission into member states that were
involved in the CIA rendition program as late as 2016 (Emmons, 2016). Whilst
courts in both France and Spain have attempted to prosecute those involved in the
torture of its citizens, the US Government has refused to hand over documents
requested by the judges in the cases (Emmons, 2016). The former commander of
Guantanamo, General Geoffrey Miller, was subpoenaed to appear before a French
court in early 2016, to answer questions about his role in the torture of prisoners at
Guantanamo (Emmons, 2016). Rather than appear before the court, he chose to
ignore the subpoena, and will only be called to account if France issues an arrest
warrant, and then only if he travels to France.
Official channels were commonly used in the US and Australia to inhibit outrage. A
number of investigations were opened into allegations of mistreatment and torture of
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prisoners over the years, but they were either biased and investigating their own
colleagues, or the investigations were so limited in their scope, that the full extent of
official incompetence would be covered up. This was apparent in relation to the IGIS
Mamdouh Habib inquiry that had such a limited scope, his treatment in US custody
was ignored to prevent embarrassment to US officials. Many of the reports were
classified either entirely, as was the case with the NCIS report into David Hicks’
torture, or with some parts redacted, in which case the public was still left with
conclusions that did not match the contents. The court system was also shown to
have let torture victims down. As the Backfire Model (Martin, 2007) suggests, even
if the cases made it to court, which many did not, they only examined legal
technicalities rather than the merits or morals of the way torture survivors and
victims were treated. International mechanisms have been used to dampen outrage,
despite the fact they lack the ability to ensure state compliance with their rulings.
Not one architect of the US torture program has been held to account, including the
psychologists and doctors involved in crafting and carrying out the torture
techniques. The results demonstrate that this method of inhibiting outrage has proven
to be particularly well used in both the US and Australia.

Intimidating or Rewarding People Involved
The tactics of intimidation and reward involve knowing that the act of torture
occurred, but intimidating or rewarding targets, witnesses, campaigners and the
media so nothing is done about it (Martin, 2007). Rewarding people is discussed in a
separate section below, but it may involve incentives for acquiescence, such as
promotion or the conferring of rewards. There are several ways that authorities
inhibited outrage at the injustice of torture by intimidating those who were subjected
to torture. Intimidation through surveillance, politically motivated prosecutions and
keeping the individuals embroiled in defending themselves publicly so they would
not have time to prepare legal cases that would have exposed their treatment, was
common.
In Australia, the way the Joseph Thomas case was handled is a key example of the
use of intimidation. When Joseph was acquitted of the terrorism related offences, he
was immediately placed on a control order and devalued by authorities in the public
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realm. Joseph stated that “they just wanted to appear as though there was a legitimate
reason to pursue charges against me. The case was falling apart and they were
losing…they just had a tantrum and put the control order on me” (personal
communication, 28 November, 2014). Indeed, the control order did appear to be
intended for public consumption rather than actually protecting the community,
especially considering part of the order was that Joseph was unable to contact around
a dozen people who had died years earlier. Regardless of their breathing status, many
politicians, officials and those in the media still focused on Joseph as someone that
the public needed protection from. The day Joseph was charged, which was
seventeen months after returning home from overseas, he said “I felt like a
tumbleweed in a ghost town. I had just started getting back on my feet. I already had
PTSD because of what they did to me overseas” (personal communication, 28
November, 2014). Joseph believes that the control order which included an
astounding amount of surveillance, and the several court actions they took against
him over the years after his return from overseas, formed part of a deliberate attempt
to intimidate him, and make sure that he was dragged through the court system long
enough to ensure that he did not have the energy to fight them in a torture case.
Even when Joseph’s torture was raised in the public arena, those in authority were
quick to ensure the focus was shifted off their actions and his torture, and onto the
actions he was acquitted of, in an act of intimidation and devaluation. One of the
more striking examples of intimidation came when Joseph was acquitted. In a final
act of unprofessional defiance, former AFP Commissioner, Mick Keelty, stated for a
front page article that the jury got it wrong in acquitting Joseph and refused to
acknowledge that the AFP’s flawed torture induced ‘evidence’ was rejected by the
12 member jury (Moor, 2006). Keelty even repeated the claims that were proven to
be false for the front page article, including accusing Joseph of being a terrorist and
claiming that he was going to be of future use to terrorists in Australia (Moor, 2006),
both of which have been proven as untrue. Joseph said “it was ridiculous, he was
basically saying that the Australian people and the court were stupid and
incompetent, when it was them all along” (personal communication, 28 November,
2014).
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Similarly, the David Hicks case demonstrated many of the same elements, except
authorities appeared to be more overt in their intimidation. Even prior to David’s
release from Guantanamo, his attempts to be treated as a citizen with rights were
removed. This was demonstrated when he sought British citizenship in order for the
UK Government to aid his release from Guantanamo.88 The same day it was granted,
the British Government revoked his citizenship – one can only imagine this was so
the Australian Government would avoid further political embarrassment, and to
ensure David knew his fate was completely in the hands of politicians (Hicks, 2010).
At the time David’s plea deal was politically arranged in 2007, a one year gag order
was already prescribed and imposed on him. The gag order prohibited him from
speaking about any element of his torture or mistreatment to the public, or he would
risk two years prison – something he believed was intended to “shut me up” and
intimidate (personal communication, 2 February, 2010). It is still unclear as to who
arranged for the gag order to be imposed because FOI documents I requested have
been stalled after a number of years. However, it was curious that the order lapsed
just after the federal election was due to take place in 2007, and Howard was down
in the polls partly because of his Government’s handling of David’s case. David’s
voice was effectively removed, and he was unable to bring a case against his
torturers and those who allowed it to happen, even if he wanted to.
The authorities also placed on a control order on David after he was released from
prison in Australia and, in much the same manner as Joseph, it included a prohibition
on speaking to people who were deceased. David was told that he could not fight the
control order in court, and that it was in his interests to agree with the Australian
Government’s requirements (Hicks, 2010). As is already noted in an earlier part of
this chapter, it did not matter what David did to attempt exposure of what had been
done to him, the authorities still managed to remove his voice in one way or another
– either by starting court proceedings against him which they did after his book was
released (and they subsequently had the books removed from the shelves in the
major shopping centres) – or by diverting attention off the crimes committed against
him, and focusing on denigrating his personal character so he would not have public
support or sympathy.
88

Although David is an Australian citizen, his mother was a British citizen, and it was thought that if
he was granted citizenship that he would be brought home like other UK citizens.
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Both Joseph and David were subjected to oppressive surveillance that could also be
classed as intimidation. Both describe having cars tail them, even when they were off
to do mundane tasks, like family grocery shopping. Both had to ask permission to
stay anywhere but the one registered address. At the time of David’s control order,
he was living in Sydney and had to seek permission to fly to Adelaide to visit his
family (Hicks, 2010). By the time the AFP approved the trip, the tickets would either
be too expensive, or he would miss the flights he organised. He risked two years
imprisonment for even picking up his father’s home telephone if it rang. Every
aspect of life was impeded by the authorities at a time when he was attempting to
recover from his years of torture and mistreatment at Guantanamo Bay.
Consequently, authorities effectively removed the voices of those who were
subjected to torture, not only by starting court cases and engaging in unnecessary
surveillance, but also through the emotional pressure they applied to those who were
tortured. One of the primary goals of torture is to break people’s spirits. To come
back to Australia and endure surveillance and endless legal battles that drag on for
years can only be described as a form of intimidation to ensure that the torture
survivors kept their heads down, and did not even think about questioning their
treatment overseas, or seek to hold anyone to account. Indeed, the intimidation of
torture survivors appears to be nothing more than the authorities aiding their own
cover-up and keeping up appearances in the eyes of the general public by
legitimising their own behaviours.
Furthermore, those that spoke out against torture were, and continue to be targeted.
When the Abu Ghraib photos were released, US Undersecretary of Defense sent out
a memo to officials warning that leaks of the Taguba report would be investigated
and possibly lead to prosecution (Martin, 2007). It is reported that at the time, Feith
made his office a “ministry of fear” (Martin, 2007, p. 138).
In an attempt to maintain cover-up, all Guantanamo guards were made to sign a
confidentiality agreement stating that they would not disclose anything they saw or
heard from their time at Guantanamo (personal communication with Brandon Neely,
2 May, 2010). If they did not sign it, they were told that they would not be able to
return home (Leopold, 2011a). It has meant that some former guards have been too
afraid to come forward publicly. The former guards, who have been brave enough to
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tell the world what they saw, have paid dearly. Former Guantanamo guard, Brandon
Neely, who was outspoken about the treatment he witnessed, has suffered severely in
his personal life after he came forward to defend the rights of those detained.
Brandon gave detailed testimony to the media about the atrocities he saw in
Guantanamo. Since then, he has received threats and has been forced to go to great
lengths to protect his family. He was called a traitor by some of his own colleagues.
His career has been impacted enormously, and his life will never be the same again.
He said “I would never change speaking out, but I have to do what I can to protect
my family. There were plenty of times where I was basically told to keep my mouth
shut” (personal communication, 3 September, 2013).
Albert Melise was another former Guantanamo guard who blew the whistle on the
treatment of prisoners. Albert detailed how his tasks at Guantanamo included
chaining prisoners to the floor, manipulating the temperature of the interrogation
rooms, turning the volume of music up and putting on strobe lights to break
detainees (Leopold, 2011a). Former Australian Guantanamo prisoner David Hicks
gave Albert a letter to send to his father Terry, whilst he was still in Guantanamo.
Albert eventually released the letter publicly after David was released, and spoke out
about the way prisoners were treated. After this, his career and personal life were
affected greatly, and because he was outspoken there are some opportunities that he
will never have. He was barred from reenlisting after the military claimed he leaked
classified information by speaking about his time in Guantanamo (Leopold, 2011a).
Another former Guantanamo guard who wishes to remain anonymous, and I will call
X, has told me of his/her personal struggles with alcoholism and domestic violence
since their return from Guantanamo. X told me s/he was too scared to come forward
and tell the public about some of the things that they saw and did, and that it is a
daily struggle. X said “if I do, I know that my life will be made a living hell…there’s
no way they [the government] will ever leave me alone. I am worried about what
they will do to my family, my life is already ruined” (personal communication, 16
July 2014). In another conversation X said “I know with all my heart if I would have
fully understood the truth then I would have been a better person. For me simply
doing my job just doesn’t cut it...I struggle a lot about what I did” (personal
communication, 17 July 2014). The fear of speaking out and the impact of the things
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they witnessed, and sometimes did, has left huge emotional scars on this person. It is
clear that the intimidation felt by the former guards weighs heavily on them,
especially when they are not free to speak out.
An enormous amount of intimidation was also placed on officials who blew the
whistle over the years. Craig Murray worked as a diplomat for the UK Foreign and
Commonwealth Office. When he took the post of British Ambassador to Uzbekistan,
he discovered that the British Government was using information gained under
torture to attempt to link the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan to al-Qaeda, a move
he said was immoral and illegal (Murray, 2016). After making sufficient noise within
the official channels about the use of torture, Murray was subjected to a long line of
accusations of misconduct and he faced charges for which he was eventually
exonerated (Murray, 2016). Murray was eventually dismissed from his ambassador
post in 2004 after a Financial Times article quoted him as saying that MI6 had used
intelligence gained by Uzbekistan authorities under torture (Murray, 2016).
Former CIA analyst and caseworker John Kiriakou, was also a victim of official
intimidation. Despite being forced by the CIA to sign nine non-disclosure
agreements which lasted for the duration of his natural life, in 2007, Kiriakou
revealed to a US reporter on ABC News that waterboarding was used as a form of
torture, and in the process became the first US official to publicly confirm its use
(Coll, 2013; Kiriakou, 2010). The blowback against Kiriakou was immense: the US
Government labelled him a criminal and many in the Agency classified him as a
traitor (Coll, 2013). Instead of prosecuting those who engaged in torture, the US
Government charged Kiriakou with passing on classified information to a reporter,
and he was sentenced to 30 months in prison in 2013. Over the years, Kiriakou and
his family have gone through immense upheaval because of the pressure exerted by
the US Administration, and the constant worry of ongoing legal action caused
significant stress and financial strain (Coll, 2013). Kiriakou stated that he did not go
through official channels to raise concerns about torture because it “wouldn’t have
gotten anywhere” (Kiriakou, 2010). In a 2013 television interview Kiriakou stated:
I am wearing my conviction as a badge of honour. I am proud that I stood up
to our government. I stood up for what I believed was right, conviction or no
conviction. I am not a criminal, I am a whistleblower (Kiriakou, 2016).
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Rewarding People Involved
The rewarding of people involved in torture, either through silent complicity or overt
sanctioning, is significant. As is well established, the chief architects of the US
torture program remain unaccountable. The architects, perpetrators and complicit
officials of the US torture program are still given more air-time in mainstream
newspapers and televisions than the victims of torture. George Bush, Dick Cheney
and Donald Rumsfeld are regularly called on to give their opinions about issues that
are in the news. More recently, when the political situation deteriorated in Iraq with
the rise of the terrorist group ISIS, former leaders from both Bush and Howard
Administrations were asked for comment.
Former President George Bush retired from politics in 2009, when Obama took
office. Despite his retirement, Bush is a regular public speaker and in 2010 published
a memoir defending his torture program (Bush, 2010a). Bush now runs the George
W Bush Presidential Center and the Bush Institute which advertises its service as
being built “on the leadership principles that have shaped President and Mrs. Bush’s
life of service: self-responsibility, the importance of freedom and opportunity for all,
and the guidance of a compassionate heart” ("George W Bush Presidential Center",
2016).
Dick Cheney, who was Vice President until 2009, and is credited with much of the
torture program, is still receiving protection from the Obama Administration. Even
though Leon Panetta (former CIA director) told a US Senate Committee that the CIA
withheld information about the torture program for years on Cheney’s orders, he was
awarded an honorary doctorate from the Brigham Young University in 2007 and
continues to receive accolades. Cheney is still promoting torture, and defends the
decisions he made to inflict suffering on others, including in his memoir published in
2011 (Cheney, 2011).
Former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld retired in 2006. He released a
memoir, which also defended the torture program (Rumsfeld, 2013). Rumsfeld was
awarded the “defender of the constitution award” in 2011 by the Conservative
Political Action Conference in Washington. As with other former high-profile
politicians, Rumsfeld has been awarded several honorary degrees. The list of
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Rumsfeld’s accolades is quite extensive; they include the Presidential Medal of
Freedom, the Ronald Regan Freedom Award, and the Victory of Freedom Award.
The front page of his official website has a quote which states “Learn to say ‘I don’t
know’. If used when appropriate, it will be often” (Rumsfeld, 2016).
Cofer Black was the Director of CIA’s Counter-Terrorism Center (CTC) until 2001,
then State Department Ambassador at large for Counterterrorism until 2004, when he
moved into private security companies such as Blackwater and its subsidiaries. Black
is currently a Vice President of Blackbird Technologies in Washington, which was
acquired by Ratheon, and provides surveillance technology, cyber security and
global intelligence systems for the military and private contractors. Black was
awarded the National Distinguished Intelligence Service Medal, for meritorious
actions to the betterment of national security in America and the George H Bush
Medal for Excellence (Greater Talent Network, 2011).
Those who authored the torture memos and provided legal advice regarding torture
techniques have been rewarded with prestigious teaching positions, such as John
Yoo who is now working in the legal faculty at the University of California in
Berkeley (Kulwin, 2013). David Addington, the lawyer to former Vice President
Dick Cheney, is now Vice President of Domestic and Economic Policy Studies at the
Heritage Foundation in the US. Jay Bybee, one of the authors of the now notorious
‘torture memos’, and the man who advocated legal immunity for acts that clearly
amount to torture, is now a sitting US federal judge (Cohen, 2013). Alarmingly, he is
ruling on cases involving the torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment of US
prisoners.89
Larry James, a former Army psychologist and former head of the Behavioural
Science Division who was involved in overseeing the ‘interrogation’ of prisoners at
both Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay, was appointed Dean of the School of
Professional Psychology at Wright State University in 2008. He was selected by
Michelle Obama to a head a White House Task Force entitled Enhancing the
89

In 2012, Bybee oversaw a case where a US prisoner alleged his treatment amounted to cruel and
inhuman treatment. In Bybee’s ruling he stated that the guards did not have any reason to believe
that contraband watch was unconstitutional. The man in question was subjected to 24 hour bright
lighting, no mattress to sleep on, body cavity searches, waist chains which prevented him from
using his hands to eat, and being placed in an unventilated and hot cell for a week (Cohen, 2013).
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Psychological Wellbeing of the Military Family (Greenwald, 2011; The Center for
Torture Accountability, 2013).
Those who ran torture facilities have also been rewarded. General Geoffrey Miller,
who oversaw prisons such as Camp Bucca, Abu Ghraib, and Guantanamo, refused to
appear before a French court and answer for his conduct, but was nevertheless
awarded the Distinguished Service medal in the Pentagon’s Hall of Heroes ("Critics
rage at abuse ‘reward' Abu Ghraib chief honoured", 2006). Miller has since retired
from the military.
The CIA Station Chief who oversaw the Salt Pit black site in Afghanistan where Gul
Rahman died, allegedly of hypothermia, was also promoted (Mayer, 2010). It took
two years for the death of the man to come to light, and his family was only
informed after reading about it in the newspaper. In addition, the other officials
involved have also been promoted inside the CIA (Mayer, 2010). CIA agents who
were convicted in Italy of kidnapping are still fighting extradition to serve their
sentences. One of the agents, Sabrina de Sousa, is waiting to hear whether she will
have to serve her sentence in Italy ("Ex-CIA spy says she is to be extradited to Italy
to serve prison sentence", 2016).
In addition, because of the immunity provided to PMSCs in Iraq and Afghanistan,
they have largely escaped accountability for their involvement in torture and
assassination. The founder of Blackwater, Eric Prince, remains extremely wealthy
and has never been held to account. Rather, he is now running another private
company called Frontier Services Group, and is said to be making a killing – literally
(Scahill, 2014).

Australia
Despite the clear evidence that links members of the Howard Government to the
illegal attacks on Iraq and the torture of prisoners in the War on Terror, they are still
rewarded and sought after for interviews and comment by the media. This serves as
an extension of the distortion of the historical record, where politicians involved in
such atrocities are asked to comment on banal social issues and given air-time rather
than the victims. Asking perpetrators or those involved in cover-up to speak at social
events as distinguished speakers only aids in suggesting to the public that they are
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people with credible opinions, and ignores the lies and deceit they told the public
whilst in office.
Despite his role in facilitating and covering-up the US torture program, former Prime
Minister John Howard has been rewarded in a number of ways throughout the years
since his time in office. Not only is he on a taxpayer funded retirement, with a
private office in Sydney, he is still awarded accolades in various settings. He has
signed with the Washington Speakers Bureau, and is regularly called upon to give
his opinions on current events, including the Australian media airing his refusal to
apologise for involving Australian troops in the illegal invasion of Iraq (Coorey,
2016). In 2008, Howard was awarded the Irving Kristol award by the American
Enterprise Institute due to his “steadfast support of the Australian-US alliance and as
a proponent of strong conservative values” (Davies, 2008). The same year he was
awarded the Companion of the Order of Australia for, amongst other things,
promoting Australia’s interests internationally. One of the most ironic awards
conferred on Howard was the Presidential Medal of Freedom which was given to
him by George W Bush in 2009 ("Howard to receive US Presidential award", 2009).
In 2012, Howard became a Member of the Order of Merit by Her Majesty, Queen
Elizabeth II.
Alexander Downer, who was Foreign Minister during the early years of the War on
Terror and misled the public on the treatment of US prisoners, was also given
accolades instead of a trip to the Hague. Upon retiring from parliament, Downer was
appointed the UN Special Advisor to the Secretary-General on Cyprus until 2014
(Taylor, 2015). After his UN post, he became Australia’s High Commissioner to the
United Kingdom and an officer of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
(Australian Government, 2016). He also holds an Order of Australia medal. The
media still gives him air-time to spout pro-torture rhetoric and he continues to
denigrate torture survivors.
Former Attorney-General Philip Ruddock remained a sitting member of parliament
until his retirement was announced in 2015. Ruddock was the Attorney-General
who stated that sleep deprivation was not torture and sanctioned the internationally
condemned US Military Commissions system. He was appointed to a UN position as
Australia’s first Special Envoy for Human Rights to promote Australia’s candidacy
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to the United Nations Human Rights Council in 2018–2020 ("Veteran Liberal MP
Philip Ruddock to retire from politics after 42 years", 2016). Ruddock has also
chaired the Parliament’s Joint Committee on Human Rights. He still wears his
Amnesty International pin to his press conferences.
The former Chief of the Defence Force, Peter Cosgrove, who was made aware of the
torture of prisoners at Abu Ghraib, and signed off on minutes that contained
information concerning serious breaches of international law, yet chose to hide them
from the public in order to protect the US and UK from embarrassment (Cosgrove,
2004), now holds the highest office in Australia – the Governor-General. Working
his way up the ranks over the years, His Excellency General the Honourable Sir
Cosgrove AK MC, was even bestowed a knighthood (Governor-General of the
Commonwealth of Australia, 2016).
The inquiry into the bungled Haneef case exposed some of the Australian
Government officials who were involved in the equally bungled cases of David
Hicks and Joseph Thomas. In particular, former AFP Commander Ramzi Jabbour
was singled out as having lost objectivity in the Haneef case (Clark, 2008, p. x). It is
little wonder that enquiries were prevented from examining his role in David and
Joseph’s cases given Jabbour’s deep involvement with the attempted prosecution of
those matters. Despite being named in the report, in 2015 Jabbour was promoted to
become Deputy Commissioner of the AFP (Keenan, 2015). The senior Australian
Government prosecutor in the Haneef case, Clive Porritt, was also named as being
responsible for giving advice that should not have been given (Clark, 2008). Despite
being named in the report, no one was charged with misconduct, or held to account.
Former ASIO Director-General of Security, Dennis Richardson, was the Australian
Ambassador to the US at the height of the first War on Terror, and FOI documents
demonstrate that he was deeply involved in negotiations around Habib’s
‘hypothetical’ rendition to Egypt, as well as other Australian’s treatment whilst in
Guantanamo Bay. Since his US Ambassador post, Richardson has been promoted to
the Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and is now Secretary
of the Department of Defence. Richardson was appointed as an Officer of the Order
of Australia for his service to foreign policy and national security. Duncan Lewis,
who was the Special Operations Commander from 2002–2004, and a National
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Security Advisor in the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (2008–2011) and
Secretary of the Department of Defence (2011–12), has now moved up to the
position of ASIO director.
Federal Police Commissioner Michael (Mick) Keelty, who told the public that the
jury was wrong in acquitting Joseph Thomas, and relied on evidence obtained under
torture has now retired, but was appointed an Adjunct Professor at Charles Sturt
University and the Australian National University. He is a member of the
International Advisory Board for the Australian Research Council Centre for
Excellence in Policing and Security, and was appointed as a part-time commissioner
for the Crime and Misconduct Commission (Remeikis, 2013). He was awarded the
Order of Australia medal in 2011, and a series of other accolades including the
Australian Police Medal (Australian Government, 2011).
Since his time in Iraq, George O’Kane, the Australian Army officer who provided
legal advice about the torture techniques used at Abu Ghraib, and knew about ghost
prisoners being hidden from the ICRC, has worked his way up the ranks to be
promoted to Lieutenant Colonel, and is now the Chief Legal Officer for the Office of
the Chief of Army. O’Kane is now in a position where he vets FOI requests
pertaining to matters that relate to torture.

Journalists and Academics
Then there are the journalists who for years reported US and Australian Government
press statements, with clear bias, which were subsequently shown to have been false
and misleading. Leigh Sales who wrote the inaccurate and biased account of David
Hicks’ story is still a prominent ABC journalist and heads up the ABC’s 7.30
Report. Helen Graswill who produced the skewed Australian Story program on the
ABC which misrepresented David Hicks is still working for them as a “senior
journalist and Producer”, and the Australian Story website boasts that she obtained
his “exclusive interview”, which is false (Australian Story, n.d.). Sally Neighbour
who produced the 4 Corners story on Joseph Thomas which was used in the
government’s case against him is still working as a freelance journalist and still
regularly writes columns in newspapers. Neighbour has been awarded several
Walkley Awards for “excellence in journalism” (Neighbour, 2011). Despite these
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ABC journalists being proven incorrect on a number of points, not one correction or
apology has ever been issued to the torture survivors they denigrated.
The shock-jocks whose work is also detailed in the above chapter, continue to spread
the same opinions, and they have also never apologised for or corrected their false
accusations. Miranda Devine and Andrew Bolt continue to have their own columns
and are protected by the corporate might of News Limited. Bolt has even been
rewarded with his own television program on Channel 10, where Miranda Devine
and others regularly appear on a Sunday morning.
Many journalists also continue to be rewarded by being fed stories by their trusted
government sources. Certain government officials have favourite journalists or
newspapers that they release stories to; those which they know will report in the
narrative they have put forward – especially The Australian under the Howard
Government. This has remained particularly apparent in relation to stories on
Guantanamo, where the same journalists appear to write many of the stories printed
in Australia and in the US, such as Carol Rosenberg. In other words, it pays for the
journalists to print what their government sources want them to; they will get more
scoops, and be the go-to avenues for many media stories.
Academics that defended the torture of people they deemed as terrorists are still able
to spout their beliefs in public lecture rooms and classrooms around the country with
no challenge. For example, the St James Ethics Centre hosted a pro-torture lecture by
former Bush speech writer, Marc Theissen at the Festival of Dangerous Ideas. The
Executive Director of the Ethics Centre did not think there was anything wrong with
promoting pro-torture opinions to the general public, and neither did he think it was
necessary to have the opposing view aired, even when he acknowledged that more
people walked out of the lecture theatre holding pro-torture views than when they
walked in (personal communication with Simon Longstaff, 30 October 2011). The St
James Ethics Centre refused the opportunity to have a lecture on the problems with
torture, even though there is ample evidence that points to an increasing pro-torture
majority in the general public (Pew Research Center, 2016). Inevitably, those with
pro-torture stance have been rewarded with public platforms that reinforce the
violent actions of the state. Those who push and facilitate pro-torture rhetoric still
remain largely unchallenged.
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Conclusion
This chapter presented evidence of the extensive use of techniques to reduce outrage
in relation to the injustice of torture in the War on Terror. The methods of inhibiting
outrage were used extensively by authorities, and revealed in all mainstream
newspapers examined. There was a large overlap in the use of techniques; however,
the most common tactics appeared to be cover-up in the first instance, then the use of
devaluation and reinterpretation. Despite the usual problems with exposing cover-up
given that torture is conducted in secret, the evidence was widespread, and many
instances of US and Australian officials covering their tracks were noted, including
US agents and officials destroying evidence of torture and hiding evidence from the
public, such as the destruction of torture videotapes, denying FOI requests, or only
releasing heavily redacted documents. The use of cover-up was also apparent in
relation to the Australian military’s involvement in torture, and the lengths that
Australian officials went to in order to preclude the truth from reaching the public;
including preventing George O’Kane from testifying before US and Australian
Senate hearings, preventing information about the death and mutilation of prisoners
from being released to the public, and protecting the US and UK Government’s from
embarrassment by hiding evidence. The Australian Government also failed to
investigate the torture of its own citizens in Guantanamo Bay and elsewhere, instead
relying on diplomatic assurances, not reading reports, and failing to ask US
authorities any questions they did not want to know the answer to. Evidence that
served to cover-up torture from the mainstream public was also noted in the form of
reinterpretation techniques, such as playing semantics to confuse the public as to
what actions constitute torture.
Evidence pointing to the devaluation of torture victims and survivors was
voluminous, and many Australian newspaper articles focused on denigrating the
personal character of those subjected to torture, rather than the serious crimes against
humanity committed against them. Torture victims were labelled as liars, terrorists
and dangerous individuals and they were effectively cast as social pariahs which
served to inhibit outrage at their suffering. Torture testimony was discredited by both
US and Australian officials, and articles demonstrate that officials went largely
unchallenged in their official statements about events. Official narratives were given
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disproportionate coverage compared with that of the torture victims. Commentators
that were classed as more ‘liberal’, and media platforms that are traditionally
considered to be more reliable, also engaged in the denigration of torture victims,
which served to discredit torture testimony. This denigration is inevitably worse,
given that it is normally expected that people will be provided with more reliable and
accurate information from these forums.
The reinterpretation of events was also stark. There were many ways in which
language and propaganda was used to promote a particular narrative, and to shift the
focus off the crime of torture and the suffering of the victims. This was particularly
the case in relation to Guantanamo Bay, and the way the Australian authorities used
US wording for press releases, and the media followed suit in printing the official
version of events. Australian newspapers regularly reported official narratives and
disproportionately aired officials’ claims about torture, or focused on the accusations
against victims, even when they were found to be false. It is also clear that
Australian newspapers omitted large amounts of material from their stories, such as
the ways in which ‘confessions’ were obtained, and therefore they silenced the voice
of the survivor.
There was also a great deal of evidence that official channels were used to give the
appearance of justice, or to prevent the torture testimony of survivors from being
heard. Enquiries were limited in scope and often were carried out by those
implicated in torture, or the results were censored and kept from the public, such as
the investigation into Mamdouh Habib’s torture, and the NCIS report into David
Hicks’ torture. Even when reports substantiated the victims testimony, there is
evidence that the Australian Government lied to the public about the contents, or
failed to read the reports, and simply relied on talking points provided by US
officials. In the cases where investigations were not established, the papers reported
the official version of events and instead focused on government enacted legal cases,
or initiated actions like control orders to shift the focus off the torture that had
occurred, which served to reinforce official narratives, and in the process dampen
outrage.
The use of intimidation was also apparent and widespread. Many torture survivors
have been subjected to treatment from authorities that can only be described as
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intimidation, such as control orders, gag-orders and protracted legal cases. The use
of surveillance and extreme forms of emotional stress were exerted on victims to
ensure they had no energy to fight torture cases. In addition, quite a number of
people involved in the torture program were rewarded for their involvement, and no
one has been held to account. Officials both in the US and Australia have either been
promoted to positions of power, or are still called upon to give comments about
public events, giving further legitimacy to their behaviours and involvement in
covering-up or acquiescing in the US torture program. Whistleblowers on the other
hand, continue to be persecuted and are afraid to speak out because of the
intimidation they feel. The results are therefore concerning.
In the end, it appears that only a few lower ranking soldiers were prosecuted in order
to give the appearance of justice (Brooks, 2015). For example, years after the event
only a few soldiers were found guilty of dereliction of duty and conspiracy to
mistreat prisoners at Abu Ghraib prison (Brooks, 2015). This is the exception that
proves the rule: outrage management succeeded in protecting those at the top.
Overall, the Outrage Management Model (Martin, 2007) was successfully used by
authorities in a number of ways over the ten year period to stifle outrage at the
injustice of torture. Many people knew what was really happening to prisoners, but
were too afraid to come forward. Guantanamo guards were forced to sign nondisclosure agreements and risk prison for speaking out, and the peer pressure that
came from their fellow soldiers pressuring them to remain loyal to the military,
resulted in many feeling intimidated, and remaining quiet. Whistleblowers were
prosecuted and punished for speaking out. Conversely, those who were heavily
involved, acquiesced, engaged in cover-up, or toed the official lines were promoted,
and now have positions where they can continue to aid the cover-up of torture. The
many examples presented here show the incentives for covering-up and protecting
the interests of those who perpetrated torture in the US, UK and Australia.

Propaganda
There is also clear evidence of the circumstances outlined in Herman and Chomsky’s
(1988) Propaganda Model introduced in Chapter One. The use of techniques, such as
reliance on people deemed as experts, was apparent in the reporting on torture in

253

Australian newspapers. Numerous articles demonstrated that the same individuals
who spouted official pro-torture propaganda were asked to provide comment on the
situation of people held in the War on Terror. For example, John Howard, Alexander
Downer and Phillip Ruddock were called upon to provide comment about the
situation of Australian’s held in Guantanamo on abundant occasions, and were
considered to be qualified to give opinions on the treatment of prisoners. However,
besides the fact they never visited Guantanamo or black sites, documents showed
that they essentially protected the US Government from embarrassment, shared
speaking notes, relied on diplomatic assurances and even failed to read reports
regarding the treatment of prisoners. There were also numerous examples of socalled ‘experts’ being called upon to define torture in the public realm, or, more
frequently to redefine torture as ‘enhanced interrogation’, etc. in order to stifle
outrage by stating that these techniques were not the same as torture. The same airtime was not provided to actual experts who are familiar with internationally
recognised definitions that include cruel or inhuman and degrading treatment, and
those who would have clearly stated the US Government was engaging in torture.
The Propaganda Model (Herman & Chomsky, 1988) also points to the use of ‘flack’
as a means of those in power controlling the narrative. The newspaper articles
examined demonstrated this in several ways. Even if commentators or journalists
printed stories saying that torture was wrong, in most cases, there appeared to always
be a qualification in relation to the personal character of the person who was
tortured, because of the fear of flack. For example, a number of articles concluded
that torture was wrong, but there was always either an allusion to, or blatant
comment about the guilt or innocence of the person involved; especially when it
came to the three Australian’s who received the most coverage in Australian
newspapers – Joseph Thomas, David Hicks and Mamdouh Habib. If a forum was
giving air to their torture testimony, it was immediately attacked, and the narrative
was changed, such as the script changes in Australian Story.
In addition, and to a large extent, newspaper articles demonstrated that holding an
anti-torture stance in relation to individuals in US custody was seen as akin to
supporting terrorism. This also correlates with the Propaganda Model (Herman &
Chomsky, 1988) in the sense that being seen to criticise the actions of the US or
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Australian Government or their agents in relation to torture was depicted as
treacherous. For example, it was labelled “un-Australian” to question the way
Australian troops treated detainees; in this instance when they held Afghan prisoners
in dog cages (AAP, 2008, p. 1). Therefore, papers were keen to focus on what the
individual was accused of, rather than the actions perpetrated against them as a
means of controlling the narrative, which focused on the supposed terrorist threat,
rather than the crimes of torture committed against those detained.
The construction of torture became a discussion about whether a person was
deserving of torture, and their alleged actions therefore became central to the articles
examined. Torture victims and survivors were mostly cast as ‘others’ who were
accused of serious crimes, and therefore the framing of the stories meant it was of
little relevance whether or not they were tortured. The weight given to the torture of
those detained was far less than the weight given to officials who accused torture
victims of lying, or being terrorists and dangerous. All newspaper forums examined
inevitably fell into this trap, as many stories were either written by US
correspondents then reprinted in Australian papers, Australian journalists were illequipped or unable to research the story comprehensively, or Australian Associated
Press (AAP) releases were simply regurgitated onto every media platform without
any analysis of the official line.

Backfire, Denial and the Annihilation of Memory
There is another element to the results that is equally troubling, and that is the fact
that many of the violent behaviours perpetrated against the survivors and victims of
the War on Terror did not backfire on those who carried them out. Even though most
of the preconditions of backfire were present in many of the above cases, it rarely
occurred. There were countless examples of letters from the public printed in
newspapers that were hateful and venom filled towards torture victims/survivors,
including letters that called for their deaths and repeated claims made by US and
Australian officials such as “they [Guantanamo prisoners] hate us” (“Your say:
Letters to the Editor”, 2009).
The only major backfire occurred in relation to the Abu Ghraib photos, but even
then, only a few lower-level soldiers were prosecuted, the higher level officials and
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contractors escaped any real ramifications. The real damage of the Abu Ghraib
photos was in relation to US reputation, particularly in the Middle East (Gray &
Martin, 2007). However, recent studies suggest that overall, the image of the US
remains positive globally, despite the US Government’s use of torture (Pew
Research Center, 2015). There was also some evidence of backfire in relation to
David Hicks’ imprisonment in Guantanamo. Cables generated between US and
Australian officials state that the US handling of the case was “damaging Howard
politically” (Owens, 2007). However, while there was some backfire against
Howard, it was not solely due to David’s torture – rather, newspaper articles reflect
that many people found David’s indefinite detention and being held without charge
indefensible.
More generally, there are not any major protests in the street calling for
accountability for torture, and even members of the public who do care about the
injustice, are not engaged in calling for accountability on a broad scale. There are
small pockets of advocates who continue to call for accountability, however, there
are no major calls for members of the Howard Government to be formally
investigated and held to account.90 In the US there appears to be a little more
engagement, however, like Australia, there is a lack of political will to hold officials
involved in the torture program to account. The same situation is apparent in the UK
where, although Tony Blair has been questioned about his involvement in leading
the country into the invasion of Iraq, the focus was not the torture of prisoners.
Cohen’s (2001) theory on denial may provide some explanation of the lack of
widespread blowback against the US, UK and Australian Governments. As explored
briefly in Chapter One, people prefer to deny or ignore that atrocities are taking
place through the denial of responsibility, denial of the injury, by denying the victim
appropriate status, and appealing to higher loyalties (Cohen, 2001). The material
presented in this chapter reflects the successful deployment of these methods by US,
UK and Australian officials and their agents, whether through the denigration of
torture victims and survivors, or the use of the national security narrative to appeal to
90

For example, Independent MP Andrew Wilkie has pushed for Howard to be investigated for his
involvement in involving Australia in the Iraq invasion on false pretences, however, it was not
widely supported, and there was no political will (Coorey, 2016). There was a push for the torture of
Australians to be investigated, and a letter was sent to former Prime Minister Julia Gillard calling
for an investigation, however, she refused in 2010 (The Justice Campaign, 2010).
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higher loyalties and nationalistic aims. The torture of people in the War on Terror
was habitually denied by authorities, and subsequently cast as someone else’s fault,
like a ‘few bad apples’, or framed as not that bad to begin with. Victim’s pain and
suffering was rarely acknowledged and they were not only refused victim status, but
in most cases, their experience remained completely hidden from the public. Some
people died in black sites and prisons, only to be ascribed criminal status by
authorities, and their deaths labelled an act of warfare. Others were kept in
incommunicado detention and denigrated to the point that anything they said upon
release was already framed as a lie.
Even more disturbing for the victims, is the collective annihilation of their memory
and experience of torture in the public realm, whereby their experience was either
blatantly denied or reinterpreted to the point that their torture was regarded as a fairy
tale. The result is devastating, not only for the survivors personally, but also the
broader community in the sense that historical record remains distorted. The media
still provides public platforms to those involved in perpetrating or covering-up
torture in order for them to reinterpret events and discredit the torture victims’
experience. This phenomenon reinforces collective denial and a lack of action to
counter the injustice. Collective denial serves the political structure because it keeps
the focus on the victims as deviant and deserving of torture, rather than the
perpetrators. The result manifests in a lack of outrage in the general community, to
the point where the atrocity is either ignored, minimised, or no steps are taken to
address the injustice.
Another explanation for the lack of blowback is the broader political situation that
was operating at the time, and the fact that there were much more powerful forces at
play. The following chapter explores the network of support for state inflicted
torture, including the ideological, political, economic and practical supports, such as
the politics of torture and terrorism and the notion that torture carried out in the War
on Terror is intimately tied with the workings of the deep state. In particular, Chapter
Six examines the broader issues in operation in light of research into preconditions
for torture and agents operating with impunity.
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Chapter 6: Underlying & Structural Support for
State Torture
But now just have a look at this apparatus… up to this point I’ve had to do
some of the tasks by hand, but from now on the apparatus works entirely by
itself… There would be no point in announcing [his sentence] to him. You
see, he gets to know it in the flesh – The officer, judge and executioner
explaining to the voyager the torture device used to punish and kill convicts
in Franz Kafka’s Penal Colony (Kafka, 1992, p. 128 & 132).
Chapter Five provided extensive evidence of governments and other perpetrators
inhibiting outrage at the injustice of torture through the tactics of cover-up,
devaluation, reinterpretation, the use of official channels and the intimidation or
reward of people involved. In the process of analysis, it became clear that the outrage
management tactics were supported and enabled by a broader political structure, and
other state created apparatuses, that further aided in the cover-up, denigration and
intimidation of torture victims and survivors, including discordant political rhetoric
related to torture and terrorism, the rise of militarism, and the surveillance state.
Torture that occurred as part of the War on Terror was much bigger than the
individual men women and children who became the victims and survivors. Figure
17, which is presented on the following pages, demonstrates the vast networks that
work collaboratively to provide ideological, economic, practical or political support
in relation to the practice and cover-up of torture. The table provides a summary and
overview of issues that are explored in the chapter.
Accordingly, this chapter explores some of the social and political conditions that
give rise to torture and impunity including the normalisation of violence perpetrated
by the state, divisive and manipulated political rhetoric to create an enemy ‘other’,
increased militarisation and surveillance, and the systemic mechanisms that support
torture occurring with impunity. The underlying politics of both torture and terrorism
support the tactics of inhibiting outrage at the injustice of torture by providing
ideological and political support for the perpetration of torture. This is particularly
the case in light of the manifestation of the deep state, which is unresponsive to
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civilian leadership. The concept of the deep state is crucial to recognise when
examining the issue of torture, in order to understand the pillars of support for torture
in the War on Terror, and the effective way the system works to carry out and coverup torture by creating a network of reliance economically, practically and/or
politically. Therefore, the secret workings of the state on a geopolitical scale are
highly relevant to understanding torture in the present context, including the political
narratives around terrorism, the role of the national security state and the intelligence
community, and deeply entrenched militarism and reliance on war.

Figure 17 - Underlying Systems and Supports for State Inflicted Torture
Support
Mechanism

Outrage Management
Tactics Primarily
Supported

Functions



Mainstream Cover-up
Devaluation
Political Rhetoric

Reinterpretation

Ideological and
Political

Official Channels

Reinterpretation
Torture as a
Political Tool

Intimidation

Process






Ideological,
Practical and
Political




Mainstream cover-up



Reinterpretation
Terrorism as a
Political Tool

Devaluation

Ideological and
Political







Lying to the public about torture and victims, e.g. saying that prisoners are
being treated humanely, or that investigations have taken place
Officials reinterpret torture, and give legitimacy to the treatment of those
deemed ‘others’
Focus on minority feature (religion, ethnicity) to create division
Keep public occupied in partisan debates rather than seeking to understand
structural problems
Torture used a mechanism of power, and the state’s right to punish
normalised
Casting actions of officials as noble to save ‘others’ from their own
behaviour; torture is moralised
Torture used as a weapon to defend the states interests (maintaining control of
empire)
Calling violent acts terrorism when they are not and conversely legitimising
state sanctioned violence
Creating a climate of fear
Focus on minority features (race, ethnicity)
Divert attention away from underlying causes for political violence, & create
support for the cycle of violence
Pass laws to target non-state political violence, minorities and whistleblowers
(criminality)
Focus on national security

Outcome

















Reinterpretation
Watching Torture
Recreationally

Devaluation

Ideological and
Political




State inflicted violence shown in recreational contexts (e.g. television shows
that depict torture as effective, and ‘fun’)
Presents misleading narratives (e.g. torture is the only way to protect the
public)
National security sold as more important than torture prevention






Public believes that torture is not
occurring. Even if some do, enough is
done to minimise outrage
Victim and their testimony is devalued
Society divided
The creation of an enemy
Torture and otherness becomes
‘normalised’
Creates the enemy
Actions of the authorities deemed as
legitimate and victim blamed
Torture normalised
State protects its power as a function of
empire
Enemy is created
State is cast as the protector, victims as
perpetrators
State inflicted violence is considered
legitimate
The individual’s race/religion is cast as
the ‘problem’, in the process taking
focus off injustice of state-inflicted
violence
Legitimises actions of the state in the
eyes of the public
Moral disengagement
Torture normalised
Reporting skewed
Weight not given to torture survivor’s
testimony (e.g. fictional characters)
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Deep State
(operates
regardless of who is
voted in & doesn’t
respond to civilian
leadership)




Cover-up
Official Channels
Intimidation/rewarding
people involved

Practical, Political
and Economic






Cover-up
Reinterpretation
Militarism

Official channels
Rewarding those
involved (e.g. economic
rewards)

Practical,
Ideological,
Economic and
Political







Creation of covert torture programs
Interests of specific people and groups are served (e.g. shuffling people
through different institutional and private corporate positions to maintain
cover up and secrecy)
Network of individuals becomes reliant on supporting each other’s work
(enmeshment)
Promote intelligence gathering and control narratives around torture

Creation of vast global networks that support torture
Privatisation of the military (involving companies that politicians have
financial interest in)
Creation of bases that assist in the facilitation and cover-up of torture
Creation of close links between government, military companies and the
media (e.g. former government staff now sitting on the board of weapons
manufacturers)
Create economic dependence through military spending agreements
(including purchase of weapons)
Creates close political ties so cover up can occur

















Cover up
Reinterpretation
Surveillance State

Intimidation/
Rewarding those
involved

Practical,
Ideological,
Economic and
Political








Surveillance and prosecution of whistleblowers
Intimidation of torture survivors
Surveillance of mainstream public
Creation of surveillance operations involving torture and extrajudicial killing
in other countries (so the host state won’t be able to criticise their actions)
Military engagement in PSYOPS (e.g. sock puppets to give the appearance of
pro-torture opinion)
Creation of lists that designate those critical of state actions as terrorists








Torture hidden from public view
Network of reliance and cover-up
created
Those involved in ordering and carrying
out torture are protected by individuals
and organisations and are unaccountable
Those involved in torture
rewarded/promoted – actions are
legitimised
State-inflicted violence legitimised
Government allegiance is to a foreign
power and economic interests, rather
than torture victims (enmeshment)
Consistent manufactured messages that
are conveyed to the public supporting
specific interests
Economy reliant on war and violent
militarised conflict
Torture facilitated through nation hosting
bases
Creates division (Promotes ideology of
legitimate violence and ‘us and them’)

Whistleblowers too afraid to come
forward
Chilling effect on freedom of speech
Torture survivors too afraid to tell their
stories
Pro-torture attitudes
Torture facilitated through host nation
(e.g. Pine Gap providing intel for drone
strikes and torture programs)
Enmeshment

The Politics of Torture
Ignorance and obscurantism have never produced anything other than flocks
of slaves for tyranny – Mexican Revolutionary, Emiliano Zapata Salazar (as
cited in Myers-El, 2008, p. 158)
Michel Foucault’s (1979) formative work Discipline and Punish, provides a thoughtprovoking historical account of the way in which torture switched from being a tool
used by the state in providing an outward and visible display of power, to a more
insidious, silent and concealed method of control. Foucault describes how, prior to
the nineteenth century, the public torture of the body in the town square had a
political function (Foucault, 1979, p. 25). Torturing the body publicly was as tool
whereby the body served the social function of punishment for violating the laws of
the state, and an outward representation of the loss of wealth or rights (Foucault,
1979, p. 15). The public ‘spectacle’ of suffering functioned as the outward display of
the state’s ability and power to enact penal punishment. However, the use of torture
as a public spectacle changed after it was realised that the ‘criminal’ became the
object of either pity or admiration (Foucault, 1979, p. 9). This shift signalled the
onset of the technology of control that sought to dehumanise the tortured individual.
Punishment inflicted by the state became a matter that was conducted behind closed
doors. As Foucault describes:
The apportioning of blame is redistributed: in punishment-as-spectacle a
confused horror spread from the scaffold; it enveloped both the executioner
and the condemned; and, although it was always ready to invert the shame
inflicted on the victim into pity or glory, it often turned the legal violence of
the executioner into shame. Now the scandal and the light are to be
distributed differently; it is the conviction itself that marks the offender with
the unequivocally negative sign: the publicity has shifted to the trial, and to
the sentence; the execution itself is an additional shame that justice is
ashamed to impose on the condemned man; so it keeps its distance from the
act, tending always to entrust it to others, under the seal of secrecy. It is ugly
to be punishable, but there is no glory in punishing (Foucault, 1979, pp. 910).
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Bureaucratic concealment of punishment therefore became the preferred method for
the state. Prisons were built, the walls painted black or white. If prisoners were
executed, it was done behind closed doors, their faces were covered with shrouds,
and the executioner no longer touched the body. The body became an object of what
Foucault describes as ‘suspended rights’, and punishment became an instrument of
state to deprive the individual of liberty whilst keeping at an arm’s distance.
Punishment is still inflicted on the body, but in more routinised practices such as
food rationing, sexual humiliation and solitary confinement.
Most importantly for Foucault, the body becomes the strategy in the exercise of
power – and power is one of the conditions of knowledge (Foucault, 1979, p. 27).
Foucault is concerned here with the body politic as “a set of material elements and
techniques that serve as weapons, relays, communication routes and supports for the
power and knowledge relations that invest human bodies and subjugate them by
turning them into objects of knowledge” (Foucault, 1979, p. 28). The manifestation
of this is the state’s right to punish, and the body of the condemned person as a
manifestation of a lack of power. Torture serves as an activation of the power of the
sovereign through punishment. The condemned becomes the common enemy of the
society – hence, rather than torture being cast as an exercise in punishment, the state
is defending the society from the individuals who seek to attack social rights, as is
demonstrated with the torture of those deemed terror suspects. The punishment then
is cast as a result of the law being applied in a gentle and humane way, and in the
interests of the society. Indeed, the narrative must follow that society sees
punishment as natural and in their own interests (Foucault, 1979, p. 109).
Consequently, prisons were framed as reformatories or places where an individual
could go to correct their behaviours – as docile bodies that can be transformed.
Foucault states that the power of discourse around the individual was crucial. Rather
than being perceived as the state punishing the individual, the response of the state
was a reaction to the individual (Foucault, 1979, p. 130). It was because of their
behaviour that the state wielded the power to punish. This of course is dependent on
the society being kept in a state of automatic docility, cogs in the machine to
maintain social order and discipline being the essential element.
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The way this manifested in the War on Terror is stark. Not only have the bodies of
the tortured men been purposely hidden from the public, they have been tortured in
black sites out of the reach of any assistance, and simultaneously blamed for their
own torture in the public space. Either through official comments that ascribe blame
for their torture as being a consequence of their supposed dangerous intentions
towards Westerners, or the denigration of personal characters, their torture has been
framed as necessary to protect the public from a supposed threat, and they have been
cast as unworthy of humanity.
When Bush’s former speech writer Marc Theissen (2011) gave a speech at the
Sydney Opera House promoting the use of ‘enhanced interrogation’, he stated that
one man in particular was unperturbed by the waterboarding he endured. In fact,
Theissen (2011) argued that he was grateful to be waterboarded by the CIA because,
he said, it took a moral weight off his shoulders. Theissen’s (2011) description of
this man’s torture as an act of moral salvation and liberation cast the actions of the
US Government as righteous and all powerful – as if it were an act of God to rid the
man of his demons and protect the public from an evil that knows no bounds.
Theissen (2011) asserted that the man who was waterboarded 183 times thanked his
interrogators for torturing him, and essentially cast his torture as a liberating
experience. The representation of this man’s torture was akin to the Salem witch
trials when priests would torture women to death to lift the weight of the devil off
their shoulders. Theissen (2011) reframed the torturers as divine messengers who
were doing the tortured man a favour by near drowning him. The man who was
tortured not only had his voice removed during the torture, he was also ascribed the
position of a person that wanted and needed his behaviour reformed, and the agents
of the state were the saviours to help him do it.
These narratives are underpinned by the ideology that is reliant on a community
believing they need to be protected from an enemy, and of a people that are morally
righteous, who are absolutely sure they know right from wrong, and they are right
and everyone else is wrong. This ideology unites people in support of state
sanctioned violence, and sees state violence as necessary for their protection and the
right thing to do, and therefore legitimate. History has seen this in many forms and
the hunt for terrorists in modern times has chilling parallels with the witch trials of
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centuries ago. For example, the accused person is “assumed to be guilty without
proof, secret accusations are accepted, evidence against the accused is often falsified,
torture can be used” (Rapley, 2007, p. 4). Witch hunts are not solely an activity, but
a state of mind that develops when society is under great stress and fear, such as after
the events of 9/11 (Rapley, 2007). Society is inevitably cast into roles of good and
evil, where the witches – or now terrorists – are hunted by the force of good, whether
by the church in the case of witch hunts, or the military and government agents in the
case of terrorists. The dynamics and characteristics are largely similar; the witches
were cast as evil and, as such, demanded to be hunted down and tortured into
providing false confessions that sometimes resulted in death, and authorities fought
tirelessly to prevent the public from finding out their errors, which were many
(Rapley, 2007). Robert Rapley (2007) points out that, following this narrative,
rendition and torture have therefore been conducted by honourable people and their
actions construed as necessary to protect the community in the post 9/11 era (p. 251).
Certainly, this was the narrative set by Theissen (2011) in his speech to the Sydney
Opera house, and by countless other officials and in newspaper articles that
described the actions of the Bush Administration as “heroic” and that the reason why
Bush “upsets his opponents” is because he is a champion of democracy for “every
man and woman” (“Bush understands the issue of our age”, 2009; Fournier, 2002).
Similarly, in her book Torture and the Twilight of Empire, Marnia Lazreg (2008)
argues that occupying nations justify their use of torture as regrettable, but as a lifesaving tool necessary to protect Western civilisation from those who challenge their
rule. Tracing the justifications used by the French in Algeria to the justifications of
torture in the War on Terror, Lazreg (2008) suggests that the moralisation behind the
case for torture was reinforced by institutions like the church, and the moralising use
of language was called upon to provide validation for torture (p. 237). Seeing torture
as the moralistic ‘lesser evil’ was one way of justifying the use of torture on a broad
scale and, just like Theissen’s remarks at the Sydney Opera House, the same
propaganda of torture being carried out for a higher moral purpose has been echoed
by many politicians and theorists both historically and in the War on Terror (Frow,
2007; Lazreg, 2008).
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But it is the notion that torture cannot be separated from the state’s geopolitical
ambitions that is most significant for this analysis. As Derrida’s (1976; 2001) work
suggests, the empire building exercises of the state are inevitably backed by
moralistic and nationalistic ideology that sees torture as necessary to protect the
power of the state. Lazreg states:
The line between democracy, a major justification of torture, and empire
blurs. Torture becomes a weapon with which to defend imperial politics.
Thus, torture establishes continuity between France in Algeria, and the
United States in the World. Torture is a cornerstone of the structure of power
and geopolitics (Lazreg, 2008, p. 252).
This played out in several ways in the War on Terror, including the use of the
‘human rights’ narrative to secure the actions of the state. Certainly, torture in the
War on Terror was never about extracting information or about saving lives. Torture
was carried out as a function of the state to maintain its power and control by
declaring a state of emergency, militarising the population, then moralising torture
and the punishment of bodies as a necessary act to protect the greater good. The War
on Terror became a war of terror (Lazreg, 2008, p. 269).

The Politics of Terrorism
There is a temptation that seeps into the souls of even the most righteous
politicians and leads them to bend the rules, and eventually the truth, to suit
the political needs of the moment – Michael Ignatius (as cited in Kassimeris,
2008, p. 4).
International torture prevention organisations contend that the general political
environment is an important factor in the prevention of torture (Office of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights et al., 2010). The risk of torture is
increased if political rhetoric that casts the state as under severe security threat from
‘others’ such as terrorists is used. This inevitably leads to the acceptance or indeed,
justification of torture (Kelman, 2005). Occurrences of torture are also increased if
there is no political will to hold perpetrators to account, or there is a general
propensity for state leaders to play the bystander role, and excuse or condone torture,
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whether explicitly or implicitly (Basolglu, 1993). The narratives set by powerful
entities like the government play a central role in this.
Indeed, the politics of the state plays a central role in the narrative and framing of the
issue of torture in the War on Terror, particularly when dealing with those who carry
out violent acts for political purposes. The political aftermath of the Madrid
bombings demonstrate this point perfectly. On the 11 March 2004, people strapped
with bombs caused the death of 191 people and injured 1, 900 others (Kassimeris,
2008, pp. 1-2) . The criminal act took place three days before a general election in an
attempt to influence the outcome of the elections (Kassimeris, 2008, p. 2). George
Kassimeris (2008) describes that the Partido Popular (PP) right wing government
instinctively blamed Euskadi Ta Askasuna (ETA), the Basque separatist movement,
which had been performing terrorist acts in Spain since the 1970s (p. 2). However, to
avoid the attacks being affiliated with Spain’s involvement in the Iraq war, which 90
per cent of the population disagreed with, the PP began an “audacious exercise in
spinning and political manipulation” (Kassimeris, 2008, p. 2). Aznar personally
called the editors of the major newspapers, assuring them that the attack was carried
out by ETA, and the papers ran with it. Unfortunately for Aznar, the day before the
election, a video was posted showing three masked men claiming responsibility for
the attacks because of Spain’s collaboration with “that criminal Bush and his allies”,
and the “crimes” Spain had committed in Iraq and Afghanistan (Kassimeris, 2008, p.
3). Aznar was voted out of government at the elections because he played politics
with the terrorist attacks and sought to capitalise on people’s fear (Kassimeris, 2008).
Fear is certainly one of the most powerful human emotions and at its peak, all
rational thought and reason becomes secondary to the emotional impulse. Fear has
long been used as a tool to achieve political aims, either by those who are carrying
out state sanctioned violence, or non-state sanctioned political violence. Political
violence relies on the fear response to achieve its goals (Calcutt, 2014). Fear in the
general community was widespread after 9/11, and officials reinterpreted non-state
actor political violence as attacks on freedom and democracy (Carney, 2006;
“Treading wearily with Indonesia”, 2002). The fear was not only in relation to the
criminals who attacked New York and the Pentagon on 9/11, but also the response to
that, which caused large numbers of civilian casualties in Iraq and Afghanistan. Non-
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state terrorism, when considered as a pragmatic tool in a conflict, relies on
governments to respond with an excess of repressive violence. For example, a
terrorist attack in Yemen may be carried out in response to a drone killing of women
and children. The response by the US Government is to order another drone strike to
‘punish’ the terrorists. Ordering the drone killing then proves the point for the nonstate actor engaged in the political violence. The political cycle is well established. It
does not help that people of one particular faith are carrying out many of these nonstate attacks; in fact, it has only served to strengthen the US Government’s argument.
Numerous studies have highlighted the fact that people of Islamic faith who engage
in political violence are more often than not labelled in Western political narratives
as terrorists, as opposed to white people who engage in political killings who hold
extreme right-wing views. For example, in 2014, a young couple from the state of
Nevada in the US, fatally shot three people and covered one of the bodies with a
Nazi swastika and the “Don’t tread on me” flag, which has become a symbol of the
extreme far-right Tea Party movement in the US (Farhi, 2014, para. 3). Paul Farhi
(2014) points out that none of the news media labelled the killings as acts of
terrorism, even though it would qualify as such under the existing US definitions
because, as he quoted a US news organisation, “they are reluctant to call anyone a
terrorist unless officials do so first” (Farhi, 2014, para. 11).
A similar situation occurred with Anders Breivik, after he killed ninety people in
Norway (Shanahan, 2011). Commentators noted that Breivik was named a
“murderer” or “mass murderer” rather than being labelled a terrorist (Ismail, 2016).
The media focus was on Breivik being criminally insane, with his clear political
motivations treated as a secondary issue. Interestingly, Breivik used conservative
ideology pushed by Australian politicians John Howard and Peter Costello as
supporting his efforts to protect white Christian values (Jakubowicz, 2011). This
case suggests that attribution of insanity may be more likely when the perpetrator is
not Islamic.
Of course, there is no question that people of Islamic faith engage in terrorism, and
some verses in the Quran advocate for striking fear into the “disbelievers” and
encourage other forms of blatant violence (Khan & Al-Hilali, 1996, p. 246). It is
because of verses and Hadiths like these that some people have called for the
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reformation of the religion (Hirsi Ali, 2015). There is no getting around the fact that
the Quran advocates violence in some circumstances, but so do parts of the Christian
bible (Garcia, 2015). It does not make all Christians violent, just as it does not make
all Muslims violent either. It is well known that George W. Bush prayed about the
invasion of Iraq that led to the deaths of millions of people (Singer, 2004). Many US
states still engage in capital publishment. People who kill and torture are not limited
to one faith.
Despite the obvious problems of the Quran sanctioning violence, ostracising those
who are of Islamic faith will only serve to further divide the community and breed
more resentment. This is a controversial issue, as it is clear that there are people who
hold extreme views in many of the major religions, and the communities themselves
are diverse. However, there is a strong belief in the broad Islamic community in
Australia (and other places) that they are being targeted by the state because of their
religion (Parliamentary Joint Committee on ASIO, ASIS and DSD, 2005).
Consequently, there appear to be two parallel dynamics transpiring simultaneously in
the War on Terror context. Firstly, non-state actors who are engaging in political
violence in places like Iraq and Afghanistan are relying on ideological frameworks
used in religious texts and teachings to justify their behaviours (Smith, 2014).91
Secondly, the state needs an enemy to fulfil its coercive role, and it needs ‘targets’
that can be easily framed as ‘others’ in the broader community. Just as the ‘target’
was communists during the Cold War, in the War on Terror context it has shifted to
‘Middle Eastern terrorists’. Non-state actors using religious ideology to validate their
engagement in violence has served the states involved in the War on Terror by
justifying their counter-attacks which have targeted people of Middle Eastern origin.
Therefore, religion is of limited relevance to the broader process – it just makes it
easier for these states to target specific groups of people in the War on Terror, given
that non-state actors are using Quranic verses as their ideological justification for
carrying out acts of violence.

91

The Islamic State uses verses in the Quran and Hadiths that speak of the return of the Caliphate.
These religious teachings have been used to justify the vicious cruelty the group has perpetrated
against civilian populations (Smith, 2014).
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Indeed, religion has a political role as an institution in the functioning of the state,
and can be a mechanism for legitimising the state and maintaining the structure that
utilises violence (de Ligt, 1989). Whilst people are focusing on religion as the
problem, they are less likely to look at the structures that create and entrench
violence within the society. This serves the broader political structure because it
creates cognitive paralysis by keeping the focus off the actions of the political
structures that support torture and violence and the broader mechanisms at play.
There is also the reality that non-state violence in the form of terrorism actually
serves and legitimises the state, an effect that those who do carry out violence for a
political purpose sometimes fail to recognise (Martin, 2002). Martin (2002) argues
that counter violence which occurred in response to the events that took place on
9/11, was legitimised by the actions of the non-state terrorists and provided the
justification and pretext for the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan.
Incidents like the Sydney Lindt Café Siege in December 2014, which saw the killing
of two hostages and the gunman, Man Haron Monis, strengthened the state. Because
Monis utilised a black Islamic flag in the killings, it was labelled by the media as
terrorism, and there was live coverage across most major Australian TV networks.
Whilst some see that Monis was just someone with a history of mental health issues,
and not connected to any terrorist groups, the government capitalised on the flag as a
reason to label what was occurring as a terrorist act. In any event, it did not matter
whether it was a ‘terrorist’ attack or not, because it served the same purpose of
legitimising the state, and created a perceived reliance on the state to protect the
citizens from terrorism (Martin, 2016). The siege also aided the state in legitimising
its targeting of certain community members in order to protect the public from a
deemed terrorist threat (Martin, 2016). It did not matter whether it was called
terrorism or not, it had the same intended effect on the public – fear and compliance.
Terrorist attacks by non-state actors provide legitimacy for passing further counterterrorism laws, and they firmly plant themselves as the legally sanctioned enemy
(Martin, 2016).
Another example of this occurred when the actions of non-state actors behind the
Bali bombings created the excuse for the resumption of joint training of Australian
SAS forces with other state forces that are notorious for their involvement in torture
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and extrajudicial assassination, in particular, KOPASSUS (Dodd, 2005).
KOPASSUS is the Indonesian Special Forces Command regiment that has been
implicated in a number of crimes against humanity including rape, torture, bombings
and disappearances (McCulloch, 2002). The non-state actors attack on the Kuta
nightclub not only provided the impetus for the Australian Government to resume
military training, but also to increase intelligence ties with Indonesia – the result may
have facilitated and enabled state agents to carry out torture and killing in West
Papua.
The effect of this legitimisation of state violence is devastating, and almost
inevitably, non-state actors who engaged in violence ended up creating support for
war and state inflicted violence. Unsurprisingly, the political rhetoric concerning
torture and terrorism has served as ideological and political support for the
perpetration of state inflicted torture.

State Torture as a form of Terrorism
Take my blood. Take my death shroud and the remnants of my body. Take
photographs of my corpse at the grave lonely…Let them bear the burden,
before their children and before history, of this wasted sinless soul, of this
soul which has suffered at the hands of the ‘protectors of peace’ – Former
Guantanamo prisoner Jumah al Dossari (as cited in Falkoff, 2007, p. 32).
Torture is intimately tied up with the ideology around state terrorism and the failure
of the mainstream narrative to call state inflicted terrorism exactly what it is. The
phenomenon of state terrorism has been explored by several researchers including
Alexander George (1991), Michael Stohl (1988), Noam Chomsky (2003) and
Edward Herman (1979). As briefly discussed in Chapter One, state-sponsored
terrorism is largely absent from mainstream rhetoric, partly because the mainstream
discourse has legitimised some forms of violence committed by the state, and
because most scholarly and political debate is state-centric (Blakeley, 2009).
Alexander George (1991) stated that “the term ‘terrorism’ has been virtually
appropriated by mainstream political discussion to signify atrocities targeting the
West” (p. 1). This is most notable in its lack of application to systematic state
terrorism committed by the US and its allies, for example in South America, and
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now in the War on Terror (Chomsky, 2003; Chomsky & Herman, 1979; George,
1991). Stohl (1988) posits that there are several dimensions of state terrorism,
including the use of coercive diplomacy (e.g. the US bombing of Vietnam), nuclear
deterrence, surrogate terrorism (training others to terrorise such as death squads in
Latin America), and clandestine terror, such as the covert activities carried out by the
CIA around the world (p. 43-58).
Definitions of terrorism in the US, and indeed the UN, outline that the act of
terrorising individuals in order to induce fear in the intended target assumes that all
individuals affected are simply ‘innocent’ or ‘guilty’ (Blakeley, 2009, p. 27). It
implies that when violence is perpetrated by the state, this is ‘legitimate’ violence –
and that those at the receiving end are ‘guilty’. This relates to arguments around the
notions of ‘just war’, and that if states abide by international humanitarian law, they
are operating within a moral vacuum that legitimises their behaviours, such as the
excuse of having to act out of military necessity (Chomsky, 2003; Chomsky &
Herman, 1979). However, scholars point out that states rarely comply with the GCs,
and other mechanisms instead become the means of legitimising violence (Blakely,
2009; Stohl, 1988). The actions of the US Government and its allies in the War on
Terror exemplify this reality. As explored in Chapter One, whilst there are
definitional issues as to what constitutes terrorism, and the victims of terrorism, there
are essentially three main features of terrorism that are common in the literature:
there is threatened or actual perpetrated violence against a victim; the perpetrator
intends that the action will induce terror on the victim; and the witness or victims of
the violence will alter their behaviour (Blakely, 2009; Stohl, 1988).
The three elements of terrorism can clearly be seen in the practice of torture in the
War on Terror, and torture is, in itself, an act of terrorism. Torture is an act of state
terrorism because of the terror it inflicts on the survivors and victims, and due to the
way that behaviour is modified as a result, both in the individual and the broader
community.
The testimony of survivors of torture in the War on Terror is now vast, and many
former prisoners describe the overwhelming fear they felt whilst in custody and the
physical torture as well as physical threats that were imposed on them. David Hicks
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(2010) describes being terrified that interrogators wanted to get blood from a stone,
and he was afraid he was that stone. He and others in, and on transit to Guantanamo,
described being hooded, blindfolded, shackled, and terrorised by screaming and dogs
(Begg, 2007; Hicks, 2010; Kurnaz, 2007). The physical beatings described by US
torture survivors were severe, including kicking, punching, spitting, being hit with
batons and other implements, and sexual assault (Begg, 2007; Hicks, 2010; Kurnaz,
2007). Another element was the immense fear they felt when interrogators used
psychologically manipulative techniques, like mock executions to terrorise prisoners
(Hicks, 2010; Kurnaz, 2007). Murat Kurnaz (2007), a German citizen and former
Guantanamo prisoner, describes how upon arrival at Camp X Ray in Guantanamo,
one guard screamed “We’re gonna put you in a cave with Osama Bin Laden…and
then we’re gonna shoot you” (p. 91). A number of US torture victims have also
detailed how interrogators would tell them that family members would be killed, or
their wives and children would be raped. Joseph Thomas, who was held in several
CIA black sites, spoke at length about the trauma of interrogators telling him that
state agents were raping his family members and that there was nothing he could do
about it. He said, “it caused me to have nightmares for years” (personal
communication, 28 November, 2014). The victims’ reliance on captors for their lives
was also a source of fear, and it was made clear to prisoners that even the medical
personnel were there only to extract information from them. One prisoner noted
“their [the doctors] job was not to treat any illnesses but rather to only keep us alive
and prolong our suffering unless we had information to provide the interrogators”
(Deghayes, 2009).
The fear felt by prisoners who have been the subject of extraordinary rendition is
also indicative of them being terrorised, not only because of the torture they
personally endured, but also because of what they witnessed. For example, Ruth
Blakely (2009) argues that even the witnessing of torture is intended to intimidate
the other prisoners. Many former prisoners describe the panic they felt when hearing
the screams and crying of other prisoners being tortured, and sometimes begging for
their lives (Kurnaz, 2007). This also came in the form of interrogators showing
photos of beaten and bruised prisoners to inmates threatening that if they did not
cooperate with interrogators, they would be subjected to the same treatment (Grey,
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2007; Hicks, 2010). For example, Binyam Mohammed who was tortured in a black
site in Morocco was told, “They’ll come in wearing masks and beat you up. They’ll
beat you with sticks. They’ll rape you first, then they’ll take a glass bottle, they break
the top off, and make you sit on it” (Grey, 2007, p. 56). It is clear when hearing
testimony like this that there was a strong intention to strike terror into the prisoners,
and it undoubtedly worked. Of course, many of these threats, and even more brutal
terrorist torture techniques, were carried out on prisoners, including cutting of
genitals with scalpels, sticking electrodes on genitals, and beatings that caused the
death of some torture victims (CIA Inspector General, 2004; Grey, 2007).
As detailed in Chapter Two, the CIA Inspector General’s report describes torture
victims being subjected to a range of terror-inducing behaviours by the CIA and US
Government agents like Blackwater, including; placing detainees on racks and
shackling them in painful positions, subjecting them to mock executions, telling
them their children will be killed, using guns and power drills during interrogations,
applying painful pressure points, giving the prisoners cold showers and placing them
in front of air conditioners for hours at a time, water dousing, placing detainees in a
nappy and throwing them to the concrete floor, leaving them in complete darkness
for days at a time and placing them in ‘sleep deprivation cells’ (CIA Inspector
General, 2004).
Some prisoners even witnessed the death and permanent disability of other victims.
Murat Kurnaz (2007) describes witnessing a man being kicked to death:
I could see the prisoner’s head had been wrapped in a blanket. The soldiers
hit the man’s head with their rifles and kicked him with their boots… There
were around a hundred feet between our pen and the open hangar. I noticed
that the man was no longer moving. The soldiers kept kicking him. Then they
walked away, leaving him lying there…The next morning, the prisoner was
still lying on the ground…he was lying in a pool of blood….He was
dead…And I might be next (Kurnaz, 2007, p. 70-71).
Other prisoners witnessed the infliction of permanent disability on those who defied
the guards in Guantanamo. Prisoners have reported that a man was pepper sprayed,
and his legs were pulled out from underneath his body and he was repeatedly beaten
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and kicked. He was eventually taken to the detainee hospital where, years after,
prisoners would see him chained to the bed, shaking continuously and no longer able
to feed himself or go to the toilet unassisted (Hicks, 2010). There is no doubt that the
witnessing of this level of violence was intended to induce dread in those who were
also detained.
The third condition of terrorism is for the witness or survivor to change their
behaviour. This manifested in interrogators and other US Government agents
encouraging prisoners to be compliant and talk as a result of their suffering. Many
former prisoners described making admissions just to make the pain and torment
cease (Begg, 2007; Hicks, 2010; Kurnaz, 2007). Kurnaz (2007) describes
interrogators changing tactics when they were not getting the answers they wanted.
He said:
Before I realised what was happening, I felt the first jolt. It was electricity.
An electroshock. They put electrodes on the soles of my feet…It was as if my
body was lifting itself off the ground of its own accord…There as a bang. It
hurt a lot. I felt warmth, jolts, cramps (Kurnaz, 2007, p. 69).
Interrogators then asked him whether he wanted to change his last answer. Kurnaz
(2007) continued, “That was the worst thing, knowing that the pain would come
again, until you thought there was no way you could take it anymore” (p. 70).
Binyam Mohammed also described what he termed the “circle of torture”, in which
“They’d ask me a question. I’d say one thing. They’d say it was a lie. I’d say
another. They’d say it was a lie. I could not work out what they wanted to hear...
They tortured me again” (as cited in Grey, 2007, p. 58).
Sometimes mind-altering drugs were used to modify behaviour. Mohammed
describes having drugs added to his food and through an intravenous drip, on top of
the use of excruciatingly loud music and temperature manipulation (Grey, 2007).
Guantanamo prisoners were given experimental drugs in the form of pills and
injections in order to alter their mental state and modify their behaviours. David
Hicks (2010) described being taken for an operation on a hernia in 2003, but instead
of being completely anaesthetised, a civilian interrogator was brought in to conduct
an interrogation whilst he was in an altered state of consciousness. Certainly, David
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described the medical experimentation as the most harrowing part of his torture, and
he still has nightmares about being forcibly medicated. David said “I was given
another injection. I was scared and pleaded for them not to do it, but I was threatened
with an IRF’ing if I did not cooperate…I was quickly aware of the results of the
injection. I went straight to the corner and curled up… I tried to fight this reaction
but was powerless” (personal communication, 6 June, 2009).92 David’s medical
records demonstrate that in April 2003, he suffered a burst ear-drum after being
given unknown pills that had significant health effects.
Another form of torment for captives was the uncertainty about when, or if, they
would ever be released. Interrogators would state that if the prisoners didn’t tell the
truth, they would never be returned to their families. Joseph Thomas refers to
interrogators telling him “if you don’t help yourself [by making confessions], you
won’t be going home”, but describes that when he told them the truth, they kept
torturing him anyway (personal communication, 28 November, 2014). It is evident
that the threat of indefinite detention, and the endless cycle of torture, caused
significant torment for the former US captives. But it is inevitably not only the
tortured men and women who suffered at the thought of potential indefinite
detention, it would also have been equally as traumatic for the families – a type of
trickle-down effect.
The impacts of torture are never solely felt by the individual or group at the physical
or psychological receiving end. Whilst the torture memos authored by Bush
Administration and public statements by officials did not expressly state that
instilling terror was the aim of the torture program in the War on Terror, the
terrorising effects of torture on the individual and the wider community are
unambiguous. If a victim of torture dies, and the community hears about it, it instils
fear. Even if the person does not die in the process of torture, they become a ‘living
testament’ to the torture that was perpetrated against them – those who hear about
their torture then become afraid that they too may be subjected to the same
treatment. In addition, the trickle-down effect of torture means that torture that is
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IRF refers to Guantanamo’s Internal or Instant Reaction Force which is a riot squad responsible for
breaking bones and beating prisoners. One team caused the brain damage of Sgt. Sean Baker, who
was dressed as a detainee during a training exercise. Baker was beaten so severely, he now has
seizures (Simpson, 2004).
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perpetrated in the context of war can be exported to the domestic sphere after the
conflict ends. For example, techniques used at Abu Ghraib were used on psychiatric
patients in Belgium, when patients were placed on a leash and forced to walk on all
fours (Vervaet, 2010).
It also must be made clear that even though public displays of torture are not
practised in the context of the War on Terror, the visual is not necessary to instil the
same amount of fear. Just as political dissidents in some Latin American countries
were snatched off the streets, tortured by state officials and then dumped in public
places with physical injuries to prove it, the War on Terror is littered with numerous
examples of similar occurrences. However, because of the prevalence of ‘clean
torture’ used by Western states, the victims are most commonly returned with no
physical marks (Rejali, 2007).
Even the testimony of a torture victim has the capacity to alarm a community in the
same way as any act of terrorism. Vivid descriptions of acts of torture can cause
vicarious trauma in the broader community. When the photos of the torture that
occurred in Abu Ghraib prison were released in 2004, there were shockwaves
through many Middle Eastern countries. People who were in Iraq at the time
describe the feelings of horror when they saw the photos of the men. A colleague
who was present in Iraq stated “I remember the outrage, people were angry, but they
were also scared. They knew it could happen to them” (personal communication, 5
May, 2013). David Hicks (2010) recalls that some of the guards at Guantanamo were
“happy” that the photos came out because it sent a message to their ‘enemies’ “not to
fuck with us”, so people were afraid of what they would do to them (personal
communication, 2 October, 2010).
Hence, given the evidence, one can certainly argue that torture in the War on Terror
is a form of state terrorism because it draws on the three commonly recognised
preconditions for a terrorism classification; 1. there is strong evidence of threatened
or actual perpetrated violence against those detained in US custody; 2. the
perpetrator intended the action to induce terror on the victims – for example, through
physical beatings or by threatening life and the lives of family members; and 3. those
subjected to, and witnesses to the violence altered their behaviour and said anything
to make the pain and torment stop.
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One of the most concerning elements in this, is that in numerous official statements
and media stories, the terror induced by torture was ignored or seen as excusable or,
in some cases, even celebrated. Whilst there were outright criticisms of US
Government sanctioned torture, and some exceptional pieces that advocated for the
victims, most commonly torture was framed as the fault of the survivor, and never
labelled for what it was – state terrorism. Commentators who identified torture as
wrong and never permissible still largely fell into the trap of making personal attacks
on survivors, or calling into question their guilt or innocence, and sometimes the
truthfulness of their testimony. The lack of courage and apathy shown towards
torture survivors in the War on Terror continues to be felt.

‘Recreational’ Torture and the Normalisation of Violence
One could say that capitalist culture has produced a predatory culture of
control and cruelty that promoted vast forms of suffering and repression and
it does this increasingly through cultural apparatuses that promote
widespread symbolic violence – Henry Giroux (as cited in Tristan, 2013 para.
11).
In his book The Violence of Organised Forgetting, Henry Giroux (2013) raises
concerns about the way in which public pedagogy has shaped individuals into
commodities and shoppers rather than responsible members of society that have
social obligations. When human rights are seen as a commodity and of monetary
value, then the way in which social ‘problems’ like torture are interpreted, will
always be challenging. Part of the commodification of violence is the way that the
film, television and computer game industries have normalised certain state-enacted
behaviours, particularly torture (Flynn & Salek, 2012).93 International torture
prevention bodies contend that a culture of violence, or public support for getting
‘tough on crime’, increases the risks of torture being perpetrated and viewed as
acceptable (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights et
al., 2010; Staub, 1990). This has certainly been apparent in the War on Terror and
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It is important to note the influence of the military and CIA in the production of these methods of
‘entertainment’. For example, as already mentioned in Chapter One, the CIA was involved in script
changes to the film Zero Dark Thirty which depicted the torture of someone suspected as being
involved in the 9/11 attacks. They wanted the CIA to be viewed more favourably.
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the associated dogma has served as ideological and political support for the
perpetration of torture.
On any given night in Australia (and elsewhere), it is likely that viewers can switch
on to a program that either glorifies violent state-based behaviours most commonly
conducted by military and police, or promotes the use of torture against an ‘enemy’.
Seeing depictions of the ‘goodies’ torturing the ‘baddies’ to elicit information and
prevent a so-called terrorist threat is certainly not an unusual sight in the War on
Terror era, and research has confirmed an increase in such depictions since 9/11
(Kearns & Young, 2014).
But the impacts of this saturation are yet to be fully realised. As briefly discussed in
Chapter One, research demonstrates that watching depictions of torture as being
purportedly ‘effective’ at eliciting information from prisoners, impacts dramatically
on a viewer’s attitude towards torture (Kearns & Young, 2014). For example, out of
five seasons of the television program 24, there were sixty scenes depicting torture
(Kearns & Young, 2014). A study of students who watched 24, revealed that after
watching the depictions of torture, their level of support for torture increased and,
more concerning, they demonstrated a behavioural commitment to this belief
(Kearns & Young, 2014). The study found that 64 per cent of those who were
supportive of torture after watching the 24 clip signed a petition in support of their
stated beliefs (Kearns & Young, 2014).
Studies also suggest that when torture is normalised and considered the status quo, it
is more likely that pro-torture attitudes will follow (Gronke et.al., 2010). Further,
scientists have found that attitudes towards aggression are potential predictors of
aggressive behaviour (Friedman, 2016). The fact that violence, including torture, has
become so normalised and continues to readily be shown on Western television
screens is therefore a concerning situation.
People watch torture as a form of recreation, whether through Hollywood
productions that are infiltrated by political players to promote a pro-war or protorture mentality, such as Zero Dark Thirty, or video games and other violence-based
activities. Computer games such as Black Ops and War on Terrorism that depict
extreme violence and torture can desensitise the viewer to the behaviours
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(Brockmyer, 2014; Carnagey, Anderson & Bushman, 2006).94 One online game
called Osamagotchi allows a player to switch to ‘God Bless America’ mode, which
allows the player to torture Osama bin Laden in different ways (Tin, 2011). The
generation of young people who are now in their teens and early twenties are
growing up in a media environment saturated with violence that could potentially
lead to decreased empathy.
Indeed, the normalisation of violence and torture to this extent provides for a
structural amnesia in relation to the experience of the torture survivors and victims.
Torture, as a gross violation of human rights, is framed as ‘enhanced interrogation’,
or acceptable violence that is only used on people who are deserving of such
treatment – like terrorists. Torturing people for ‘fun’ in computer games and
watching torture on television or film as a form of recreation serves to trivialise the
serious social consequences of torture, not to mention the pain and experience of the
victims and survivors. Further, normalising torture serves as an erasure of memory
that these actions occurred against human beings rather than fictional characters in a
film. It is a challenge for torture survivors to feel safe in their surroundings whilst
they live in a pro-torture environment.
This phenomenon is exacerbated by the mainstream media’s reporting about torture,
especially when the victim’s testimony is regarded as illegitimate in the public arena.
Because the national security cloak was sold as more important than concern over
torture, little weight was given to the testimony of torture victims who were
implicated in terrorism related activity. It became almost seditious to speak about
Western countries engaging in terrorism. The mere suggestion that the men and
women of Iraq and Afghanistan who were being subjected to bombing,
assassinations and torture by Coalition forces would be resentful or unwilling to
cooperate was barely mentioned in the public realm, even though theorists such as
Chalmers Johnson (2007) had already argued that events like 9/11 were a form of
blowback. Their suffering was only presented as relevant when it was at the hands of
Saddam Hussein or other Middle Eastern dictators. Australian television screens
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For example, Anders Breivik used the Black Ops game for target practice before he killed all of
those people in Norway.
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were swamped with images of local people grateful for the ‘assistance’ of the
coalition forces, but were rarely shown dissenting voices (Riddick, 2013).
Because of the political rhetoric and social situation, the seriousness of the torture
and weight given to testimony was wholly dependent on the country or people being
accused. For example, as outlined in the previous chapter, the torture committed by
Saddam Hussein and the Taliban was given plenty of air time (“Kids freed from
school torture cell”, 2011; “Saddam’s execution the wrong option for many Iraqi’s”,
2007). The ‘enemy’ was cast as brutal and inhumane because of the torture
perpetrated on the people of Iraq and Afghanistan, but it was a different story when
Western forces were accused of similar forms of torture.
Overall, ‘recreational’ torture serves as part of the torture support network by
providing ideological and political support through; normalising state-inflicted
violence, creating a social situation that reinforces the lack of humanity of the
victims/survivors,

presenting

misleading

narratives

that

promote

moral

disengagement, and creating a distorted view of reality. This supports outrage
management tactics on an ideological and political level through reinterpreting
torture as a normal activity carried out for fun or out of necessity on national security
grounds, and devaluing the survivors/victims and their experience.

Taking the Politics out of Torture
The divisions between those to the left and right of politics have also served the
torture support network by creating a diversion away from the issues relating to
torture and the structures that give rise to torture, and have further divided the
community. It could be argued that the narrative surrounding torture has devolved
into a simplistic understanding of the world, along the lines of Bush’s ‘you’re with
us, or against us’ assertion, and it has been split along political lines that have played
off against each other, thereby creating another barrier to confronting torture.
The emergence of far-right nationalist political parties in Australia, such as the
United Patriots Front (UPF) and Rise Up Australia party, which have strong racist
ideological foundations have been one such manifestation of this. These groups have
been involved in violent clashes with far-left anti-fascist and pro-multiculturalism
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groups in Australia (Spooner, Gray & Dobbin, 2016). The theme of the protests on
the part of the UPF and Rise Up has been to push an anti-Islam and pro-white
agenda, further dividing the Australian community along political and religious lines
(Spooner, Gray & Dobbin, 2016). However, the ideology and actions of the far-left
have not been helpful to the torture prevention movement either. Members of the farleft involved in the perpetration of violence in order to protest far-right groups have
only served to support the state and legitimise their violent responses and harsher
stance on public protest.
Although humanitarianism and the worth of the individual are more firmly grounded
in the political philosophy of liberalism than in any notions of the common good, the
right of politics has tended to be more tolerant of torture. For example, studies have
demonstrated that those with views considered as right-wing authoritarian inflicted
higher levels of electric shock in laboratory experiments (Altemeyer, 1981). This
correlates with other research that points to those with conservative political views
aligning with the pro-torture position (Gronke et al., 2010).
It is increasingly clear that torture has developed into a partisan issue (Pew Research
Center, 2016; Wallace, 2013), and regardless of the moral dilemmas surrounding
torture, the politics concerning the right and left has impacted the way torture has
been framed and discussed in the public realm. For example, many of the opinion
columns discussing the torture of people in the War on Terror examined over the ten
year period studied in this thesis demonstrate the right and left attacking each other
on political grounds, leaving no space for the issues that require more serious
attention.95 Because those who sit to the right of the political spectrum are more
likely to support torture, debates have centred on pushing party lines, rather than
engaging in a serious discussion about the ethics of torturing human beings. Indeed,
discussions around torture that have devolved into a clash between the left and right
serve no purpose except to further divide the community along political lines. Whilst
right and left are fighting amongst themselves, torture survivors are left to pick up
the pieces of their world.
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Pro-torture opinion columns written by those with high circulation are particularly concerning, such
as those by Andrew Bolt (2008) and Miranda Devine (2006; 2011).
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Simplistic political narratives therefore need to be challenged by those who find
themselves to the right and left of politics. Indeed, the manifestation of both the right
and left in any fundamentalist or extremist fashion is divisive, and takes the focus off
the humanity of the person or people who are subjected to torture. The infliction of
torture as part of the War on Terror demonstrated that some people on both sides of
politics have been responsible for, or complicit in, either covering-up torture, or
aided in framing torture as excusable in some situations, and in discrediting
survivors. The current system supports both right and left to condone torture, and aid
in the tactics of cover-up.

A Brief Summary
So far, this chapter has discussed how political rhetoric played a significant role in
the normalisation of state-inflicted violence and terrorism through the crafting of
narratives that seek to moralise torture, cast society into groups of good and evil, and
obstructively divide individuals and groups along political lines. State-inflicted
violence has become largely normalised and ‘recreationalised’, and political rhetoric
has served to reinforce torture as legitimate violence used against those cast as
enemies. These ideological and political strategies have functioned as support
mechanisms for state-inflicted torture and the outrage management tactics. Despite
the selective political rhetoric surrounding torture and terrorism, addressing the
underlying political ideology of individuals is insufficient, and what has become
most apparent is that a larger and more covert operating system is not only providing
the mechanisms to carry out torture, but also the support to prevent oversight and
allow torture to be carried out in secrecy. These mechanisms are unresponsive to
civilian leadership. The increased manifestation of covert operations, militarism and
the creation of global surveillance networks have all contributed to a system that
facilitates and condones torture, whether through the intimidation and prosecution of
whistleblowers, or the systems in place that manipulate and control the narrative.
The following section explores these structural elements of support.
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Torture as an Instrument of the Deep State: “Imperium in
imperium” the State within a State
...there were actually two governments: the one that was elected, and the
other, secret regime, governing in the dark – Edward Snowden (as cited in
Retiman, 2013, p. 4).
Historically speaking, the state is a relatively new form of social organisation. The
state has been widely confused with the government, however it is much more
complex than this (Heywood, 2004). Modern versions of the state are commonly
defined as a collection of human agents organised by geographic location, into
various institutions of government, the bureaucracy, military, police and courts
which can be described as the body politic (Heywood, 2004; Lindsey, 2013, p. 11).
The defining feature of the modern state is the notion of sovereignty96 and its
absolute and unrestricted power – if you want to live within the state, you must abide
by its laws within its territory (Heywood, 2004, p. 76). This has led to much
criticism of the state as an entity of oppression, as before the creation of the modern
state, anarchist literature in particular points to the way in which society was able to
order itself naturally, without a centralised system of governance (Perlin, 1979).
As discussed in Chapter One, Thomas Hobbes (2016) described the state as a
leviathan, a giant monster that displays ultimate power. To maintain control of its
territory the state has a coercive function in order to compel its citizens to obey the
laws determined by the government (Heywood, 2004; Hobbes, 2016). Further,
Weber suggests that the state claims the use of ‘legitimate violence’ as a practical
expression of this state sovereignty (Heywood, 2004, p. 77). The relationship
between the use of violence and state sovereignty led Philip Bobbit (2002) to
characterise the state as a war-making institution and indeed, much has been written
about the way in which politics is dominated by the military industrial complex
(Mills, 1956). Even in a modern liberal democracy, where the role of the state is
minimised to what John Locke (1965) characterises as a ‘nightwatchman’, the state
96

It is recognised that there is a distinction between legal and political sovereignty. Political
sovereignty refers to the existence of a supreme political power “possessed of the ability to
command obedience because it monopolises coercive force” as opposed to the law claiming the
authority to require someone to comply (Heywood, 2004, p. 91).
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still has coercive functions. After 9/11, the coercive activities of numerous states,
especially the US, greatly expanded, with the increased use of private intelligence,
military and security contractors.
As Figure 18 demonstrates, the modern state is no longer a body of institutions that
make decisions on behalf of the people. Instead, it has morphed into a multi-faceted
system that is set in place to favour particular interests. It does not matter greatly
who is voted in, the same systems operate no matter what political party is in
government. It is this phenomenon, and the link to coercive and secretive practices,
that has led to the creation of the concept, the ‘deep’ state or ‘secret’ state.97
Figure 18- The Elements and Functions of the Deep and Shallow State

Dynamics of the Deep State
Since the term was initially coined in Turkey,98 there has been much debate over the
concept of the deep or secret state and how it operates in different contexts. Much
depends on the theoretical lens of the person defining it. For example, more recent
theories of the deep state have been largely developed by those who sit on the left of
97

The term ‘deep state’ has been most often referred to in the United States. In Australia, the ‘secret
state’ is most often utilised.
98
The concept of the deep state was originally developed to describe operating systems within the
Turkish political system, allegedly comprising anti-democratic groups within the intelligence
organisations or military elites who were pushing a nationalistic political agenda.

285

the political spectrum, and they see the actions of the deep state as an extension of
class warfare, or operating as part of a broader economic social control system.
Others see the functions and operations of the deep state as more complex and farreaching. Despite the varying political lenses, the core features of the deep state are
more commonly described as a political situation where, whilst appearing to work
formally under the control of the established government, the deep state operates as
an internal organ that does not respond to civilian leadership (Scott, 2014).
This manifests in the creation of two operating systems within modern states: the
shallow state which is composed of the elected government and government owned
or managed organisations; and the deep state, which is composed of high-level
elements within intelligence organisations, the military, police and judiciary whose
agenda is to use violence or other means to manipulate those who wield economic
and political power to further ‘nationalistic’ and/or corporate goals (Lindsey, 2013,
p. 4). For example, policy makers in the shallow state may claim that they are at the
mercy of outside market forces and policy is therefore wholly driven by
globalisation, when in reality, they are using their positions to favour certain
corporations or international interests, rather than fulfil the basic needs of the
community such as providing housing and healthcare, or protecting its citizens from
torture.
The cornerstone of the deep state is secrecy, a complete lack of oversight and the
subversion of democracy, thus it is particularly powerful in relation to understanding
intelligence and security activities. Marc Ambinder & David Grady (2013) note that
“misinformation is layered on top of myths and misunderstanding” in order to hide
the actions of the deep state (p. 5). Indeed, ‘group-think’ drives the deep state in the
same way that individuals assimilate the ideas of their supervisors or peers without
even being conscious of it (Lofgren & Moyers, 2014). For example, discounting
covert operations of intelligence organisations by delegating them as ‘conspiracy
theories’ has been a mechanism used to stifle political debate about the existence and
operations of the deep state. This has also contributed to the lack of visibility in
relation to the operations of the deep state in the mainstream media, or the reinterpretation of events that minimises or diverts attention off those who are
responsible for atrocities as explored above.
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Manifestations of the Deep State
According to Ambinder & Grady (2013), the US deep state encompasses agencies
such as the CIA, FBI, Defense Programs Activity Office, the Navy Systems
Management Activity, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s Special
Capabilities Office or Special Collections Service (p. 4). One example of the
manifestation of the deep state was the CIA’s extraordinary rendition program that
took place entirely out of the reach of Congress. Only a select few within the Bush
Administration knew of the existence of the programme, as it was a clandestine CIA
and private security contractor operation. The same level of secrecy was used when
the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) SEAL team assassinated Osama Bin
Laden. No Congressional permission was sought, rather only a handful of people,
including the director of the CIA, Leon Panetta, and the President knew of the
operation (Ambinder & Grady, 2013).
The deep state is not a group of people that sit in a room and control everything.
Rather, it can manifest in different ways, whether through the creation of covert
torture programs, economic systems that favour certain elite groups or organisations,
or the creation of mass surveillance systems that operate as a mechanism of social
control. For example, Peter Dale Scott (2014) argues that Wall Street bankers were
responsible for the creation of the Federal Reserve in the United States, rather than
people elected to form government. This aligns with other economic functions of the
deep state, such as the incident where the US Government provided subsidies to
Silicon Valley companies that produce surveillance equipment that was then used to
spy on the public, in the process bypassing constitutional and democratically
embedded protections. The same link was drawn by David Faris (2013), in
explaining how the US Government influenced economic and political ‘reforms’ that
have taken place in Egypt since the 2011 uprising that favour privatisation, and
benefit only a small number of ‘elites’ (p. 99). Indeed, the economic functions are
essential to the military and political aims of those who form part of it.

9/11 and the Expansion of the Deep State
…we know, there are known knowns; there are things we know we know.
We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are
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some things we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns-the ones
we don’t know we don’t know. And if one looks throughout the history of
our country and other free countries, it is the latter category that tend to be
the difficult ones – Donald Rumsfeld (2002).
The events that took place on 9/11 facilitated the expansion of the operations of the
deep state and expanded state power. The ‘terrorist threat’ and rhetoric seizing on the
need for national defence have provided the underlying ideological framework for
many infringements on human rights in both the United States and Australia. The
same rhetoric paved the way for an increased engagement in military conflict, in
particular, Australia’s involvement in Iraq, at least in the shallow state arena. Yet,
decisions to go to war are not made by parliament in Australia. In fact, decisions
made behind closed doors in regards to engagement in US-led military intervention
have become a trademark feature of successive Australian Governments.
The expansion of the deep state provided a practical and economic support for the
perpetration of torture. One such manifestation of this has been the increased use of
private military and intelligence contractors. According to former US congressman
Mike Lofgren, as of 2014 there was 854, 000 contract personnel with top-secret
clearances (Lofgren, 2014, p. 5). In 2001, a US firm called Aviation Development
Corporation provided reconnaissance for the CIA in South America. They
misidentified a plane which was consequently shot down, killing a missionary and
her granddaughter (Yeoman, 2003). Because they were US citizens, the US Congress
ordered an investigation. However, in order to block the investigation, Congress
could not discuss the issue as those involved formed part of a private entity
(Yeoman, 2003). No one was held to account for the deaths. It is this kind of
collusion and cover-up that exemplifies the darker aspect of the deep state, and one
that has played out even more prominently since 9/11. It involves collusion between
the forces that operate covertly and the governments that provide immunity and
inhibit transparency. The use of contractors to torture, kill and cover up has been
widespread, and the phenomenon of keeping the same group of people in positions
that ensure secrecy and compliance is common.
This secrecy was also extended to private military companies that have evolved into
powerful armies as part of the War on Terror. Because many of the PMSCs are
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staffed by former military, diplomatic or intelligence employees, it means that they
are “politically formidable” (Yeoman, 2003, p. 5). For example, Blackwater’s
founder Eric Prince was a former Navy SEAL and has ties with the Republican
Party. Not only do many PMSCs have intimate links to government agencies and
officials, they are protected by those within these organisations.
Indeed, the cases that have been brought to the courts involving rendition and torture
have been countered with deployment of State Secrets Privilege because they were
conducted as part of clandestine CIA, JSOC or other programs. They have operated
with impunity, above any established legal system. As previously discussed, the state
may provide scapegoats, usually lower level military personnel, however, those who
order, oversee and carry out much of the covert torture are free from scrutiny. The
perfect example of this was the fallout from the Abu Ghraib torture saga, where
those like General Miller who ordered and oversaw the techniques were not only left
unaccountable, but rewarded and promoted for their actions.
In order for this to occur, the mainstream media plays a role as a pillar of support for
the deep state. As Herman and Chomsky’s (1988) Propaganda Model illustrates, the
political and corporate influence on the mainstream US media is core to the
manufacture of stories that, whilst appearing to report facts, are actually deceptive
and carefully crafted manufactured messages. This was demonstrated in Chapter
Five which outlined the way embedded journalists received information that was
reported in the Australian media, and was largely uncritical of the way the US was
treating its captives, or simply repeated press statements or wording from US talking
points, as was the case in relation to Guantanamo and Australian prisoners.
Evidence about the operations of the deep state in the US, UK and Australia have
been extensively revealed by the work of WikiLeaks and Edward Snowden who
exposed of the level of global mass surveillance conducted by the US National
Security Agency (NSA). They also demonstrated the internal machinations of
government that proved it did not matter who was voted in, the same interests were
protected. The War on Terror has allowed for the expansion of the activities of the
deep state, both in terms of its nationalistic aims and the structures that support these
activities. In the US, the ‘terrorist threat’ has paved the way for the enactment of
nationalistic legislation such as the USA PATRIOT Act, which stands for Uniting
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and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept
and Obstruct Terrorism Act 2001 (USA). The Act provides for the indefinite
detention of immigrants, the authorisation of law enforcement to enact warrantless
searches, including the authorisation for the FBI to search telephone, email and
financial records without a court order (Harris, 2014). The NSA has lied to Senate
committees and there is no effective oversight (Ambinder & Grady, 2013).
This has inevitably meant that a chilling effect has occurred on freedom of speech in
affected countries. As some have argued, knowing what you write online can be
instantly read by someone in authority can make people think twice about expressing
their opinions; for example, it may impact job opportunities because a person’s
Facebook page is monitored (Stray, 2013; Whitehead, 2015). The monitoring of
journalists and those in government has also become a manifestation of the deep
state. For example, the Snowden revelations showed that the German Chancellor
Angela Merkel’s phone was being monitored by the NSA (“Embassy Espionage:
The NSA’s Secret Spy Hub in Berlin”, 2013).

Australia and the Deep State
Clandestine actions of the Australian Government have been long researched and
established (Coxsedge, Coldicutt & Harant, 1982; Fraser, 2014; Hall, 1978). Joan
Coxsedge, Ken Coldicutt & Gerry Harrant (1982) outlined the covert element in
Australian politics as manifesting in the increased influence of corporations on
political decisions; CIA and other US Government and military interference in
Australian politics; and the growth of other clandestine security operations, such as
the establishment of ASIO the Defence Signals Directorate (DSD) and the Australian
Security and Intelligence Service (ASIS) in the 1950s. Researchers also point to the
way that Prime Minister Gough Whitlam (1972-1975) was removed from office after
his criticism of the actions of the CIA, ASIO and ASIS, and his threats to withdraw
funding for Pine Gap (Coxsedge, Coldicutt & Harant, 1982; Fraser, 2014). Former
CIA spy, Victor Marchetti stated in an Australian television interview that the whole
purpose of the CIA was to:
get rid of a government that they did not like and did not feel was stable, and
a government that was not cooperative enough for their own purposes, and to
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replace it with a more stable government. In a sense it’s a Chile, but a much
more muted and subtle form…they’ve overthrown governments all over the
world…So why wouldn’t they do something to Australia if they felt it was in
their best interest? (as cited in Coxsedge, Coldicutt & Harant, 1982, p. 27).
More recently, it was revealed that the Australian Government has been spying on its
allies, not only for their own political interests, but in relation to corporate deals, and
at the behest of the US Government (WikiLeaks, 2015). The WikiLeaks files also
showed that members of the Labor party, such as Mark Arbib, Michel Danby, and
Bob McMullan, were giving briefings on the internal workings of government to the
US embassy (Kelly, 2010). The political subservience to US interests by Bill
Shorten, Labor Party leader since 2013, was also aired when the documents revealed
that he met with the US consulate in Melbourne to seek approval for his prime
ministership candidacy ("Wikileaks: Shorten seeks US approval for Prime
Ministership", 2011). The outside influence on Australian politics is also clear in
WikiLeaks cables released about Julia Gillard, Prime Minister 2010-2013, that state:
“…Labor party officials have told us that one lesson Gillard took from the 2004
elections was that Australians will not elect a PM who is perceived to be antiAmerican.” They note, Gillard “is now a strong supporter of the Australia-US
Alliance and Israel…[and] recognizes that to become Prime Minister, she must move
to the Center, and show her support for the Alliance with the United States”; and in
another leaked document it stated that “Israeli Ambassador Yuval Rotem told us that
Gillard has gone out of her way to build a relationship with Israel and that she asked
him to arrange an early opportunity to visit…” ("WikiLeaks State Department
Australia files", 2008). The cables also point to the ousting of former Prime Minister
Kevin Rudd in order to make way for Julia Gillard because he refused to fully
cooperate with US and Israeli interests, and that she was already vying for the
position at least a year prior to his ousting in 2010 (WikiLeaks, 2015).
Former DFAT employee Paul Barratt (2010) commented “The effect of these
conversations behind closed doors is that the United States and Israel can go about
their affairs confident that Australia will never press them on any issue…the gap
between public statements and the government’s real views is outrageous” (para. 8 &
11). Certainly, Australia has been seen as a Little America and as subservient to
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these hidden agendas, and it has long been held that political life in white Australia
has always been influenced by US politics (Rolfe, 2014). The WikiLeaks files show
that it did not matter who was elected in Australia, the same protection of
international interests as well as cover-up and obfuscation continued.
This manifestation of the deep state is central to explaining the support and collusion
of the Australian Government with the US torture program. Whilst most of these
decisions were kept out of the public realm for the interests of plausible deniability
and public appearance, it was clear that elected officials knew exactly what was
going on, they just cooperated in keeping it silent. For example, whilst the Howard
Government kept the same people with ties to the US Government involved in the
communications around the treatment of detainees, they could tell the public that
they were relying on diplomatic assurances that prisoners were being treated
humanely. At the same time, they held meetings behind closed doors about
‘hypothetical’ situations like rendition.
One such outcome of this were the many cases where intelligence organisations like
MI5 in Britain and ASIO in Australia used evidence obtained through the use of
torture in other countries to target their own citizens (Evans, 2009). After revelations
about the extraordinary rendition program surfaced in the UK, Craig Murray, former
British ambassador to Uzbekistan, told a television program that the British
Government did not ask other states whether people were tortured. He said: “As long
as we kept within that guideline, then the Uzbeks, or the Syrians or the Egyptians or
anyone else tortured someone and gave us the information that was OK” (Evans,
2009, p. 122). Murray, now a prominent whistleblower and human rights activist,
would later state:
I had learnt a great deal about the modus operandi of the Uzbek security
services and their widespread use of torture…The head of the CIA station
confirmed… that the material probably was obtained under torture, but added
that the CIA had not seen this as a problem…I sent official telegrams to the
FCO [British Foreign and Commonwealth Office] stating that I believed we
were receiving material from torture, that the material was painting a false
picture and that it was both illegal and immoral for us to receive it…I was
summoned back to the FCO and told by Sir Michel Wood, chief legal
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adviser, that it was not illegal under the UN Convention against Torture for
us to obtain or to use intelligence gained under torture, provided we did not
torture ourselves or request that a named individual be tortured (as cited in
Evans, 2009, p. 123-124).
The same situation occurred in the Australian context where officials attempted to
use numerous statements obtained under torture in Australian courts, as
demonstrated in the David Hicks and Joseph Thomas cases.
The appointment of the same people to posts integral to protecting the interests of the
deep state are also an extension of this, and provides a practical function in relation
to the torture support network. For example, Dennis Richardson went from the
position of Director General of Security at ASIO, to being US Ambassador, to being
the National Security Advisor in the Prime Minister’s office. The promotion of
O’Kane to a position where he assesses FOI requests in relation to torture is also a
perfect example of this. Effectively, the same people are shuffled through shallow
government departments whilst simultaneously operating at deep state level. The
shallow state then becomes a tool for the deep state to conduct its activities.
The concepts of the deep and shallow state are helpful in understanding how
organisations and individuals carry out and support torture and its cover-up. The
deep state provides practical support for torture through the use of state agents that
carry out covert torture, such as the work of the CIA and Blackwater, which was
detailed in Chapters Two and Three. Subsequently, they are provided immunity
through the shallow state structures in place that are designed to cover-up the crimes;
for example, the immunity provisions granted to PMSCs and court systems that
provide legal loopholes to prevent torture cases from being heard. The political
support provided by the deep and shallow state ensures political enmeshment, and
contributes to controlling narratives that promote a national security threat, and
inevitably provides the ideological support to carry out torture. This may take the
form of shifting individuals from shallow government roles, to deep state roles as
private intelligence or military contractors. The media plays a role as a pillar of
support by publicly disseminating information that is in the interests of the deep
state. The deep state also provides economic support because of the substantial
amount of funds allocated to private contractors, and associated activities such as

293

surveillance. This has manifested in the increased role of militarism, whether
through the traditional operations of the military, or the general narratives around
acceptable violence.

Militarism
America must always lead on the world stage. If we don’t no one else
will….The United States will use military force, unilaterally if necessary,
when our core interests demand it…International opinion matters, but
America should never ask permission to protect our people, our homeland,
our way of life – Nobel Peace Prize winner and US President, Barack Obama
(2014b, p. 2).
Research suggests that militarism contributes to the problem of torture in several
ways, and has been identified as one of the preconditions for an increase in the
occurrence of torture. Firstly, the manifestation of power plays a significant role in
the ideology underpinning militarism considering the state is framed as the
controlling power which utilises the military to curb a supposed terrorist threat.
Studies conducted by Staley Milgram (1969) and Robert Zimbardo (Haney, Banks &
Zimbardo, 1973) have established that anyone is capable of committing acts of
cruelty given the right conditions, and that people are mostly obedient when given
orders to inflict suffering on ‘others’. These conditions include the post 9/11 fearbased social condition that sees an emphasis placed on protecting the public from a
threat, or an increase in punitive laws that target vulnerable groups.
Military inflicted violence is framed as justifiable violence towards the ‘targets’, and
it is usually the military or contractors that are made up for former military personnel
that are involved in carrying out torture, and the learned techniques are frequently
exported to the domestic sphere (Basoglu, 1993; Rejali, 2002). For example, as
mentioned in Chapter One, torture techniques used at Guantanamo Bay and Abu
Ghraib have spread to different parts of the world, including an incident where
prison guards from Mons Prison in southern Belgium forced several prisoners from
the psychiatric wing to walk on all fours and placed a dog collar and leash around
their necks; and a prison in Brussels saw guards enter a prisoner’s cell, beat him on
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his back and testicles and ordered him to repeat “The prophet Mohammed is a
paedophile” and “My mother is a whore” (Veravet, 2010, p. 30).
Militarism has crept into a number of civilian realms including law enforcement, not
only through militarised training of police, but also through the weaponry used, such
as Tasers (McCulloch, 2002). Professor Jude McCulloch (2002) a lecturer in Police
Studies believes that this shifts police from defensive and protective roles, to more
repressive and coercive ones. Indeed, years of involvement in war and political
violence are attributable to the rise in the militarisation of politics and other civilian
realms (Lyons, 2005). The commonly used language of militarism and military
strategy emphasises the ‘us and them’ mindset that creates enemies and promotes
‘legitimate’ violence and the normalisation of violence as a means of the state. The
focus on national security and advanced weaponry provides the reframing of issues
as the creation of an enemy that needs to be thwarted to protect the Western way of
life. Therefore, actions such as torture are deemed as necessary and a regular part of
anti-terrorism strategies.
Since 9/11, militarism has contributed to the propensity and cover-up of torture in
supplementary ways. There has been a substantial privatisation of the military and in
the process, oversight has been limited (Feinstein, 2012). Despite the increase in
militarisation, the role of traditional military in modern warfare has diminished to
make way for more covert activities by private security firms and Special Forces
operatives like JSOC. More troubling, are the intimate links between these covert
operatives, politicians and the media, as entities that facilitate and cover-up torture
and act as a support for the global economy. Indeed, the economic and political
function of militarism plays a central role in the operation of the US and many other
states, both in relation to the ideology underpinning the activities of those involved,
and as a display of the interconnectedness between the covert operators, policy
makers and corporations. To understand the operation, one must also understand the
ideology behind it.
Firstly, the international order has been established in a way that ensures the only
way in which states can maintain sovereignty within the current international system
is to have large economies sufficient to “develop the technology that lies behind
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modern military might” (Lindsey, 2013, p. 3; Perkins, 2006). The country at the head
of the military empire at present is the US.
The ‘Project for a New American Century’ provides a glimpse of the ideological
framework outlining the extent of global military domination sought by the US state.
The policy document stated that “liberty and law must be backed up by force…The
predominance of liberal democracies is necessary to prevent a return to a
destabilising and dangerous great power security competition” (Ikenberry &
Slaughter, 2006, p. 8). This includes the preventative use of force to ensure US
military dominance and counter the rise of competitors, such as China (Ikenberry &
Slaughter, 2006, p. 9). The manifestation of these policies have been the US military
intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the establishment of more extensive
military bases and presence world-wide, including Australia.99
In order to establish and preserve its military might, the US Government, and deep
state operatives, have used the decisive step of privatising war and becoming reliant
on private corporations in order to prop-up the economy as well as opinion polls
(Perkins, 2006). Besides the obvious moral concerns with this situation, the US
Government is then reliant on war to retain its position in the world, both on a
military level, and economically.100 It has now become a self-fulfilling prophecy
marred with endless war, corruption and nepotism. Peace has become a lamentation,
as was demonstrated in June of 2013, when the New York Times released an article
stating “The Lack of Major Wars May be Hurting Economic Growth” (Cowen,
2014). Three months later, US and Australian forces entered Iraq and Syria again,
seemingly in response to the rise of ISIS and al-Sham (Tranter, 2014).
As mentioned in Chapter Two, former Vice President Dick Cheney was CEO of a
corporation called Halliburton, a subsidiary of which was KBR. At the end of the
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Tellingly, the policy document outlining the shift in US foreign policy to the Asia Pacific region,
almost reminded Australia of its place as a tool for the US to remain the military superpower.
Australia was described as being “useful” to “inculcate values and norms that align with the United
States”, and that “Australia’s participation can help facilitate such efforts as well as dampen
concerns about the “real” intentions behind such initiatives” i.e. setting up militarily to be ready to
attack China (Cossa et al., 2009, p. 68). It suggested trilateral dialogue between Japan, Australia and
the US.
100
John Perkins (2006) argues that the US Government has established and maintained its power
through the establishment of a ‘corporatocracy’, an economic and political system that is controlled
by corporations and elite interests.
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1991 Gulf War, Dick Cheney was Secretary of Defense and provided KBR $9
million to research how private military companies could support US troops during
conflict (Yeoman, 2003, p. 3). Whilst the Clinton Administration used private
military companies, it was not until the Bush Administration that it escalated to the
point of no return. The 2003 invasion of Iraq particularly cemented the change that
saw governments pay contractors for almost everything, and money went straight
into the pockets of billionaire companies, most of which had ties to the Bush
Administration. Private military companies in particular secured the biggest
contracts. It was again KBR that was awarded the most contracts as a result of the
Iraq invasion. The Bush family also had ties to Halliburton as well as the Carlyle
Group. It has been estimated that as of the 2015 financial year, the US Government
spent US$4.4 trillion dollars on the ‘wars’ in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan alone,
and this is projected to increase to an astounding $8 trillion by 2054 (Watson
Institute for International and Public Affairs, 2015).
The establishment of the Obama Administration’s foreign policy, which focused on
the strategic move to the Asia-Pacific region, was also inextricably linked with
private corporations, particularly weapons manufacturers and companies with
substantial military contracts. For example, in 2009, the groundwork for Obama’s
foreign policy was developed after a series of workshops in Washington DC. The
workshops included representatives from several private military and intelligence
organisations including Mr. Mark A. Torreano, a representative of Lockheed Martin,
Capt. Richard (Dick) Diamond from Raytheon, CENTRA Technology Inc.,101 and
the CAN Corporation (Cossa et al., 2009). Other individuals present at the 2009
policy meeting were those who have ties to the World Trade Organisation.
The largest weapons manufacturers and military contractors in the world have
massive budgets to lobby governments including Boeing which spent around $22
million, Lockheed Martin $14 million, and United Technologies which spent $11
101

CENTRA technology is an organisation that provides support to a range of clients dealing with
“critical defence, intelligence, and security missions”. Their website exhibits its extensive
experience in “irregular warfare support” in Iraq, Afghanistan, Africa and South America. In
addition the company provides technical and analytic services to support intelligence. Of specific
note is the company’s role in providing ‘support’ to the Defense Advanced Research Projects
(DARPA), Office of Naval Research (ONR), Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL), National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), “and other national security agencies”. See
www.centratechnology.com
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million on lobbying in 2015 (The Center for Responsive Politics, 2016). Even
without these lobbyists, most military and security companies have intimate ties with
government or intelligence organisations. For example, Lockheed Martin has
bipartisan US Congressional support, and it has been noted that members of
Congress read Lockheed’s talking points “word-for-word” at Congressional hearings
(Munsil & Wright, 2015). These contractors also provide a great deal of money for
political campaigns, and therefore have exerted influence in the decisions made by
political parties (Munsil & Wright, 2015).
In addition to lobbying, it is clear that politicians have significant ties to contractors
through their business interests. For example, the board of Lockheed Martin contains
individuals who worked for the Carlyle Group, a mega US corporation with ties to
the Bush family, former British Prime Minister John Major, and former US
Secretary of State James Baker.102 The political ties to the Carlyle Group apparently
did not end after Bush’s term ended. For example, in 2014, it was reported that the
Obama Administration changed a policy initiative to reduce carbon emissions after
being asked by the Carlyle Group because they were concerned it would impact on
the profitability of two oil refineries they owned in Philadelphia (Alexander, 2014).
There is also a link between these private military companies and the political and
intelligence community. For example, former Foreign Policy Advisor to George W
Bush, Steven Hadley, and former Commander of US Strategic Command James
Cartwright, sit on the board of directors at Raytheon USA. Raytheon Australia also
hosts a number of former government and military insiders, including the Managing
Director, who served in the Australian military for 20 years, and was previously a
Defence Advisor in the Australian Parliament (Raytheon Australia, 2016). The Chief
Executive of Lockheed Martin Australia and New Zealand is a former Navy Rear
Admiral, Defence Attaché and Head of Australian Defence Staff in Washington
(Lockheed Martin, 2016). Former Labor Deputy Prime Minister, Kim Beazley, sits
on the board of Lockheed Martin in Australia, he previously served as the Australian
Ambassador to the United States from 2010-2016 (Lockheed Martin, 2016). Another
102

The Carlyle Group is a mega firm that invests in the defence industry and arms manufacturing
companies. The Carlyle Group came to prominence after it was discovered an investor conference
took place in Washington on September 11 2001, involving members of the Bin Laden family (“The
Carlyle Group: C for Capitalism”, 2003).
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Australian Lockheed board member with government and intelligence ties is John
Rood who, before joining Lockheed held a position at Raytheon, held various
positions at the CIA, US State Department, Department of Defense, National
Security Council, and was a Senate staffer (Lockheed Martin, 2016).
Given these networks, the influence of weapons manufacturers and private military
contractors on policy issues is concerning. For instance, arms manufacturers, such as
General Dynamics, Raytheon, Lockheed Martin and MBDA paid a reported
£300,000 to exhibit at the meeting of world leaders at the 2014 NATO summit
(Reprieve, 2014). Access to politicians at these high-level functions as a result of
buying their way in is of extreme concern, particularly as they have proven to hold
so much influence.
Australian foreign policy decisions and weapons contractors, which mostly involve
US companies, are also inextricably linked. The US Asia Pivot can be seen as an
extension of the expansion of militarism in Australia. In 2011, President Obama
came to Australia to announce the shift in focus off the Middle East, towards the
Asia Pacific region (Cossa et al., 2009). Obama stated that the aim was to create jobs
and opportunity for the American people by solidifying the larger and long-term role
the US has in the Asia Pacific region (Obama, 2011). Deep in his speech, President
Obama stated that the US Government will be decreasing their military spending
whilst maintaining military presence and interests in the region (Obama, 2011). But
whilst the US was spending somewhat less, Australia and other allies were spending
more on US military products in return for their ‘presence’ in the region. Almost all
of Australian military spending goes to US corporations (Keane, 2012a; SIPRI,
2016).
Key to the success of the US global plan has also been the increased militarisation of
countries who are traditionally independent or pacifist. The Japanese Government
under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe changed their constitution to remove its pacifist
clause, and for the first time in 2014 allowed the export of military products and
participation in weapons-development programs in order to grow its defence industry
(AFP, 2014a). The first transfer was a Patriot Advanced Capability-2 (PAC-2)
infrared seeker that is attached to missiles to track incoming targets. These weapons
are produced by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, and they are under licence from the
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US company Raytheon (AFP, 2014a). The Japanese Government also ordered the F35 Joint Strike Fighter (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2014). In
accordance with the 2009 think-tank strategy for the Obama Administration, Prime
Minister Abe visited Australia in July 2014 to strengthen military ties with the
Australian Government, thereby fulfilling the goals of the regional alliances
necessary to the US Government strategy of military dominance.
Military spending by Western nations makes up over half of the total global military
spending (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2014). Figure 19 demonstrates
that the US Government topped the list in 2015-2016 at US$597.5 billion, whilst
China sat in 2nd place at US$145.8 billion, and US allies Japan in 8th place at
US$56.2 billion, and Australia, 12th place at US$22.8 billion.
Figure 19- Top 15 Defence Budgets 2015-2016

(Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2016)
The US Government is the largest arms exporter globally (SIPRI, 2016). It is
estimated that the US has exported US$108 082 million worth of weapons since
2002 (SIPRI, 2016). The largest arms importers are India, closely followed by Saudi
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Arabia, then China and the United Arab Emirates (SIPRI, 2016). The arms trade
inevitably provides significant support for the US economy.
But the issue is not just the vast economic and political power that defence
contractors have, it is the considerable influence they exert on the media landscape,
either directly, or indirectly (Der Derian, 2001). Norman Solomon’s (2005) book
War made Easy details the links between companies like General Electric and the
influence they had on the reporting on the successive military interventions in Iraq.
Solomon (2005) notes that military contractors are able to exert media influence in
several ways, including the use of paid advertisements as well as more overt means.
For example, General Electric had $2 million in military contracts during the Gulf
War, and also owned the US media company NBC. Inevitably, the reporting on the
Gulf War was skewed and served a pro-war agenda (Solomon, 2005).
The links between private military contractors, government and the media in
Australia are less overt, but there is significant overlap. For example, the Head of
Communications at Lockheed Martin Australia is a former DFAT employee, and
previously worked for Defence South Australia (Lockheed Martin, 2016). The NonExecutive Chairman of Prime Media Group, which includes Sky News Australia, has
worked as an advisor for the American Australian Association, which was
established by American bankers and “has provided an important forum for
exchange between political and business leaders across the United States and
Australia. Every Australian Prime Minister…[has] been among the many individuals
hosted by the Association” (American Australian Association, 2016). One of the
Patrons of the Association includes the Chairman of military contractor and weapons
manufacturer, the Boeing Company, W. James McNerney (American Australian
Association, 2016). Before taking the role as the Association’s Chairperson, Jennifer
Nason was the Managing Director and Global Chairman of Technology, Media and
Telecom Investment Banking at J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. (American Australian
Association, 2016). The Association’s Board of Directors and Patrons also includes
Jim Kennedy and Robert Thomson, both holding executive positions at the most
influential media organisation in Australia, News Corp. (American Australian
Association, 2016). Coincidently, News Corp. chairman, Rupert Murdoch is also a
Patron of the American Australian Association. Murdoch’s News Corp. dominates
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the Australian media landscape (Pusey & McCutcheon, 2011), and has long been the
make-or-break of successive Australian Prime Ministers, even though he runs his
media empire from the US. For example, Murdoch’s support for Kevin Rudd
correlated in positive media stories that eventually saw him elected in 2007 (“Rupert
Murdoch backs Rudd as future PM”, 2007).
Given the apparent incestuous link between private military companies and
manufacturers, politicians, policy formulation and media, the network of militarised
systems plays a large role in the function of the deep state and the cover-up of
torture. Indeed, this has filtered through to different parts of the world. This
phenomenon has never been more apparent than since the events of 9/11.

Australia and the Expansion of Militarism
The increased military collaboration between the US and Australian Government has
served as a mechanism for supporting torture and its cover-up. This coincided with
the expansion of military ties between the Australian and US Government over the
past two decades, and the increasing presence of US troops and bases on Australian
soil. Put simply, whilst the Australian state is militarily, economically and politically
enmeshed with US military presence and support, the Australian Government’s
allegiance to its own citizens is compromised and regarded as secondary to foreign
powers and private entities, as was clearly the case with the Australian victims of US
Government sanctioned torture.
Concern over US military presence became an issue during the Cold War era, in
light of the substantial number of US bases and the secrecy surrounding their
activities, resulting in a likelihood that Australia would become a target in a nuclear
conflict. This was “because many [US bases] had deterrence or warning factors
associated with US nuclear forces” (McCaffrie & Rahman, 2014, p. 89).103
However, this opposition dissipated after the end of the Cold War when the
Australian Government’s position shifted to the US presence being necessary to
ensure the peace and security of the Asia Pacific region (McCaffrie & Rahman,
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The full extent of the activities of US Government bases still remains controversial. The US
Government does not disclose the full extent of the operations to the Australian people (McCaffrie
& Rahman, 2014, p. 97).
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2014, p. 90). Acceptance of US military presence in the region has been somewhat
dependent on political parties. As Jack McCaffrie and Chris Rahman (2014) state, at
times when various Labor Governments have been in power, the US Government
has threatened to cut off intelligence flows to Australia and so the government had
very little control over them (p. 98). However, this appears to have changed as a
result of 9/11.
Since 9/11, the US-Australia alliance has been at the core of Australia’s National
Security Strategy for both the Liberal and Labor parties. As the 2009 Defence White
Paper states “The Government’s judgement is that strategic stability in the region is
best underpinned by the continued presence of the United States through its network
of alliances and security partnerships…The contribution of these facilities to global
U.S. capabilities both strengthen the alliance and greatly enhance our own
capabilities” (Commonwealth of Australia, 2009, p. 43; 94). A recent Australian
Army report points out that, whilst the US will continue to remain the “strongest
military power”, China’s growing military power will influence Australia’s military
strategy which incorporates potential conflict in the East, South-East and South Asia
(Dorling, 2014a). This was echoed in the 2014 Defence Issues Paper which
reinforced the alliance with the US as “integral” to Australia’s defence and security
arrangements (Australian Government, 2014b, p. 6).
With growing concerns over the rise of China and ‘challenges in the Asia Pacific
region’, the US Government shifted its focus off the Middle East, and instead looked
to Australia as key to its military presence in the region (McCaffrie & Rahman,
2014, p. 90).104 In 2011, President Obama came to Australia to announce the US
Global Posture Review which was seen as the most “important development in the
operational arrangements under the alliance since the striking of the joint facilities in
the 1980s” (Smith, 2011, p. 12942). The 2011 Australia-United States Ministerial
Consultations (AUSMIN) communique outlines increased access to training
104

Hartley (2014) argues that the withdrawal of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa
(BRICS) from the Western dominated monetary system created under the Bretton Woods agreement
has also created strain. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank were shaped and
have been controlled by Western interests, so the BRICS countries have created a new BRICS New
Development Bank which will finance sustainable development projects and provide assistance to
members in financial difficulty. This has created a decentralisation of economic power and a shift
away from Western controlled economic systems (Hartley, 2014).
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facilities, access to ports and increased joint activities in the Asia-Pacific region
(AUSMIN, 2011).
The foreign policy implications of having increased US military presence in
Australia, and an unquestioning alliance, are extremely significant given it is an
apparatus that carries out and supports the use of ‘illegal’ war, torture and cover-up.
Former Liberal Prime Minister Malcom Fraser, went so far as to term the USAustralian alliance as “dangerous” (Fraser, 2014). The alliance has reduced
Australia’s international credibility as an independent, sovereign state on a number
of occasions, including the proposal for a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean that was
later rebuffed because of US Government pressure (Brown, 1990). The involvement
of US bases and secretive government operations in the War on Terror has
reinvigorated this debate.
For example, although the Australian Government’s involvement in the CIA’s
extraordinary rendition program has been documented (Open Society Justice
Initiative, 2013), there is a significant possibility that Australia was more involved
than previously revealed. For instance, the US Air Force has long deployed from the
military base in Darwin, Australia to Diego Garcia, a small island in the Indian
Ocean which is British territory (UK Intelligence and Security Committee, 2007).
The base in Diego Garcia was used as part of the extraordinary rendition program
(UK Intelligence and Security Committee, 2007). If Darwin was used, this would
raise serious concerns as to the Australian Government’s knowledge of the
operations of the US Government on Australian soil. It is unlikely that the public
will ever know whether Darwin was a transit point for renditions from Diego Garcia.
The Australian Government has stated that it has a policy of “full knowledge and
occurrence” of the activities of foreign governments (Australia-United States
Ministerial Consultations [AUSMIN], 2010). Despite this, it asserts that this does not
mean the Government approves “every action or tasking; rather we approve the
presence of a capability or function in support of its mutually agreed goals, based on
our full and detailed understanding of that capability and the uses to which it can be
put” (AUSMIN, 2010).
The use of Australian facilities as training grounds for US forces also contributes to
this concern, and demonstrates the enmeshed nature of US-Australian relations. In
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2005, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed for a Joint Combined Training
Centre (JCTC), which provided for joint training exercises in several facilities, and
included the Australian Government’s agreement to host B-52, B-1 and B-2 long
range bombers (McCaffrie & Rahman, 2014, pp. 102-103). Operation Talisman
Sabre is a joint training exercise between the Australian and US military that occurs
every year in Shoalwater Bay, Queensland. During these ‘war games’ live
ammunition is used and military personnel are put through a range of military
exercises. The training that takes place on Swan Island remains much less
documented, but as raised in Chapter Three, it appears Swan Island is used to train
the JSOC equivalent, 4 Squadron. The joint training of JSOC with Australian SAS
forces is also concerning. Little has been revealed about the types of training that
Australian and US forces engage in, and my FOI requests seeking clarification as to
whether 4 Squadron and JSOC have been training in relation to interrogation
techniques have blocked over the years, and are being appealed before the
Administrative Appeals Tribunal.
The number of military and weapons contractors operating in Australia is also an
indicator of the function of the deep state. Not only do key US weapons
manufacturers have offices in Australia, the technology used to create weapons is
also found in the Australian facilities. These weapons are used in such conflicts as
the Israel siege on Gaza, drone strikes in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Syria, and the
continuing conflicts in Africa (American Friends Service Committee, 2014). The
three top arms producing companies, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman and
Boeing, all have offices in Australia, and the reach of these companies which operate
on Australian soil is vast. In 2015, 78 per cent of Lockheed’s sales were from the US
Government and 21 per cent were classed as international sales (Lockheed Martin,
2016a). The Australian Government awarded Lockheed an initial seven year contract
worth US$750 million to train defence force pilots (Lockheed Martin, 2016a). And,
in 2015, the Australian Government also signed an AU$665.7 contract with Boeing
to provide communication and information systems (Boeing, 2015). Figure 20
demonstrates the reach of Lockheed, Boeing and Raytheon, just three of many
military contractors which operate in Australia.
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Figure 20- Table Demonstrating the Global Reach of Weapons and Military Technology
Suppliers, Lockheed Martin, Boeing and Raytheon
Company

Lockheed Martin

Location of
Headquarters
USA: Maryland

(World’s largest
arms

Weapons/Technology Used


F-16 Fighter Jets

Mainly US, but also



Longbow Hellfire

Israel, UAE, UK, Saudi

Missiles

Arabia, Qatar, Australia,

AH-64 Apache Longbow

Malaysia, Taiwan, Kuwait

helicopter parts

(and other un-named



Laser Weapons

Middle Eastern countries),



Robotics/Autonomous

Japan, Europe (Norway,

operations

Netherlands, Italy,

Hybrid Airships

Germany)



manufacturer)

Supplies to



Etc.
Boeing

USA: Chicago

(Boeing Defence
Australia)



F-15 Fighter jets

US, China, Israel, Africa,



Apache Helicopters

Middle East, India,



B-52 Bomber

Europe, Australia, and



Super hornet

around 1000 “un-



Maritime Surveillance

identified” orders.



Missile Defence



Phantom Badger & Eye



Space systems (GPS)
etc.

Raytheon

USA: Boston



Largest producer of

US, Canada, Israel,

Guided Missiles

Europe (Germany,



Cluster bombs

France), UK, Asia Pacific



Bunker Busters

(India, Australia), Middle



Radar Systems

East (Saudi Arabia,
Bahrain, Egypt, Morocco,
Oman, Qatar, UAE,
Jordan, Kuwait, and
others)

Note: Data from Lockheed Martin (2015), Boeing (2016), and Raytheon (2016).
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A particularly disturbing trajectory of these companies is the expansion of weapons
that can be used to torture from a distance. For example, Raytheon has marketed a
microwave weapons system called Silent Guardian that projects a beam of
microwave energy into the target causing burning pain (Wright & Arthur, 2006).
This is but one of many microwave energy weapons that are designed to target
humans from a distance and may be used to torture. The diversification of weaponry
that may facilitate torture is therefore concerning given the global reach.
Also demonstrating the political and economic enmeshment
is the increased role Australia has played in the arms trade

Figure 21- TIV of Arms
Exports From Australia
(Source: SIPRI, 2016)

since 9/11; and with increased involvement has come an
even greater lack of oversight. In 2010, an agreement made
between the US, UK and Australia allowed for the
unlicensed trade in arms and services between the countries,
and was described by arms trade researchers as ‘scandalous’
(Feinstein, 2012). This agreement has inevitably allowed
for deals to be done behind closed doors, without the
knowledge of the public. Whilst a minor player in the arms
trade compared to the US, China and Russia, Australia is an
arms exporter. As Figure 21 demonstrates, most of
Australia’s arms exports in 2014-2015 supplied the US,
Indonesia, and to a lesser extent, New Zealand and Papua
New Guinea (SIPRI, 2016). These arms supplies to the US
and Indonesia, and the economic enmeshment it creates,
may serve as a contributing factor in explaining the
Australian Government’s collusion and cover-up of torture perpetrated at the behest
of both nations. Indeed, in his book Shadow World: Inside the global arms trade,
Andrew Feinstein (2012) demonstrates that privatisation of war, widespread
corruption and the increased level of covert operations post 9/11 has served as a
“parallel world of money, corruption, deceit and death” (p. xxii). Australia’s
increasing engagement with this parallel world should be of concern to citizens.
The reach and scope of the economic and political systems of militarism acting as an
agent of the deep state is therefore vast and characteristic of the way that particular
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interests are protected. The level of collusion between politicians, private military
contractors and the media provide the framework of cover up for covert practices
like torture.
However, these covert activities do not operate in a vacuum away from the day-today lives of the public. Indeed these private companies are key to the maintenance of
order and, in the process, stifling dissent to counter narratives that may be contrary to
the aims and goals of the deep state, including the cover-up of torture. One such
manifestation of this is the use of widespread surveillance by private security
companies, and the targeting of whistleblowers by the shallow state.

Surveillance State
There [are] now more investigations and prosecutions by the Obama
Administration of people under the Espionage Act – principally,
whistleblowers and journalists – than all previous presidents combined, going
back to 1917 – in fact, more than double – WikiLeaks founder, Julian
Assange (as cited in Goodman, 2014).
The power and functions of the state are intimately tied with the practice of
intimidation through the creation of the surveillance state, and solidifying the means
of control through global surveillance networks. The shallow state has used the
national security paradigm to practise surveillance as a means to protect the interests
of the deep state, including facilitating the cover-up of torture. This has served as an
element in the torture support network by facilitating the intimidation of
whistleblowers and torture survivors, ideological support in the form of infiltrating
social media platforms to control the narrative, and economic support due to the
considerable amount of money government’s provide to private corporations. The
practical and ideological functions of surveillance have also supported outrage
management strategies, such as the military engagement in psychological operations
that denigrate torture survivors (PSYOPS).
A number of governments involved in the War on Terror have asserted that broadscale surveillance is necessary to protect national security, however, there is little
evidence to defend this claim (Harris, 2014). Even Lance Cotteral, chief technology
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officer of private security firm Ntredpid,105 has stated that “widespread internet
surveillance tends to provide no real security benefits” (as cited in Webster, 2011).
Consequences of global mass surveillance include the chilling effect on freedom of
speech, the creation of norms that mean some forms of violence are deemed as
acceptable, and the stifling of dissent.
The mass surveillance system has been created in a way that aids in preventing war
crimes such as torture from being exposed, and several governments have taken a
punitive approach to whistleblowers and publishing organisations that have exposed
such evidence (Human Rights Watch, 2014b). Many recent examples have
exemplified this, including the punitive treatment and sentence given to Chelsea
Manning (formerly Bradley Manning),106 the investigation into Edward Snowden
and his malicious classification as a “traitor” by the Australian Attorney-General
George Brandis (Knott, 2014), and the ongoing “unprecedented in scale and nature”
investigation and persecution of WikiLeaks and its founder and editor Julian
Assange, who is an Australian citizen effectively imprisoned in an Ecuadorean
embassy (Dorling, 2015). It is apparent that the vilification of whistleblowers was
used as a tactic by the Australian and US Government to divert attention off the
either graphic, and/or widespread criminal activity that whistleblowers have
exposed, including the torture of US captives, and the extra-judicial killing of
civilians.
This is particularly the case for Chelsea Manning and her disclosure of caches of
classified documents and audio-visual material to the whistleblowing website,
WikiLeaks. Manning was an intelligence analyst for the US Army which gave her
access to classified material in relation to intelligence sources, foreign policy issues,
and military activities (Manning, 2013, p. 5). It was not until she was deployed to
Iraq that she thought to release the classified material because she felt:
that if the general public, especially the American public, had information
contained within the CIDNE-I and CIDNE-A tables it could spark a domestic
debate about the role of the military and our foreign policy in general as it
105

Ntrepid Corporation is advertised as a privacy and security firm. They held a USD$2,760,000
contract with the US Air Force in 2010 (Webster, 2011).
106
Chelsea Manning is undergoing treatment to change her gender from male to female.
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related to Iraq and Afghanistan. I also believed the detailed analysis of data
over a longer period of time by different sectors of society might cause
society to re-evaluate the need or even desire to even engage in
counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations that ignore the complex
dynamics of the people living in the affected environment every day
(Manning, 2013, p. 6).
Her concerns increased after she realised that many of the counter-terrorism and
counter-insurgency operations were “obsessed with capturing and killing human
targets on lists” and that there was growing distrust between the US military and the
host nation (Manning, 2013, p. 6). When sending the documents to WikiLeaks she
said, “this is possibly one of the more significant documents of our time removing
the fog of war and revealing the true nature of twenty-first century asymmetric
warfare” (Manning, 2013, pp. 6-7). Part of the truths that Manning thought the
public had the right to know about was the involvement, participation and
acquiescence of US military in the killing of civilians and the torture of Iraqi people
– both of which are deemed war crimes.
Manning was mostly concerned about the dehumanisation of people in the countries
being attacked and the lack of value for human life – such as the US military
referring to those killed as “dead bastards”, and the way that they “congratulated
each other on their ability to kill in large numbers” (Manning, 2013, p. 8). A video
depicting the indiscriminate killing of civilians, which would later be edited and
released by WikiLeaks under the title of ‘Collateral Murder’ (WikiLeaks, 2010a),
was one of the most important pieces of evidence of war crimes released by
Manning. The footage revealed not only the killing of civilians, and the apparent
satisfaction the US soldiers had in doing so, but also the secret public relations war
being fought on the public.
The film depicted a US military unit indiscriminately killing over a dozen people in
New Baghdad, Iraq from an Apache helicopter in what Manning described as
“blood-lust” (Manning, 2013, p. 8). Not only was there evidence that children and
two Reuters journalists were killed, but the film also clearly depicted how the Aerial
Weapons Team were looking for an excuse to kill when the voices of military
members can be heard calling for a wounded person to pick up a weapon so they
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could shoot them (Manning, 2013, p. 8). Later the film depicts the enjoyment of the
Aerial Weapons Team seeing one of the bodies being driven over by a ground
vehicle (Manning, 2013; WikiLeaks, 2010a).
Manning was eventually detained after revealing her identity to hacker Adrian
Llamo, who told authorities about Manning’s leaks to WikiLeaks, and her location
was tracked. Manning was held in particularly cruel conditions when first detained,
including being left in isolation for prolonged periods, and in conditions described as
inhumane by the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture (Mendez, 2012; Pilkington,
2012).107 Manning was eventually convicted of five charges under the Espionage Act
1917 (USA), which provides that criminal intent does not need to be established, and
was sentenced to 35 years imprisonment.108 Ironically, the day of her sentence was
National Whistleblower Protection Day, which marks the anniversary of the passing
of whistleblower protection legislation that was the first of its kind in the US
(Gosztola, 2014b). Manning is a prisoner of conscience, who was clearly troubled by
the information that she was receiving, as opposed to what the US Government was
telling the public.
Another targeted whistleblower was Edward Snowden, a former CIA employee who
became disenfranchised with the “continuing litany of lies” of senior US officials,
and Congress “wholly supporting the lies” (as cited in Reitman, 2013, p. 4). He told
New York Times reporter James Risen that “Trying to work through the system,
would only lead to punishment” (as cited in Reitman, 2013, p. 3). Snowden worked
for the NSA as a contractor for Dell, a computer company that maintains internal
NSA IT networks, and Booz Allen Hamilton which according to Rolling Stone was
“involved in every aspect of intelligence and surveillance” in the US (Reitman,
2013).109 Snowden became particularly concerned about the operations of the deep
107

Parallel to the situation in Guantanamo, the US Government would not allow Juan Mendez to have
an unmonitored visit, so Mendez declined the invitation to see Manning, and could not assess the
conditions of detention completely (Mendez, 2012, p. 75).
108
Establishing criminal intent is the cornerstone of criminal law matters – there was no burden
placed on the US Government to prove that Manning disclosed the material maliciously, in an
attempt to harm US relations or advantage a foreign government which is the usual requirement in
espionage cases (Gosztola, 2014b).
109
Whistleblower Thomas Drake noted that the mass expansion of the NSA through private security
contractors led to information being widely accessible because of the amount of people that needed
access. For example, a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 1978 (FISA) order used to be stored in
a safe that only a few people had access to, now files are digitised (Reitman, 2013).
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state, the involvement of corporations in furthering government secrecy, and the lack
of oversight of mass surveillance programs. He commented, “if the highest officials
in government can break the law without fearing punishment or even any
repercussions at all, secret powers become tremendously dangerous” (as cited in
Reitman, 2013, p. 4). Paradoxically, Snowden is currently under asylum protection
in Russia.
Massive resources were poured into the NSA after 9/11, and as a result, signals
intelligence or SIGINT expanded at Fort Meade, Texas, Georgia, Colorado, Utah,
and Australia’s Pine Gap (Reitman, 2013, p. 3). The number of private contractors
the NSA depended on more than tripled by 2013 (Reitman, 2013, p. 3).
At the request of the NSA, the US Government passed the Protect America Act 2007
(USA) in response to what it said was the loss of cooperation from telecom and
internet companies and in relation to so-called terrorist threats (MacAskill, 2014).
Not only did the legislation allow for the mass surveillance of the public, but it also
retroactively provided immunity for companies that engaged in unlawful wiretapping (MacAskill, 2014). Similar legislation was passed in the UK in 2014 at the
request of the UKs NSA counterpart, the Government Communications
Headquarters (GCHQ). The reason provided to the public was again, the emergency
justification of a terrorist threat that led to a lack of adequate scrutiny of the
legislation, and fear driven responses by policy makers (MacAskill, 2014). The UK
legislation requires overseas companies to comply with interception warrants and
data requests, and most troublingly, “to build interception capabilities into their
products and infrastructure” (MacAskill, 2014, p. 1).
The collection of metadata and electronic communications has also been a
cornerstone of the growth of the deep state in the Australian context. The Australian
Government has significantly expanded its collection of electronic, telephonic and
internet communications of Australian citizens. It is now mandatory for
telecommunications companies to keep metadata records for two years (AttorneyGeneral’s Department, 2015). It has forced some advocacy organisations and
individuals to use dark web programs, like Tor, to protect their location and enable
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the ability to carry out work securely.110 The significant breach of privacy has again
been premised on the national security paradigm and the supposed need to protect
the population from terrorism (Attorney-General’s Department, 2015). In reality
however, it is the continuing impingement on civil liberties that aids in propping-up
the state and its covert and sometimes sinister operations.
Predating 9/11, but of strategic importance in the War on Terror context, the desire
for global surveillance networks resulted in the ‘5 Eyes’ arrangement, which is an
‘intelligence sharing’ agreement between the Australian, Canadian, New Zealand,
UK and US Governments (Privacy International, 2016). The Australian Signals
Directorate (ASD) is the base for the Australian information collection and sharing.
This alliance was tasked at building a global surveillance infrastructure “to master
the internet and spy on the world’s communications” (Privacy International, 2016,
para.2). The agreement is largely secret, however, thanks to Edward Snowden, it is
now clear that Australia has access to intelligence from across the globe, and
conversely shares information that it gathers from the ASD with its partner
governments. Given that values and norms are shaped by the operation of
surveillance (Johnson, Regan & Wayland, 2014), and that these governments have
been implicated in sharing information gained under torture to target citizens, the
implications are concerning.
These surveillance programs have also resulted in the Australian Government being
further and more intimately linked with the morally dubious military and intelligence
operations of the US Government. For example, the joint CIA-Australian
intelligence facility at Pine Gap in the central desert of Australia has been central to
intelligence sharing and the coordination of international operations and SIGINT
since the 1960s (Ball, 1988).111 Successive authorities have stated that the role of
Pine Gap is to “perform government arms control function…the function of the
satellites was to collect intelligence data which supports the national security of both
110

The Tor Project was developed as a mechanism whereby people in oppressive countries could
bypass state censors and government surveillance programs to peruse the web without fear of their
location or search history being used to cause them problems with authorities – such as being
classified as terrorists. The program is used by journalists, activists and others who wish to protect
their location and identity. For more info, see www.torproject.org.
111
Pine Gap was actually established as a joint US-Australian facility in 1966, but it was only in
1977, after Whitlam’s dismissal, that the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)
became the cooperating US organisation at Pine Gap (Rosenberg, 2011, p. 45).
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Australia and the US…” (Rosenberg, 2011, p. 42). However, its main role is SIGINT
by performing a surveillance role through the collection of telecommunications and
espionage (Ball, 1988). This has only expanded since the events of 9/11, and the
nature of the facility has changed. Former Australian Prime Minster Malcom Fraser
(2014) raised the serious concerns about Pine Gap being used “to pinpoint targets in
real time” and to “facilitate targeted assassinations and drone killings” (p. 252).
Indeed, Pine Gap is now linked to military operations all over the world, and given
the US-Australian agreement behind the cooperation, Fraser (2014) states, “it is clear
that Australian personnel are involved in drone attacks, in assassination” (p. 252).
Apart from the obvious moral dilemmas associated with extrajudicial killing, the
secrecy surrounding the covert operations means that there is no accountability.
Fraser (2014) asks, “how can we allow Pine Gap, which is now at the very heart of
our relationship with America, to be used in such a fashion? Australian’s working
there are not covered by US law or by any Australian law” (p. 255). Pine Gap and
other US facilities on Australian soil continue to work outside any rule of law, and
external oversight. The use of Pine Gap in the killing of people all over the world as
a result of drone strikes is a serious and pressing human rights matter and
exemplifies the operations of the deep state as supporting the torture and
extrajudicial killing that characterises the War on Terror.
The other joint US Australian base on Australian soil that has caused some concern
in the War on Terror has been the Joint Operations Command, located in
Canberra.112 This facility is the primary coordination centre for joint military
operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq, and now assumedly, in the Horn of Africa.
Fraser (2014) notes that this facility signifies that Australian military operations are
completely reliant on the US for approval, which is an abrogation of sovereignty (p.
256).113 While this is concerning, an even greater issue is that these organisations are
unaccountable to the Australian parliament or public. Even the Inspector General of
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All US bases caused concern in the 1970s and 1980s, especially North West Cape. Much of this
was due to the nuclear debate.
113
Fraser (2014) also notes the play in language. Australian and US political leaders have been using
the term ‘rotating through’, or removing references to the “US” in an attempt to deny that the
presence means that the US has established bases. Fraser stated: “That was no more than a changing
façade. It made no difference to the way in which the base was used. It was still an American base”
(p. 257).
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Intelligence and Security (IGIS) has a limited public role, and the Australian people
are largely unaware of the actions of Australian intelligence services.
Another feature linked to the expansion of the surveillance state is the new ways that
an agency determines who can be labelled as terrorists. Despite resistance from the
Bush and Obama Administrations, the rules for designating people as ‘terrorists’
were released to the public in 2013. It was revealed that the Obama Administration
expanded its terrorist watch-list system enabling agencies to designate anyone a
terrorist

without

“concrete

facts”

or

“irrefutable

evidence”

(National

Counterterrorism Center, 2013, p. 1; Scahill & Devereaux, 2014). The US National
Counterterrorism Center report outlines the secret rules for designating a person a
terrorist risk, and demonstrates that the US Government now has the ability to label
entire groups of people as terrorists; in the process placing them on a terrorist
database, triggering enhanced security at airports and designating them to no fly lists
(National Counterterrorism Center, 2013). This precarious situation allows for
individuals, and even family members, to be blacklisted without any evidence
(Scahill & Devereaux, 2014).
The impact of these no-fly lists has been felt on all corners of the globe, and
numerous cases have arisen showing that innocent people have been caught up in
this massive surveillance system and designated an ‘enemy of the state’, without any
grounds, or for simply being vocal about issues that are perceived to counter US
interests (Armengol, Johnson & Regan, 2014). Lawyers for activists and
whistleblowers have been caught up in the system, and have been intercepted at
airports because of these lists (Keane, 2012b).114
More generally, widespread surveillance has led to activists and whistleblowers
being arrested and charged for subversive activities (Croeser, 2008). This is another
mechanism of control utilised by the shallow state in order to support the interests of
the deep state. Indeed, the use of surveillance is intimately tied to the economic and
political functions of militarism and the increasing militarism in the form of cyber
warfare. The frontlines of today’s wars are mostly on computer screens, not soldiers
114

Human rights lawyer Jennifer Robinson was designated an ‘inhibited person’ when trying to board
a flight from Heathrow airport. She is a supporter of WikiLeaks and has advised Julian Assange
(Keane, 2012b).
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engaging in hand to hand combat. This is characteristic of the expansion of the deep
state post 9/11.

PSYOPS – The New Frontline
War is never fought solely on the battlefield and the revelations of WikiLeaks and
Snowden have exemplified this. The importance of having control over the cyber
world has increased since 9/11, and is inextricably linked to the way that outrage
against torture is inhibited simply through the power to set the narrative and control
responses. PSYOPS refers to part of the Information Operations carried out during
times of war; they are sometimes called Influence Operations (Rampton & Stauber,
2003). Dana Priest and William Arkin (2011a) describe Information Operations as
“operations primarily engaged in influencing foreign perceptions and decision
making. During armed conflict, they also include efforts made to achieve physical
and psychological results in support of military operations” (p. 58). They can be in
the form of planted media stories to manipulate an audience into supporting
American interests (Priest & Arkin, 2011a; Rampton & Stauber, 2003), or planting
pro-torture and dehumanising articles to lessen the outrage at the torture of people
deemed enemies of the state. PSYOPS have long been used to manipulate public
opinion, including during the Gulf War and the 2003 Iraq invasion, when public
relations companies and the CIA were involved in setting up locals with US flags in
order for television cameras to stream the manufactured pictures into Western living
rooms (Rampton & Stauber, 2003).
After 9/11, the US military’s Special Operations Command spent millions of dollars
funding pro-democracy/America media campaigns in the Middle East, as well as
generating fake online personas to “create fissures within terrorist groups and
deceive them about US operations” (Priest & Arkin, 2011a, pp. 89-90). This resulted
in US spies infiltrating chat rooms where individuals were uploading terrorism
related material, and then sending out Special Forces to capture and kill the resultant
‘targets’ (Harris, 2014, p. 19). Priest and Arkin (2011) note that the military were
careening into areas such as “propaganda, public relations and behaviour
modification messaging” (p. 91).
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For example, in 2011, it was revealed that the US military were developing software
whose purpose was to create fake online personas, known as ‘sock puppets’, to
influence debate and opinion (Fielding & Cobain, 2011). The purpose was to have a
round-the-clock system of US service personnel to respond to conversations and
debates. The Guardian reported that the program is likely part of Operation Earnest
Voice (OEV), which was developed as a psychological warfare weapon in Iraq to
“counter extremist ideology and propaganda and to ensure that credible voices in that
region are heard” and according to General Petraeus, to be “first with the truth” (as
cited in Fielding & Cobain, 2011, p. 2).
Cyber-warfare is now a key function of all US combat, whether in relation to
capturing and killing ‘insurgents’, remote killing by drone strike, or propaganda
techniques (Harris, 2014). Consequently, cyber warfare has turned into an industry
where military, intelligence and private security contractors have blurred the lines
between winning hearts and minds, and stifling dissent – including opposition to
torture and the treatment of prisoners. For example, In 2010 WikiLeaks was set to
release “potentially” embarrassing information on the Bank of America (Harris,
2014, p. 114). The Justice Department had the Bank contact the law firm Hunton &
Williams who had put together a team of companies to run a “cyber propaganda
operation against the US chamber of commerce” called Team Themis (Harris, 2014,
pp. 114-115). Team Themis included Plantir technologies, who coincidently had the
backing of Richard Perle and former CIA director George Tenet and worked with the
CIA Special Operations Command and the US Marine Corps (Harris, 2014). The
idea of Team Themis was to collect information on WikiLeaks supporters and
volunteers “in order to intimidate them” and submit fake documents so that
WikiLeaks would publish them and they could therefore be discredited (Harris,
2014, p. 115). This attack on WikiLeaks came after the embarrassing State
Department releases showing the extent of cover-up in relation to torture that was
occurring in Iraq and Guantanamo. The plan did not work, but it was still indicative
of the level of collusion between these private contractors serving as covert
operatives and shallow government.
The military has also purchased software programs that give their operatives the
ability to pose as fake personas in order to give the impression of support of a
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particular government policy, or to discredit people’s views. In 2011, Raw Story ran
a detailed article exposing the military’s use of ‘persona management software’ that
sets up credible looking internet profiles who have fictionalised backgrounds to
prevent their real identity from being discovered (Webster, 2011). Webster notes, “a
fake virtual army of people could be used to help create the impression of consensus
opinion in online threads, or manipulate social media to the point where valuable
stories are suppressed” (Webster, 2011).
The success of major persona software and the increased spying on activists has been
explored in the research of Eveline Lubbers (2012). Although set primarily in the
UK, Lubbers (2012) outlines the ways in which large corporations, including private
security contractors, seek to manage and manipulate public protest, and that
information has become the primary means of gaining and extorting their power.
Lubbers (2012) also outlines how the targeting of activists and other people and
organisations deemed to be political threats is widespread and performed in a
methodical way by state operatives.
This level of collusion has been apparent to activist communities in particular, and
when looking at the narratives on social media and chat forums. The Pentagon
recently funded research named the Minerva Research Initiative, that examined what
it termed ‘social contagions’ (i.e. the conditions for large scale social movements), in
the process militarising social science research and conflating peaceful activist
groups as being supporting of political violence (Ahmed, 2014).115 In effect, the
Pentagon-funded research assumes that peaceful social movements are a threat to US
national security (Ahmed, 2014). In Australia, the amended counter-terrorism laws
included provisions that extend intelligence agencies surveillance of computer
networks, extending ‘material support for terrorism’ definitions, which could, in
effect, target those individuals and groups who are calling for torture accountability.
Therefore, surveillance can be understood as another state imposed control
mechanism that serves to aid in the intimidation of whistleblowers, chill freedom of
115

The Minerva Research Initiative funds university research to further understand the “tipping points
for large scale civil unrest across the world… to improve DoD’s basic understanding of the social,
cultural, behavioural, and political forces that shape regions of the world of strategic importance to
the US” (Ahmed, 2014, p. 1). It was revealed that Facebook was used to conduct psychological
experiments on its users by hiding emotional words from people’s news feeds to test whether this
had an impact on their “Like” status (Gibbs, 2014).
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speech, control the narrative, delegate those critical of government policy as terrorist
threats, and serve the agendas of powerful entities and individuals. The connection
between private security companies as political entities is intimately tied to this
expansion of surveillance. All of this is sold under the cloak of protecting national
security, thereby legitimising the activities of private security contractors and
governments.

Conclusion
This chapter explored the broader operating systems that have underpinned and
supported the tactics of outrage management used by authorities and the media. The
politics of torture and terrorism provide an explanation of the way in which the state
and its agents created a social climate where violence is normalised and victims were
reframed as ‘others’ whose lives are deemed as less ‘grievable’. Power exerted by
the state in the form of violence such as torture, is framed as legitimate and
acceptable, and reframed as a moral act, when in reality it is a form of terrorism.
This ‘legitimate violence’ has permeated many institutions and aspects of modern
society, including the television programs and movies whose scripts are influenced
by agents of the state to present and normalise pro-torture and pro-war narratives.
Whilst those with political agendas continue to play politics, and left and right wing
political actors continue to fight between themselves, the state will continue to
benefit from the broader inattention towards their behaviours. These tactics primarily
serve as political and ideological support for the perpetration of state inflicted
torture.
The creation of a broad network of individuals, organisations and institutions that not
only participated in and facilitated the perpetration of torture, but enabled the coverup, is concerning. Their livelihoods and logic for existence is reliant on perpetual
war. This network includes the manifestation of two operating systems; the shallow
state, which includes the elected government and institutions such as courts, and the
deep state, which is unresponsive to most civilian leadership and includes
intelligence agencies, private security and military contractors. These systems
provide practical, economic and political support for the perpetration and cover-up of
torture. For example, the shift away from regular military towards PMSCs has led to
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covert torture being enacted, and served as an economic support due to the vast
amount of money changing hands. Further, those placed into positions of power
within these PMSCs have deep ties to governments, and can influence policy
decisions, thereby creating enmeshment.
The reality is that, whilst covert activities continue to operate out of the public eye
and away from any accountability, nothing will change, and the public focus will
instead remain on certain individuals as aberrations who need to be ‘modified’. The
privatisation of the military, the expansion of surveillance programs, and the
incestuous link between these broader networks that are completely reliant on each
other for economic and political influence, has proven to be a disastrous combination
for torture prevention. No matter who is elected, particular interests are being
protected, and covert operations continue regardless, and with impunity.
In addition, these extensive networks support outrage management techniques, and
suggest that the state is becoming better at implementing systems to keep the reality
from the public, and cover up crimes committed against ‘others’. The fact that they
have gone to so much trouble to create these networks also indicates that there was
opposition to torture.
However on a broader scale, it could be argued that the false comfort of democracy
has only served to pacify the masses, divert attention towards terrorism, and allow
those who do not respond to civilian leadership to carry out their roles with
impunity, leaving death, destruction and torture in their wake. This conforms with
Foucault’s (1979) theory which posits that in order for the state to carry out its
punishment of ‘docile bodies’ that supposedly need reforming, society is being kept
in a state of automatic docility, like cogs in the machine in order to maintain social
order. All the while, corporations, arms dealers and private military contractors are
in bed with politicians who use their influence to carry out and cover-up crimes
against humanity, and operate with immunity whilst they literally make a killing.
The legal system and investigatory bodies inevitably become participants in the
cover-up by providing the appearance of justice. Simultaneously, the victims of
torture are sold to the public as perpetrators, and the heinous acts committed against
them are left largely unchallenged. The social and political structure therefore
supports systematic torture, and the subsequent tactics of inhibiting outrage at
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injustice of torture due to the enmeshment between states, institutions, powerful
individuals and corporations.
Given the vast network of operation, and the breadth of its influence and control,
addressing torture within the current operating system appears to be a significant
challenge. Chapter Seven explores some methods of challenging structures that give
rise to torture. By no means exhaustive, the chapter explores some tactics to address
torture, including the ‘countermethods’ outlined in the Backfire Model (Martin,
2007) that seek to expose cover-up, re-humanise torture survivors and victims,
reinterpret events to promote the injustice, expose the ineffectiveness of official
channels, and expose intimidation. Finally, the following chapter explores whether it
is necessary to abolish the state in order to remove the mechanism that supports and
carries out torture and large-scale violence.
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Chapter 7: Eradicating State Torture?
It is time for the world to wake up…if we want to preserve and foster peace,
we must reject the coat hanger of national security, and turn once again
towards justice - Former Guantanamo prisoner, Shaker Aamer (2014, para.7).
The deep and shallow state have created the social and political condition that sees
violence such as torture, war and terrorism legitimised and normalised when it is
imposed by the state, particularly in the context of the War on Terror. There are two
important factors to consider. The first is the way power is exercised by the state and
deep state, which may be described as using torture as a means to impose and retain
power and control. The second factor is the network of support that has been created
to sustain the perpetration and subsequent cover-up of torture, and consequent
impunity. This functional support includes political, ideological, economic and
practical support, and includes institutions such as the media, the rise of militarism,
and the shift towards private security contractors rather than traditional military
forces.
This chapter explores the methods used to counter the inhibition of outrage at
injustice drawing on countermethods from the Backfire Model (Martin, 2007), such
as exposing cover-up, re-humanising torture survivors and victims, interpreting
events to highlight the injustice, exposing the ineffectiveness of official channels,
and exposing intimidation. Finally, tactics of nonviolence are explored as a means to
address torture at a structural level, given that the state cannot be relied upon to
protect rights and prevent torture, the limited effectiveness of torture prevention
activities so far, and the situation that sees democracies engage in covert ‘clean’
torture that mostly leaves no physical marks (Rejali, 2007).

‘Countermethods’– Promoting Outrage
One of the key purposes of the Backfire Model (Martin, 2007) was to provide
advocates with strategies to counter the methods used by those in authority to inhibit
or reduce outrage at injustice. These countermethods have been termed as tactics to
promote outrage, or tactics that allow appropriate outrage to be expressed in relation
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to a particular issue (Martin, 2007). Countermethod techniques include exposing
information about the injustice; validating the targets of injustice; interpreting the
events as unjust; mobilising public support and either avoiding or discrediting
official channels; and refusing to be intimidated and exposing the intimidation
(Martin, 2007, p. 7).
These techniques have been effective in several cases, most notably when blowback
occurred against the US Government when the photos depicting torture at the Abu
Ghraib prison were released (Gray & Martin, 2007). Truda Gray & Brian Martin
(2007) argue that whilst the photos served the primary purpose of circumventing the
usual processes that authorities use to stifle outrage, the success of the
countermethods was the combination of tactics that were able to “cut through”
barriers, and provide a platform for soldiers to engage in whistleblowing, and rehumanised the victims of torture (p. 138-139). The extensive media coverage, and
the number of journalists and publishers willing to speak out, created a situation that
prevented US authorities from stifling outrage. It was the combination of
countermethods that ensured success.

Exposing Cover-up
The exposure of information in relation to torture in the War on Terror has been
difficult, but it is one of the most pressing issues facing torture prevention
organisations. For example, the organisation World Without Torture, has noted that
limited awareness about torture is “perhaps the greatest challenge facing the antitorture movement today” (McAusland & Marmori, 2010, p. 4). Evidence suggests
that authorities have gone to great lengths to promote a culture of non-disclosure that
seeks to suppress evidence and prevent the public from being informed of the
complete situation. However, there are countermethods that can be used to address
this.
Social media has been particularly useful in spreading information to the public
realm, simply because it bypasses the media filters that have been used to skew the
message or promote a certain official framing of events. Social media is now an
invaluable asset for advocates to expose cover-up and disseminate information about
the tactics officials have used to minimise outrage.
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One of the core problems with social media, however, is the limited scope, and more
often than not, an inability to reach broader sections of the community. For example,
an anti-torture organisation may have a number of Twitter or Facebook followers,
but they are most probably already sympathetic to the cause because they have
‘followed’ in the first place, and those who hold pro-torture views are unlikely to see
or be sensitive to anti-torture posts. Sock-puppets and online persona management
software have also posed problems for advocates.
However, ‘hacktivist’ groups, such as Anonymous, have been particularly successful
at countering these issues (Knappenberger, 2012). Anonymous have engaged in a
number of strategies to spread information to a broad network of people, and have
been extremely vocal when it comes to challenging government narratives around
torture in the War on Terror. Anonymous is a diverse group of activists, but they
have successfully coordinated a number of global actions against torture. For
example, in 2013 Anonymous started the #OpGITMO campaign to show solidarity
with the prisoners which resulted in the US military shutting down its wireless
internet connection at Guantanamo (Toor, 2013). Part of Anonymous’ strategy was to
encourage people to phone, fax and email ‘bomb’ political leaders, and the group
posted contact details of White House and Department of Defense officials, and a list
of questions to ask them about Guantanamo (Toor, 2013). Anonymous has also
instigated a number of ‘Twitter Storms’ which use globally coordinated tweets to
give prominence to an issue with the use of hash tags such as #endtorture and
#GitmObama. Anonymous has played a key role in working with torture prevention
activists in disseminating alternative sources of information to the broader
community on social media because they have such a large following, particularly
with young people.
Social media is one of the most valuable tools advocates have in the War on Terror
context, and if organisations have broad networks, they can overcome some of the
major barriers encountered when trying to spread information, not only about torture,
but about the subsequent cover-up. Exposing the cover-up of torture can be as simple
as exposing the language used by mainstream media and politicians to curb outrage
and shift the focus off their own behaviours.
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It is still the case that gaining exposure in the form of mainstream newspaper and
online articles is one of the best ways to spread information about an injustice to the
mainstream public, especially if it is coupled with a television interview on
primetime programs. This kind of coverage can result in articles for weeks if
coordinated correctly. Coverage of this nature remains difficult to achieve, as many
papers are simply uninterested in addressing torture; particularly when there has
been a concerted effort to placate those in authority, the coverage would discredit
prior work by journalists that work at the same media organisation, or there is
increased coverage of non-state terrorism. There is also the problem of papers not
wanting to appear sympathetic to those accused of terrorism related offences,
regardless of whether or not they have been found innocent. This appears to have
impacted on the kind of stories printed about torture. Despite these issues, spreading
information about the issue of torture in the War on Terror is as important in the
present context as it ever was, and if this means engaging social or alternative media
as a primary platform, it is an important tool for anti-torture advocates. Creating
relationships with journalists that are ethical and trustworthy is an important part of
this.
Images are particularly useful, as was apparent when the Abu Ghraib photos were
released. Images can convey much more than words and can aid in humanising
torture survivors/victims. It is important that the culture of victim blaming is
addressed, and in order to do this, the focus must be on the actions of the perpetrators
of torture, rather than the alleged actions of the victims/survivors. However, it is
important that the perpetrators are not ostracised to the point where they feel unable
to speak out. Fostering a culture of blame can be somewhat counterproductive in
many aspects. Nevertheless, it is important that the image of victims as outcasts is
changed to a more inclusive picture as members of society who deserve protection
from torture.
It is also important to raise awareness about the vast networks of support that
collaborate in the perpetration of torture and subsequent cover-up. As the outlined in
the previous chapter, exposing the way in which states involved in the War on Terror
have politically and economically enmeshed themselves is important to shed light on
the level of collusion in the public realm. For example, this may entail social media
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posts or newspaper articles that raise awareness about the economic reliance on war
that is fuelled by protecting the economic and political interests of certain state and
corporate entities. This would provide a context for the public to understand how
mainstream narratives are manipulated and how the cover-up of torture and other
crimes against humanity are achieved.
The role of Non-Government Organisations (NGOs) is important in this regard.
Many NGOs have played a role in documenting cases of torture, and subsequently
raising awareness about the experiences of torture survivors. For example,
mainstream human rights organisations such as the Center for Constitutional Rights
are extremely active in representing Guantanamo prisoners, documenting their
experiences, representing them at Military Commissions hearings and relaying their
stories through the mainstream media. Medical documentation of torture has also
contributed to the exposure of cover-up. Organisations such as Freedom from
Torture and the International Rehabilitation Council for Torture Victims (IRCTC)
have successfully documented the experiences of US torture survivors and provided
a platform for interested researchers and activists to read about their experiences.
This has served as an effective way of exposing the cover-up of torture.

Validate Torture Survivors
One of the most important tools for promoting outrage in relation to torture is to
validate the torture survivors and victims. This is particularly the case due to the
significant evidence that points to the use of denigration tactics by those in authority
and the media. Legitimising the suffering of torture victims in the public realm is
extremely important given the serious psychological impacts of torture on survivors,
as well as the commonly used tactic of denigration to invalidate their torture
publicly. Many survivors and victims have been unable to convey their experience to
the mainstream, and their stories have been hijacked by those in authority to skew
the reality of their torture, or shift attention off their experience. Practically, this
means re-humanising people who have been victims of torture by ensuring that their
names are used when they are referred to publicly, instead of references to official
terminology like numbers, or other labels such as ‘detainees’ and ‘terror suspects’.
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Re-humanising the person by ensuring they are acknowledged as an individual and
firmly establishing their worth as a human being is crucial, rather than casting
victims/survivors as ‘others’. This could take the form of challenging those who state
that all people in Guantanamo are terrorists, or telling the stories of the men, women
and children who have been tortured in a sensitive way. Further, countering the
denial by officials or the methods of shifting attention off the crime of torture is also
important. An example is challenging official comments reprinted in a story that
asserts a person subjected to torture has ‘confessed’ to an apparent crime. This
strategy has been successfully employed by several NGOs and activist organisations
such as Witness Against Torture in the US and Reprieve in Britain.
It is most important to go to the primary source for information; this has been the
trap for some advocates and NGOs that have attempted to assist victims/survivors,
yet have written inaccurate stories/blogs that have not validated the victim’s
experience because it has contained unfounded allegations or inaccurate personal
information. Seeking accurate information is essential for conveying respect to the
survivor. More generally, promoting a sense of community is important in the public
space. This means promoting inclusion, rather than divisive communities. Using
positive imagery can be an important communication strategy.

Emphasise the Injustice
The interpretation of torture in the War on Terror as unjust is also crucial. One of the
reasons why the outrage management tactics used by authorities and the media have
been so effective is attributable to torture being presented as acceptable when
inflicted on ‘others’. Torture denigrates every person in the community, and
conveying the disastrous legacy of torture is extremely important for advocates.
Powerful narratives continue to pervade the public sphere that portray torture as an
anomaly that only affects a few people on the other side of the world whom
authorities deemed to be unworthy of rights. Many in the broader Australian and US
community are still largely unaware of what really occurred, and most would
probably be horrified if they knew the details.
It is important that the lies are challenged, including those that are spread not only by
officials, but the media organisations that parrot their claims uncritically.
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Challenging the minimisation of the impact of torture plays a role in this, and
includes challenging official narratives around torture that have framed it as ‘not that
bad’. Communicating the facts around torture and its devastating consequences,
therefore becomes a crucial step to convey the injustice of what occurred. This may
practically take the form of encouraging people to imagine what it would be like to
have a family member subjected to rendition and torture, and how they would feel if
no one was held to account for their family member’s loss and suffering. Promoting
the injustice can be as simple as using the language that exposes the act and
subsequent events as unjust. Ensuring that the focus is on the actions of the officials,
rather than the victims or survivors, is another way of emphasising the injustice.
Emphasising injustice can also take the form of exposing the power exercised by
officials and those who perpetrate torture to set pro-torture and anti-victim
narratives. This may take the form of creating mainstream awareness about the
tactics officials use to minimise the empathy people feel towards victims/survivors.
Some NGOs and activist organisations have been active in attempting to convey the
realities and injustice of torture to the mainstream public since the early years of the
War on Terror, particularly in Europe.
These are simple strategies, but can be very powerful if conveyed effectively.

Discredit Official Channels & Mobilise Support
It has already been established that official channels have failed to hold those who
ordered and carried out torture to account. One explanation is that “if agencies were
able to dispense justice, then powerful elites could be convicted of crimes, and
unequal social structures would be in danger of collapse” (Martin, 2007, p. 197).
Indeed, the legal system and even international human rights mechanisms have failed
to hold the chief architects of the torture program to account.
In this political climate, accountability for torture is a somewhat utopian idea. It is
general knowledge in political circles that governments should never commission
reports unless they know what the result is going to be (Hindess, 2014). So too, the
legal system has done little to comfort those who have been victims of torture
because of the way the system has been created. US Government lawyers have
crafted ways of generating jurisdictional nightmares, and Australia has followed suit
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in quiet acquiescence. Both sides of politics both in Australia and the US are largely
guilty of silence on torture, and there is no reason to suggest that this will change any
time soon, given the increasing militaristic ideology permeating the Australian and
US spheres of government. The legal system itself has aided in the cover up through
legal loop-holes like the State Secrets Privilege, or the ability for governments to
prevent information from being released under FOI on ‘national security’ grounds.
Therefore, raising awareness about the ineffectiveness of these official channels is
important, given that it is a general assumption that the legal system and other
channels dispense justice. Practically, this may require advocates to publicly
discredit

official

channels

by

creating

awareness

about

the

ineffective

‘investigations’ that have taken place as a result of torture allegations, and the
continued lack of accountability for those who orchestrated and covered up torture.
Exposing the limited scope of investigations, as well as the apparent appointment of
biased individuals to carry out investigations, is another method. Having publicly
respected individuals discrediting official channels is a powerful tool in this process.
For example, aiding the mainstream coverage of military whistleblowers who have
witnessed firsthand the reality for those detained as part of the War on Terror would
be one such strategy. Making the investigations or court cases public is also
imperative. If the public is unaware of what has occurred, those in authority will not
act because the political pressure is absent. As with the above tactics, timing is
everything.
Instead of utilising official channels, mobilise
public support. It is important to provide a
space where people can act, and feel effective
in taking action. This may mean harnessing
key events like International Torture Survivors
Day that takes place on 26 June every year.
Key events such as these are important dates to
utilise when raising awareness about torture in
the War on Terror, and they can also be used to
mobilise people. This has been a critical time

Figure 22 - Melbourne action at US
Embassy organised by the
Whistleblowers, Activists & Citizens
Alliance (WACA) and The Justice
Campaign on the Global Day of Action
to Close Guantanamo
(Source: Castro, 2014)
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for action for torture prevention organisations such as World Without Torture and
other activists. Timing is critical though. Spreading information about the use of
torture at times when people will be open to the message is necessary to
communicate effectively. Realistically, this is difficult given the social and political
environment in many countries, and the rising pro-torture attitudes that continue to
pervade the social landscape. If public mobilisation is absent, the inhibition of
outrage tactics will be successful because there will be no political will. Nonviolent
direct action is an excellent way of raising awareness and increasing political
pressure, especially if carried out in a coordinated in a way that can harness media
coverage.

Resisting Intimidation
The final countermethod examined here is resisting intimidation. Intimidation has
been a key tool authorities use to prevent torture victims and survivors from telling
their stories, as well as preventing whistleblowers from exposing their knowledge
about torture. Therefore, resisting intimidation is crucial in ensuring that the public is
made aware of what is happening. This may take the form of whistleblowers gaining
media coverage about the intimidation that has occurred, and in turn, public pressure
can be placed on authorities to protect whistleblowers from prosecution. Supporting
the work of organisations that allow the spread of information governments would
otherwise hide from the public is therefore important. This could be in the form of
supporting publishing organisations that have exposed information about torture, and
the whistleblowers that have provided information.
Supporting individuals and organisations who promote an anti-torture message is
extremely important in the context of the War on Terror. It has become a dangerous
time to speak out against impunity for torture, especially considering the legislation
passed to prevent the exposure of information, such as the Australian laws that
criminalise the publication of information about ‘special intelligence operations’
(Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, 2014b). These provisions can
consequently catch many who carry out torture prevention work, as most clandestine
torture programs are considered ‘special intelligence operations’. Providing support
to those who engage in these whistleblowing activities has never been more vital.
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Those who speak out are targeted by institutions that have a great deal of power and
resources behind them. Ensuring that they have support is key to resisting this
intimidation.
It is also important to become a credible advocate, and leaving political alliances at
the door when engaging in anti-torture advocacy is vital. Party politics only serves to
divide, and preaching to the converted is insufficient. Building up networks of
support will aid in ensuring that the work is not only supported, but also the
organisation or individual is supported sufficiently.
Most importantly, protecting the survivors from attack is essential if the public is to
ever become aware of the breadth of the torture program, and the extensive impact
on survivors and victims. If a survivor is trying to engage in a community that is
already pro-torture, it is unlikely that they will feel safe enough to convey their
experience. The media and other powerful institutions that promote pro-torture views
should also be exposed. This may take the form of blog posts and social media
coverage that confronts these organisations, or engaging in forms of nonviolent
direct action.
Exposing those involved in the torture program, especially those who have been
promoted, also forms part of this strategy. Equally, ensuring those who were either
complicit through their actions or their silence, are exposed for their behaviours is an
important countermethod. This could mean writing letters or boycotting
organisations that have promoted or employed those involved in torture and its
cover-up.
These countermethods are by no means exhaustive, but do provide a general guide
for advocates to counter the tactics used to reduce outrage at the injustice of torture
in the War on Terror. Over the past decade, there have been several key events that
have utilised countermethod techniques, and have been effective at raising awareness
about torture, such as spreading information to the mainstream public through the
publishing of newspaper articles and television interviews, and the spread of
information over social media. Several effective and persistent advocacy
organisations have continued to call for accountability in the US and Australia,
including the Center for Constitutional Rights and the American Civil Liberties
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Union. However, they have mainly taken action through existing structures like the
legal system, and lawsuits have been effectively blocked by authorities in many
cases, exposing the limitations of official channels.
Overall however, because of the breadth of the torture support network, these
techniques will only be effective to a limited degree, unless addressing official
channels is interpreted as challenging the entire system. Despite some damage to the
US Government’s reputation, torture continues and many people are still unaware of
the extent of the torture program. Some know what occurred, but are too concerned
about other issues, or are simply indifferent. Regardless of the many campaigns that
utilised the countermethod techniques listed above, there is no evidence of a
widespread outcry on the streets or calls for the people who were involved in the
torture program to be held to account. Indeed, there is little public support for an
independent investigation into the torture of Australian citizens overseas. Even
Amnesty International Australia dropped its ‘torture and terror’ campaign after
President Obama took office in 2009.116
A contributing factor to the limited effectiveness may be partially attributable to the
timing of the communication of these messages. This requires political awareness
and the ability for torture prevention organisations to judge social conditions. Unless
the public is open to hearing the messages there will always be limited impact. Part
of this relies on empathy being established in the broader community.

Empathy
There are many discussions that delve into the question of whether a human being is
born ‘evil’, or whether violence is a learned behaviour (i.e. the nature vs. nurture
argument) (Layton, 2006). There is some evidence to suggest that there are
predetermined genetics and brain structures that impede a person’s ability to
empathise, such as the evidence displayed in brain scans of people diagnosed with
116

Because Amnesty International Australia dropped the campaign, the organisation has not been
effective in continuing to engage in action that raises awareness about torture in Australia. In this
regard, it is important to note that the European context, in which there are overarching human
rights protections, is very different to Australia. For example, the Huridocs database, which is a
European database that documents human rights violations, is in my experience not very useful for
activists because of a lack of uniformity in data entry, it is inaccessible to Australians and not at all
useful in achieving broader structural change. Documenting human rights violations is most useful
when the information is distributed to a broader audience that are open to the message.
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psychopathy (Card, 2010). However, research has also determined that the
environment plays an enormous role in whether these behaviours are triggered and
nurtured in the ‘predisposed person’ (Card, 2010; Layton, 2006). In other words, if
an individual is brought up in a violent culture, where torture and state violence have
become normalised, there is a greater likelihood that these behaviours would
manifest, and inevitably become normalised.
There is another school of thought that sees empathy as a skill that is learned rather
than innate (Layton, 2006). Even though a person may be predisposed to certain
adverse behaviours, the culture and environment determine whether these behaviours
are triggered. This is not wholly determined by the family environment; even if
children are brought up in a supportive household that models universal respect for
humanity and indicates a belief that no one should be subjected to violence or
torture, the broader social culture will have a greater influence on a person’s
acceptability of torture or violence. For example, after 9/11, studies in the US
demonstrated that there was an increased level of moral disengagement during the
Iraq invasion – meaning that more of the US population thought that it was
acceptable to bomb Iraq, even if they knew civilians would be killed (Bandura &
Owen, 2006). This as well as other studies point to the fact that moral disengagement
is affected by broader social factors, such as the cultural environment that normalises
violence (Bandura & Owen, 2006; McAlister et.al., 2006).
The many arms of institutionalisation play a role in this. Through the process of
socialisation, contemporary Western society normalises the notion that if there is a
problem in the world, resolution will only occur through military intervention
(Nelles, 2003). This normalised state-inflicted violence is pervasive throughout
history and school books across the world (Nelles, 2003). War has almost become
interchangeable with peace, and is generally seen as the prerequisite to peace. Young
people in their teens and early twenties have only known a post- 9/11 world, where
the community is socialised into being afraid of ‘terrorists’, and believing that a
Global War on Terror exists because of the actions of non-state actors. In the US,
young people are immersed in a country that has been in perpetual war for decades,
and some see the high incidence of shootings as one such manifestation of the
cultural normalisation of violence (Robbins, 2012).
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Just like fifty years ago when the public were told to be afraid of communists, there
are not many serious discussions about peaceful solutions to terrorist threats, only
more military intervention, draconian legislation and increased surveillance.
Unsurprisingly, the social and political structure is not set up to encourage broader
empathy. Whether through the media that has established certain rules around whom
to portray sympathetically, or the divisive rhetoric of political leaders, there are
regular practices affecting empathy that are contributing to social norms and the
ongoing suffering of others. This inevitably causes a cycle of violence because of the
injustice that has been created, either perceived or real, and the fact that injustice has
not been addressed.

Structural Barriers
The operation of the state has a strong influence on the way people behave and,
importantly, whether violence is normalised and moral disengagement takes place.
Some argue that institutions, such as schools, teach children to conform, and be
obedient and passive to authority for most of their formative years (Chomsky, 1995;
Milgram, 1974). This remains a concern as there is evidence to suggest that
individuals with a predisposition to obedience are more likely to carry out the
infliction of pain if they are exposed to systematic training (Gibson, 1991). The
combination of obedience and the cultural normalisation of violence presents some
serious challenges in relation to torture prevention.
The structure of the modern state also means that a person cannot easily escape the
influence of the state and the particular culture of violence that has been established.
In contemporary Australia, most people have to work to eat, to get paid one must
have a bank account, when a person works they get taxed, if taxes are paid they
contribute to military spending, which in turn funds the purchase of weapons that kill
people in other nations, etc. The modern state therefore binds people to the system it
has created, and fosters the social conditioning that normalises state-inflicted
terrorism and violence and obedience. Indeed, the media’s narrative on who seems
deserving of human rights protections, and whether torture is seen as acceptable in
certain circumstances, is shaped by the state and its influence on social and political
life.
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Furthermore, it is apparent that state created institutions have contributed to the
maintenance of the torture support network. For instance, because the law has been
subverted by those who have engaged in the War on Terror, it is clear that the law is
insufficient in preventing torture. The legal system has not provided justice for the
victims/survivors. It was argued by Henry Thoreau (2000) that “cultivating respect
for the law” should not be the aim as, through this, people become part of oppressive
regimes (p. 172). In his seminal work Civil Disobedience, Thoreau states “Law never
made men a whit more just; and, by means of their respect for it, even the welldisposed are daily made the agents of injustice” (Thoreau, 2000, p. 172).
Similarly, this thesis has established that human rights have been subverted by
powerful entities and used as a tool of oppression rather than protection. The
proposition by Derrida (2001), as introduced in Chapter One, that human rights
narratives are employed by powerful states as a function of empire, rather than an act
of common humanity, has proven to be accurate in the War on Terror. This was
demonstrated through the extensive evidence of tactics employed by authorities to
minimise outrage and the supporting network to facilitate and cover-up the crimes
committed. Human rights have not been equally or universally protected, and those
who were tortured in the War on Terror have not been shielded by torture
prohibitions outlined in international declarations, treaties and conventions such as
the Universal Declaration on Human Rights 1949.
Even international bodies like the UN, which were supposedly created to provide
global cooperation and oversight, have only served to facilitate a lack of action
against torture in many respects. This has been through the creation of powerless
oversight mechanisms that are legally non-binding and are reliant on political will
and state compliance, or through investigatory bodies that are limited in scope and
merely give the appearance that something is being done about the injustice. Instead,
states are given UN platforms to assert mendacities to the public about their respect
for human rights, and the supposed steps they are taking to improve their human
rights record, when in actuality, they are just finding improved ways to hide the
brutal reality. The political institution of the UN is effectively unable to stop states
from committing torture, and it is unrealistic to rely on the UN to achieve
cooperation and oversight. One view may therefore be that the UN is only interested
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in targeting states that are politically expendable to more powerful interests in order
to give the general appearance that they are achieving change.
Further, it is also apparent that the work of whistleblowers and transparency
organisations such as WikiLeaks, has motivated institutions to become more
effective at covering up their activities. Torture expert Darius Rejali (2007) notes
that:
Public monitoring leads institutions that favour painful coercion to use clean
torture to evade detection, and to the extent that public monitoring of human
rights is a core value in modern democracies, it is the case that where we find
democracies torturing today, we also find stealthy torture (p. xviii).
This has resulted in the rise of psychological torture techniques; politicians creating
the public illusion that torture does not occur any more by engaging in specially
crafted public declarations that omit realities; passing legislation with loopholes that
allow torture; blocking journalists critical of the torture program from entering
places of detention like Guantanamo; and the removal of recording devices or log
books from detention facilities, as occurred on the US prison ships. There is also an
apparent move for politicians not to record conversations so that the paper-trail can
be protected from FOI release. In other words, torture has effectively been pushed
further underground so that the broader public is kept in the dark.
In a way, the situation proved to be better for anti-torture advocates in the early days
of the War on Terror when politicians and institutions that carried out torture were
still leaving a trail of their activities. Now, the state is using media blackouts and
other methods of stifling outrage more regularly and in a more effective manner. The
reality is that the countering tactics are limited by the broader structural and political
environment and, unless these structures are challenged and transformed, torture
with impunity will continue.
Torture in the context of the War on Terror has not only been instigated by the state,
but the state has also controlled the lack of accountability for those who ordered
torture and took part in it. In addition, the shallow state is complicit in controlling
and contributing to the narrative and continued lack of accountability, thereby
reinforcing the injustice. The whole structure of militarism serving political and
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economic interests is firmly entrenched in the modern state, thus contributing to the
normalisation of, and reliance on torture and violence, not only as a source of social
control, but also as the primary means of conflict resolution and to support the
economy. Because of the existence of the deep state, and the fact that it matters little
who is elected to government, the same policies and entrenched interests that support
violence such as torture will be prevalent no matter which political party is elected.
Consequently, the “atrophied version of democracy” offered by the state, and the
inability to enact radical change within the current system, renders the state “useless
in the struggle for progressive change” (Ross, 2008, p. 9). As one political
commentator noted in the 1970s, “there are no recorded instances to my knowledge
of despots resigning or secret police desisting from torture because they were asked”
(C, 1979, p. 165).
So, the state has become reliant on protecting itself, rather than citizens, and this is
achieved through coercion and war. Famously in Niccolo Machiavelli’s (2011)
formative work The Prince, he submits:
My new dominion and my harder fate
Constrains me to’t, and I must guard my
State (p. 75).
Because of the structures in place, and the broad-ranging networks that support the
functions of the state, an individual solution to torture, including the restoration of
empathy, and the tactics discussed in the countermethods above have been limited in
their effectiveness and are not sufficient to eradicate state sanctioned and inflicted
torture. The systematic nature of torture in the War on Terror requires a different and
more radical response.
Therefore, one might then surmise that the only way to address the culture of
violence and impunity is to dismantle and abolish the state (and, in the process, the
deep state) altogether, as the present situation appears to be creating, maintaining and
reinforcing the injustice. There are many different visions of a decentralised,
stateless world that include varieties of libertarianism and anarchism (Martin, 1995;
Ross, 2008). For example, Gandhi’s anarchist sarvodaya envisions a nonviolent
society which opposes hierarchy and proposes village-level democracy (Kantowski,
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1980; Ostergaard, 1985). However, alternatives are not explored in this thesis given
the complex and lengthy arguments that require in-depth examination, and this
concept is a thesis in itself. Instead, the following material focuses on the process of
achieving structural change, rather than the end goal, which would be an egalitarian,
nonviolent society.

Nonviolent Resistance
Violence does not live alone and is not capable of living alone: it is
necessarily interwoven with falsehood…It does not always, not necessarily,
openly throttle the throat, more often it demands from its subjects only an
oath of allegiance to falsehood, only complicity in falsehood – From the
Nobel Lecture of Alexander Solzhenitsyn delivered to the Swedish Academy
(1970).
There are many pre-conditions for radical change and political revolution has
become the focus of many texts. The concept of revolution has changed over the
years, with medieval and post-medieval theories focusing on exchanging the person
who happened to be in authority, rather than a rebellion against established authority
(Arendt, 1965). Some resist complete change and advocate for minor changes within
the current operating system (Carroll, Lakey, Moyer & Taylor, 1979), for example,
proposing legislative reform to broaden the definition of torture. The current social
and political situation in the Australian, UK and US contexts could largely be seen as
stuck in ‘reformism’. There have been tweaks to the current system, such as policy
changes, however, they have continued the maintenance of the social and political
order which favours particular groups of people, and serves to facilitate and hide
torture. Therefore, grassroots activists focus on the importance of the development of
a movement for radical change. Given the focus on torture as a means of the state to
uphold its power, the use of nonviolent tactics to enact change is crucial.
Precursors of modern nonviolence theory include ancient religious traditions such as
Hindu teachings of Ahimsa (nonviolence) and Taoism which directs that “violence
goes against the very grain of the universe” (Zunes, Kurtz & Asher, 1999, p. 3).
Nonviolent action has been central to successful uprisings against authoritarian
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regimes for centuries, and the earliest nonviolent insurrections can be traced back to
ancient Egypt (Zunes, Kurtz & Asher, 1999).
Over the past century in particular, nonviolent struggles have overthrown numerous
authoritarian regimes and created substantial reforms in others (Zunes, Kurtz &
Asher, 1999). Gandhi’s satyagraha, which eventually saw the ousting of the British
colonial rulers, is a famous example. The effectiveness of nonviolence can also be
demonstrated in the resistance to Nazi occupation in several European countries, the
toppling of Indonesian dictator Suharto in 1998, the 1986 people power movement in
the Philippines that resulted in the removal of Marcos from power, as well as the
removal of autocratic regimes in Serbia (2000), Madagascar (2002), Georgia (2003),
and the many other instances that resulted in major social and political change
(Ackerman & Duvall, 2000; Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011, p. 5-6).
Research conducted by Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan (2011) demonstrates
that nonviolent campaigns against repressive regimes conducted between 1900 and
2006 were twice as likely to achieve full or partial success compared to campaigns
that utilised violent methods (p. 7). The reason for success is that nonviolent
campaigns have an advantage of attracting the support of all citizens, and therefore
they do not face obstacles to the moral or physical involvement. This higher level of
participation and contribution results in nonviolent social movements being more
effective at creating civic disruption and therefore more likely to shift loyalties
among opponents (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011). Additionally, the researchers
found that of all the conflicts they examined from 1900-2006, nonviolent resistance
was able to provide more durable and internally peaceful democracies (Chenoweth
& Stephan, 2011). This research provides support for the view of anarchist and
pacifist Bart de Ligt, who argued that “the more violence, the less revolution” (de
Ligt, 1989, p. xxix).
It has also been argued that nonviolent tactics come naturally to people, and that
most human interaction is essentially nonviolent (Boulding, 1999; McAllister, 1999).
This is a great strength of nonviolence, and forms the basis of many successful
movements over the years. Examples include the Egyptian princess and Hebrew
slave who protected a male child from being slaughtered by the pharaoh in 1300 BC,
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and the Argentinean Mothers of the Disappeared who challenged authorities and
demonstrated at the Plaza de Mayo in order to defy the military regime that
abducted, tortured and killed their children (McAllister, 1999). The Mothers of the
Plaza de Mayo brought the plight of their children and community to the world
through their simple (and brave) acts of defiance. The mothers did not need
extensive military training, nor did they need to carry arms in order to resist the
authorities. It came naturally for them to protect their children and join together as a
community.

Process
The process of resistance to the state can take many forms, but some of the most
common nonviolent methods include tactics of protest and non-cooperation such as
strikes, boycotts, mass demonstrations, destruction of symbols of state authority
(such as identification papers) and tax refusal (Galtung & Jacobson, 2000; King,
Zunes, Kurtz & Asher, 1999). These techniques have been classified and
documented by nonviolence researcher Gene Sharp (1973). Sharp (1971) sees the
waging of social and political conflict through nonviolent means as the only solution
to the problem of politically inflicted state violence. Sharp (1971; 1973) posits that if
there is general conformity, then the ruler becomes all powerful, therefore noncooperation forms the underlying basis for nonviolent action. Dr. Martin Luther
King Jr. (1970) also advocated nonviolent direct action as a means to challenge the
state. King (1970) saw the creation of tension as the door to open up negotiations
with authorities, such as the use of sit-ins and protests. He saw these acts of
disobedience as a challenge to the regime itself and they reinforced the illegitimacy
of the structure.
Many proponents of nonviolent action such as Gandhi and King contend that
complying with unjust laws is as bad as perpetrating injustice. As already briefly
touched on, it could be argued that by paying taxes and accepting government
services, citizens are participating through cooperation and silent complicity in state
structures that have enabled torture in the War on Terror. Certainly, Thoreau (1970)
argued that paying taxes was a form of paying homage to “and support [for] our own
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meanness” (p. 17). Therefore, he saw civil disobedience as every person’s
obligation. He said:
If the injustice has a spring, or a pulley, or a rope, or a crank, exclusively for
itself, then perhaps you may consider whether the remedy will be worse than
the evil; but if it is of such a nature that requires that it requires you to be the
agent of injustice to another, then, I say, break the law. Let your life be a
counter friction to stop the machine. What I have to do is to see, at any rate,
that I do not lend myself to the wrong I condemn (Thoreau, 1970, p. 19).
This can be translated into refusing to comply with laws that aid the culture of
secrecy and non-disclosure in relation to torture and supporting or becoming a
whistleblower. Thoreau (1970) would consequently argue that there is an onus on all
members of society not to comply with any laws that perpetuate injustice. This
extends to those unjustly detained in places like Guantanamo Bay and other black
sites. Whilst one person is unjustly detained, Thoreau (1970) argues that the true
place for a just individual is also in prison.
Ultimately, the state is reliant on widespread obedience and compliance to carry out
its functions, including violent activities. To a large extent, the exercise of power by
the state is dependent on a community believing in the legitimacy of those who hold
power, and that the structure itself is legitimate (Boulding, 1999). Remove the
legitimacy, and the pillar of support is removed. As one nonviolence theorist
contends, “we tend to regard as legitimate those structures from which we feel we
can benefit” (Boulding, 1999, p. 12). Withdrawing support for the state is therefore
necessary to enact structural change. As the quote by Solzhenitsyn at the beginning
of the section suggests, all that is required for violence to go unperturbed is ultimate
allegiance to the state, and silent complicity then follows. Accordingly, only when
people’s allegiance is turned to their fellow human beings will the state that
facilitates torture be subverted.
Whistleblowers who work within the structure of military and intelligence agencies
have already refused to comply with confidentiality clauses they were forced to sign,
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and leaked information to the public resulting in powerful outcomes.117 In addition,
the work of publishing organisations like WikiLeaks have aided in challenging the
system by exposing the violence inflicted by the state, the massive abuses of power,
and the underlying political machinations that supported these actions. Some have
argued that as a result of the releases, the ripple effect continued for many months
and contributed to people-power movements, such as the Arab Spring (Chenoweth &
Stephan, 2011). These tactics have exposed the illegitimacy of the current structure,
and raised awareness about the many crimes against humanity perpetrated in the War
on Terror.

The Global Justice Movement
The emergence of the Global Justice Movement (GJM) – commonly referred to in
the media as the anti-globalisation movement – has seen a marked change in the way
that non-state actors work to achieve structural change and has played a key role in
harnessing the nonviolent strategies mentioned above. The goal of the GJM is to
achieve change on a global scale, rather than solely a reactionary movement against
globalisation and capitalism (Croeser, 2008). The movement has not taken a
traditional form that organises itself in a hierarchical structure or a horizontal
network. Rather, the GJM is decentralised and comprised of a diverse group of
individuals and organisations that are loosely
organised by a common goal – equality and
justice. For example, Anonymous, which was
mentioned earlier in the chapter, has played a
key role in the GJM.
The initial visibility of the movement took place
in Seattle, when concerns about issues such as
climate change, privatisation, and the actions of
international financial institutions led to massive
protests at the meeting of the World Trade

We are the 99 per cent. We
are getting kicked out of our
homes. We are forced to
choose between groceries
and rent. We are denied
quality medical care. We
are
suffering
from
environmental pollution.
We are working long hours
for little pay and no rights,
if we’re working at all. We
are getting nothing while
the other 1 per cent is
getting everything. We are
the 99 per cent.

(as cited in Northridge,
2012,
p. 585)
Former soldiers and guards from Guantanamo have been extremely
brave
in speaking about what
they witnessed – Chris Arendt, Albert Melise, Brandon Neely, Joseph Hickman and Terry
Holdbrooks included. The Guantanamo Testimonials Project documents some powerful testimony,
http://humanrights.ucdavis.edu/projects/the-guantanamo-testimonials-project/
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Organisation in 1999 (Croeser, 2008). Some scholars saw the protests in Seattle as
the “turning point in the history of social movements” (Croeser, 2008, p. 2). In
Australia, the protests organised against the Asia Pacific Summit of the World
Economic Forum in September 2000, known as s11, became the catalyst of the GJM
to identify as a movement, rather than uncoordinated individuals and organisations
working towards common goals (Humphrys, 2013). Since then, the movement has
gone through ebbs and flows given the varying political contexts.
The networking between the individuals and groups that make up the GJM have
largely taken place through social media and the internet, as these forums have made
organising and networking adaptable and effective. For example, the Occupy
movement manifested in global protests and a coordinated social media campaign
that raised awareness about the unequal social and economic structure which saw the
symbolic rise of the phrase “we are the 99 per cent” (Northridge, 2012, p. 585).
Importantly, the strength of the GJM movement is the decentralisation of power, due
to the inclusive and participatory nature of the movement. Organising tactics are
more commonly inclusive of models that see stability and structure as exceptional
states, and alternatively embrace change as a natural state. Rhizomic networks
(Deleuze & Guattari, 1981), for example, focus on the notion that all individuals and
organisations are connected, just as tree roots that are connected into a bulb (Chia,
1999). Within the tuber, there may be many different organisations and individuals,
but there is no unitary point, and not one specific entry or exit point (Langmans,
2011). The bulbs ripple outwards to network and create more lines of development.
There are shared elements, such as direct actions, slogans, communications and
tactics, and the emphasis is on action and participatory democracy (BougstyMarshall, 2015). When one root is broken or destroyed (e.g. information about
torture is censored due to the intimidation of a whistleblower), the idea of rhizomic
change is that the root will inevitably grow somewhere else on an old or new line
(e.g. an activist will spread information about the censorship over social media).
There is no dominant trunk; instead, a rhizomatic network develops and creates the
capacity to coordinate actions through omnidirectional connections, and offshoots
grow in different directions. For example, a small environmental group may be
engaging in direct action against environmental damage caused by military war
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games, but its actions are effectively contributing to the peace movement and the
work of other anti-war organisations on the other side of the globe by building online
presence and political pressure. This results in the creation of complex systems to
effectively challenge authority, and the weaving of multiple and diverse political
struggles which form a rhizomic movement for change.
The rhizomatic conceptualisation of power also provides the means of challenging
the state in the sense that power is no longer viewed as hierarchical, rather, the
interrelationships between individuals and organisations can be used to coordinate
resistance (Bougsty-Marshall, 2015). The goal of the movement is more action
outside of traditional structures and providing alternative modes of influence.
Movements for global justice and structural change have manifested on all corners of
the globe and these rhizomic networks, along with tactics grounded in nonviolence,
provide guiding principles for the process of change.

Challenges
The move towards structural change requires an acknowledgement of the many
debates and challenges faced when seeking to enact transformation. For instance,
some believe that the idea of radical social change is utopian and could never be
realised. The struggle between realism and idealism has been explored extensively,
without much agreement throughout the years (Stegar, 2003). Indeed, the Thomas
Hobbes (2016) school of thought posits that where you have self-interested
individuals who have different moral codes, they are always drawn into conflict and
fear (Layton, 2006). Hobbes (2016) believed that only way to subvert conflict and
fear is to create an authority that enforces order through coercion. Similarly, the
Machiavellian theoretical lens sees that without laws to govern people they will not
have purpose (Stegar, 2003). Machiavelli (2011) perceived people as inherently lazy
and corrupt, so they need the state or a strong leader to govern and guide them to
virtue. These viewpoints have provided some influence in relation to arguments
surrounding the individual barriers to change. But there are also solid counter
arguments which postulate that even if some individuals are not innately good,
humans are social beings, and therefore cooperation for the common good could
become a natural way of being (Layton, 2006; Perlin, 1979).
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For example, nonviolent methods of resistance have been utilised successfully by
some torture-prevention specific organisations through the mobilisation of different
individuals and sections of the community that are united in their condemnation of
torture. For example, the US group ‘Witness Against Torture’ regularly engages in
protests in front of the White House and ‘fasts for justice’, in order to raise
awareness in the general community about the prisoners in Guantanamo and those
elsewhere who continue to be tortured. Similarly in Australia, ‘The Justice
Campaign’ holds events and engages in social media campaigns that raise awareness
about the plight of torture survivors and has continued to call for accountability.118
These organisations comprise people from many different walks of life, including
barristers, military personnel, politicians, students, scientists, artists, and peace
activists. They also coordinate with other individuals and organisations that form
part of the GJM. The organisation Non-Violent Peace Force has also engaged in
protecting individuals who are effected by violent conflict and has used many of the
methods of resistance outlined above.
But these organisations have faced major social and political barriers, and despite
raising awareness, the limited impact on broader change can be attributable to
several factors. For a start, not enough people have been mobilised to counter the
torture system. The political environment has seen authorities perfect their ability to
use the tactics of inhibiting outrage about torture, so fewer people appear to be
willing to engage. The phenomenon of armchair activism (McConnell, 2012) has
also contributed to citizens clicking online petitions and feeling that this is sufficient
to voice their opposition to torture; however, it has not been enough to bring about
systemic change. Large mobilisations of people are difficult when non–state terrorist
attacks are hyped by governments and the media, and the broader community is in a
state of constant fear.
There are also internal organisational barriers to change. The many different
approaches to advocacy and political affiliations within organisations have led to the
splintering of some sections of the GJM and anti-torture movement. For example,
the use of violence by some anti-statist activists has led to the nonviolent proponents
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disengaging with the GJM movement at some level.119 The lack of consensus and
political disunion in some organisations has also caused some splintering of the
movement. In addition, when connections and networking with other groups have
become inhibited, the movement has inevitably faced significant challenges.
The social barriers to structural change are also significant, and it is certainly
acknowledged that building a movement that promotes nonviolent social change in
the direction of the abolition of the state requires an enormous cultural shift.
However, patterns of behaviour, such as obedience to authority, can be unlearned,
just as they were learned, and nonviolent activists would argue that the community
could unlearn the belief that violence and war are the only means of conflict
resolution. Key to this is cultural and social change and the introduction of
nonviolence as a way of life. Anthropologists and behavioural ecologists have
established the factual basis of John Locke’s (1965) theory which asserts that people
can live without the sovereign, and that humans are essentially rational beings. The
crux of this theory in practice, however, is that those individuals must forgo
immediate selfish goals in order to further support the needs of the community
(Locke, 1965).
Without state sponsorship, certain forms of violence and torture would most likely
still exist, but at a lower level, without legitimation and structural support. It is
postulated that there would be a cultural shift in the way that violence is constructed
on a societal level. To further explain, in the present statist context of Australia and
the US, some forms of violence are seen as legitimate actions of the state and
conflict is seen as inevitably violent. If the ideology of legitimate violence is
removed from day to day rhetoric, and structures do not facilitate violence, it would
be seen as an aberration rather than normalised. It therefore follows that the
likelihood of torture and other systematised violence would be diminished.
Despite the obstacles, the sweeping manifestation of the deep state in a post 9/11
world has inspired the search for a radical and nonviolent response. Whilst the state
exists, so do the mechanisms that support torture and violence, including the regular
military, courts and elected officials. Undermining the state’s pillars of support and
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It must be said, however, that government agents have infiltrated groups and initiated violence at
protests to give activists a negative public image (Lubbers, 2012).
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choosing to not comply with a system that facilitates torture and violence is a
nonviolent approach to this deep-seated structural and social problem. This means
refusing to accept torture in the current structure, and insisting that those responsible
be made accountable.
Professor of rhetoric Judith Hall (2010) eloquently states “We may well be formed
within a matrix of power, but that does not mean we need loyally or automatically
reconstitute that matrix through the course of our lives…” (p. 167). Making the
choice to live peacefully and challenge those systems that inflict suffering on others,
means taking a leap of faith and being brave. Indeed, Hall (2010) suggests “Nonviolence is not a peaceful state, but a social and political struggle to make rage
articulate and effective – the carefully crafted ‘fuck you’” (p. 167). It is a choice to
conform to a system and obey authorities that use violence as a tool of control and
have made violence a norm. As a community, these norms can be changed with a
little time and effort, and it is upon the whole community to ensure the ‘fuck you’ is
done peacefully, thoughtfully, and in a considered and effective way.

Conclusion
This chapter explored some of the strategies that can be employed to counter the
tactics used to inhibit outrage at the injustice of torture. Several countermethods
were outlined including methods that expose torture; validate the survivors and
victims of torture; challenge the reinterpretation techniques of lying, minimising,
blaming and framing; mobilising public support and refusing to be intimidated by
authorities who seek to stifle support for victims and whistleblowers. These methods
have been successfully used in previous situations where blowback against authority
has occurred, such as the beating of Rodney King, and the release of the photos
depicting the torture of prisoners at Abu Ghraib. In the case of Abu Ghraib, the
reputation of the US Government was severely tainted (Gray & Martin, 2007).
However, blowback does not result in justice for the victim.
The success of the countermethods is also dependent on communicating the message
at the right time and when the public is open to receiving the message. Part of this
openness involves the capacity for broader empathy, which has been an ongoing

347

challenge in the political and social environment of the War on Terror, and given the
overarching structure.
Because violence such as torture is structurally embedded and supported through
broad networks and institutions, one way to effectively address the roots of state
inflicted torture would be to abolish the deep state perhaps as part of a transition to
egalitarian alternatives to the state more generally. Methods of nonviolent action are
an effective way of addressing the situation, having been proven to be effective in
removing numerous autocratic and oppressive regimes that engage in torture,
including Gandhi’s satyagraha against British rule over India, and other people
power movements that have taken place in all corners of the world (Chenoweth &
Stephan, 2011).
Promoting nonviolence to bring about structural change is one way to undermine the
capacity of states to engage in torture, and consequently society would be in a
position to restructure itself more equally and in a way that supports peace with
justice. Despite the challenges of enacting broader social change, it is worth striving
for a world that is not reliant on violence and coercion to achieve social and political
goals. In the end, it is a choice whether to conform and accept that torture is a norm
in the War on Terror. The choice is upon all members of the community to comply
with the state, or resist the injustice that it creates.
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Chapter 8: Conclusion
We’re walking straight into 1984… The way things are going there will be a
large group of people in the world who won’t know what freedom is and
therefore won’t have the desire to defend it – Christine Assange, Advocate
and mother of WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange (personal communication,
3 July, 2016).
Torture was not something that ‘just happened’ as those in authority would like the
public to believe. It was not a momentary lapse of judgement, nor the result of just a
few ‘bad apples’. The torture that occurred as part of the War on Terror was
systematic, calculated, cruel, and reached many corners of the world. Using the
façade of national security and the ostensible moral high-ground, Western leaders
not only justified their use of torture, but ignored the disastrous legacy for
individuals, families and the broader community. Torture carried out as part of the
War on Terror should be publicly named for what it is – a form of terrorism.
Using the Backfire Model (Martin, 2007), sometimes termed an Outrage
Management Model, an analysis of Australian newspaper articles spanning 20022012, sought to explore whether there was any evidence indicating that authorities
and the media used tactics to ‘inhibit outrage’ at the injustice of torture in the War on
Terror in Australia. The analysis revealed that authorities and the media engaged in
the widespread use of tactics to reduce outrage in relation to torture including; coverup, devaluing the person, the reinterpretation of events, the use of official channels,
and the intimidation of victims, or reward of people involved in torture. The most
prominent tactics used by authorities are cover-up in the first instance, then
devaluation of the torture survivor or victim, and reinterpreting torture, often in
conjunction with other strategies to reduce outrage.
The methods of inhibiting outrage at injustice were utilised by both the Australian
and US Government, and the mainstream media which, at times, unquestioningly
regurgitated press statements containing fabrications and facilitated propaganda
campaigns. Some exceptional articles over the years condemned torture, and some
journalists pointed out inaccuracies stated by officials, however, these articles were
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largely overshadowed by those which repeated official narratives or published false
and defamatory information. In the early years of the War on Terror, US and
Australian Government officials, as well as their agents, viciously denigrated those
detained in US custody. Despite the absence of evidence or trials, much less
convictions, men, women and children were labelled as terrorists and evildoers who
wanted to do Westerners harm.
The cover-up of torture was also significant and extensive. Authorities went to great
lengths to hide what occurred in US detention facilities, and to those subjected to
extraordinary rendition. This included destroying and removing records, obfuscating
investigations, refusing to release formal reports and preventing independent
oversight. There is evidence to suggest that authorities even removed DNA evidence
from the bodies of men who had been killed at a secret camp in Guantanamo.
Disturbingly, the comprehensive attempt to discredit and devalue the humanity and
experience of the torture victims and survivors was highly effective. Repeatedly,
torture was reinterpreted as ‘not that bad’, and the focus was shifted off the torture,
to the accusations levelled against them, or whether they were guilty or innocent.
Torture survivors/victims were effectively labelled as liars and unworthy of respect
and dignity. Their torture was minimised, degraded and they were cast as deserving
of any ‘mistreatment’ they endured. Torture victims’ testimony was discredited even
before it was heard; and even when it was heard, it was cast aside as ‘tall tales’ or
‘delusions’, particularly if payment was involved, or if survivors chose to publish
books rather than go through mainstream journalists.
Similarly, the US and Australian Government’s and their agents reinterpreted events
to suit their own political agendas. Innocuous terms such as ‘enhanced
interrogation’, a ‘dunk in the water’ and ‘single celled occupancy’ were used by
officials in order to minimise and reframe torture. There is evidence that the US,
British and Australian Government’s shared speaking points and otherwise hid or
disguised the perpetration of torture, and their involvement, in a methodical,
coordinated and systematic way. The issue of torture was framed in the public realm
as relevant only to the extent of whether the person was guilty or innocent and hence,
whether they deserved to be treated in that manner. The focus of the articles was the
accusations levelled at the victims/survivors, rather than the crimes against humanity
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perpetrated against them. The Australian media largely reported official statements
as news, and largely failed to question the details or veracity of the official
statements.
Official channels were also employed in order to minimise and inhibit outrage.
Numerous investigations were ordered into allegations of ‘mistreatment’, however,
the investigations were largely useless and typically conducted by those who were
either accused of partaking in torture, had links to the government or those accused
of perpetrating torture, or were involved in the cover-up. In Australia, the only
investigation into the detention of one Australian held in Guantanamo completely
narrowed the scope of its investigation to the treatment he endured outside the
custody of the US Government, and the final report was censored. The other
Australians did not even get that far. Even responses to FOI requests have been used
to present the façade of transparency, when in reality, those involved in the torture
program continue to censor documents, or prevent them from being released on
technicalities, such as State Secrets, or national security grounds. The courts have
also provided little, if any, relief for victims and survivors.
Numerous examples demonstrate the lengths that Australian and US Government
officials and their agents went to in order to intimidate prisoners who wanted to
challenge their treatment. It was apparent that successive court cases, which lasted
for years, and attempts to deny the public’s ability to hear torture testimonies, was
used as another means of stifling outrage. Blatant intimidation included a US
Government imposed gag-order on David Hicks, the use of control orders and the
attempted prosecution of those who had given interviews about the extent of their
torture. Torture whistleblowers have also been targeted. Former Guantanamo guards
have been threatened and subjected to blatant discrimination due to their
outspokenness about what they saw and heard. They have been labelled as traitors
for speaking out. Whistleblowers such as Chelsea Manning have been held in
oppressively cruel conditions and prosecuted for disclosing the truth about torture.
Former CIA agents and government officials such as Edward Snowden, John
Kiriakou and Craig Murray were subjected to a number of tactics in order to
discredit them, including being labelled as criminals by US, UK and Australian
Government authorities.
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Meanwhile, those who were involved in the US torture program and those in
Australia who were involved in the cover-up, have been rewarded and promoted into
higher positions of power and influence. Some have been shuffled from one
department to another, or into private contractor roles in order to continue exerting
their influence. Indeed, officials who ordered torture have been open about their
involvement in war crimes, yet have been provided with diplomatic immunity, and
enjoy comfortable taxpayer-funded retirements. The contrast is striking.
The tactics of outrage management employed by officials and the media were
therefore effective, and blowback only occurred in a few situations, most notably,
when the photos depicting the torture of prisoners at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq.
Overall however, the tactics were successful in protecting those at the top.
The more disturbing element to arise from this research is the emergence of a broad
structural network that not only supports the use of torture, but aids in its cover-up.
Elements of the torture support structure work synchronously to carry out
ideological, economic, practical or political functions. The politics of terrorism
served as ideological support for the perpetration of torture, and was used as a
political tool to capitalise on fear and cause division. The reluctance to call far-right
murderers terrorists, compared to their Middle Eastern counterparts was described,
and the targeting of certain minority communities was used as a diversionary tactic
to shift attention off state inflicted violence and structural issues. This is intimately
related to the legitimisation of certain types of violence, whether at the hands of the
state in war, or through the torture of those they deem terror suspects. Although the
anti-torture stance is predominately assumed by those to the left of the political
spectrum, it was evident that both sides of politics have served to legitimise torture
in one way or another. Using torture and terrorism as a political tool has only served
to further divide and shift focus off the important issues relating to torture.
The notion of the deep and shallow state is a useful concept in understanding the two
operating systems that are apparent in the War on Terror, and the practical and
economic support provided to the torture support network. The shallow state consists
of elected government and other institutions such as courts, and the deep state is a
system that does not respond to civilian leadership, and is mostly comprised of
intelligence agencies, military contractors and private corporations. Since 9/11,
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torture was used as an instrument of the deep state, through covert operations such as
the extraordinary rendition program and extrajudicial assassinations. The secrecy and
lack of accountability are hallmarks of the operations of the deep state, and this is
exemplified by the covert torture programs that have taken place since 9/11. This
relates to the link between the state and the surge in the use of private military and
security companies as part of the rise of militarism. The incestuous links between
private military contractors, politicians and the media present a disturbing picture of
the level of collusion between institutions, and an understanding of systematic nature
of torture and its cover-up.
The establishment of mass surveillance systems as another manifestation of the deep
state was also explored as a tool that aided in the tactics of preventing outrage at
torture and its cover-up. The revelations of Edward Snowden and WikiLeaks have
exemplified the far-reaching implications of the mass surveillance and intelligence
webs that are now functioning globally. Consequently, the targeting of
whistleblowers has also been significant as a result of the torture and war crimes that
were exposed. The use of PSYOPS and expansion of cyber-warfare was also
illustrated, along with the shift towards remote warfare rather than hand-to-hand
combat, which facilitates new human rights abuses. The lines have been blurred
between winning hearts and minds and manipulating audiences to believing certain
events are taking place. The use of US military funded software that creates false
online personas to counter dissent has been one of the overarching tactics to support
the minimisation of outrage at the injustice of torture.
Given this broad reaching and devastating situation, the countermethod tactics that
formed part of the Backfire Model (Martin, 2007) were presented as a means of
addressing torture including; exposing information about the injustice, validating the
targets of injustice, interpreting the events as unjust, mobilising public support and
either avoiding or discrediting official channels and refusing to be intimidated and
exposing the intimidation (p. 7). These tactics have been useful in countering the
vast use of outrage minimising tactics used by authorities, including the blowback as
a result of the release photos depicting torture at Abu Ghraib.
Nevertheless, given that the structure serves to maintain the current order which
legitimises state-inflicted violence, and supports systems of torture and cover-up, one
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option to address this would be to abolish the state – the goal being a society based
on egalitarianism and nonviolence such as Gandhi’s anarchist sarvodaya. It is
essential that the process of change must be grounded in nonviolence, utilising the
tactics of noncompliance which have already been established as effective in several
people-power movements over the years. It is recognised that structural change is a
challenge, particularly given the political and social environment and reliance on the
structure of the modern state. Regardless of these debates, a radical approach in
relation to torture prevention is essential. Concerted efforts to disobey the current
torture facilitating system are the only way to remove the pillars of support for
torture. Only when individuals turn their allegiance to each other rather than the
state, will the possibility of a torture-free world ever be possible.
The implications of this research are therefore significant. The collusion between
media, government and those who operate outside the political and legal structure,
and without oversight, results in torture being legitimised and supported. The
network of support for torture theorised in the research may also be applied to other
contexts of state-inflicted political violence, such as genocide. For example, the same
methods have been employed as a tool to perpetrate torture and genocide in a
number of state-enacted conflicts around the world, such as South America and in
some African nations. In addition, it is clear that the state has become skilled at
hiding its activities through the use of ‘clean torture’ that leaves no physical marks,
and the network created to facilitate and cover-up the criminal actions of the state.
The use of political violence by non-state actors (conventionally called terrorism)
has only served to legitimise the counter-violence of the state, and indeed, the cycle
appears to be endless.
But what does this leave for those who have been tortured as part of the War on
Terror? There is little justice for someone who has been tortured. When reflecting on
his torture in CIA black sites, Australian torture victim and survivor, Joseph Thomas,
remarked, “They took everything from me. My dignity was stripped; I was used,
torn, humiliated, lied about and smeared. Nothing they will ever do can give back
what they took from me; nothing will ever change what they did” (personal
communication, 12 September, 2015). Behind all of the newspaper headlines,
official remarks and court cases discussed in this thesis are the harrowing
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experiences of people whose lives have been forever stained, and many are still
suffering. The collective destruction of their memory and experience as a result of
widespread denial is public and painful. The reality is that whilst the state, and
agents of the state, perpetrate and cover-up their crimes against humanity, it is the
victims who are left with the personal legacy of torture.
Yet, this legacy does not end with the victims/survivors. It is inevitably the broader
public that choose to endorse, accept or resist the torture system that was used to
destroy so many lives, and extinguish the many any freedoms that have taken years
to establish. Torture is one of the most vicious forms of human cruelty, and change
will only occur if enough people join together and resist.
In the end, we will remember not the words of our enemies,
but the silence of our friends – Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. (1986).

Figure 23- Artwork entitled ‘Guantanamo’ (Source: Latuff, 2013)
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Postscript
I would bring back a hell of a lot worse than waterboarding… – Republican
Presidential nominee Donald Trump (as cited in McCarthy, 2016).
Since the bulk of analysis in this thesis was written, a number of events have
occurred that are worth mentioning. A US election is to be held in a few months, and
whilst the hype over election promises are front and centre in the media, questions
still remain about what outgoing President Obama will do with the 61 men left in
Guantanamo. Former and current prisoners’ experience of torture continues to be
discredited by officials. In June 2016, the latest revelations of torture and illtreatment saw a US military commander state publicly that “There was no need to
investigate it. We didn’t deem it was credible” (as cited in Johnson, 2016).
Meanwhile, Congress has blocked transfers by passing legislation that prohibits
Obama from releasing any more prisoners (Demirjian, 2016). However, Congress
have allowed funds to carry out repairs in Guantanamo, so it is clear that the torture
facility is set to remain open for years to come. It is still unclear as to why Obama
does not use his authority to veto the National Defense Authorisation Act (USA) and
close Guantanamo regardless of Congress blocking funds. He has the authority to do
so, he signed an executive order in 2009, he just chooses not to.
The US Military Commissions are still in the process of holding so-called ‘trials’ for
men in Guantanamo and some embedded US journalists are continuing to parrot US
Government propaganda by calling them ‘war courts’, as if they hold some
legitimacy (Rosenberg, 2016). Men who have been subjected to torture, cruel,
inhuman and degrading treatment are still being prevented from clearing their names
in a fair system that precludes the use of evidence obtained under torture or
‘coercion’. David Nevin, an attorney for some of those accused of involvement in
9/11, has accused Judge Col. James Pohl, of being involved in destroying evidence
after he granted an order that allowed the prosecution to destroy classified evidence
crucial to reconstruct his client’s torture (Eakin, 2016).
Under the Military Commissions Act 2009 (USA), a “no name motion” allowed the
prosecution to apply to the Commission to grant the US Government permission to
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destroy evidence related to a CIA black site that was used in the torture of several
‘high-value’ prisoners (Garcia, 2016). It was also revealed that the FBI had tried to
infiltrate defence teams to build ‘informant’ relationships, and Judge Pohl ruled that
he did not think this posed a conflict of interest (Froelich, 2015). Military
Commission hearing audio feeds have been muted by the CIA when any discussion
of torture or the CIA rendition programme has occurred (Schwartz, 2016). US
officials are still trying to prevent those subjected to torture from testifying in
Military Commissions proceedings (Pitter, 2016), whilst at the same time petitioning
the Commission to allow 9/11 victim’s family members to testify prior to the ‘trial’
even starting, even before guilt or innocence is established (Feldman, 2016).
Commissions have been marred with ongoing injunctions and prohibitions
preventing prisoners and defence lawyers from discussing torture (Ledermen, 2015).
If these trials had been held in article three courts on the US mainland, they would
have concluded by now; instead they are only at pre-trial stage, almost 17 years after
the event.
Lawyers defending the men are also under increasing pressure after the military
pushed for new rules seeking that their legal representatives live at the prison camp
for the duration of trials, which can last years (Huffman, 2016). One legal advisor for
a Guantanamo prisoner has sought whistleblowers status after being removed from
Guantanamo for reporting three officers for defying a court order (Huffman, 2016).
Guantanamo is still a dangerous place for whistleblowers.
The situation in relation to the treatment of men in Guantanamo is desperate. Men
have been protesting their treatment in the form of a long-term hunger strike. A core
group of around 12 men have refused food, one man, Mohammed Ghulam Rabbani
is in his 11th year of hunger striking (Ryan, 2016). To encourage the men to eat,
reports suggest that they are left strapped to what was described by the manufacturer
as a ‘padded cell on wheels’, for extended periods, and forcibly tube fed. Force
feeding entails a tube being forced up the nose, and down into the stomach. The
procedure is conducted without anaesthetic, and has been described as amounting to
torture by the World Medical Association, amongst others (Marion, 2014).
Documents obtained under US FOI legislation demonstrate that the medical restraint
of prisoners has been used as punishment for those who refuse to eat (Kaye, 2014e).
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Although the military has recorded the numbers of force-fed prisoners, they refuse to
release them to the public. Those who have seen recordings of the force-feeding have
said that they were so disturbing they found it hard to sleep. 120 However, it is now
formal US policy to prevent the public from knowing the true numbers of hunger
strikers in order to curb any favourable support for prisoners (Leopold, 2013).
Despite the media blackout ordered by US authorities, it is clear that some people
detained in Guantanamo continue to participate in an ongoing hunger strike in order
to protest their treatment (Leopold, 2013). The UN Special Rapporteur on Torture is
still being denied unrestricted access to Guantanamo. Juan Mendez has repeatedly
sought access to the detention facility over the years, however, the US Government
continues to prevent him from having private, unmonitored access to prisoners
(Pitter, 2016).
After a long fight, Guantanamo prisoner Mohamedou Slahi published a best-selling
account of his time in Guantanamo (Slahi, 2015). The account is nothing less than
harrowing, but at least the public have the chance to read a firsthand account of his
torture and time in Guantanamo. Even though Slahi has been cleared for release, he
is still languishing in Guantanamo (Ackerman, 2016).
Whilst more and more information has been leaked to the media, there is still a
concerted effort to hide torture. Former Guantanamo guard Joseph Hickman wrote a
disturbing and powerful book about the events he witnessed in Guantanamo,
including the deaths of the three men that were labelled by the US Government as
suicides (Hickman, 2015). He has paid a high price for speaking out, and remains a
target for those who want to discredit any allegations of US Government
misconduct. Chelsea Manning, the heroic US army intelligence operative who
released evidence of war crimes to WikiLeaks, is still languishing in Fort
Leavenworth prison and, in July 2016, tried to take her own life (Free Chelsea
Manning, 2016).
Former guards still tell me how their jobs are regularly placed in jeopardy because
they have spoken out against Guantanamo, and spoken up for the victims of torture.
120

One man, Ahmed Rabbani, who has been held without charge for over a decade, contracted a chest
infection which in-turn caused him to vomit blood. Rabbani described them repeating the procedure
on him, although it left him “screaming in pain” (Marion, 2014, p. 1).
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But it is the personal cost that never makes it to the media. I have had long
conversations with former military personnel who are wracked with addiction, have
taken out their PTSD on their loved ones, and who are suffering because of what
they have seen, and sometimes done. It will take a number of years for the full extent
of the damage to be known and if history repeats itself, those who sit in their offices
ordering and covering up atrocities, will come out unscathed whilst everyone else
suffers in silence.
Several court cases concerning rendition and torture in the US have been dismissed
on the grounds that judicial precedent prevents cases from being heard in US courts,
or because of immunity provisions. The ACLU filed a case on behalf of Amir
Meshal who was rendered from Kenya to Somalia and Ethiopia before being
returned to his family in 2007 without being charged with a crime (ACLU, 2016c).
Although the case was dismissed, it is being appealed to the US Supreme Court. A
lawsuit brought by four Iraqi men against CACI, the private military contractor that
tortured them at a hard site in Afghanistan, was dismissed in 2009. Similarly, a class
action lawsuit on behalf of prisoners who were tortured at Abu Ghraib prison against
CACI and Titan Corporation (Saleh, et.al. v. Titan, et.al.), was dismissed in 2011 on
the grounds of “battlefield pre-emption” and because claims of torture could not be
brought against private contractors because they are not ‘state actors’ (The Center for
Consitutional Rights, 2011).
After years of litigation, a lawsuit against Adel Nakhala and L-3 Services (formerly
Titan Corporation, now Engility), a private security contractor was settled. The CCR
filed the complaint on behalf of 72 men from Iraq who were subjected to “horrifying
acts of torture at the hands of these contractors and certain government conspirators”
(The Center for Consitutional Rights, 2012, para.1). The men were subjected to
“rape, threats of rape and other forms of sexual violence; electric shocks; forced
nudity; hooding; isolated detention; and being urinated on” (The Center for
Constitutional Rights, 2012, para. 3). One of the men witnessed a fourteen year old
boy being forcibly held down by Adel Nakhala, he was then brutally raped with a
toothbrush. Despite this, the private contractors have never been held to account in a
criminal setting.
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After years of legal battles in US courts to hold Blackwater contractors to account, in
October 2014, a federal jury in Washington DC finally convicted some of the
contractors for the Nisour Square massacre. Blackwater guard Nicholas Slatten was
found guilty of first-degree murder, and Paul Slough, Evan Liberty and Dustin Heard
were found guilty of voluntary manslaughter (Scahill, 2014). It is unlikely that they
will ever spend a day in prison however, as their lawyers are appealing the decision.
The Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR) continues its fight for accountability in
Europe where it has filed a complaint on behalf of 12 torture victims in Germany
under the universal jurisdiction principle (The Center for Consitutional Rights,
2014). The case asks the German prosecutor to criminally prosecute high ranking
officials in the Bush Administration for ordering war crimes (The Center of
Constitutional Rights, 2014). The torture victims in this case were held at sites in
Iraq and Guantanamo. The case is yet to be decided. The CCR has started several
cases under the universal jurisdiction principle in Spain, Switzerland and Canada.
Lithuania and Romania also have trials pending at the European Court of Human
Rights over their role in the CIA rendition program ("Guantanamo prisoners taking
Lithuania to ECHR over suspected CIA detention centre", 2016). The case is yet to
be heard, and it is unlikely to resolve soon given the delays employed by these
governments to stifle outrage. Whilst the European Court of Human Rights found the
Polish Government guilty of hosting a CIA prison on its soil, it is appealing the
decision in order to delay having to openly declare its involvement (Lowe, 2014).
The case has already been running for six years.
In April 2016, a US federal judge ruled that two psychologists, Bruce Jessen and
James Mitchell, could be sued for their role in the CIA torture program (Watt, 2016).
This was a landmark decision for torture survivors, as the psychologists involved in
the program have been largely left unaccountable prior to this decision. The case has
been brought by Suleiman Abdullah Salim, Mohamed Ben Soud and the family of
Gul Rahman, who died whilst in CIA custody in Afghanistan. Time will only tell
whether or not they will be successful in holding those complicit in their torture, and
in Rahman’s death, to account, though the Backfire Model suggests it is unlikely.
More documents released in the US point to intelligence agencies holding people in
US custody, even when they knew they were never involved in terrorism (ACLU,
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2016a). The CIA released a cache of documents under FOI in June 2016 that
demonstrate the deplorable treatment and torture of Khaled El-Masri, a German
citizen who was disappeared, tortured and held for over four months before being
released as a result of “mistaken identity” (Dakwar, 2016). Included in the
documents was a “death report” on Gul Rahman that detailed his treatment including
being placed in diapers to “humiliate the prisoner for interrogation purposes”, or they
are left in their cells naked (ACLU, 2016, para. 4-5).
Transcripts of Guantanamo prisoners graphically describing their torture were also
released to the ACLU in 2016. Obtained after a seven year battle with US
authorities, the documents contain testimony from Abu Zubaydah, who the US
Government admitted they were mistaken in their assessment of him as a top alQaeda operative, and who has been held without charge since 2002. The first-person
account of his torture at the hands of US agents released is harrowing and includes
details about being waterboarded, shackled to a board and a chair naked and in
freezing temperatures, being beaten, and being placed in what he called a dog box
which was two and a half feet long, wide and high (Bonner, 2016). In one document
Abu Zubaydah recounts:
They shackle me completely, even my head: I can’t do anything. Like this
and they put on cloth in my mouth and they put water, water, water. Last
point before I die they stand [via language analyst] bed they make like this
[make breathing noises] again and again and they make it with me and I tell
him ‘If you want to kill me, kill me (ACLU, 2016b, para.5).
Not one official has been held to account for any of this.
JSOC and other Special Forces personnel continue to get away with torture and
murder – literally. A report by Jeremy Scahill notes that an internal US Defense
Department investigation found that the killing of Afghan children and pregnant
women was an “appropriate” use of force (Scahill, 2016). The use of official
channels and investigations that seldom hold anyone to account, and attempt to give
the appearance of justice, continue to pervade the military landscape.
The Obama Administration released supposed numbers of people killed by drones,
or what they term ‘kinetic’ strikes. The Administration claims that between 64 and
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116 people have been assassinated by drones so far, however, those numbers exclude
deaths in Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria (Shah, 2016). Human rights groups however
have claimed that these numbers are a gross distortion of reality given the evidence
from people on the ground (Shah, 2016). It was also recently revealed that Hillary
Clinton, the Democratic nominee for the upcoming US election, was ordering drone
strikes in Pakistan from her mobile phone (Priyadarshi, 2016). It has been reported
that the FBI has emails in its possession that point to CIA drone strikes that are
responsible for killing hundreds of people, including 200 children. Given the lack of
accountability for any officials, it is unlikely that she or anyone in the
Administration will be held to account for the murders.
More information continues to come to light about the FBI setting people up to
commit terrorist acts in the US. According to Aaronson (2013), nearly half of cases
between November 2001 and 2010 involved informants with criminal backgrounds.
Aaronson (2013) also revealed that the FBI has preyed on the mentally ill and people
with intellectual disabilities and tried to coax them into committing terrorist acts. It
was also revealed in 2016 that Omar Mateen, the man who shot and killed 49 people
in an Orlando gay and lesbian nightclub, was also unsuccessfully lured by the FBI
into committing a terrorist act three years prior (Rodriguez, 2016). The question
remains whether Mateen would have carried out the murders if he did not have the
idea implanted in his mind. Coincidently, Mateen worked for the mega security firm
G4S, which once operated in Guantanamo (Shen, 2016).
Mamdouh Habib is the only Australian who was subjected to torture in the War on
Terror to have a limited investigation opened into his case and to be compensated.
The remaining former prisoners are left with the long-term scars of torture, both
physically and psychologically. The Australian Government is yet to hold an
investigation into its involvement in torture that occurred to its citizens, and it is
unlikely to occur given the political situation.
The Turnbull Government has introduced a fifth tranche of counter-terrorism laws in
Australia, some of which propose the indefinite imprisonment of individuals
convicted of terrorism related offences (Owens, 2016). Turnbull said “the existence
of post-sentence preventative detention as a measure will serve as a real incentive for
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those imprisoned for terrorist offences to reform” and that he thought the measures
were “proportionate” (as cited in Owens, 2016).
The heavy redactions of documents continue to remain an issue for those seeking
information under FOI laws. The FOI requests I have submitted over the past ten
years have been met with constant delays. I am still waiting for documents relating
to torture that the office of Prime Minister and Cabinet have sought to censor for
around five years. The Department of Defence (DoD) continues to block FOI
requests into 4 Squadron and JSOC’s activities on Australian soil on ‘national
security’ grounds. The DoD will not even confirm the existence of documents. After
several internal reviews, and the case being passed to the Information
Commissioner’s office, as of July 2016, it is being appealed before the
Administrative Appeals Tribunal in Sydney. Interestingly, I have had more success
in obtaining documents from the US. I have several cases for documents pending
against the CIA, FBI, State Department, Department of Defense, and the Department
of Justice and, little by little, more is being released. Ironically, I have found out
more about the Australian Government’s role in the detention and treatment of
prisoners from the US, than the Australian Government. I cannot help but consider
that FOI laws are just used as another way to give the appearance of justice and
transparency.
The people of Iraq, other parts of the Middle East and the horn of Africa are
continuing to deal with the rise of ISIS. Disturbingly, the founder of the so-called
‘Islamic State’ was held in the US torture facility Camp Bucca in Iraq in the years
prior to the rise of the violent organisation, and its members subsequently dressed
their Western victims in Guantanamo-style orange jumpsuits, and used CIA torture
techniques on them before executing them (Queally, 2014). This is a graphic
illustration of blowback from torture.
Sadly, over a decade on from 9/11, families remain broken, and no one has any sense
of justice. The legacy of state and non-state terrorism remains.
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